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Piagetian theory" 'and. previous research suggest that the child
"below school age is severely handicapped in his verbal communication
by egocentrism. This is said to be revealed by a speaker's inability
to perceive the listener's rol© attributes. Investigations of the
communicative abilities of children between throe and five years were
still considered feasible and some of Piaget's own findings and those
of others are cited in justification. In particular, tasks should be
within the known ability range of young children and should take
advantage of a child's preference for active participation in a concrete
situation.
Recent theories of semantic development emphasising the importance
of context were believed to be relevant to the proposed research which
had six main aims: (1) To assess the communication abilities of pre¬
school children in a discrimination task. (2) To determine the types
of strategies used, successful or otherwise, in the roles of speaker and
listener. (3) To break down the communication process into it3
constituent skills and to discover the ability level of children engaged
in tasks designed to measure these skills, (4) To test one aspect of
the egocentric hypothesis by providing the child with a partner' whom he
would recognise as inferior in knowledge end ability (a talking doll).
(5) To establish some parameters of the effects of context or extra-
linguistic factors (e.g. type of material) on 3peech production and
comprehension. (6) To develop a technique for investigating thinking in
the young child by having one child instruct another in a conceptual
problem.
The sample was confined to 30 children in all, attending a research
nursery. This allowed the long term development and establishment of
effective methods and t he use of techniques such as a talking doll.
Kxtonsive U3e was made of videotape equipment in preparing experimental
procedures and assessing performance. A necessary consequence of the
sampling conditions was that a full measure of control was not always
possible. The basic task had two participants, facing each other across
a table* one acting as speaker and the other as listener. Each player
had tho same collection of objects (screened from the other's view)
which differed on certain features within sets. The speaker's task uns
to describe the objects one by one so that the listener could identify
them from hio set in the order reported. Experiments were conducted with
a child communicating with a poor* an adult and a talking doll. Tasks
varioci along a dimension of concreieness of differentiating features
and the number of alternatives from which the specified iters had to be
discriminated. In relation to tho ados outlined the findings were as
follows: (1) As communicators pre-school children were some way short
of competence but considerably more accomplished than previous theory
and findings predicted. A significant proportion of children wore
consistently able to produce messages sufficiently adequate to specify
an intended referent. Effectiveness declined with more abstract material
and was significantly correlated with the number of alternatives
available. The improvement on previous findings was thought to be ..ue
to the use of more sensitive measures of communication ability and to
more representative tasks. (2) Qualitative analysis roveclod that
differentiating fo tuxes tended to be reported first and that irrelevant
information dropped amy with ago.but number of features reported did not
correspond to an ideal strategy. Listeners were seen to be a major cause
of communication fcdluro by not providing feedback and by acting
independently in an unproductive fashion. (3) Two skills involved, in
these tasks wore perceptions of differentiating feeturos and conservation
of amount and identity. The latter wen shocai to be absent under certain
conditions .idle judgements 0f differences tended to bo governed by the
salioncy of features for individual subjects. Some relevant findings
were reported in the area of conservation of number and acquisition of
relational terms. Paired with an adult listener providing feedback,
children as speakers showed they were far from egocentric in modifying
messages. Paired with en adult speaker providing minimally adequate
(non-redundant) messages children achieved a high level of discrimination
success, (4) The findings indicated that an absolutist position on
egocentrism must be rejected. It was better to consider it as a long
term developmental phenomenon involving limitations of perception, cognition
and language, rather than, as a unitary construct confined to cne age period,
Attentional factors were thought to bo especially important for the
listeners failures who were seen as the main cause of communication
breakdown. (5) Many specific effects of context on communication wore
reported. It seemed that there were two broad aspects. One was related
to the properties of materials which captured attention and therefore
affected object choice and the features reported by speakers; it also
contributed to comprehension difficulties when listeners relied on
non-linguistic strategies for determining the meaning of utterances. The
second was the effect of context as a '.Thole on the construction of
messages and showed that even young children take account of the intended
referent in relation to the perceived alternatives, (6) Children made
good instructors in a conceptual problem as long as the task material did
not require the use of abstract instructions. Then the task became
demanding, speech tended to dry up, with obvious consequences for the
listener. The advantage of this technique for investigating thinking was
that the child was encouraged to make explicit the strategies vised in
solving problems. It was suggested that tasks providing an even more active
role for the players, and malting the perceived goal more explicit, would



















Communication Ability in a Picture Discrimination Task
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"■Then I_ use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less,"
(Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 1871)
"I know what I meant to say".
(Richard. M, Nixon, U.S. Television Broadcast, April 50, 1974)
If we all possessed the supreme egotism of Kumpty Bumpty, it is
doubtful if language would survive long. Although Humpty prided
himself on lucid speech, because he chose words to mean what he wmrfced
than to mean, without taking account of others, he was essentially in a
verbal vacuum - a talking machine unable or unwilling to adapt to the
demands or conventions of the remainder of the speaking community. Some
have likened the young child to Humpty IXuapty in this respect, but before
embarking on that issue, it is worth considering for a moment what is
normally regarded as the day to day use of language.
Language has been called a species specific behaviour of man.
(Lenneberg, 1969)- and the prime function of language is communication.
Unfortunately language is not the perfect tool for this purpose, and
although it is frequently assisted by gestures, facial expressions and
the like, as well as the prosodic features like tone and stress, there
remains a large margin for error in transmission of information from one
individual, to another. There is, for example, the situation expressed
in the second quotation above, of having one's meaning construed in a
different manner from that intended or claimed. Leaving aside the
particular ca3e, a failure to communicate adequately is a regular
occurrence for most of us. The consequences may v;iry from bafflement,
annoyance or possibly amusement, to the downright disastrous.
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And yet -are manage fairly well with this imperfect instrument.
One of the reasons we do, is that apart from the aids to communication
mentioned above, there are two other important contributions. If the
discussion is confined to spoken communication, these are (i) the fact
that dialogue takes place in a context, a reality, and this context will
very often help to determine the nature of speech when simple reliance
on the verbal utterance may give rise to confusion, and (ii) that
communication is a dynamic process involving at least two participants.
If we take the reality component first, this practically always plays
some part. .hen someone says 'There's nothing I like more than a good
novel', as he puts down a book by Mickey Spillane, we are able to conclude
something about that person's taste in literature. The remark may have
been made sarcastically, of course, but discounting any evidence to the
contrary, we would normally assume such a sentence to refer, in good
faith, to the book that had been put down. A statement like, 'Can I have
another one?* night give rise to a great deal of difficulty without the
situation to aid interpretation. If the speaker was holding out an
empty glass then one would infer that he wanted another drink. If,
however, one was an attendant in a Turkish Bath and the speaker was a
particularly 1urge man, one might think he was asking for a second towel.
An even more valuable means of determining the meaning of a spokon
utterance, should there be any doubt, is to ask for an expansion. I.tost
everyday discourse has people playing two simultaneous roles, those of
speaker and listener. Frequently the speaker will invite a reply from
his listener and he will certainly expect, unless a tyrant, to be asked
to say what he means if the listener is not clear about something. Thus
the response to 'Can I have another one?* might be 'Sweet or dry?', or
'Another what?'. A modification of the original request by the first
speaker should then lead to a satisfactory outcone for that small
episode of dialogue.
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Underlying all this behaviour is the foundation on which we assume
it is built. This is that communication is purposive. When someone says
something to us we assume he has something to sa.y. liven if what he says
is a substitute for something- else, as in the euphimistic cliche, ' /ould
you like to come and see my etchings?', or a device for keeping the
conversation going like 'Did you really?', vie nevertheless recognise,
or unconsciously assume, some intent. At the last resort, when all other
appendages to the communication process have failed to enlighten us, we
will continue to try to discover what the speaker means because we
believe he would not be talking to us if there was not something that he
wished us to know.
Now although the above sketch of the communication process may
require assumptions concerning man as a rational being which are not
justified, the outline does not violate reality unduly. But where it
might be said to present an unrealistic picture would be if applied to
the language behaviour of young children. This is basically because many
of the elements which enable the social purpose of language to function
reasonably smoothly are acquired skills. And here one is not referring,
primarily, to the command of language itself but to the associated
factors which, it has been argued, make verbal understanding between
people possible. It will be the purpose of the research to be reported
to define as precisely as possible what these factors are, some of whixh
have already been described in very broad terms. Having defined thou,
the hope will be to investigate their existence, genesis and utility in
children between three mid five years of age.
Before continuing in this endeavour, a word should be said about
the wider rationale behind these studies. The facility of being able to
transmit perceptions, thoughts mid feelings to our fellow men is something
we usually take for granted. Yet when we encounter those who are unable
ho firtinv tin b rm+.nral human aM H+.v. boof iipin of onroo nhvfii nnl or mwrrfcnl
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impairment, we realise what a profound loss they suffer. C-ranted we
have the ability, it is important that we understand it and make it our
valuable servant, for though it may seem hackneyed to say so, it is
nevertheless the case that a great many of our ills are due to failures
of communication, They may be on the grand scale as when nations seom
unable to agree on apparently simple goals, or they may be as trivial
as not understandiiig the instructions for opening a tin of sardines.
The area of particular interest i3 education. Communication is often
coupled with education as the twin panaceas which will, given time,
solve our social problems. As slogans they are harmful, because they
can become a substitute for action. But if we can discover better
methods for promoting understanding, for nurturing the desire for know¬
ledge which someone has said is also species specific to us (Piaget 1971)»
then the smallest contribution is worth while.
A difficulty in providing background to the research being
undertaken, is that there is little empirical work and even less theory
which can be directly related to it, Prc-school children have not been
considered a productive group in which to investigate coramunication.
Nevertheless the tradition from .vhich it arises can be seen more clearly,
Piaget*s pioneer work in the 1920*s is first reviewed because it has had
a considerable influence, not all of it desirable, on the direction
research has taken. Vygotsky is another figure who has had an impact on
the field and the implications of the work of both Piaget and Vygotsky
will be made explicit. Plavell, together with a group of co-workers,
has developed a model of communication behaviour derived from Piaget,
Vygotsky ,md Head. This, as well as some empirical v/ork by his team,
will be considered. The other mayor series of existing studies are those
by : rauss and Glucksbergj these are also assessed. On the basis of this
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evidence, and that from certain other sources, justifications for the research
to he presented will he given. It is also necessary to give some
indication of the theoretical hias governing the research, in particular
in the area of me. uing, which is intimately related to communication.
■There will he no mention here, however, of communication theory,
the branch of psychology which has sought to provide a formal mathematical
account of the transmission of information. It will become evident that
the extent of the empirical knowledge is as yet insufficient to justify
such an approach, lor is the work on communication networks, begun
by Bales (1950)♦ appropriate to these studies. The model developed by
Maelay and Newman (1960), derived from communication studies with adults,
may be applied to children's behaviour with profit, but the approach
taken here has been a different one. (see Chapter 2).
Much of the interest in the role of language in the young child's
cognitive development has been stimulated by Piaget's early work, 'The
Language and Thought of the Child*, originally published in 1925 and in
English in 1926 (5rd edition, 1959). Somewhat ironically Piaget has since
become noted as an exponent of the minimal part played by language in the
development of thought. Nevertheless it is important to begin with a
consideration of this pioneer work, since it has strongly influenced subsequent
research in this field.
The work has been much criticised, particularly by research workers in
the inter-war period who failed to find the volume of egocentric speech in
children's spontaneous conversations which Piaget had reported. Egocentric
speech is defined as speech where the child "does not bother to know to
whom he is speaking nor vdiether he is being listened to" (Piaget, 1959, p. 9).
In contrast to the normal communicative form, socialised speech, egocentric
speech is language which does not take account of
6
the listener, Piaget claimed that even for six year olds it made up
40 per cent of spontaneous language recorded, McCarthy (1954) reviewed
the studies which followed up those of Piaget and the general conclusion
was that egocentric speech was very much loss prevalent than Piaget had
indicated, Piaget answered hi3 critics and published fresh data in an
additional chapter to 'The Language and Thought of the Child' (1959),
His conclusions were as follows;
"starting from its initial stage, during which it no doubt exceeds
three-quarters of total speech (without, however, at any time
coinciding with speech a3 a whole), egocentric speech, between the
ages of three to six, passes through a serai-stationary phase during
which it gradually decreases while at the same time it fluctuates
bet ween half nnd one-third of the total amount of speech; after the
age of 7» egocentric speech tends to decrease to les3 than one-
quarter of the totality of spontaneous speech." (piaget, 1959» p. 257)•
These proportions are important since egocentric speech is
equivalent to non-comrramicating speech. But if half is non-socialised,
what about the other half? The other half is made up of two categories,
dialogues and questions. Dialogues include discussions, information,
criticism, orders and so on. The precise proportions of these categories
is difficult to establish from the figures presented by Piaget, but it
appears that, from a small sample of 4 children, about J>0, of the
socialised speech consists of questions, 40/ of adapted information and
20/ of other dialogue. Of these types the most interesting from the
standpoint of this research is that of adapted information. In Piaget'3
words this is defined in the following way;
"The criterion of adapted information, as opposed to t he pseudo-
information contained in the collective monologue, is that it is
successful. The child actually makes his hearer listen, and contrives
to influence him, i.e., to tell him something. This time the child
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speaks from the point of view of his audience. The function of
language is no longer merely to excite the speaker to action, hut
actually to communicate his thoughts to other people." (Ibid, p. 19)*
Now, such speech accounts for about 20/ of all spontaneous speech and
ranges from 14, at 3*1 years to 26; at 4.4 years. Although the proportion
is relatively small it is not negligible and it is difficult to reconcile
with statements Piaget was making as recently as 1966,
"The fact is that the speech of subjects between four and six (observed
in situations in which children work, play, and speak freely) is not
intended tc provide information, ask questions, etc. (that is, it is
not socialised language), but consists rather of monologues or 'collective
monologues' in the course of which everyone talks to himself v/ithout
listening to the others (that is, egocentric language)." (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1969, p. 120).
./hen Piaget himself has said that nearly half language is socialised, his
subsequent statement, even within the confined context of an Introductory
I
textbook, seems a rather serious exaggeration.
A possible explanation of this inconsistency is that the figures
above a/re based on content analyses of spontaneous speech. As the quotation
below shows, Piaget later became suspicious of the reliability of such
data.
"It is essential not to limit oneself to the spontaneous remarks of
children in general - experience shows that interpreting them is not
always easy - but, as one of us has already done, to make a thorough
analysis dsf the success a child has in getting another child to do
something to another or in discussions among children."
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, P» 121)
•hen he studied children in an experimental situation,where one child had
to recount a story just heard to another, or describe the workings of on
object like a tap with the aid of a diagram, Piaget's conclusions were:
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"In "both situations, one sees the systematic difficulty children, have
in taking the point of view of the other, in making him grasp the
desired information, and in modifying his initial comprehension."
(Ibid., 1969, p. 121)
It was the restilts of these experiments that convinced Piaget of the
all-pervasive influence of egoeentriara on communication and possibly
led him to virtually discount the findings from the spontaneous records.
(But perhaps this is being too generous to Piaget since the first
quotation from Piaget and Inhelder (19&9) above, clearly indicates that
they are referring to spontaneous speech).
She cause of communication failure, derived from the experimental
work, is said to be egocentric. In an unusual passage, because
environmental influences are stressed, Piaget gives the deeper reasons
for egoeentrism.
"If children fall to understand one another, it is because they think
that they do understand one another. The explainer believes from the
start that the reproducer will grasp everything, will almost know
beforehand all that should be known, and will interpret every subtlety.
Children are perpetually surrounded by adults who not only know much
more than they do, but who also do everything in their power to
understand them, who even anticipate their thoughts and desires. Children,
therefore, whether they work or not, whether they express wishes or
feel guilty, are perpetually under the impression that people can read
their thoughts, and in extreme cases, can steal their thoughts away.
...... It is obviously owing to this mentality that children do not take
the trouble to ex-press themselves clearly, do not oven take the trouble
to talk, convinced as they are that the other person knows as much, or
more than they do, and that he will immediately understand what is the
matter." (Piaget, 1959, PP« 101 - 102)
This passage suggests, among other things, that if a way could be found
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of presenting children with a communication situation in which it is
quite clearly the case that the other does not 'know as much, if not
more than they do', hut on the contrary is demonstrably inferior in this
respect, egocentrism might diminish, and communication efficiency improve#
Piaget began his formal studies in children's language with the
question, "When children talk together do they understand one another?".
After those studies his answe to his own question was:
"
M it is only from the age of 7 or 8 that there can he any talk of
genuine understanding between children, Till then, the egocentric
factors of verbal expression (elliptical style, indeterminate pronouns,
etc.) and of understanding itself, as well as the derivative factors
(such as lack of order in the accounts given, juxtaposition, etc.) are
all too Important to allow of any genuine understanding between
children." (Ibid., p. 125)
following such a prognostication from a distinguished scholar it
seems difficult to defend a programme of research into communication
among pre-school children, especially when the sort of purposeful
communication which Pi ..get says does not exist is the basis of the tasks
to "be used. The egocentric hypothesis has undoubtedly been persuasive,
©©searchers looking at communication in children almost always start with
a lower age limit of 7 years and cite Piaget in support of this, (e.g. Plavell,
Batkin, Pry, ./right, and Jarvis, 1960} Shsntz and Jilson, 1972? Rubin, 1975).
When younger children have been studied, the findings have been interjected
as supporting the egocentric hypothesis, (e.g. Gluoksberg, Krauss and
Weisberg, 1966).
What, then, is the justification for the proposed research? firstly
there is Piaget's own finding that there is a proportion of the conversation
of even 5 and 4 year olds that can be called adaptive information. For
example, this conversation between. liana (5y 8m) and Barbara (4y 1m):
Barbaras I want to make a fire (goes near the stove).
Hans; No, Barbara, you mustn't moke a fire because we have central
heating.
B; Yes, I will.
H: No, mustn't make a fire because its already warm with the central
heating.
and
H; Yesterday, I had to have tea all alone.
B: Why, all alone?
H; Because of you, you weren't there. (Piaget, 1959, p. 247)
If, on average, this type of language accounts for seme 20 per cent of
children's spontaneous conversation, why should it not be used at length
in experimental situations which encourage it? The obvious answer is that
Piaget did this and found the children's language "saturated with
egocentrism". Piaget's tasks, however, were fairly demanding including
recounting twelve-point stories .end nine-part explanations of the working
of a tap or a syringe. Secondly, therefore, it seemed worth trying a
different formal task situation adapted to the capabilities of young
children. Apart from the fact that Piaget's tasks were considered too
demanding for pre-school subjects, there was a methodological (and theoretical)
preference for starting with the simplest situation and increasing the
difficulty as necessary.
Thirdly, another aspect of young children's language behaviour, also
pointed out by Pisget, gave reason for hope. While considering what he
calls "the highest types of conversation between children", collaboration
and argument, Piaget distinguishes two different cases - the acted case
and the verbal case. The former, as its name implies, is connected with
action} the collaboration or argument is said to be accompanied by
gestures and hand movements. Piaget goes on to say, "it matters little,
therefore, whether the talk is intelligible or not, since the talkers
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have the object under their eyes". (Placet, 1959, P* 77) Placet's
impression is that in acted conversation children of 5 azid 6 years
understand each other well hut in the verbal case, involving
abstraction, understanding only cones with the reduction of egocentrism
between 7 nnu 8.
A related classification is that "by Olson (1972). He has
differentiated two uses of language, one for communication - sentences
as descriptions, and one for reflection - sentences as propositions. The
first type of use is developraentally prior and is the function which both
children raid adults ascribe to language in everyday usage. As Olson puts
it, in the communication sense "the language is completely transparent to
the reality that lies behind it; one focuses on the world through the
language", (1972, p. 163)• In the second type of language "the focus is
on the propositions themselves and their relation to other propositions
rather than to the reality specified by the sentences" (p. 163)
A similar distinction has been made by Leushina (cited in Elkonin, 1970)*
Her dichotomy contrasts 'situational speech' with 'contextual speech'.
"
.. situational speech doe3 not fully reflect the content of a thought
as expressed in verbal forms. Its content becomes clear to the inter¬
locutor only when he takes into consideration that situation about which
the child is narrating, and also when he takes into account gestures,
movements, mimicry, intonations,etc. Contextual speech differs in that
its content is revealed in the context itself, and thus becomes
underst ridable to the listener, independent of whether or not he takes
a given situation into account". (Op. Cit., p. 11J).
It is not altogether clear what is meant by "context", but since it is
being contrasted with "situation", it presumably refers to the verbal
statement itself. It must come close to Piaget's "verbal case" and Olson's
"proposition".
Leushina found that situational speech tends to characterise the
language behaviour of pre-sehool children, but that it may become more
contextual depending on the nature of the particular task and the conditions
of social interaction. At any event, situational speech i3 developmentally
prior. The progression is summarised by Leusliina: "from exclusive
domination by situational speech, the child moves towards mastery of contextual
speech, the relative weight of which increases, depending on the extent to
which the child in his relationship with the surrounding environment moves
beyond the framework of direct sensory experience" (p. 114). Apart from
relating to the outlined speech categories of Piaget (and Olson, Leushina's last
reference to moving beyond sensory experience is reminiscent of Piaget's concept
of decentration and the transition from slavish reliance on perceptual
properties to the use of conceptual knowledge.
This discussion of developmentally related functions of language began as a
third reason for believing that communication behaviour in young children was
a feasible research topic. The relevance of the distinction made is that the
communication tasks envisaged will be able to incorporate the features which
are appropriate to the language behaviour of the young. In terms of Piaget's
classification, the children will be talking about sets of identical objects
•under their eyes' which should mean that collaboration involving action can
be utilised. The same point could be made using the terminology of Olson or
Leu3hina, when words like reality and situation would be substituted. It should
not be thought, however, that the aim of the research has shifted from an
investigation of spoken language. This remains the target; but it seems to be to
the advantage of child and researcher for a method to be used that is in some
3ense 'natural* for the subject.
A fourth reason for undertaking this line of investigation is owed to the
writings of Vygotsky (1962) on the n ture of egocentric speech. Vygotsky
regarded egocentric speech as the precursor of inner speech, which itself is
said to have an important directive function in the child's cognitive strategies.
Because all language is thought to arise from a social need, and egocentric
speech derives from that, there is in the young child no distinction
between speech for others and speech for self. Egocentric speech,
for Vygotsky, is a hybrid form with the structure of inner speech
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(i.e. telegraphic, predicted) hut vocalised as social speech. It is
predicated in the sense of omitting sentence subjects and telegraphic
in reducing language to a few high information carrying words. In
contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky believed that egocentric speech decreased
with age only in terms of amount vocalised (i.e. quantity) and, in fact,
rose to a peak in terms of quality (e.g. degree of predication) at age 7
before submerging as inner speech.
iihat are the implications of this view for communication? On the
face of it, not very bright, since a child who is not distinguishing
between speech for self and speech for others is not going to be a
fountain of clarity. This is especially so in view of the predicated
and telegraphic nature of egocentric speech. As Vygotsky puts it:
"A single word (in inner speech) is so saturated with sense that many
words would be required to explain it An external speech. No wonder
egocentric speech is incomprehensible to others ..." (1962, p. 148)
At the same time Vygotsky does give a communicative intent to
egocentric speech, something denied by Piaget. But the important insight
to emerge from Vygotsky'3 theory is his assertion that
"egocentric speech is a stage of development preceding inner speech:
Both fulful intellectual functions; their structures are similar;
egocentric speech disappears at school age, when inner speech begins
to develop. Prom all this we infer that one changes into the other", (p.132)
He goes on to 3ays
"If this transformation does take place, then egocentric speech
provides the key to the study of inner speech. One advantage of
approaching inner speach through egooertric speech is its accessibility
to experimentation and observation. It is still vocalised, audible
speech, i.e., external in its mode of expression, but at the same time
inner 3peech in function and structure. To study an internal process
it is necessary to externalise it experimentally, by connecting it with
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some outer activity; only then i3 objective functional analysis
possible* Egocentric speech is, in fact, a natural experiment of
this type" (p* 132)
According to Vygotsky, then, egocentric speech only gradually
becomes differentiated from socialised speech proper. This latter
takes on a truly communicative function as the child comes to appreciate
the requirements of a listener. He starts to put in sentence subjects
and generally flesh out his conversation with words that are redundant
for himself* In modern parlance a recoding operation takes place
It may be that some evidence of that editing process will be
forthcoming in the proposed research since the subjects are between 3
and 5 .years* Vygotsky's la3t notation above indicates that the experiments
envisaged may well provide an opportunity to study egocentric speech, if
and when it occurs, us the overt sign of the 'intellectual function'.
To quote Vygotsky again,
"egocentric speech does not merely accompany the child's activity;
it serves mental orientation, conscious understanding; it helps in
overcoming difficulties; it is speech for oneself, intimately and
usefully connected with the child's thinking." (p. 133)* This is not to
say that the study of egocentric speech i3 a major aim of this research.
If it wore, sane of the conditions that Vygotsky himself and Syrkina
(reported in Elkonin, 1970) have indicated encourage this form of 3peech,
such as task interruption and working with unfamiliar adults and children,
would have been used. Kohlberg, Yaeger, and Hjertholm (1968) have, indeed,
carried out a very thorough survey and series of experiments on 'private
speech' which have substantially supported Vygotsky. For the present
purposes Vygotsky's pertinent and often fascinating pronouncements are
noted, and any instances of the phenomenon will be re.orted.
There is an important series of experiments by ICrauss and Gluck3berg
and various collaborators (1965t 1966, 1967, 1969) which have been partly
instrumental in instigating the present research. They may he said
to represent the fifth branch of support for the work. Krauss and
Gluckaberg have studied communication behaviour in children as young
as three years and right up to college student level. Their standard
task has consisted of a speaker and listener with identical sets of
6 blocks, with holes through the centre, having novel forms or 'squiggles'
drawn on them. The speaker's job is to describe the squiggles so that
the listener can stack the blocks, on a peg j>rovided, in the described
order. A screen separates the communicators from one another 30 that
they are obliged to rely on verbal messages. A trial is successfully
completed when the stacked order of the listener's blocks matches that
of the speaker.
In brief the findings were that cliildren below school age were
extremely poor at the task, none achieving even a single errorless trial.
Communication ability was found to improve with age and go on improving
right up to adulthood. For our purposes the performances of the youngest
subjects are of particular interest. To gain a better idea of the
problems for the pre-school child, it is worth considering the task
material. Three of the set of six squiggles are illustrated below.
These forms were used deliberately because they did not lend themselves
to simple object names or descriptions - they had 'low codability' to
use the research workers jargon. The types of messages sent by the
children reflected this. To give some examples, (1) was described
variously as 'Llother's hat*, 'lion' and 'snake, (2) as 'ghost',
'caterpillar' ond'Mother's dress' and (3) as 'bird', 'dress' and 'knife'.
It has been effectively demonstrated that children of nursery age use
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idiosyncratic or egocentric speech in such situations - "The imagery
eraployed seemed to be private, rather than socially shared or conventional"
(Crlucksberg, Krauss, and tv'eisberg, 1966, p. 556). In support of Vygotsky's
thesis it was further found that these idiosyncratic descriptions were
completely effective at discriminating forms for the subject who had
formulated them when presented at a later date. In other words, -Mien a
child is given his own message, ,lother'3 hat', he has no difficulty in
picking out the correct block.
Although egocentric language seems to be responsible for the failure
of these children as communicators, it could be argued that the task
material encouraged such behaviour. In a warm-up task the children were
given blocks with pictures of familiar animals on them,at which they were
generally successful (although one group aged between 55 and 49 months
managed no errorless trial3 with the animals blocks). This seems to
indicate that if one wants to investigate the communication ability of
small children it helps to use material that is at least within their ken.
Certainly, highly abstract material, such as that used by Krauss and
Crlucksberg, is almost bound to lead to the result they found, though the
undoubted interest of their findings as a whole i3 not in dispute.
A sound procedure would seem to be to start with material which
the children are able to describe and which does not stretch their
vocabulary, perceptual abilities, etc., unduly, then to increase the
demands of the communication effort systematically to discover at what
point the procedure breaks down. Glucksberg et al. started with simple
enough material, animal pictures, but having established that the method
worked they made a considerable jump to material which amounts to Rorschach-
like abstractions. Like the reaction to the well-known ink blots,
subjects may project any images they happen to see. It is true that
older subjects were constrained by the communication situation to describe
the forms in terms which had high communality. But, if we wish to gauge
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the level of pre-school children's ability in this direction, a
necessary precaution is to avoid material encouraging highly imaginative
responses.
.mother possible criticism of Glucksberg et al.'s procedure, which
they refer to themselves, is that the training task (animal pictures)
al"
may have given rise to a set to use object names, rather than descriptions,
which are then unproductive in the novel forms task. In en attempt to
control for this they gave a small group of subjects a modified
pre-training task with blocks having two coloured squares on them. Here
it wee necessary for the speakers to describe both colours for
discrimination to be possible. This group of subjects, however, also
used object names in the squiggles task. Yet it is somewhat difficult
to conceive of any way in which three and four year olds could describe
these forms without projecting idiosyncratic object names upon them.
Grushcow end Gauthier (1971) overcame this difficulty by providing
ready-made descriptions,for subjects aged between 51 and 62 months,in
a communication task adapted from Glucksberg et al. They also controlled
for variables which Glucksberg et al. were confounding, familiarity and
abstraction! that is, there was a change from familiar objects (animals)
to unfamiliar objects (squiggles), and at the same time a change from
concrete forms (animals) to abstract forms (squiggles). In order to test
whether familiarity or abstractness was the significant variable, Grushcow
and Gauthier U3ed material consisting of sets of blocks with familiar
and unfamiliar animals upon them, and sets with familiar symbols, capital
letters, and unfamiliar symbols, the same letters with their constituent
lines rearranged in an unfamiliar pattern. Three-statement descriptions
were prepared for each stimulus, an elephant being described as follows:
'His feet are very wide and flat; he has a very long no3e which reaches
almost to the ground; he has wide floppy ears.'
The children were, of course, only able to -oerform as listeners in
1Q
Grushcow and Gauthler' 3 task, and there was no peer group communication
in the fashion originally investigated "by Glucksberg et al. ihe
experiment was, in fact, a comparison with a second experiment reported
"by Glucksberg et al in which children were paired with the experimenter,
as speaker, who provided descriptions of the novel forms based on the
protocols of adult subjects. In this condition 67, of children were
successful. Grushcow and Gauthier's findings were that the difference
between animals and symbols was significant but the familiarity variable
was not. They conclude that the important factor in Glucksberg et al.'s
study was a change from animals to symbols rather than familiarity per se.
It is not clear, however, if the abstractness of Grushcow and Gauthier's
material, the letters, can be equated wf%h Glucksberg et al's squiggles.
A sixth and final reason why this research is being conducted in
apparent defiance of certain negative findings, means returning to Piaget
once more. On the basis of his experimentation with 6-8 year olds
Piaget was satisfied that no comprehensible com: runicat ion was possible
between nursery age children. Although Ms arguments are persuasive,
the fact remains that he has not carried out research of this nature «e.th
children under five and so no hard data i3 available. But, if Piaget is
right,it || surely still worth studying the communication endeavours of
younger children in a formal situation in order to understand how the
process does develop. The ability to understand, and make oneself
understood, does not arise suddenly, it is built on something and the sort
of skills on which it is based should be investigated. In short, therefore,
the questions fire: Can children between 5 and 5 take part effectively in
meaningful communication tasks? If not, why not? What are the abilities
that they lack? Is egocentric^ an explanation? Or is this, itself, a
global term for a number of distinct perceptual, cognitive end linguistic
skills? Even if one t.vices a pessimistic view, that success in the tasks
will be as limited as that achieved by Krauss and Glucksbergs subjects,
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there remains the possibly greater value to be derived from an analysis
of the performance records - that is, an understaiming of what gives
rise to failure.
One of the main works in this still largely uncharted area is that by
Plavell, Botkin, Pry, /right and Jarvis (1968). Their model of
communication draws on the theories of Piaget, Vygotsky and Mead* It is
a model which places considerable emphasis on the ability to take roles.
This is defined as followst
"The basic and essential ingredients of any sort of skill sequence in
this area appears to us to be that process in which the individual
somehow cognizes, apprehends, grasps — #1atever term you prefer —
certain attributes of -another individual. The attributes in question
are primarily of the type that could be described as inferential
rather than directly perceptible, for example, the other's needs, his
intentions, his opinions and beliefs, and his emotional, perceptual,
or intellectual capacities and limitations." (Plavell et al,, 1968, p. 5)
The young child is thought to he poor at communication because he
fails to take into account the listener's role attributes and the reason
for this, after Piaget, i3 his egocentrism. Coupled with this is the
notion, noted by Piaget but most forcefully expressed by Vygotsky, that
the young speaker does not distinguish his private or egocentric speech
from his public or social speech. The necessary editing or recoding, which
later goes on, to make an observation fit for someone else's consumption
does not occur at this earlier age.
It may be that Plavell et al, over-emphasise the part played by
failure to take roles, to the neglect of other perceptual, cognitive and
linguistic factors involved in communication. This is not to say they
are not given a place in the model but that they are not seriously
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explored like the other area, This is not a criticism of Plavell at al.#
who make it clear that their concern is with role taking factors, hut it
means that studies with a bias towards investigating the specific cognitive
factors operating ore required.
In common with other workers in this area, Plavell et al. do not
include pre-school children in their investigations of communication. This
is not due to a total disinterest hut the implication of their model is
that effective communication will not he taking place among children of
that age. They do, however, report some interesting preliminary research
on role talcing skills among pre-school age subjects.
A typical task used a self-standing card with a set of three different
%
pictures on each side of the card. One side of the card was a duplicate
of the other. The child was shown the identical nature of the sides of
the card and then a piece of hinged cardboard was placed over both sides of
the card covering the top and middle picture on each side. The cardboard
covering extended beyond the edge of the picture board so that the child
had elear perceptual cues for inferring exactly what pictures were
covered. In two other variations the covering was placed only over the
experimenter*s pictures; in one case it covered just the top picture, and
in the other the top and middle pictures. In these latter cases, therefore,
the pictures visible to the child and the experimenter were not the same,
but could be inferred from any one side through a simple inference. After
each operation the child was asked: Can you tell me what picture I can
i
see on my side of the card?
Very briefly, the results showed a developmental progression with
correct responses increasing up to complete success for six year olds.
The performance of three year olds in contrast was relatively poor, with
only 2 out of 10 children making no errors. The success rate was up to
70y, however, for ages 4 and 5.
The conclusions from their preliminary studies,.and 3ome anecdotal
evidence from a questionnaire sent to parents, were that during their
pre-school years children raastored certain perceptual role taking skills
of the 'most global and undifferentiated sort'. Thus they learned how
to infer whether a given stimulus was or wa s not visible to another aas
long as the cues were sufficiently strong. They also came to appreciate
that the effect of an interposed object between child and another was
that the other would not see what the child saw, but whatever was on the
opposite of the object. 'This is not to say that the child could
reconstruct the other's perceptual input from svhat he hiiaself saw. The
recognition was more primitive than this, namely that the other would see
whatever was to be seen from the other's side. He would not, therefore,
be able to cope with something like 11aget*s Three Mountains problem
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1956).
But Flavell et al.'s conclusions were once again ominous for
communication ability in early childhood,
"It is virtually cert;An that a momentary recognition of perspective
differences is much more likely to occur in a young child when the
prediction of Other's perspective is the stated objectives of the task
(explicit instructions) than when the stated objective is some
accomplishment, such as the construction of a communicative message, for
which role tailing activity is a useful means (implicit instructions)".
(p. 181 - 182)
An issue not really talien up by Flavell et al., but one which seems
unavoidable in a study of communication behaviour, is that of meaning.
Communication is, after all, the transmission of meaning. As Vygotsky
pointed out "a child's ability to communicate through language is directly
related to the differentiation of word meanings in his speech and
consciousness" (1962, p. 129). Coupled with this is the idea broached
in the opening paragraphs that communication is a dynamic, tvro-way,
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purposive process in its spoken form. V/inograd, writing in the context
of a computer simulation approach to language as it appears in real-life
communication situations, said:
"Language is a x^ocoss of communication between people, and is
inextricably enmeshed in the knowledge that these people have about
the world. That knowledge i3 not a neat collection of definitions
and axioms, complete, concise and consistent. Rather it is a collection
of concepts designed to manipulate ideas. It is in fact incomplete,
highly redundant and often inconsistent. There is no self contained
sot of *primitives' from which everything else can be defined.
Definitions are circular with the meaning of each concept depending
on the other concepts"'. (Winograd, 1971, P« 210)
Shotter (1974) also lays emphasis on the active nature of meaning:
"A sentence is something one uses to express one's meaning, and it
is not an expression of a meaning itself; its meaning is a logical
construction to be completed both by oneself and one's listener out
of the influences exerted by one*3 utterance." (1974, p. 55)
And he could have added 'and the situation itself', 3ince context will
play an important part in meaning, particularly for the young child.
The theoretical approach to meaning favoured, and one which may
intrude from time to time in this research, is that developed by Olson
(1970, 1972). Thi3 is particularly because it has been constructed vrith
the language user in mind. A basic contention, in opposition to Bever
(1972) and others who take a more formal approach, is that sentences do
not have fixed meanings, rather "the meaning of a sentence is always
intertwined 'with the speaker's intention in uttering it" (0l3on, 1972,
p. 165). Shotter seems to be making a similar point when he says,
"It i3 just not the caso, empirically, that we turn our eye3 inward,
shut ourselves off from our environment, arid refer to some pre-
established inner plan to determine what we say. tie can in some eases,
23
but usually we do not, Pace-to-fo.ce conversations are not mediated
solely by linguistic rules ... rather, what seems to be the case is
that we continually monitor the construction of our expressions in
relation to our intended purpose" (197$* p, 36).
In his 1970 paper Olson develops what he calls a cognitive theory
of semantics, though it might also be called a neo-referential theory of
meaning. He rejects the simple notion that things have names# on
assumption which he claims Vygotsky made, and points out that "everything
has many names, aid every name 'has' many things, and a theory of reference
must specify how and why this is the case". (1970, p. 26?.),
He takes up Wittgenstein* 3 idea that "the meaning of a word is its use
in the language" (1959* P* 20), arid from this he develops the theme "that
words do not 'mean' referents or stand for referents, they have a use -
they specify perceived events relative to a set of alternatives, they
provide information" (Olson, 1970, p. 263), Olson goes on to illustrate
how context determines the manner in which an ♦intended referent' is
encoded in language. To do this he uses a paradigm case shown in Figure 1-1.
mm ALTERNATIVE UTTERANCE
Case 1 0 • ... the white one
Case 2 0 □ ... the round one
Case 3 0 ... the round,
white one
Fig, 1-1. Tho relation of an utterance to on intended referont.
(Adapted from Olson, 1970)
The task requires that a speaker tells a listener the location of
a gold star that he has seen hidden under one of a number of blocks. The
blocks are of similar siae but vary in other dimensions, i.e. colour and
shape. In each case the star is hidden under the same item as indicated
in the figure, hut Olson hypothesises that the speaker's messages will
be different as follows: For case 1: 'It's under the white one' ;for
case 2j 'It's under the round one'; for case 3 s 'It's under the round,
white one'. Four propositions concerning word-referent relations follow
from this paradigm case,
1. Words do not name things • i.e., the thing is a block "but few, if
any,speakers would say so because as all the objects are blocks such a
communication conveys no useful information, therefore the pronoun *one'
is used.
2. Words do not simply name the intended referent, but the intended
referent relative to the set of alternatives from which it must be
differentiated. Although the same item (referent) is involved each time,
the message varies according to the context obtaining.
3. The message does not exhaust potential properties of the target item.
Depending on the perceived alternatives so different features would be
reported.
4. The advantage that words have over direct perception of events is
that not only do they specify the perceived referent but also the set of
excluded alternatives, i.e., they contain more information than the simple
perception of the event itself.
Olson recognised that these postulates would not hold under all
conditions. A degree of redundancy, for instance, is often included in
messages. This is frequently to the benefit of listeners, which does not
mean to say that it is always put in consciously. Speakers acquire habits
of including words and phrases which do not contribute to the meaning.
Brown (1958) pointed out that a tiling tends to be given its most common
name which may also lead to more information being given than necessary.
Another* factor relates to the speaker's assumptions about the range of
alternatives to be differentiated. Very often these are not perceptually
present end tiiis requires that the speaker must infer what alternatives
are being entertained "by the listener. Ultimately this set of inferred
alternatives would seem to depend on what Flavell et al. (1968) would
call the speaker's ability to discriminate the listener's role
attributes#
This is by no means an exhaustive account of Olson's theory, which
covers somewhat wider ground than this, but the part which has been
explained in some detail relates to the sort of research to be reported
in the succeeding chapters. What it would be interesting to know is how
0l3on'3 model fits the communication behaviour of young children. Olson
and others have carried out some work relating to this, some of which is
reported in Chapters by Olson and Freedle in a volume edited by Carroll
and Freedle (1972). This work will be cited where appropriate in discussions
of the studies which follow.
Perhaps the main point which Olson makes is an obvious, but frequently
overlooked,one, that meaning is intimately related to context. A number
of writers have made the same general point. Flower, for instance, puts
it this way.
"All language functions in a context, words exist within a linguistic
context andHiey take significance from that context. But the utterance
that provides the linguistic context, or part of it, is itself set
witixin a context of situation and derives much of its meaning from the
non-verbal elements as well as from the verbal elements present in that
situation" (1966, p. 143)
This area is sometimes called pragmatics, defined by Robinson (1972) as
an area of enquiry in which "one is concerned to see how contextual
variables are relevant to the meaning of utterances" (p. 28). Described
by Robinson as a "nascent discipline", pragmatics is said to "focus on the
manner in which contextual variables and linguistic features interact to
change the significance of speech acts for a listener". Examples of this
new discipline , if that is what it is, are starting to appear (e.g. Clark,
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1973? Donaldson and Lloyd, 1974? onali.son and IIcGarrigle, in press)*
A related phenomenon has long been known - the young child'3 global
perception of events and situations which make it difficult for him to
differentiate parts from the whole*
"The young1 child has the tendency to conceive of a group as a
■ naturalistic situation in which the single elements are
embedded and from which they get their meaning." (./erner, 1937» p. 227).
One of the best recent theoretical accounts giving emphasis to
context in semantic development is by Macnamara (1972). His main thesis
is that "infants learn language by first determining independent of
language, the meaning which a speaker intends to convey to them, and by
then working out the relationship between the meaning end the language*
{Macnamara, 1972, p. 1). Macnaaara*s definition of meaning is "those
intentions which a speaker wishes to express in language" (Ibid., p. 2),
though his interpretation of language is wide enough to include non-verbal
aspects of communication. He assumes, after Vygotsky and Piaget, that
thought is developmentally prior to language, and that during the pre-
linguistic period the sort of cognitive activity that assists language
acquisition such as (primitive) classifying behaviour, is achieved. In
Macnamara*s words, "the child's success depends on a set of cognitive
strategies which function as shortcuts in the task of relating symbols
to a speaker's intentions". As an example of such strategies Llacnaraara
cites the fact that children do not form bisarre concepts to include foot
and floor and exclude all else. '.There seem to be constraints on what will
be grouped together in a concept.
"It is obvious that an infant has the opacity to distinguish from the
rest of the physical environment an object vhlch his mother draws to
his attention and names. It seems clear too that in such circumstances
he adopts the strategy of taking the word he hears as a name for the
object as a whole rather than as a subset of its properties, or for its
position, or weight or worth, or .anything else", (p. 4).
nother example suggested is that there is a differential 3ot to
attend to varying states and. activities which appears after the child
has acquired the names for at least some entities. Phrases like *Baddy
gone', *Daddy sitting down* and 'Daddy washing up' make early appearances
in the language,
Macnamara provides support for his thesis, which is too extensive
to develop here, from various quarters, including the growth of vocabulary,
syntax and phonology. Our concern is not the acquisition of language hut
the implications of this theory for communication behaviour. Namely, if
meaning is a clue to language rather than language a clue to meaning in
the young child, then the context in which communication takes place is
going to he particularly relevant. If the theory is right, then in order
to understand what is happening in the verbal interaction between three
and four year olds, it will be necessary to observe closely the effect of
material and situation both on the speaker's encoding of messages and,
even more especially, on listener's interpretations. By the age of three
or four, the child will have become reasonably proficient in language use
and this may well affect the use he makes of the pre-linguistic strategies
referred to by L'acnamara, and his reliance on context.
But if this is the case, it is likd y that there will still be some
occasions when the child relies more heavily on context than others. One of
these occasions is very probably a novel situation such as that the
listener s faced in Krauss and Glucksberg's task, and to some extent which
they will also face in the proposed experiments. Like strangers in a
foreign land with only a limited knowledge of the language, the reliance on
what can bo inferred from the situation, using other perceptions end
conceptual experience, is likely to be considerable. Apart from the
standard aims of assessing communicative ability by various means, an
additional aim will be to see what, if any, are the specific effects on
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performance, and strategy even, of changing material, i.e., the context
in which the utterance takes place. In pursuit of this objective,
availability of a videotape record will be particularly helpful.
Summary and Aims.
In this introduction to a series of studies investigating
communication in young children, the conclusion drawn from the pioneering
vrork of Piaget was that research into communication behaviour in pre-school
children would be an unproductive exercise. This was because such
children were said to be very poor communicators, indeed they did not
really know whet it was to communicate* Piaget's explanation of this,
based largely on egocentrism, was outlined. Despite such a gloomy prognosis
there seemed to be a number of reasons for proceeding with the investigation.
1, Piaget's own findings suggested that the emphasis on egocentric
speech wan exaggerated. There was a significant proportion of 'adaptive
information' in young children's socialised speech find if this could be
encouraged by the experimental situation, effective communication might be
possible.
2. Piaget's tasks were developed for 7 year olds and were considered
fairly demanding for them. There was a case fortrying simpler tasks for
younger children rather than extrapolating from the results of older
subjects.
J. The distinction made by a number of writers between the developmentally
prior language for communication and language for abstract propositions was
thought to be significant. The former was said to he dependent on action
and the concrete situation and since the task envisaged represented such
a context, it was believed that the conditions for 'natural.' communication
behaviour would be available,
4. Vygotsky's theory of egocentric speech was outlined and though it
provided, support for the view that young children communicate poorly,
such speech was said to have a communicative intent, A >osoible spin-off
from the research would he examples of egocentric speech regulating
cognitive strategies, giving r,n insight into such functioning*
5. Socio of Krauss and Glucksberg* s work was reviewed. It indicated that
it was feasible to conduct such investigations with nursery age children.
It was possible that the poor performances of the under fives was due to
the choice of task, A simpler experimental situation within the known
limitations of pre-schoolers was proposed*
6. It was argued that it had not been demonstrated,in any way conclusively,
that adaptive communication behaviour was beyond the capacity of pre-school
children. If they failed to achieve it in a conducive task situation, then
it was still worth studying to try? to gain further insights into the reasons
for communication inadequacy and to the precursors of communication proper.
Some theoretical models of the communication process and the related
issue of meaning were discussed. The implications of these theories for
tho proposed research were stated.
The main aims of the research may be summarised as follows:
1. To assess the communication abilities of children between three and
five years in a discrimination task.
2. To determine the type3 of strategies used, successful or otherwise, in
the roles of speaker and listener.
3. To break down the communication process, as represented in. these tasks,
into its constituent skills and to discover the ability level of the
children when engaged in tasks designed to measure these skills.
4. To test one aspect of the egocentric hypothesis by providing the child
with a partner whom he Would recognise as inferior in knowledge and ability,
5. To establish some parameters of the effects of context or extra-
linguistic factors (e.g. type of material) on speech production and
compreliension.
6. To develop a technique for investigating thinking in the young child
by having one child instruct another in a conceptual problem.
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The following pages will show to what extent these targets were
attained. But to end the beginning, at least, on a hopeful note, some
words from Plavell et al, seen to provide adequate justification for the
coming work.
"Even less is known about early, communicative skills than about
early role taking ones. Study of pro-school communication behaviour
should at idle very least provide additional - and perhaps clearer -
data on the sorts of immature communication forms which we
encountered in our younger school-age subjects. A more important
justification for such study, however, would be the possibility of
identifying forms which even our youngest subjects had outgrown,
and hence of contributing something new to the developmental-
descriptive picture."
(Plavell ot al., 1968, p. 224 - 5)
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Chapter 2. The nesearch Approach.
The major concerns in this series of studies have been to try to
discover what makes up the communication process as well as to gain
empirical data in a little explored area. This desire to go beyond the
surface behaviour has demanded an intensive analysis of complete
behavioural records. These twin aims have conflicted somewhat.
Investigation of underlying thought processes and cognitive strategies
in young children does not always lond itself to a tight experimental
design with rigorously controlled variables. A frequency count of
correct arid incorrect responses followed by a statistical treatment may-
reveal certain trends, but such group data are insufficient to gain a
deeper understanding. For this reason a degree of flexibility in the
procedure was considered preferable, one that would allow the researcher
to probe in a direction that might not have been considered initially,
if an individual's performance suggested that this might be revealing-.
This is not to say that large 3cale research studies, obtaining normative
data based on content analyses of coiaiaunicat ion, are without value} on
the contrary they are regarded as a necessary adjunct to the approach
adopted in these studies. The basic tenet here, however, is that until
we have some idea about the nature of the communication process, the
skills involved and the best method of investigating this area of
cognitive development, a large scale study would be unlikely to prove
productive.
As a preface to the research findings it will be useful to say some¬
thing about the research setting and the sample used. An outline of the
basic situation, the usual method of procedure and the recording and
treatment of data will est: blish the methodological approach of the
project. There were also some special circumstances obtaining which had
as
important effects on the course taken by this research and it is/well to
specify these at the oofcset.
The Cognition Project. These studies were carried out at the Cognition
Project, Department of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh. The
Cognition Project was set up in 1J66 by hargaret Donaldson and Roger
wales under the joint auspices of the Social Science Research Council
and the University of Edinburgh. The work carried out was investigations
into the development of cognitive skills in pre-school children. A
research nursery was set up for this purpose which 20 children attended
daily during normal school terms. The staff of the Project has typically
consisted of up to 9 research workers, up to 5 postgraduate students,
two nursery 3taff and a secretary. Apart from the work on thinking and
language, there has been a continuing programme of ethological work
looking at various aspects of territorial, agoniptic and leadership
behaviour.
The Sample. The original Cognition project sample was a homogeneous
group, carefully selected from the waiting lists of Corporation nursery
schools. The children were of parents engaged in skilled or semi-skilled
occupations who were unlikely to leave the district during the child's
pre-school years. Later, during the time the present research was
carried out, the homogeneity was disturbed a little and the sample came
to take on a more varied background. The parental occupations of
children who took part in communication studies varied from surgeon and
university lecturer to motor mechanic and unskilled labourer. Places in
the nursery were not advertised and vacancies tended to be filled by
siblings or friends of those already present.
Children were accepted from three years onwards. They were given a
Stanford-Binet intelligence test, before entry, to gauge their performance
in a test situation, rather than to obtain an I. Q. This, together with a
parental interview, served to screen out children with intellectual or
emotional difficulties, which was a necessary precaution in a small
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sample. In fact the incidence of rejection was very low - less than 5 per
cent.
The nursery was run on the lines of other Edinburgh Corporation
nurseries and children attended from 9 a.m. to midday. The major
difference was the number of adults interacting with the children. The
ethological work consisted mainly of passive observation, while the work
on language and thought used testing rooms beside the nursery area.
Children were allowed time to acclimatise to the new situation before any
testing was attempted and the experimenter spent many hours in the nursery
setting so that the children were at ease in his company. In all?30
children were used in the series of studies to be described, find ages
ranged from 39 months to 62 months.
The Basic Task Situation and Procedure. Pour typos of situation were
employed. The standard one adapted from that used by G-lucksberg, Krauss
and Welsberg (1966) had two children communicating with each other. The
participants faced each other across a table. Typically they had identical
sets of material which were intended as the focus of their dialogue. The
verbal nature of the task was encouraged through the communicators being
able to see only their own array of objects. 'The basic task was simple;
one child acted as speaker, the other as listener, and the speaker's job
was to select an object and tell the listener about it in such a way that
he would know which object the speaker had chosen, since ultimately they
had to match selections.
The second task situation involved a child communicating with an
adult, namely,the experimenter. The basic format was similar to that
described above, the difference being the measure of control possible.
This situation was used to assess the various components which appeared to
compose the communication skill, components which it would not have been
practical to investigate in the child-child situation.
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/mother variation used involved a talking doll as a partner for
the child, This was thought to have the advantage of control without
the distorting effects which an adult must have if the main interest is
communication between peers. The special circumstances of the talking
doll test situation vd.ll be explained below,
A further variation occurred in the child-child communication
condition, A final series of studies required the children to instruct
each other in a more complex cognitive problem. The task chosen for
this purpose involved ordering skills, specifically the behaviour
described by Piuget (1952) as seriation. This study required that one
of each pair first took part in a preview session during which the task
to be communicateu was acquired.
It was standard procedure to begin each study with a simplified
preliminary session which served a number of purposes. It enabled the
children to become familiar with the type of situation in which they
would be required to operate. It allowed the e-perimenter 3ome oppor¬
tunity to vary and revise the procedure and task instructions if
necessary. (The use of videotape in this context was invaluable (see
below) ). Finally it acted as a screening procedure} any child who
indicated he was totally unable to grasp the simple problem was usually
eliminated from the main experiment. Such a course was necessary because,
apart from time considerations, in communication tasks the presence of
one member, in a pair, who had a basic comprehension problem meant the
loss of two, rather than one, subjects.
As far as the material used for communicating purposes was concerned,
the aim was to supply objects or pictures which were sufficiently
attractive to hold the child's interest, without being so exciting as to
deflect the child from his communication intent nor so complex as to lead
him to report a great deal of irrelevant information. A danger also lay
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in using abstract material which might be meaningless in verbal terms
for the child, or over-simple iteras which did not allow enough scope
for description.
Recording and Treatment of the Data. She sise of the sample and the
nature of the task limited both the power of the experimental designs
and the statistical treatment of data. A number of factors weighed in
the decision to restrict the sample to those children attending the
research nursery. One of these was the technical problem of talcing
television recording equipment and lighting to other nurseries or play¬
groups - in practice it was not feasible. Communication research does
not, of course, demand television, but the type of intensive analysis
of performance records which was carried out would not have been possible
without videotapes. Use of the talking doll was also limited technically,
as it required a specially built sound proof cubicle which could only
be used at the Cognition Project.
A less obvious, but equally important factor, was the value attached
to developing the necessary task conditions slowly and carefully. In
the case of children of pre-sehool age, when the establishment of trust
and rapport is so important, there are many advantages in having the
research population permanently at hand. The special advantage for this
research was that it enabled the development of a technique like the
talking doll, and the use of communication, itself, as a method of
investigating cognitive abilities. Again,this should not be taken to mean
that the study of communication is only possible in such conditions. A
number of studies have been reported which have not operated in such
conditions, but it is argued that a real knowledge of the way communication
as a skill develops,does require the sort of intensive approach that is
only feasible with a sample that can be studied regularly and at length.
To return to the limitations imposed by sample sise; these were
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mainly felt when it might have been desirable to eontrol for order
effects. To have done so in a number of cases would have meant that
the siae of groups receiving the effect of interest, in the desired
order, would have been too small to give any thing like a reasonable
picture. These issues are discussed in the particular experiments in
which they occur. It was also the case that many subjects performed
in these tasks on a number of occasions. Although this might be said
to be giving rise to a practice effect, in the within-task cases where
it was possible to measure such an effect,no significant generalisation
was evident. The only sure way to avoid possible confounding effects
of this sort would have been to use different samples for each
experiment. The difficulties of adopting such a procedure have already
been outlined above, and it would have involved the loss of some of the
important comparison effects,between tasks,which were possible. In
the series of tasks which were designed to probe some of the constituent
skills involved in communication, a constant sample was required to gauge
the effect of such experience on subsequent communication.
Particular attention was paid in the administering of these tasks
to providing instructions which were clear and comprehensible. To tliis
end considerable use was made of videotapes. Since preliminary or
pilot sessions were invariably given, the instructions could be changed
v/Iien it was thought appropriate and, by studying the television recordings,
their efficacy assessed. In thi3 way the procedure which best conveyed
the task requirements could be constructed.
All test sessions were videotaped and this allowed two methods of
treating the data. One was a standard presentation and disc ...onion of
group data based on frequency counts, comparison of means and the use of
statistical significance tests. But very often this provided only a
broad guide to the behaviour and so_,to gain a deeper understanding of the
processes underlying1 such findings, it was necessary to study the
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individual performances which videotapes, perhaps uniquely, allow. By
assembling detailed performance records annotated from the tapes, it
became possible to discern patterns in approaches used and to infer the
strategies which might have accounted for them, A developmental
progression, for instance, was sometimes apparent. This analysis was
often aided by a prior break-down of the task into a 3tep by step
description of the cognitive components involved - a sort of prescription
for sucoess. Such a logical 'programme' provided a standard of comparison
against which to assess the children's performances. The effect of such
a procedure on the presentation of results is that many extracts from
the test session protocols, sometimes lengthy, must be included to illustrate
particular aspects of behaviour. Such a method means that the data do
not always fall into neat categories and the smoothing of rough edges has
been kept, deliberately, to a minimum.
As pointed out in the earlier chapter very little work has been done
in this somewhat hybrid area of language, social behaviour, and the
development of thought. Like much pioneering it is inclined to be messy
at times, nevertheless, within the limitations mentioned, all precautions
have been talien to maintain the rigour demanded of scientific research.
A note on the Talking Loll Technique. The rationale for using a talking
doll in this research will be found when the relevant studies are
described in Chapter 6. The purpose here is to- say a little about how
the technique arose and developed,and how the actual test situation
involving the doll operated.
The idea of a talking doll was conceived by Margaret Donaldson as
a means to obtain judgements from young' children about language and the
worldj(Donaldson and Lloyd 1974). It was not clear at the time, whether
three year olds knew what it was to be in error. If they showed that they
could tell when statements about a situation were right or wrong,then a
method widely used in psycholinguistic research with adults (e.g. V/ason
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1961, Chase and Clark 197k) could be employed. It did not seem
plausible to ask pre-3Chool children to judge the truth or falsity of
statements made by an adult, and of course they were not in a position
to assess written statements. Ihe talking doll was therefore invented
as a source of descriptions about particular situations, with the child'a
role being to tell the doll when it was right and 'Mien it wa3 wrong. The
reasoning was that if the doll was presented as someone learning to
talk,'he' would be expected to make mistakes from time to time in his
conversation. With encouragement? we believed that the young children,
as competent but not mature language users, would be happy to help the
doll in its speech development by pointing out the correctness or other¬
wise of its utterances. In this way we would obtain what interested us,
namely an understanding of the children's own ideas about the relationship
between sentences, or spoken language, and the situations they described.
To achieve the degree of co-operation required by the child in the
talking doll situation, the technique was developed slowly and carefully.
Initially the doll, a large toy panda called Chu-Chu, was taken into the
nursery to meet the children when they were assembled as a group. It was
explained that this was a special toy panda because he could talk, but
that he could not talk very well as he was still learning. The children
were asked if they would help the doll to learn to talk as well as they
could. They were asked if they would come to see him one at a time, since
he was too shy to say anything with everybody present. From this beginning
the relationship was established through a series of meetings between the
doll and each child. To facilitate the experimenter's interpretation
of the children's judgements of the doll's statements, they were trained
in the use of a device which involved sounding a bell Mien the doll said
something which the;, thought was correct, and a buzzer Mien they thought
it had made a mistake. When they signalled errors, the children were
asked, by the doll, to tell 'him' why 'he' was vmmg.
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This early work with the talking doll indicated that children
as young as 39 months were able to signal truth and falsity as they
saw it. This was initially established with the doll making quite
gross errors, such as calling a toy soldier a banana. Later sessions
wore devised to investigate comprehension of particular aspects of
language such as negation and quantifiers (all, some, none etc.). These
have been reported elsewhere (Donaldson 1971» Donaldson 1972, Donaldson
and Lloyd 1974).
The test room lay-out for talking doll experiments is illustrated
in figure 2-1. The voice of the doll was provided by an assistant
concealed in a sound proof cubicle which had a one-way vision panel through
which the assistant could see the child and the material about which he
was to converse. A high-level microphone in the room recorded the
dialogue on a tape recorder in the sound proof cubicle. The assistant
was able to monitor this through headphones. A 3" Yungh loudspeaker
in the doll's head was connected to a broadcast system (microphone and
Sinclair z-12 amplifier) in the sound proof booth, and when the assistant
spoke the voice came from the doll. The doll's mouth did not move and,
in fact, it was in every way inanimate. This did not appear to lessen
the strength of the contact between child and doll which in all cases
was friendly and sometimes remarkably close, a3 when the doll took on
the role of a confidant. The fact that most of the children wore familiar
with talking animals from television doubtless helped to reinforce the
otherwise bizarre idea of a talking panda. It is also true that the young-
child's notions of reality are such as to make a situation like this -
which never pretended to be more than a game - quite acceptable,
(q.v. Piaget 1955).
All experimental sessions were videotaped using a Sony CV2000 videotape
recorder and a Sony CVC2000B automatic camera, the L-inch tapes being-
played back through a Rediffusion Arundel 19" television monitor.
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Pig. 2-1. Test room lay-out for talking doll experiments.
S - Subject
E1 - Experimenter for doll's voice
E2 - Experimenter manipulating materials
D - Doll
SI/I - Stimulus material
G - Camera
SPC - Sound proof cubicle
TR - Tape recorder
VTR - Videotape recorder
K1 - Broadcast microphone for doll's voice
M2 - Microphone recording room conversation for E1
M3 - Sound recording microphone for VTR
A - Amplifier and power pack
H - Headphones monitoring outside conversation
G - One-way vision glass
L - Dim light source
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Chapter J. rilot -Studies.
Before starting the main course of experiments, two pilot
studies were carried out to acquire some experience in the laethodology
of such research and to obtain some first hand evidence of the sort of
performances to he expected. The preliminary studies will not he
described in full, hut the method and main findings will he outlined
since some of them affected future research strategy.
The first pilot study used the standard procedure adopted by
Glucksberg and Krauss (19^7) hut greatly simplified the task itself. The
subjects in this study were three pairs of siblings taken from the
research nursery. Although siblings were not chosen with any serious
intent to compare their performance with that of non-siblings, it was
nevertheless arranged that the subjects operated in two conditions, with
a sibling and with a non-sibling, so that the subjects acted as their
own controls. This was done as a somewhat crude safeguard to see if the
findings were at all suggestive. The disinclination of one subject to
take part effectively demolished on already precarious design, and no
attempt was made to compare the tvvo conditions.
Pilot Study I.
Each child operated as speaker and listener with a sibling and a
non-sibling. The exception was the boy whose brother withdrew from the
experiment. This child accordingly performed only with non-siblings.
There were eight pairings in all, four with one set of materials (A) and
four with another 3et (B). These were small plastic toys as follows:
Sot A
1. Red steam ship (Short title: Ship)
2. Purple centipede (Snake)
5. Green fir tree (Fir)
4. Dark green pelican (Bird)
5. Red yacht with yellow sail (Yacht)
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6. Palm tree with monkey climbing it (Palm)
Items 1 and 5 were included as being potentially confusable if
a label like boat or ship was used. Items 3 nnd 6 might also lead to
errors of identification if the description was ambiguous, e.g. 'tree*.
Set B
1. Yellow crocodile (Crocodile)
2. Doll with black trousers, blue and white striped shirt,
red belt and red hat (Bed hat)
3. Orange lisard (Lizard)
4. Doll with black trousers, red waistcoat, white shirt
with blue spots, and black hat (Black hat)
5. Pal3e red lips (Lips)
6. Large fly (Fly)
In this set items 1 and 3» <Jnd 2 and 4 "were potentially confusable.
Procedure.
The subjects operated in pairs, each talcing the role of speaker and
listener. They faced each other across a small table and each had
identical sets of toys. The object of the task was for the speaker to
select a toy and tell his partner which toy he had chosen, so that the
listener could pick out the same object from Ms own array of toys. Small
screens were placed between the subjects so that they could not see each
other's toys.
Both subjects were shown that the sets of toys matched before the
screens were put up. The role of speaker (or listener) was taken until
all the toys in the array had been selected and described and then the
subjects reversed roles and repeated the experiment.
Results and Discussion.
The performance of the sneaker may be judged in terns of the adequacy
of his description of the selected object, that is, whether or not it
contains sufficient information to permit successful discrimination
43
by the listener. For example, the one word message 'tree' is not
adequate as a description of the fir tree, since it nay equally well
apply to the palm tree. On the other hand, descriptions containing mare
information like 'fir tree', 'Christmas tree* and 'tree without monkey'
will normally be considered adequate. The performance of the listener
may be judged on the ability to pick out the intended object on the
basis of the message received,
2ASEJL1
Summed data sho.dng number of adequate and inadequate
descriptions by speaker, per task item, and subsequent
correct and incorrect choices by listener.
Speakers* Listeners' Speakers* Listeners'
Adequate ..Choice Kvv Inadequate Choice
Descriptions C, I_ Descriptions C I
Set A
1. Boat 2 2 0 5 5 0
2. Snake 8 8 0 0 0 0
3. Fir 3 3 0 4 1 3
4* Bird 8 8 0 0 0 0
5. Yacht 5 4 1 3 2 1
6. Palm 2 2 0 6 1 5
TOTAL 28 27 1 18 9 9
Set B
1. Crocodile 4 X>■ 1 3 0 3
2. Red hat doll 0 0 0 8 3 5
3. Lisard 5 4 1 3 0 3
4. Black hat doll 0 0 0 7 6 1
5. Lips 8 6 2 0 0 0
6. Fly 8 8 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 25 21 4 21 9 12




Table J-1 gives some indication of the overall performance. Out of
a total of 92 descriptions, 53 (58/) were adequate. The adequate
descriptions were not distributed evenly over the set of objects used.
Some (snake, bird, lips, fly) were always described adequately, while
others (red hat and black hat doll) never received adequate description.
An inspection of the table shows clearly that it was only the
potentially confusable items 1, 3» 5 and 6 in Set A, and 1, 2, 3 and 4
in Set B that gave rise to inadequate descriptions. The reason for this
was evident in the children's performance, namely, a tendency to describe
items in one word. When one word, e.g. 'fly', was sufficient to
distinguish the chosen object from the rest of the items, then
discrimination was no problem - the description was adequate. But where
two or more objects were described by the same word, e.g. 'boat', a
discrimination problem arose and the description needed to be expanded
to include those features which would enable a correct choice to be made.
Looking at the listeners' performance, it was largely governed by
the adequacy of the description. Thus, of the 53 objects given adequate
descriptions,only five failed to be correctly picked out by the listener.
But, not surprisingly, the same trend did not hold for inadequately
described objects. The totals at the foot of the right hand column show
that the 39 inadequate messages are more or less evenly divided between
correct and incorrect choices. This is because Ein inadequate description
cannot be considered the exact opposite of an adequate message. The
inadequate message will usually contain some useful information, and in
the majority of cases it will limit the choice for the listener to one
or two objects. A child hearing 'boat' is unlikely to think it refers
to a tree or a bird, but he may be undecided as to whether it refers to
the sailing yacht or the steam ship. So, if inadequate messages usually
limit the listener's choice to one of two possibilities, it is consistent















































The results suggest that the degree of confusability between
objects determined performance in this simple communication task. This
inference is supported by the descriptions used by the subjects. Table
3-2 shows that there are nine descriptions which are common to more than
one item within a single set (1, 2, 6, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23) and most
of them concern those objects which were predicted as potentially
confusable before the experiment. For example, number 1 in the table,
•red boat1, wa3 used to refer to the steam ship and the sailing boat.
Red boat is a perfectly accurate description of both toys but it is not
adequate since it does not discriminate one from another. On the other
an
hand * lobster' (No, 4) is noi?/ accurate description of the purple
centipede, but because there is nothing else in the set of toys that
remotely resembles a lobster, the description proved adequate for the
purpose of identification.
The case of the false plastic lips was particularly remarkable.
It is unlikely that any of the children had seen such a bizarre object
before and this was borne out by the fact that only one subject used
the term 'lips • to describe them; the rest used the word 'hat*. Yet
despite this description being, strictly speaking, inaccurate, only two
identification errors were made on this item by listeners. This represents
support for Olson's (1970) claim that the meaning of a word is determined
by the perceived set of alternatives, that is, other referents present
whsch may be covered by the verbal description used, 'Hat', though
inaccurate, is perfectly adequate to discriminate the 'lips' in the absence
of any other hat-like objects. In contrast, as we have seen, a word like
'doll' i3 not sufficient in this context because it only reduces the set
of alternatives to tiro, both of ..hich are specified by that word. Thi3
suggests that Glucksberg et al's (1966) concern of whether or not a
description is regarded as egocentric, ac in this case 'hat' may be so
regarded, i3 relatively unimportant beside the issue of how the speaker
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(and for that matter the listener) partitions the set of perceived
alternatives.
It is of interest that the twelve objects used yielded a total of
25 descriptions, but because some descriptions wore applied to more
than one object, the total number of different descriptions used was 36
(see 'fable 3-2). If simple, and for the most part, easily recognisable
objects give rise to so many different referent words, the value of
using novel or nonsense drawings with pre-3choolers must be questioned
(viz, Glucksberg et al«, 1966). It is noticeable that the children
almost invariably limit themselves to one word descriptions. In this
study ouch a limitation was not usually a handicap, but on occasions
where a more elaborate description was required (e.g. i^he dolls)
the apparent inability to provide more information than the simple label,
•dolly', meant that a 'correct' choice between the two items answering
tliis description would be made only by chance.
The design of the pilot study precluded much information on the
relationship and interaction between speaker and listener. In fact there
was very little interaction between the children although sibling pairs
were involved. There were just three instances of messages being
modified, to use Glucksberg and Krauss*6 (1967) terminology, that is, of
a speaker providing additional information to a description in a
subsequent message. In one case the original message 'tree' was expanded
to 'Christmas tree*, and 'red boat' was modified to 'rod and yellow boat'.
Both of these modifications resulted in making messages that were
previously inadequate, adequate. For the most part the listener was a
passive performer, restricting himself to repeating the speaker's
message on occasions and otherwise selecting the toy he thought to be
appropriate. There were no instances of the listener asking for more
information.
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To sum up the main findings of this pilot study.
1. /ith the one exception noted, the subjects appeared to
enjoy and wore involved in the task. In other 'words the
method seemed to be a workable one.
2. Adequate communication tended to be restricted to:
(a) those items that were not confusable
(b) those items that could be described in one word.
5. Accurate description was not equivalent to adequate
communication and vice-versa. For example, a crocodile
could be described as a buffalo and the listener would
still select the correct object.
4. In this limited study, successful communication was determined
by the relationship between the objects rather than the
intrinsic features of the objects themselves. Ho child
showed signs of being aware of the importance of the context.
Pilot Study II
Communication was limited in the first pilot 3tudy by the nature
of the material, in that for the most part one word descriptions sufficed.
One change in the second study was to introduce material intended to
promote more verbalisation. This was uone by providing a relationship
common to all the objects instead of just to one or two as in the first
study. Accordingly, one theme was selected and variations on this theme
introduced. In the previous experiment thi3 would have been achieved
if all the toys had been identical doll3, each with different clothing.
For the present study two experiments were carried out one using a set
of dravriuigs of houses, the other of cars, both varying in certain
dimensions.
A further aim of this study was to give more attention to the
instructions used, to make as certain as possible that the subjects wore
aware of the roles they had to play. To this end two experimenters
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took part, which allowed individual attention for each child in the
critical phase when the object of the game was explained.
The study was restricted to one pair of children to discover the
value of an in-depth approach to the performance of children in the
communication situation. It was hoped to obtain some idea of the
strategies used and of how the children interpreted their roles in the
task. It was also believed that such an approach might provide some
genuine interaction between subjects, behaviour that was largely absent
in the first study. To assist these aims intensive use of videotape
recording and analysis was made.
Method.
Subjects. Two children -who had not taken part in the earlier study,
Janet - 4 years, 6 months, and James — 4 years, 5 months.
Material. Two sets of 3ix drawings of houses on white card (3" x 3").
The houses were identical in form and size but varied on a number of
dimensions! colour of walls, colour of roof, smoking or not smoking
chimney. Among the more obvious constant features wore a black door,
four windows, and a chimney.
Another two sets of six, side-on, drawings of a car wore used in
a second experiment. Here the changing features included colour of
car, colour of wheels and presence or absence of driver. Obvious
constant attributes were number of wheels, and number and colour of
windows.
Procedure. The conditions for the experiment were as in the first study.
The subjects were invited to inspect the sets of pictures and place
side by side those which matched exactly until they were satisfied that
there were two identical sets. One experimenter sat beside Janet and
one with James. The purpose of the 'game* \?a3 explained to both
children and then each experimenter instructed his assigned subject in
the role he was to play.
The speaker was asked to choose a picture and tell the listener
till about it so that he could choose the same 'house' from his sot*
Small screens were again placed between the subjects* To avoid
excessive periods of inactivity (and potential boredom), the subjects
switched roles of speaker and listener after the selection find description
of each picture, except for the first trial when roles were not reversed
until halfway through the set of pictures, A trial was completed when
the stock of pictures was exhausted. The session involved two such
trials, and lasted about twenty minutes. On a subsequent day, the
subjects returned and performed the same task with the set of car
pictures* both sessions were recorded on video-tape.
Itesults. As in the first study a successful performance by the speaker
depended on his supplying sufficient information to allow the listener
to discriminate the chosen picture. Since only three features of the
pictures varied, any description which contained accurate information
about these critical features allowed a correct choice to be made* But
because the size of the array diminished in the course of the trial, it
was not necessary to provide specification of all critical features in
every case* Before looking at the ability of the children to tailor
their messages according to the size of the array, the performances were
assessed according to whether or not they permitted a correct choice by
the listener.
The task proved well within the capacities of the subjects. In a
total of 26 descriptions only two were inadequate and these were the first
two of the first trial* Once the subjects realised what the task
entailed, their descriptions were always sufficiently full to enable
their partner to ohoose the identical pictures.
The subjects' descriptions were adequate, but tlii3 dmd not necessarily
mean that they had an appreciation of which were the critical attributes
in the pictures. The data given in Table 3-3 show that the children
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TABLE 5-5
Descriptions by speakers given in the order








No Smoke - f1 mx2 *i
A Red White + RSHD(5) IffiSDC(7)
B Red White - SDR(6) SHR(3) HRSD(O)
C Red Black - HRDS(3) SHR(2)
B Brown White + HSCRD(7) SHHB(4)
E Brown White - CS(1) SCHRD(1)





A Red Yellow + CW0G(3) CW0G(1)
B Red Yellow *• CWG(5) /COG (6)
C Red Shite - C®0G(5) C8K(7)
D Blue Yellow + 0CW(1) C0f(2)
E Blue Yellow - JC0G(4) CG JO ( 3)
F Blue White - COWG(4) CW0G(2) CWG(6)
Dotation
Houses:
H «= Colour of house
R » Roof colour
S » Smoke/no smoke
D = Door
C = Chimney
Figures in "brackets refer to
Cars:
C = Colour of car
W « Colour of wheels
0 = Occupied/not occupied
G = Windows
order in Which cards selected.
52
were not exclusively concerned with critical attributes. Before this
table is examined some explanatory notes are necessary. In their
descriptions the children are not always specific. A red house with
a white roof might be described as 'It's a red and white*. In the few
cases where the speakers were not specific, the context invariably
made it clear to which attribute they referred.
The critical attributes ares
(i) Houses: Colour of house (H), colour of roof (R) and presence
or absence of smoke (3).
(ii) Cars: Colour of car (C), colour of vsheela (W), occupied
or not (0).
3ince subjects never mentioned a critical attribute without
specifying its colour, the occurrence of such an attribute in the
description can be taken to be a complete specification unless indicated
otherwise. i?or this reason critical attributes will be referred to by
the abbreviations listed above, H, R and S etc.
The table shows that although the children usually included all
the critical attributes in their descriptions, they did not confine
themselves to these. In the houses session, the presence of a chimney
(C ) and door (I>) was frequently included in the message, when
describing the cars, the speaker invariably commented on the presence of
windows (G).
The number of attributes mentioned did not suggest an appreciation
of critical features, that is, there was a failure by the children to
restrict themselves to those features. Another possible index of their
significance to the child may be the order in which attributes are
reported. Table 3-5 (Houses) shows that the feature smoke, or its
absence, was reported first in eight out of thirteen cases. In the cars
experiment, colour was the feature reported first in ten out of thirteen
cases. The second and third attributes reported were usually the critical
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features: 'roof and 'colour" in the houses task and 'wheels' and
'occupancy* for the cars.
The children, then, gave priority to the critical features in
their descriptions. The constant features like door, chimney and
windows tended to appear at the end of the reports. whether this
implies a genuine appreciation of the importance of the critical
attributes or whether the behaviour is of a more simple perceptual
nature is a matter for debate. The topic will be taken up again after
the question of strategies has been introduced.
strategies in simple communication tasks.
Thus far the descriptions used by the speakers have been described
as adequate or inadequate, these being defined on the basis of whether
or not they contained sufficient information to allow the speaker to
pick out the item that was being described. An adequate description
might not represent the optimum message however. It might contain a
proportion of redundant information beyond that required for a
satisfactory description. To take a simple hypothetical example, if
the Chairman of a committee wished the members to turn to page 23 of
a particular book or document, among a number they had before them, he
would not need to describe the colour, dimensions, texture, publisher,
title and author of the book; normally, one of the features and page
number would be sufficient. Any communication like *Look at page 23 of
the big book/Robinson/Annual Report/pink document* would be adequate
as long as there were not two items answering the same description. The
use of additional information would be regarded as unnecessary and, if
used habitually, irritating.
In tasks like those used in this study, it is possible to formalise
the strategy which should be adopted to give minimal descriptions of
items selected, that is, descriptions that contain the minimum amount
of information needed to make a correct choice. The general rule should
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be:-
(i) Look for a unique attribute, that is an attribute
possessed by the selected item and no other. If the item
has a unique attribute, transmission of that will enable
discrimination.
(ii) If no unique attribute, look for that attribute which is
possessed by the selected item and only one other item (or
least number of other items) - the rainimum attribute,
(iii) 'Hold' the minimum attribute and look for the additional
attribute(s) which is needed to differentiate the selected
item frora 5.ts subset. In effect, having determined the minimum
attribute,the operator returns to stage (i) and searches for
a unique attribute possessed by the selected item within
its sub-set. It may be necessary to reduce the set further
before a description which applies only to the chosen item
can be transmitted.
In Table 3*-4 descriptions based on the above rule are set beside
the descriptions given by the children in the communication situation.
They cover the first trial in the second session with pictures of cars.
A glance at the Table will show how the rule operates. The first
picture selected is a blue car with yellow wheels which is occupied. To
arrive at the minimal description that will isolate this card from the
rest of the cards, a unique attribute is first of all sought. In this
instance there is no unique attribute, and, by rule (ii),a minimum
attribute is sought. Since the car is occupied and there is only one
other occupied car, this represents the minimum attribute. The task then
is to distinguish the selected car from the other occupied car. Since
one is red and one blue, it is a simple matter. Hence the minimal
description is 'occupied and blue'. This means that whan the other
occupied car is selected, picture 3, the fact of being occupied is a
rfABLK 5-4.
A comparison of the minimal description










n DRIVER (Occupied/not occupied Minimal Description Child's Description
1 B Y 0 Occupied, blue Man, blue, wheels
2 B W 0 Blue, white wheels Blue, white wheels,
no man, white wheels,
white windows.
5 R Y 0 Occupied Red, yellov/ wheels,
man, white windows.
4 B Y 0 Blue Yellow wheels, blue,
no man, blue, yellow
wheels, white windows.
5 R W 0 White wheels Red, white wheels, no
man, white windows.
6* R Y 0 - Yellow, red, no man,
white windows.
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unique attribute and, us can be seen in the Table, the minimal
description is therefore 'occupied',
.hen the child's description is compared to the minimal description,
a number of differences are apparent. As the siae of the array
decreases so the length of the description needed to discriminate the
ohosen card can also decrease. This is what happens with the minimal
descriptions. But the descriptions given by the children show no
3uch decrease. They remain a more or less standard length for every
card, even the last one which does not need differentiating at all. (dee
also Pig, 5-1),
Besides the inclusion of those critical attributes which are
unnecessary to a satisfactory description of the selected card, the
children ;dso tend to include features which are common to every card-
in this case ' windows* - which usually have their colour specified as
well. In the first description the word 'wheels' falls into this
category, since it is not qualified by colour and therefore becomes on
attribute common to every car.
Though the child is not following the most parsimonious strategy -
i3 there evidence of a pattern in his descriptions? One possible piece
of evidence would be the consistency of order of report of attributes.
If the child consistently followed a particular order, one might infer
a plan, however crude, guiding his behaviour. Prom Table 3-3 some very
tentative inferences may be made about the possible strategies operating.
Although not strong in themselves they serve to provide an introduction
to the way data in this area can be presented. They need to be
discussed separately in terms of both subjects and materials.
Janet (Houses).
illore is no consistent order of communication. In six messages
three different first choices occur. Evidence suggests (see below) that
these early trials represent a learning period for the subject during
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which she adapts to the comr.mnication situation. This therefore
represents the period during which a plan (if there is going to he
one) comes to he formulated* There is no systematic ordering of attributes,
but rather they are mentioned as they impinge on perception or perhaps ,
more accurately, capture attention. A relationship between the
attributes may be set up in much the same way as the chain complexes
described by Vygotsky (1962). For example, spatial contiguity may lead to,
say, 'smoke*, 'roof* and 'chimney* occurring adjacently in messages.
From Janet's record there are a number of examples of this. In Trial
1 (5) 'roof is followed by 'smoke', and in Trial 1 (7) 'smoke',
'chimney* and 'roof are reported in succession. There is a further
example in T2 (7). (See Table 3-3). A temporal contiguity may be
established when the final component in one message becomes the first
item in the following meserge either by the same subject, or the listener
who now becomes speaker. It represents a sort of recency effect. A
possible instance of this occurs in T1 (3) when the last feature reported
by James in T1 (4), 'roof*, is the first attribute reported in the
following trial, T1 (5) by Janet.
James (Houses)
Six of the eight messages begin with smoke or its absence. This
suggests that the subject has noticed a small specific feature with
some element of action in it, i.e. moving smoke. When that feature is
not present it is still the first thing transmitted.
Talcing his most common sequence, James's rule is:
(i) Look for dynamic component. Is smoke there or not?
(ii) Next, look at most global feature - colour of house.
(iii) Look at other critical f ature - colour of roof.
(iv) Redundant information
Janet (Cars)
Talcing the most common sequence, the strategy appears to be as
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follows:
(i) Communicate the global feature - colour of car. (It night
be argued that having classified the object - 'car' - the
most obvious feature, in terms of surface area on the
picture, is the colour)*^
(ii) (a) When car was occupied, that was reported as second feature.
(b) Apart from (a) (above) wheels reported as second feature,
(iii) Redundant feature, windows.
James (Garsj
No consistent strategy apparent, though colour of car was
favoured followed by 'wheels'. 'Windows' appeared as the last item in
messages.
Conclusions.
These results show a marked improvement on the performances in the
first pilot study. The material almost certainly had something to do
2
with this since, as hoped, it encouraged longer descriptions. Equally
important was the greater attention given to instructions including the
use of a second experimenter. It is difficult to ascertain the precise
contribution of the various procedural changes ana with only one pair
of subjects involved it would be unprofitable. The important outcome
was that the use of videotape playbacks made it possible to adopt what
seemed to be the most efficient method for future studies.
/
1. This argument should not be taken too literally. Idle largest area is
in fact the background colour of the card (white) or even the table
on which the card was lying. In any case size of surface area is
only one factor which might affect attention.
2, This may be an additional factor in explaining Krauss and Gluckberg's
(1967) results; when the items in a set have a common relationship
there is a greater chance of full descriptions of these iteni3 resulting.
When such a common identity is lacking- (or not perceived) as in Krauss
and Glueksberg*s task, full descriptions are unlikely.
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The legitimacy of inferring cognitive strategies from the limited
data available may be questioned. But it represents a potentially
useful way of assessing this form of behaviour. In the beginning' it
was pointed out that one of the hopes was that the pilot studies might
give some useful methodological pointers. It remains to follow tip
some of the trends emanating from these preliminary studies in experiments
using larger samples and different materials.
Before leaving the subject of strategies, a number of general
points are worth making. The young1 subjects transmit a great deal of
redundant information compared to the ideal represented in the *minimal
descriptions'. Yet, the totally superfluous attributes like doors and
windows sire almost always at the end of the descriptions. They appear as
•after-thoughts' tacked on to the end of messages. It may be that
the children realise that they are never-changing components which do
not affect discrimination, or they may be at the end simply because they
are the last attributes to be noticed.
In both sets of materials there is an attribute which is only
present in a minority (53/ ) of pictures - 'smoke' and 'driver*. It
nevertheless appears in all but two descriptions, i.e. 92, ♦ For these
children, at least, it seems just as necessary to report the absence of
an attribute as its presence. In terms of identification such negative
information is of little help, since it serves only to put the object
described into the majority group (i.e. those cards with no smoke or no
occupants). A more effective strategy viould be to report these 'occasional'
attributes only when they are present, implying that no mention means
not present. /hether this would be the tactic adopted by older children
or adults requires testing.
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of the task performance was the
length of the descriptions. In one area at least the children are
consistent, in that they give a full description in every instance. This
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Figure 5-1
The child's descriptive strategy contrasted
v/ith that based on the minimal description rule
Trial (picture choice)
O O = minimal description rule
S 9 - children's performance
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does not include the first message in the opening trials, probably
because the subject does not notice all the attributes in his first
attempt. But they settle on the standard description very quickly
and this remains the pattern throughout the experiment. If anything
is added to the standard description, it is incorporated into future
descriptions and appears in every one from then onwards. The contrast
between the young subjects performance and that governed by the Eiinimal
description rule is shown in Figure 3-1. While the minimal description
decreases in length as a function of trials, the children's
descriptions rise to a peak and then remain steady.
There is a piece of valuable supporting evidence which suggests
that the notion of strategies concerning such tasks i3 not merely
wishful thinking. While describing a picture in the cars session,
Janet was interrupted by her partner. She looked up, slightly irritated
by the interruption, and after mildly chastising the listener she bent
to the task again and said, 'colour first* followed oy the description
'Blue and white wheels end white windows*. The phrase 'colour first'
was said quietly but audibly to herself, and is taken to be a self
instruction to begin the report with the colour of the car. This finding
might be interpreted in the light of the Russian work on the role of
self-instruction in problem solving. The work of Luria (1959) suggests
that children of Janet's age would not be using such techniques, but it
may be that the method i3 both available and employed if the right sort
of task or activity is in progress. This is a question that will be
reconsidered.
Finally, what can be said about the cognitive functioning of the
children based on these pilot studies'? If, as speakers, they see the
task as saying as rauch as they can about a picture, then the communication
situation is superfluous. We • would • have some useful-data-pn3ibu«l research
but little else. But if they have some awareness of the demands of the
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situation, namely,that there is a listener needing certain information
in order to make a choice, then there may be grounds for saying that
the sort of higher order cognitive activity involved in problem solving
is talcing place, fhe evidence of the pilot study is,at the very least,
that the children have an awareness of their roles. Communication is
taking place sufficiently to suggest that the implications of riagetiaa
writing on egocentrism needs to be re-examined. This will be a prime
object in the succeeding studies.
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Chapter 4, Communication ■ Mlit, in a picture discrimination task.
Introduction
A question posed at the conclusion of the last section concerned
the cognitive level at which children were operating in the communication
situation. Did the children understand the nature of the task? Were
they motivated by a recognition that a co-operative endeavour was
required to complete the task successfully and that certain strategies
would he more effective than others in carrying out the operation? Or
was the communication incidental to the task as they saw it, namely;
describing a series of pictures? A tentative answer supporting the
view that an appreciation of communication was present has been given
hut, since the study was confined to one pair of subjects, it was
necessary to repeat the experiment with a larger sample under controlled
conditions.
Using the same material the design was revised to include a
preview session in which the subjects were asked to say siraply what they
saw in the pictures, presented one at a time, 'Phis was,in effect,
providing the situation referred to above - the perpetual operation which
is part of the communication task, but obviously a long' way short of the
complete behaviour. It was hoped that this would provide some measure
of the basic descriptive capacity against which the communication
performance could be compared. Putting it somewhat over-simply, if the
descriptions and strategies obtaining in the communication situation were
essentially the same as in the simplified preview situation, then there
would be roason to think that the children were not responding to the
demands of the communication condition. In Flavell's (1968) terms the
speaker would not be taking account of the 'listener's attributes',
which might require modifying the message to suit the new situation.
According to Olson (1970), the successful transmission of meaning is
only possible if the speaker takes full account of the particular context,
64
that is perceived or inferred alternatives, relating to his intended
communication, What is being suggested is that this preview task,
involving straightforward picture description, has little to do with
•}
meaning in Olson's sense of the term. We should expect to see a
change from preview to com:>unicati011 condition if the subject takes
account of the special circumstances involved in convening meaning,
which is really just another way of describing the communication
process.
Apart from this base-line factor, there is value in knowing what
features capture the attention of pre-school children when they are
describing pictures. How consistent are they in both the number of
attributes they report and the order in which they report them? Do
the attributes which change figure more prominently in their descriptions
than the unchanging attributes?
There are other differences between the preview and communication
situations besides the presence of another child in the second task.
The instructions are veiy different, being designed to encourage awareness
of the communication requirements in that condition. A crucial difference
already implied in the reference to Olson's theory, is that the
descriptions of cards in the eoiamunication situation takes place in the
prestmce of the other cards in the series, thus highlighting the
contrasts between the pictures, hut since the aim was to gain data and
compare the simplest situation with the standard communication set-up,
these differences were necessarily part of the comparison.
A variable which was not controlled was the precise effect of the
preview on the communication performance. Ideally a control group who
1. This is not to say that the task of describing pictures is totally
devoid of meaningJ The fact that the child describes one picture
rather than another is sufficient to illustrate this.
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did not have the preview condition would have been used to assess this
effect. The various methodological and sampling conditions which
governed this work have already been discussed and these prevented
the use of a control group. The prime purpose, therefore, was to
obtain a more representative picture of communication behaviour in a
situation such as that using the houses pictures.
Preview.
Method
Subjects, 18 children took part in the preview (7 female, 11 male)
with ages ranging from 39 months to $d months, the mean age for the
group being 47 months,
Materials. A set of six drawings of a house, front view, on white
cards three inches square. The houses were identical in terras of
proportions and features, but they varied on a number of dimensions,
detailed below.
Cards.
A Red house, white roof, smoke from chimney
B Red house, white roof, no sraoke from chimney
C Red house, black roof, no smoke from chimney
D Blue house, white roof, smoke from chimney
E Blue house, white roof, no smoke from chimney
F Blue house, black roof, no smoke from chimney
Also used were four sketches of cups, which varied in two aspects,
colour of cup and colour of handle;and which were used as a warm-up.
Procedure. Subjects were tested singly and shown the pictures one at
a time in a random order. The instructions were as follows: 'Look at
this picture. What is it? Can you tell me anything else about the
picture? Anything else? Anything else? etc,' until the child had
evidently finished his description. The set of cup pictures was used
as a warm-up followed by the houses set. The 3ession3 were videotaped
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and lasted about ten minutes.
Results
A simple content analysis of the descriptions revealed that two
main categories were involved,
(i) Component words, which referred to components of the picture,
eg, roof, windows, door, etc,
(ii) Colour words, which sometimes appeared alone, sometimes
qualified a component, and sometimes were accompanied by
the child pointing to a part of the picture.
Table 4-1 shows the number of component and colour words given by
each subject in the preview descriptions. The mean number of component
words reported (20.3) considerably exceeded the number of colour words
mentioned (8,0). A iilcoxen matched pairs signed-ranks test confirmed
that the difference was significant (T = 36, p C.05). A standard
description was constructed by including all those attributes
(components and colours) 'which appeared in at least 20;- of the
descriptions. Taking this criterion, the standard description is made
up of five components (window, door, chimney, roof, smoke/no 3moke) ;md
five colours (house, door, roof, chimney, windows). For the six
pictures this gives a total of 30 components and 30 colours, 60 descriptive
segments in all. This provides a guide in assessing the performances
set out in Table 4-1. The totals in the separate components and
colours columns should he compared to a standard total of 30, and the
combined total on the extreme right to the st;ndard of 60.
Ho subject reached the total standard but three (3s. 2, 4, 16)
obtained 70$, or just over, of the total. Looking at the two main
categories, three subjects exceeded or equalled the standard for
components (3 s 1, 2, 7) a^d another four exceeded 75'/ (3 - 3 9» 13t 10,
6). Only one subject (34) achieved the standard for colours, and one
other (315) managed 75/ • It is noticeable that these children were
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TABLE 4-1
Number of component and colour worda given by each
sub;')oot in preview descriptions of 6 pictures
COMPONENT CP COLOUR - C
SUBJECT AGE JORDS (CP) MEAN (T) tSORDS (C) MEAN (£) CP, + c
1 4j10 33 5.5 0 0 33
2 4:7 32 5.3 12(3) 2 44
3 4:6 18(5) 5.0 3(3) 0.5 21
4 4:6 6(4) 1.0 37 6.2 43
5 4:3 19 3.2 0 0 19
6 4:2 25 4.2 0 0 25
7 4:1 30 5.0 4(3) 0.7 34
8 4:0 20 3.3 16(5) 2.7 36
9 4:0 28 4.7 3(3) 0.5 31
10 3:10 26 4.3 2(2) 0.3 28
11 3:10 20 3.3 1(1) 0.2 21
12 3:7 19 3.2 1(1) 0.2 20
13 3:6 26 4.3 1(1) 0.2 27
14 3:5 21 3.5 0 0 21
15 3:5 7(3) 1.2 24 4.0 31
16 3:5 22 3.7 19 3.2 41
17 3s 3 8(3) 1.3 17 2.8 25
18 3:3 15 2.5 2(2) 0.3 17
Mean 20.8 5.5 8.0 1.3
Number in brackets indicates total number of cords described which
contained a component or colour word if less than 6
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the poorest performers in terms of number of components mentioned.
On the busis of this data it may be legitimate to talk about colour-
conscious and component-conscious perceivers. Into the former category
would fall 3s 4, 15t 17» while the majority of the subjects would be
classified as component orientated, most notably 3s 1, 6, 7» 9t 10, 13.
A further highlight on this dichotomy was that only one subject (316)
included more than 50/J of the items in both categories.
To be a successful communicator, it is necessary to include
those features which allow the listener to discriminate the selected
card. These critical attributes, as they have been called, include
colour of house, colour of roof and presence or absence of smoke. These
attributes transcend the boundaries of the component .aid colour
categories «•» both are involved. The fact that subjects choose to describe
pictures in terms of colour or parts of the picture, but not both, was
an unfavourable sign for good communication. A further breakdown of the
performances was necessary, however, before such a gloomy conclusion
could be drawn.
The critical attributes were so called because they were the only
features which changed and as such identified the picture. It might be
axpected that features that change would figure in the descriptions by
the children,since change or novelty ia thought to be a factor wixich
affects attention. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the
auditory modality C accoby 1967)* but some work has also been done on
visual attention (Vi/rpillot, 1968, I,'accoby and Hagen 1965). Table 4-2
shows, however, that this effect did not seem to be taking place in this
context. There were three critical attributes involved in any one
picture as shown at the top left of the Table. In the case of the colour
of the roof, both the component and the colour needed to be included if
the description was to be sufficient. It was largely because of this
that only two subjects achieved one description which contained all
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TABLE 4-2























1 0 0 2 2 33 0
2 3 2 3 8 44 1
3 3 0 0 3 21 0
4 5 1 3 9 43 0
5 0 0 0 0 19 0
6 0 0 2 2 25 0
7 1 1 6 8 34 0
8 1 3 1 5 56 0
9 3 0 4 7 31 0
10 2 0 1 3 28 0
11 1 0 0 1 21 0
12 1 0 0 1 20 0
13 1 0 1 2 27 0
14 0 0 5 5 21 0
15 3 1 0 4 31 0
16 1 6 2 9 41 1
17 6 1 1 8 25 0
18 2 0 4 6 17 0
TOTAL 33 15 35 83 5I7 2
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three discriminating features, Since there were six pictures in all,
and 18 subjects were tested, this was two out of a total possible of
108. Looking at the critical attributes in sum, 83 such attributes
were mentioned out of a total of all features identified in
descriptions of 517 5 critical attributes thus accounted for 16. ■ of the
total. Only two subjects included as many as half of the total number
of critical features, while nearly half the subjects managed fewer
than four such features in their descriptions. A statistic not
included in the table is that, of the 108 descriptions, 46 (425) did
not contain any critical attribute.
It transpired, then, that rather than pick out and report the
changing feature, these young children preferred to describe those
features which were unchanging like door, roof and windows. A
remarkable 845 of their output fell into this category. Table 4-3 shows
that the features report ed most often, in nearly every description, wore
windows, door and chimney, which are constants. Roof was reported on
6&p of occasions but colour of roof, which is critical, only 25,. The
contrast in frequency between components and colours is again shown
clearly. It should be pointed out that this table includes only the
main features described. In sum, more than twenty separate aspects were
picked out.
To return to critioal attributes - these remain the key to
successful communication. Althou$i there was no pressure or necessity
to report these features in the preview situation, the degree to which
they figured was of interest not only in predicting performance in the
subsequent communication session but also as a clue to young children's
visual perception and attention. A question to be asked was - when
critical attributes did appear, were they at the beginning of the report?
It has already been pointed out that 3ince the cards were presented one
by one, the uiff rences between them were not available as a direct
I'ABLB 4-5
Frequency distribution of main picture attributes expressed as
percentage of totalnumber of descriptions (n) where (n) = 108
ii/indows 88 Co lour of house .
Door 85 Colour of roof ..
Chimney 82 Colour of door ..
Roof 68 Colour of chimney
Smoke/no smoke ......... 33 Colour of window
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comparison. But, if the showing of successive cards led the child to
recognise the critical attributes as distinguishing features, it might
be expected that he would report them first. In a communication task
the mo3t efficient strategy would be to report them first (and
exclusively). Inspection of the data revealed that $8 out of the 85
critical attributes appeared at the beginning of the report. Thus
Mien they were noticed there was a tendency in the ratio 2s1 to report
such information at the start of descriptions.
Although critical attributes did not play a large part in the
preview descriptions, another possible indication of a strategy,
discussed in the previous chapter, was the reporting of the attributes
in a consistent find systematic order. Table 4-4 contains data pertinent
to this question. For each subject a modal order of attributes has
been calculated, based on the modal position in which attributes in
all six descriptions appeared. So for 31 the order R.C.S(2). J.D. means
that the pictures were usually described in the order roof, chimney,
smoke, window and door. The figure in brackets indicates how many times
the attribute was reported when less than six.
Because Table 4-4- is based on modal positions it does not indicate
the degree of consistency achieved by the subjects in their order of
report. In fact no subjects were consistent, though some achieved three
or four identical descriptions among the six given, notably 3 s 2, 9»
and 13. let, although subjects could not be called consistent in the
sense of following an identical order for every description, there was
evidence of a pattern. It can be seen that Roof, Chimney, Window and
Door are the main features reported. Many subjects reported Roof and
Chimney (find sometimes Smoke) - the 'upper* attributes - in successive
positions, while Door and Window - the 'lower' attributes - also had
a high probability of adjacent report.
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TALLE 4-4
Liodal order of reporting attributes (preview)
subject position
1 2 3 4 5
1 R C S(2) W D
2 W D R C S
5 W D R C
4 R s(5) C D w
5 D C R
6 ,fr R D C S(2)
7 S D W c R
8 R(4) V c D(4)
9 S D w R C
10 c W D R
11 w D r C
12 c R W D
13 w D C R S(2)
14 s C w d
15 D W C(4) R
16 D R C W S(2)
17 R(2) 1*4) C(2) 1(4)
18 S w D(2)
TOTALS t
R 4 3 3 5 1 16
C 2 2 7 5 1 17
:w 6 4 4 3 1 18
2 8 3 4 1 18
's 4 1 0 0 4 9
R a Roof j C a Chimney| W « Window; 1) » Poor; S « Smoke
Figures in parentheses indicate nhen feature not reported for every
picture, i.e. less than 6. (For explanation, 3ee text)
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The question of which set of attributes was reported first is
open. Inspection of Table 4-4 shows that as many trials were started
with a lower attribute as vdth an upper one. Individual subjects did
tend to favour either a Lower * Upper order of report (Ss 2, 5, 5,
15* 17* 13* 11) or an Upper > Lower (SI, 4* 14* 12). Presumably
if accurate eye movement films could have been made similar to those
made by Vurpillot (1969)* they would have shown some subjects scanning
the top half of the picture first, reporting attributes as they were
noticed, then switching to the bottom portion of the house. Others
would have functioned in the opposite direction.
Some fell into neither pattern, and operated on a U ) L ^ U
plan. S s 7 & 9 are examples of this. They began with Smoke, then
switched to reporting Door and ./indow, before returning to Roof and
Chimney. It could be that the possible 'action* properties of smoke,
mentioned in the previous chapter, caught the attention of these
children, and superceded all other features. After that, they operated
on a Lower-Upper perceptual plain.
The pattern followed by five subjects (6,8, 10, 18, 16) does not
fit into any of the above categories and probably represents a random
movement between various portions of the picture
Summary of Preview Fine-lags
1. Subjects tended to report parts of the picture or colours in the
picture hut seldom an equal proportion of "both. Since successful
communication required inclusion of loth categories, colour or
component consciousness did not augur well for communication
performance.
2. The children much preferred to talk about those features of pictures
which remained constant rather than the changing or critical
features.
3. ,7hen the changing aspects were included in descriptions they tended
to be reported first.
4. Features that wore topographically adjacent were reported as a
group, and the strategy was to report the lower and upper cluster
of features separately, with the lower attributes tending to be
described first.
5* Despite the simple nature of the material, over twenty separate




Following a trial run with the cup pictures (see below), ten of
the original eighteen subjects were found suitable for use in the
communication experiment.^ They were diviued into pairs, matched for
age, which ranged from 41 months to 53 months, average age, 50 months.
The subjects faced each other seated at a table. The experimenter
was seated at the side of the table, flanking both children. The
twelve picture cards, two copies of each type, were laid face up one
at a time between the subjects so that the matching pairs were
adjacent. The experimenter pointed out the matching nature of the
two sets, but nothing about the differences within them. Then the
children were satisfied they had equivalent arrays, each set was moved
across and placed in a random order in front of the respective children.
6" high screens wore placed behind the cards so that they were hidden
from the cliild opposite, but the children remained in full view of one
another.
Instructions
In the following instructions, Jack is the hypothetical listener and
Jill the speakers 'This is a game you play together. I want you to
help each other. Jill you do that? Will you help Jack, Jill, and
will you help Jill, Jack?
*Kow, you both have the same pictures in front of you, don't you?
Jack's pictures are just like Jill's pictures. In this game we take
it in turns to go first. You go first this time Jill. I want you to
choose one of the pictures and then tell Jack which picture you have
1. Selection criteria have necessarily to be severe, since in the
communication situation, a non-participating child means the
loss of two subjects.
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chosen. But you raust not show the pictures to Jack, and Jack, you
must not show your pictures to Jill. Jack, I want you to listen
carefully to Jill and see if you can pick out, from your pictures,
the picture that she chooses.'
'How, which one are you going to choose, Jill? That one! How
tell Jack which one you have chosen, but don't show him. Jack, listen
carefully to what Jill says.'
'How, Jack, which one do you think Jill has chosen? That one?
Let's see shall we?*
At this point the subjects were asked to place their selected
pictures face down in the centre of the table. The pictures were then
turned up. E asked, 'Are they the same? Is this picture just like this
picture?' When unlike pictures were adjudged the same, E said: 'Are
you sure? Look at them carefully, is this picture just like this
picture.' If the children still ftilled to see the difference, E said
'No, they are not the same, do you know why?' If no reason was forth¬
coming E pointed out the difference, the pictures were returned behind
the screens and the speaker was asked to choose again. If, however, a
correct choice was made, the pictures were left in the centre of the
table. The listener became the new speaker and the procedure was
continued, the children alternating as speaker and listener until all
the pictures had been successfully identified.
A second trial was given in which the child who had been the
listener in the first communication of trial 1, acted as speaker for the
1first message and then alternated as before. The session was terminated
at the completion of this trial.
1. In fact the second trial was given to only two of the five pairs.
One trial was judged to have toxe4 sufficiently the concentration
of the remaining children. (See Table 4-8).
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Introductory session
Since the communication situation was a novel one for the children,
they needed a certain amount of encouragement and help initially. For
this reason subjects had. a separate introductory communication session
using items from a different picture set: the cups that were used in the
preview, The procedure was as described above, but with the experimenter
playing an instigating role where necessary. Thus, if the children
seemed disinclined or unable to communicate, the experimenter would
suggest the following:
'Tell Jack what you see in your picture. Tell him about your
picture, so that he can choose the same one from his pictures.'
To the listener: 'You can talk to Jill if you like, Jack. You
can ask her questions if you like. Help each other so that you choose
the same picture.*
Despite such help, some children showed that they were unable to
understand the purpose of the task and their role in it. Accordingly
they were not asked to take part in the main experiment. As noted
earlier, eight of the original pool were dropped for thi3 reason. The
communication pairs were made up on the basis of performances in the
introductory session which will not othervdse be discussed further.
Results
The results fall into two parts:
1. A comparison of the performances in the communication task
with those in the preview condition.
2. The children's ability as communicators, which, as in the
second pilot study, depended on their appreciation of the
critical factors involved.
In the preview session a contrast showed up in fcke Runb&r of
colour and component words reported. It appeared there were colour-
conscious and component-conscious subjects. Both types of attribute
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are necessary in adequate communication and this fact seems to he
reflected in the results. Table 4-5 shows that the mean number of
colour words reported rose from 1.69 to 2.6, while the mean number
of component words reported dropped from 3.67 to 3.3. A .,'ilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranka test was conducted on these results and
neither difference was found to be significant, though in the case of
colour words, 8 out of 10 subjects showed an increase. 'The overall
effect was to reduce the disparity between the number of component
and colour words rexported. Subjects no longer fall so clearly into
the colour conscious or component conscious categories.
This trend is supported in the critical attributes data. Table
4-6 shows that the mean number of critical attributes re orted increased
from 0.93 "to 1.76. This difference was significant (p <.005).
Inspection of Table 4-6 shows that many of the increases were marked,
in some instances doubling the preview 3core. It also appears that
the size of the increase was governed by the original number of
critical attributes included in the preview situation. To test the
strength of this relationship a Spearman rho was calculated and the
obtained value of +O.56 was significant at the .05 level. This
correlation would have been higher, but for two factors working against
each other. The one subject (32) to show a fall in critical attributes
was paired with 31, the poorest performer, so tending to bring down
32*s score, while the subject to show the highest rise (35) from 0 to
2.1 was paired with the best performer (S4) which may have led 35 to
score above her true ability.
Table 4-7 shows the frequency of report of the main attributes.
The preview figures fire included for comparison. The pattern stays as
it was, component attributes taking precedence over colour attributes,
but there are notable differences of degree. This is mo3t clearly
reflected in the range statistics. In the preview it was from 19 to 88,
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T:ag,p 4-5
Moan number of componenta .md colour attributes
per description as function of condition
Subject
COMPONENTS COLOURS TOTAL
Preview Coniaunicat ion Preview Communication Preview Communication
1 5.5 3.25 0 1.4 2.75 2.3
2 5.3 2.6 2.0 2.7 3.65 2.65
3 3.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.75 0.65
15. 1.2 1.5 4.0 1.0 2.6 1.25
4 1.0 4.1 6.2 4.5 3.6 4.3
5 3.2 2.9 0 4.3 1.6 4.1
7 5.0 3.4 0.7 3.6 2.85 3.5
9 4.7 3.1 0.5 2.75 2.6 3.0
8 3.3 3.75 2.7 3.75 3.0 3.75
10 4.3 4.2 0.3 1.0 2.3 2.6
T 36.70 33.10 16.9 26.0 26,70 20.10
M 3.67 3.3 1.69 2.6 2.67 2.81
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TABLE 4-6
Lean number of critical attributes per description














Comparison of all main attributes reported
in Communication mid Preview conditions.
Figure3 expressed as percentages of the total number of attributes
it was possible to mention in each case.
Attribute Communication Preview






Colour of door 52 25
Colour of windows 49 19
Colour of roof 46 25
Colour of chimney 42 20
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a range of 69. In communication it is 42 to 77j a range of 35* She
range has therefore halved and accordingly reduced the dominance of
some attributes over others. Redundant features like door and windows
continue to play a major role but their inclusion is not automatic as
it once was. An important change is that two critical attributes now
assume a much more prominent position, colour of house and smoke, and
even colour of roof appears in nearly half the descriptions. This
provides support and background to the data given in Table 4-6. One
of the effects of the communication situation appears to be to bring
the critical features to the fore. This must now be considered in the
context of the communication performances.
The children as communicators
The criterion of success in a communication task varies according
to the role played. A speaker* s ability is measured by the adequacy
of his message - in terms of the current task, does the message contain
sufficient information to enable the listener to discriminate the chosen
picture from the set of pictures? A message which fulfils this
requirement is called an adequate description. Inspection of Table 4-8
shows that only two subjects (7, 8) were uniformly successful with their
messages and two others came close to this performance (5, 9). At the
other end of the scale one subject (1) failed to achieve a single
adequate description. (It should be pointed out that 'last* pictures are
not included in the data . It is impractical to talk about an adequate
description in the case of the final picture, where no discrimination on
the part of the listener is required). Two other subjects (3, 15)
managed only one adequate description each. Looking at the results overall,
in terms of speaker effectiveness, 30 out of 66 messages (45/) were
adequate. Thus in this small sample over half the descriptions given by
the children did not enable their listening partners to make the correct
choice of picture.
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She index of listener effectiveness is the choice of the correct
picture. A priori this would see; to he a function of message adequacy(
hut -Table 4-8 alios® that tills was not the cose, The 35 correct choices
were made despite only 30 adequate descriptions. Chance was obviously
playing a pert. This overall result is distorting the true picture
since the 30 adequate descriptions did not all yield correct choices,
TABLE 4-8
Abilities of children as a|>eaker QX& listener
in the coutmtideation situation
SPEAKER LISTENER







(4 9 5 2 7 5)
A ( ■ )
(5 4 3 ! 3 1 4)
(2 3 fl 3 0 1)
B ( H )
(1 2 0 2 0 25
(2 8 3 2 6 1)
B < )
(1 8 0 3 5 2)
(7 5 5 3 2 9)
c ( )
(9 3 2 2 1 7)
(7 3 3 3 0 9)
c ( )
(9 2 1 2 0 75
<3 5 1 3 2 15)
D ( 5
(15 6 1 2 4 35
(8 3 3 2 1 10)
E ( )
(10 5 2 3 2 8)
TOTAL 66 30 35 31
*See note at top of next page
*As previously explained, only two pairs took part in a second trial.
Shis gave 7 trials in all. Since each trial consisted of five
pictures to be discriminated (ignoring the last item), that gave a
total of 35 items to be described and selected. Because a trial was
only completed when all pictures had been correctly identified, this
necessarily gave a total of 35 correct selections by the listeners
(column 4). The total number of descriptions was greater than this
because not all messages were adequate, and even when they were they did
not always lead to a correct choice by the listener, 'i'his required
that fresh descriptions were given until the correct choice was made.*
Table 4-9 shows the extent of the variability. Ten of the 30
adequate descriptions were not identified correctly. A majority of the
subjects made at least one error, with one (35) having more wrong than
right. Only one subject (37) was consistently accurate in this regard
since the others without error (S s 2, 15« 3) were given little or no
opportunity for error by their partners (i.e. the speakers communicated
either one or no adequate descriptions). Thus, of the 35 correct
choices, 15 were based on inadequate descriptions and, as such, amounted
to guess-work. (As pointed out in the pilot study, however, the guess
work may be more or less systematic since an inadequate description may
contain one critical attribute on which the listener can base his
decision. Further, those pictures chosen correctly might also havo been
subject to chance, since even with the full set of six, there is a
0.17 probability of getting the right answer by chance. 'I'his
probability increases as the pool diminishes).
.hen the results of the pilot study were discussed, the question
of strategy was raised. The full data is not given here for reasons of
space but the order of report for each subject is summarised in Table 4-10.
From this it may be deduced that subjects had some recognition of the
priority of the critical features. Signified by the letters H, 3 and
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table -4- .9
Distribution of correct and, incorrect choices
by listener as a function of description adequacy by speaker
type op description
Listener adequate inae;equate Speaker
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
(4 2 1 1 0 5)
( )
(5 2 3 0 4 4)
(1 2 2 3 4 2)
( )
(2 0 0 5 5 1)
(7 5 0 1 1 9)
( )
(9 6 2 0 0 7)
(8 1 1 2 1 10)
( )
(10 2 1 0 0 8)
(5 1 0 1 4 15)
( )
(15 1 0 2 2 3)
Correct 20 15 35




lodal order of ro^ortin^ attributes
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 Preview
1 II C R D V RSCWD
2 8 H D 9 R c VfflRCS
3 H WDRC
4 S C R H W D RSCDW
5 H S R f c D WDCR
7 R s H D w SD'WCR
8 S R I D RWCD
9 H S R C D SDWRC
10 H R C 3 D S(2) CWDR
15 H W DWCR
TOTALS T
H 6 1 1 1 0 0 9
D 0 0 1 3 2 2 8
1 0 1 1 3 3 8
S 3 3 0 0 0 1 7
R 1 2 4 0 1 0 8
C 0
.
2 1 1 1 1 6
Rotations
H = Colour of house C = Chimney
R * Roof (and colour) D » Door
S - Smoke/no smoke W « Windows
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R in the table, it will be seen that these attributes largely occurred
at the beginning of reports. 'House colour' nominated the first
position and 'smoke' tended to be in first or second position, 'Roof
and its colour was also reported in one of the first three positions,
the
in seven out of/eight cases where it was mentioned at all. The
order of reporting critical (H, S, R) and non-critical (C, ,7, D)
attributes was compared. For this purpose subjects were given scores
based on the positions in which they reported features. An attribute
reported at the beginning of a description, position 1, received a
score of 6, and the weighting decreased successively down to a score of
1 for attributes reported in position 6. In this way a total score for
each subject for the two sets of features was compiled. A Wilcoxen
matchecl-pairs signed-ranks test showed that the difference was highly
significant, (p<.001)
The descriptions also contained the non-changing redundant
features and,as has already been stated, these were very consistent
components in the speaker's messages. For this reason there is no
question of the children operating with a strategy that compares to the
rule for minimal descriptions (see page54 * Pilot Study 2). There is
never any evidence of descriptions decreasing in length as the sise of
the picture pool diminished.
All that can be said with confidence is that the main effect of
the communication situation was to bring the ex'itical features to the
speaker's attention, and hence the beginnings of behaviour appropriate
to successful communication was making its appear nee.
To put the above statement in context it is worthwhile at this
point to consider some of the behaviour that typifies the children's
performance in this task.
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Individual : cecords
In the comiaxmication situation an individual's performance can
only he discussed in relation to his partner in the dyad, since success¬
ful communication is dependent on the complementary roles of speaker
and listener, Since each speaker (or listener) only performed this
role with one other child any conclusions drawn can relate only to this
limited situation.
Some general points can be made. Much behaviour in this situation
might be considered, after Piaget (1926), egocentric, Children would
often point at the part of the picture to which they were referring
and 3ay 'That's black', apparently not realising that the other child
could not see what was being referred to. The pointing behaviour
itself might not be simply egocentric, but an aid to the child in
systematically progressing through the various parts of the picture as
he made his description.
The experimenter himself had a communication problem in this task -
that of transmitting the instructions. It was evident that these had
not always been comprehended. One subject appeared only to understand
hor role as a speaker, so that when her partner completed a description
to her as listener, instead of selecting the picture to which she
believed it referred, she began a description of the picture of her
choice. Apart from the inadequacy of descriptions, many of the failures
in communication were seen to be on the listener's part. His was the
passive role and, as might be expected, young children were not always
inclined to sit quietly and listen attentively, especially if the
child on the other side of the table was carrying out the more
stimulating job of describing a picture. It wan noted that on some
occasions the listener had made his choice of picture when the speaker
had only just begun his message, suggesting that the choice was quite
independent of the description. At other tiiaos a listener, having
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heard the message, might make a choice, aad then, apparently arbitrarily,
change his mind and select a different picture. It appears therefore
that even if he was aware of his part in the task, the listener had
difficulty in subordinating his ovm desires to the requirements of the
task.
Further evidence that the children had not appreciated the
essential skills of the communication task is provided by their behaviour
on the ultimate picture in a trial, When both members of the dyad had
one picture left, since they had been shown originally that the sets
were identical and that the pictures discarded were the same, then it
was necessary that the pictures which remained would also be identical*
As such communication was unnecessary. The young children did not
appear to appreciate the logical necessity of this situation and
proceeded to give the usual full description for the final picture,
('Whether this was a failure in comprehension of instructions or a basic
inability dependent on developmental level is open to question and will
be discussed below^)
Though the subjects were encouraged to ask questions of each other,
little or no communication of this sort took place. No subject ever
asked his partner for further information if the message received was
inadequate. The nearest approach to this was when one subject responded
to the first description of her partner with the query? 'Not a roof?'
This is significant for it shows that the child was listening to the message
and checking it off against the pictures in front of her, such that she
noticed an omission. Her partner seemed to pick up the same behaviour
towards the end of the session. In neither case, however, were the
references to critical attributes. Those exchanges that did take plane
between subjects were usually between trials. A common activity was
counting aloud the number of pictures in front of the subject. Both
members of the dyad tended to do this, one echoing the other. It
90
appeared to give them a lot of amusement, much laughter ensuing on each
occasion.
To conclude discussion of this study, and in an attempt to impose
some sort of order on a profusion of data, a 'balance sheet' has been
drawn up. The assets of this balance are 'good communication and
what gives rise to it', while the debit side looks at what characterises
poor communication (see 4-11). Taking this as a blueprint, the next
stage of the research was to try to tie down some of the factors which
were thought to underly this aspect of cognitive behaviour. The next
section, therefore, represents a dissection of the communication task
and some testable hypotheses which grew out of it.
TftBLb 4-11
Connuni cation Balance Sheet
ASSETS
In terms of the performances in the present study
is marked by;
1. Adequate descriptions, i.e. inclusion of critical attributes in
message.
2. Critical attributes appearing at beginning of report.
3. Tendency to leave out irrelevant attributes.
4. Lack of bias in favour of colour attributes or 'components'.
5. Co-operation between subjects - exchanges which lead to modification
of description.
6. As listener, attention to message, measured by correct choice
after adequate descriptions.
LIABILITIES
Poor communication is marked by;
1. Inadequate descriptions, i.e. lack of critical attributes in messages.
2. Failure to emphasise critical attributes - located in middle of
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rambling message,
3. Inclusion of irrelevant attributes,
4. Bias in favour of colours or components.
5. 'Egocentric* behaviour (1) Pointing at picture
(2) Stating colour without specifying referent
6. Failure to perceive differences in pictures sdien a mismatch.
7. Inability to profit from feedback, when cause of mismatch pointed
out,
8. Basic misunderstanding of task - traated as game of choosing and
talking about pictures, 2-roie aspect ignored,
9. Errors in choosing by listener despite adequate description.
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Chapter 5 Four studies investigating some of the skills involved
in Comuunlcation
The main findings of the preliminary research were summarised in
the 'balance sheet' presented at the end of the previous section. They
provided a starting point for the subsequent research programme.
Perhaps the first thing to note was that the results thus far were
hopeful. In terras of error scores young children perforated these tasks
much better than theories of role taking and egocentrism would predict.
Communication in pre-school children seemed to be an area worth
investigating. At the same time the way in which the majority of subjects
engaged in the tusks was inefficient, and a number of them did not seem
to appreciate the type of problem they were engaged upon.
There seem to be two issues here, one relating to the level of
3kill possessed to carry out the task, and the other concerning an
understanding of what the task involved. For instance,one may understand
perfectly the rules of the game of bridge or tennis, yet perforai poorly
at these games because of deficiencies in some or all of the abilities
required. These abilities are usually more clearly defined in physical
task3 than mental ones, but such activities resist analysis because in
breaking them down the essence of the behaviour, which is the totality,
is liable to be lost. This has not prevented psychologists, in
particular, trying to do this, and some attempts to analyse communication
behaviour were discussed in the opening chapter.
Returning to the comprehension aspect, a minimal linguistic
knowledge must usually be assumed, but unfortunately language is a
notoriously poor method of instruction especially for children
inexperienced in the medium. .hen we wish to explain someone's role in
a game, even as simple as tiddlywinks, it is much more effective to
illustrate by example or .Let the beginner learn by active participation.
The student of behaviour is in a dilemma because he wants to
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measure the real level of the child's competence to carry out a
particular act, without biasing the result through the method used to
describe the said act. Jith children this hope is probably a forlorn
one, though in some cases intelligent observation can compensate for
the limitations which we tire almost bound to occur in even the most
carefully planned presentation. This is not the place to go into the
many ways in 'which psychologists have sought to overcome the problems
of investigating their own kind, instead it will simplify the
discussion if it is confined to the type of task used in these
communication studies.
Although it has been argued that language is inefficient, it
cannot be avoided because it is so central in communication, borne of
the more obvious difficulties can be eliminated if in the preparation
of instructions it is not automatically assumed that the meaning of words,
even very simple ones, is shared by the experimenter and subject. The
onus is on the experimenter to provide instructions free from obscurity
and ambiguity which set out the subject's duties clearly, without doing
the task for him. They have to prime the subject but not manipulate
him. However diligently prepared, instructions will be ineffective if the
recipient does not listen to them. It is often difficult to know if
failure is due to basic raisunderstanding or lack of attention. Despite
these difficulties, the importance of instructions is stressed and in
future work, attention was paid to making instructions as clear as
possible. In this connection videotapes were invaluable, since a set
of instructions could be tried on a subject and the effect noted in an
analysis of the tape. PollovTing this they could be revised, re-run and,
if necessary, revised again.
A special problem in giving instructions in the communication
situation was that two subjects were involved. Apart from the additional
exciteraent and obvious distraction this produced, a situation arose
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where,for much of the time,the experimenter had to address himself to
either the speaker or the listener when he was outlining those
particular roles. Accordingly, the other child was liable to withdraw
his attention, became bored and a greater source of distraction to his
partner, ,/ith two children it was also more difficult for the
experimenter to be sure that his instructions were understood.
Another proposal, therefore, was that some tasks 'would be ueviaed where
the experimenter operated with single subjects, playing the role of the
partner himself. Apart from providing a better environment for
administering instructions and gauging their efficacy, this would enable
the experimenter to play the role of the 'ideal* speaker or listener.
The performance of the children could be assessed in situations where
as listeners they would be given clear, adequate, but minimal
descriptions, and as speakers they would have a listener who provided
feedback end generally fulfilled his role.
It will be evident by now that the distinction made between under¬
standing what is involved in a task and having the necessary skills to
carry it out is a blurred one. The methods discussed above for putting
across the roles involved will necessarily contribute to the skills
needed to play those roles. But it is possible to distinguish two
abilities which are required for successful performances.
Keeping to the type of task already used, an obvious requirement is
that the subject should notice the differences between the objects or
pictures used. Unless he perceives these differences and communicates
the® he is bound to fail as a speaker. A fairly simple experiment is
proposed where the child's task is to judge whether two pictures are
the same or different, and to support his judgement. No communication
will be involved.
The other factor which appears to be relevant is the conservation
of number. The child needs to recognise that two sets which are
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adjudged equ 1 at the start remain equivalent as long as the
operation carried out on any one set is also carried out on the
other. In the houses task, for example, pictures were removed from
equivalent sets when they matched. Accordingly, the remaining
piles of pictures remained equivalent in terns of number and identity.
A task was specially devised to discover the importance of this
cognitive ability in the type of situation generally used.
On the basis of the empirical data and observations made during
the performances, a number of suggestions have been made concerning
the factors involved in communication and some of the possible
reasons for fiiilure. This chapter will describe a series of
experiments whose aim was to break down the communication task into
some of its component skills. They have been referred to above as
conservation, perception of differences, comprehension of instructions
and an examination of the individual roles of speaker find listener.
This by no means exhausts the communication task. Because it is a
dynamic interaction process it resists being broken down into
component parts. Many of the problems, if problems they are, are those
which arise in the course of interaction between people. Differences
in personality, intelligence, age, sex and home environment will
all have an influence on the exchange, but it was not the purpose
of this study to investigate those variables. It must suffice to
say that one should be aware of them when interpreting findings.
Study I - Perception of differentiating; attributes - sane/different
.judgements
In the type of task used in the experiments described, a failure to note
those attributes which distinguished one picture or object from the re3t in
the set, seriously affected a child's ability to communicate, To find out to
what extent limitations of this sort might handicap communication behaviour,
a simple pair comparison task was set up. This required subjects to judge
whether two similar pictures were the same or different. Vurpiilot (1968)
found that very young children have no definite criteria of same and
different. In a picture judgement task where eye movements were
recorded, she found that their scanning was random and that their answers
were unrelated to the information collected. 'Towards the age of five they
were able to define 'sameness' as the existence of a common element and
'difference' as the absence of a common element, hut their se rches were
not exhaustive nor did they take account of the location of attributes.
Vurpiilot used presentations of houses each with six winnows, the
houses differing according to what appeared in the windows. These
pictures were rather complex, probably to provide a sufficiently
stimulating task for the upper age range of her sample which was from
5 to years of age. The pictures used in the present experiment were
essentially the same as those used in the earlier 'houses' task, (Chapter 4),
that is, they differed on the dimensions of colour, form and 'existence*
(i.e. whether or not something was there). To gain some idea of the
information on which the children were basing their decisions, and lacking
Vurpiilot's eye-movement recording apparatus, they were asked, following
their judgements, why the pictures were the same (or different). It was
hoped this would give a fair idea of the extent to which the critical
attributes, vital to successful communication, were perceived by the
children.
Donaldson and Wales (1970) have reported some work on the acquisition
of the terms 'same' and 'different'. The findings showed that most
children interpreted 'different' as they did 'some'. When asked to
choose from a set of objects one that was 'different in some way' from
a standard, they chose objects which wore either identical or same in
at least one aspect, although objects different in all respects were
available. It appeared that'same' and 'different' were being
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treated as synonyms. Donaldson and ./ales suggest other possible
explanations which need not concern us now, but, as an attempt to
overcome the difficulty, the term 'not same' has been preferred to
'different*. A study by Foubister (1971) used both 'different' and
'not same' in a classification task and reported greater evidence of
understanding with the negative form.
A further innovation in the procedure was the U3e of a bell/buzzer
device with which the child could make his judgement. Such a device
had been used with the 3ame children in a task requiring true/false
judgements, and it had been found that a non-verbal means of response
was particularly effective -with children who were aisinclined to
respond verbally. Indeed once they had learned the labels attached to
the bell and buzzer they seemed to acquire confidence and, somewhat
paradoxically, increased verbalisation resulted. (See Donaldson, 1971)•
It was further hoped that the use of such apparatus would eliminate
some of the ambiguity that was bound to be present in instructions
concerning the notion of 'same' and 'not same*. If, by careful training,
the children could learn to attach the 'ding-dong* sound to situations
where objects or pictures were identical and the 'beep' sound to
situations where there were one or more differences, it was believed
the task would be simplified. Since no systematic study of the
comprehension of '3ame' and 'not same' had been done, which incorporated
a motor response judgement without eliminating verbalisation, it was
thought the experiment night have additional benefits,
draining Programme.
Twenty-one children took part in two training sessions in which
they learned to attach the label SAME to the ding-dong button and NOT
1. The use of the terms 'ding-dong' and 'beep' was not a concession to
childish whins, but the onlj descriptions that were considered to be
appropriate to the sounds produced. The terms 'bell' and 'buzzer' had
already been applied to different sounds in an earlier study to
denote 'right' and 'wrong'. Ho confusion or negative transfer
seemed to result from this.
98
SAME to the beep button. (The buttons and bell housings for the two
sounds were very different in appearance). The materials to be
judged were small familiar objects, mostly toys. The HOT SAME
presentations included differences of class, eg. Matchbox/Duck;
colour, e.g. House with red roof/House with blue roof} form, e.g. Red
jeep/Red saloon car; 'existence', e.g. Horse with rider/Horse without
rider.
mince most of the children were familiar with a bell/busser type
of apparatus it was a fairly straightforward task to train them in
its use. By introducing pairs of toys with gross differences in the
early trials, contrasted with identical pairs of objects, the SAME/NOT
SAME dichotomy was established. In the tvra sessions 24 such pairs were
presented, eight of which were SAME* There was a tendency to make the
judgement SAME as long as there was at least one similar attribute.
'This was in line with the reported findings of Donaldson and Wales (1970).
But all of the subjects clearly demonstrated that they had discriminated
the ding-dong and beep and understood its function. Pour of the younger
children almost exclusively judged pairs as SAME, but as they appeared
to appreciate the ding-dong/beep distinction, it seemed justified to let
them take part in the experiment proper.
Method
Materials
Twelve drawings of teddy bears were used (a set of six repeated)
on white card (3" square) varying in three features: red coat/blue coat,
cap/top hat, stick/no stick. So as to be comparable with the houses set
of pictures used in the previous study, each set was made up as follows:
A Stick, red coat, cap
B Ho stick, red coat, cap
C Ho stick, red coat, top hat
D Stick, blue coat, cap
E No stick, blue coat, cap
P No stick, blue coat, top hat
Procedure
The twelve pictures formed twenty-one pairs including six SAME
(e.g. AA) and fifteen NOT SAME (e.g. AB). These were presented in a
different random order for each subject, but always began with two trial
presentations ('same* and 'not same') to ensure that the subject was
competent with the signalling apparatus.
The instructions were as follows: 'You've seen this ding-dong
and beep before, haven't you? which is the ding-dong? Yes. Let me
hear the beep. Good. Now, what do you do when I show you two things
which are the same? Yes, you press the ding-dong button. And when I
show you two things which are not the same, what do you do? Yes, you
press the beep button'.
•Now, I am going to show you pictures of two teddy bears.
Sometimes the teddies will be the same all over, sometimes they won't
be the same. I want you to look very carefully and to press the ding-dong
if they are the same and the beep if they are not the same'. At this
point the two trial pairs were presented (later to be included in the
task proper). Subjects were given guidance on these trial pairs so as
as
to be/certain as possible that they understood the requirements of the
task.
'The first two teddies I'm going to show you tire not the same.
What do you press? Look and see if you can tell me where they are not
the same'. If the subject did not report the difference, the experimenter
pointed it out. 'The two teddies I'm going to show you now are the
same. .hat do you press? Look and see if you can tell me why they are
any
the same'. The experimenter pointed out/of the identical main features
which the child failed to mention. 'Now I am not going to tell you if
the next teddies are the same or not the same. Look carefully and press
the ding-dong if they are the same, and the beep if they are not the
sane'. She subject then proceeded to the task proper. If after
presentation, he pressed the ding-dong', the experimenter said,
'This picture and this picture are the same, are they?* This gave the
child an opportunity to change his response if he wished. After a
beep the experimenter said 'This picture and this picture are not the
same then?' hatever the response, the child was asked to justify his
judgement, e.g. 'Can you tell me why this picture and this picture are
not the same?' or more commonly "Why?* directly after the judgement.
Although only one difference is necessary to justify a NOT SAKE
judgement, the subject was always further asked ' Anything else not the
same?' until he replied in the negative. This allowed him the opportunity
to mention all the differentiating attributes which occurred to him.
The study required two sessions both of which were videotaped.
Results and discussion
Subjects were scored in two main categories:
1. Making same/not same judgements
2. Perceiving and reporting differentiating attributes
The most efficient strategy for making judgements would seem to
require a search along the dimensions of the picture. At first the
subject would not be aware of which dimensions changed. It could he
colour of coat, size of head, length of walking stick or any number of
things, A systematic scanning of the pictures is therefore required,
comparing each attribute in picture 1 with its corresponding feature in
picture 2, and making the decision SAME or NOT SAME on the basis of this
information. By this criterion a NOT SAME judgement should be reached
more quickly, since it can be made as soon as one difference is found. In
contrast SAME judgements demand a complete search of the pairs until the
subject is satisfied there are no differences.
The above assumes that subjects will follow the hypothejisa^
101
rational or adult strategy. It is already known from the studies
quoted (Donaldson and /ales, 1970, Vurpillot, 1968) that young
children do not necessarily follow the adult procedure. If, despite
instructions, the child was basing all judgements on similarities,
then any two corresponding attributes which were perceived as identical
would be sufficient for the judgement SAME . Table 5-1 shows that
only one subject (Paul) judged all pairs to be SAME:, though two others
(Jamie, Ma) were heavily biased in favour' of SAME judgements.
Past findings are supported by the results of the judgement of
.SAMEpairs. Only two subjects (Scott, Jamie) judged any identical
pictures as MOT SAME, and it vrauld seem that even if young children do
not have a clear understanding of the concept "same*, they seldom
judge identical pictures to be different.
The rest of the analysis will be devoted primarily to MOT SAME
pairs. An age difference is suggested by Table 5-1• The older children,
4 years and over (subjects 1 — 10) averaged 2.6 'misjudgements' while
those under four years averaged 7»2 A Liann .Thitney U Test showed that
this difference was not significant. That age in itself is not a reliable
guide is shown by the two youngest subjects, for example, who performed
on a par -with the older group,
I ore informative than absolute figures are the types of misjudgements
which occurred and the strategies which might account for them. Under
the column headed 'misjudged pairs', the picture pairs which gave rise to
1
false judgements are listed. This column is better understood if
examined together with the list of picture types given in the ethod
Section on page . Leaving out of consideration the three subjects who
seem to represent a special case - those who judged most of the pairs SALE
(Paul, Jamie, Anna) - the distribution of false judgements is shown in
Tables 5-2 and 5-3*
1. False only in the sense that they do not conform to the normal adult
criterion of same and not-same pairs of pictures. The word 'error'
may be used in the same sense.
TABLE 5-1
Same and Not-same .'judgements of paired
comparisons by subject
SAME PAIRS NOT SAME-PAIRS
AGE IN n = 6 n = 15 MISJUDGED PAIRS
SUBJECT MONTHS JUDGED JUDGED JUDGED JUDGED (excluding S's
SAME NOT—SAMIJ SAME HOT-SAME whose error rate
is in excess of
50 )
1. Roddy 60 6 0 4 11 BC, DE, DP, EF
2. Aliadair 58 L 0 0 15
3. Alison 57 6 0 1 14 AB
4. Brian 57 6 0 0 15
5. Angela 55 6 0 2 13 AC, AD
6. Dale 52 6 0 6 9 AB, AC, BC, DE,
DP, BP
7. Alan 50 6 0 0 15
Q. Lee 50 6 0 3 12 BC,BE,DE
9. Linda 48 6 0 3 12 AB, AC, DE
10. Gregor 48 6 0 6 9 AB, AC, BC, DE,
DF, EF
11, Scott 47 4 2 5 10 AA, BC, BE, CE,
CF, EF, FF
12. Jamie 47 4 2 13 2
13. Margaret 45 6 0 6 9 AB, AC, BC, CD,
DF, EF
14. Elizabeth 45 Jj-X-* 0 6 9 AB, AC, BC, DE,
DF, EF
15. Karen 42 6 0 7* 7* AB, AC, AE, BC,
DE, DF, EF
16. David 42 6 0 6 9 AB, AC, BC, DE,
DF, EF
17. Nicholas 41 6 0 6 9 AC, AE, BD, BE,
CE, DF
18. Paul 59 6 0 15 0
19. Anna 38 6 0 9* 5*
20. Christine 38 6 • 0 5 12 AB, BC, EF
21. Sally 37 6 0 3* 11* AB, BE, DE
TOTAL 121 4 104 208
MEAN 5.8 0.2 5.0 9.9
*n = 14 **n - 5
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TABLE "5-2
Number of false judgements for picture pairs







AC 10 / y
BE 9 /
BP s J y
EP 8 y
BE 4 /
AE 2 V y
AD 1 J
BD 1 y y
CD 1 / y y
CE 2 / y
CP 1 /
AP 0 / y y
BP 0 y y
67
TABLE 5-3
Summary of errors as a function of attributes
HAT STICK COAT
IIAT 18 18 2
STICK 19 5
COAT 6
HAT & STICK 1
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The Tables show that most of the false judgements concerned
pairs where the stick or hat features were dissimilar* Only 12 out of
67 errors involved difference of coat colour. Taking the mean of the
error scores on hat and stick features (39.5) and comparing it to the
error scores on the coat attribute (12), a ,/ileoxen signed-ranks test
1
of significance was carried out. The difference was significant
(n = 18, T => 4.5 P <»01). To put it another way, most of the errors
took place within two sub groups A, B & C and D, E & P which had the
common attribute of the same colour coat. When there was a difference
in coat colour the probability of pictures being judged SAME was ,07.
With this difference eliminated (i.e. same colour coat) the probability
of dissimilar pairs being judged SAME increased to .39.
The result is hardly surprising. One would have predicted from
an inspection of the material used that the strong colour difference
between the red and blue coats would be the attribute most likely to
be noticed. Apart from the colour difference itself, the area taken up
by this feature is greater. In contrast the stick and hat differences
of existence and form were more subtle.
The results do not discriminate between the stick and hat features.
Both differences were almost equally likely to be missed. GO, of errors
a
included/stick difference* and 57, involved a hat difference. 82) of
false judgements occurred where 'stick' and/or 'hat* were the critical
features. Cutting across this apparently clear picture is the finding
that 64/j of errors occurred when there was a single difference, that is,
only one of 'stick', 'hat' and 'coat' was different. Table 5-5 shows,
however, that the number of errors for 'stick' or 'hat' alone was three
1. Since there were more presentations of pairs with a coat difference (9)
than a stick or hat difference (8), the statistical difference found
is given slightly greater weight.
I Up
times the number for 'coat' (19s18«6). Therefore a single difference
per se did not seera to he a significant factor.
The discussion of errors or false judgements may have obscured an
important fact. The error rate for the group as a whole, taking into
account only different pairs, was 35f (see Table 5-1)• Thus in a task
where young children have been found to have difficulty, two-thirds of
their judgements were nevertheless correct. The older children did
much better thin, this with an error rate of 17', for the four year olds,
and nine children, nearly half, make three or less misjudgements out of
15. This seen3 to indicate that the problem for most of the children
in the communication situation was not primarily one of failing to
perceive differences between objects or pictures. That statement must,
of course, be task specific to a large extent.
Yet, though the majority may perceive the differences, do they
report than? To answer this question, vital for communication behaviour,
the data on critical attributes must be examined. It has already been
hypothesised that the subject searches along the dimensions of the
presented pictures for similarities and differences. It may be assumed
that after a number of presentations the subject will recognise that
only certain attributes are critical fox* making the judgement; size of
head, colour of trousers, etc. are irrelevant. The successful child,
therefore, should restrict himself to reporting the critical attributes,
namely 'stick', 'hat* and 'coat'.
It is perhaps necessary at this point to reiterate the experimental
procedure. The child was asked to judge the pictures, dame or not-same,
and, whatever his judgement, he was then asked: 'Thy are they the sane/not
the same?' The resulting response was always followed up with: 'Anything
else the same/not the same?' Thus Table 5-4 contains data compiled from
this response by the subjects. It lists the number of relevant critical
attributes mentioned by each child, out of a total (possible) of 25.
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TABLE 5-4
Lata on reporting of critical attributes for each subject
(Not-sami. pairs only)
























2, Alaadair 58 15 14 24 1 1
3. Alison 57 14 12 22 8 7
4. Brian 57 15 15 25 1 4
5. Angela 55 15 7 16 5 0
6. Dale 52 9 5 9 5 1
7# Alan 50 15 9 19 0 0
8, Lee 50 12 15 25 11 21
9* Linda 48 12 6 13 5 0
10. Gregor 48 9 9 18 6 7
11. Scott 47 10 10 19 4 9
12. Jamie 47 2 0 0 1 0
13. iiargaret 45 9 0 1 1 2
14. Elisabeth 45 9 6 13 2 8
15. Karen 42 7 5 9 2 1
16, David 42 9 3 10 2 0
17. Nicholas 41 9 6 14 4 0
18. Paul 59 0 0 4 4 0
19. Anne 38 5 1 5 2 0
20. Christine 38 12 7 17 2 0
21* Sally 57 11 7 16 7 0
T 208 1*4 289 90 83
M 9.9 7.0 13.8 4.5 4.0
A 66 46,6 55.5
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It also includes the number of pairs in which all the relevant critical
attributes were reported, and the figures for irrelevant critical
attributes and other features.
Some confusion may arise from the use of the terras relevant and
irrelevant critical attributes. Critical attributes are the changing
features in the pictures, but there will not be differences for all
critical attributes in every pair of pictures to be judged. The
relevant critical attributes are those which discriminate the pictures.
Those which are identical in any particular paired comparison are the
irrelevant critical attributes and need not be reported. A little
earlier the successful child was referred to as the one who restricted
himself to reporting critical attributes. Strictly speaking he would
restrict himself to reporting relevant critical attributes. Table 5-4
shows how successful or otherwise subjects were.
None conformed to the strict criterion of all relevant and no
irrelevant critical attributes reported. Looking briefly at the mean
figures first, slightly more than half (55»5i«) the total number of
relevant critical attributes was reported on average, and the mean figure
for the number of pairs in which all relevant critical attributes were
reported was just under half (46.65 )- this results from an overall mean
performance of judging not_j3ame pairs (first column) of 9*9 (66p).
Broadly speaking, therefore, the reporting of relevant critical attributes
(55•55) was not quite keeping pace with the number of same/not same
judgements being made (66, ).
To get some idea of individual perforiaances it will be helpful,
initially, to compare five children #10 approached the optimum




DaLa on report of critical attributes for selected subjects
(abstracted from Table 5-4)
No. OP PAIRS PAIRS RELEVANT ALL OTHER ATTRIBUTES
SUBJECT JUDGED WHERE ALL CRITICAL REPORTED
NOT SAME ATTRIBUTES ATTRIBUTES
REPORTED REPORTED
Alasdair 15 14 24 2
Alison 14 12 22 15
Brian 15 15 25 5
Alan 15 9 19 0
Lee 12 15 25 53
The iao3t striking contrast among these subjects is between Alan
and Lee. Alan judged all the comparisons correctly but did not report
all the relevant critical attributes and in only 9 of the 15 pairs did
he report all the relevant critical attributes. In contrast Lee
reported all the relevant critical attributes and accordingly achieved
the maximum number of pairs with all critical features reported. In
spite of this she judged 3 of the not-same pairs, sane.
At first sight the implications of this for communication behaviour
are that Alan will communicate inadequately although he discriminates
picture differences, while Lee will communicate -well despite not always
making correct judgements about differences, hut there is a further
strong contrast between these two children. Lee reported 33 other
attributes (critical and non-critical) along with the relevant features,
while Alan mentioned none. The redundant Information contained in
Lee's reports could prove detrimental to successful communication with
"the *¥roiS'e% oVscnrlftg "the 'Signal. Alan appeared "id have a narrower
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focus of attention which was helpful to hia in this task hut which
might prove too narrow in a communication context with critical data
being left out of his messages.
Prom Table 5-5 we may conclude that- correct judgements do not
imply report of all critical features. The converse is also true:
report of all critical attributes does not necessarily mean that
correct judgements have been made. In support of this, the
correlation between judgements and critical attributes reported for
the whole group was positive but small (r3 = +0.16 n.s.). This figure
aoes not reflect the general strength of the relationship because of
the rather anomalous results of two subjects - Roddy and Linda. Thus
inspection of Table 5-4 indicates that success in judging pairs was
usually acoompanied by a good score on critical attributes.
The number of irrelevant attributes mentioned seemed to follow
no obvious pattern. Among the subjects listed in Table 5-5, for instance,
Alison and Lee scored highly and the res+ reported few extraneous
features. For the group as a whole (Table 5-4) the range was considerable,
from 0 to 59. The distribution was far from uniform however. Thirteen
subjects reported 5 or less irrelevant features, six subjects reported
between 6 and 15, and two children scored more than 50. To put this in
perspective, it means that these two children included two and sometimes
1
three irrelevant features with each justification. A slightly larger
group reported one irrelevant feature with most justifications, while
1. It is interesting to note the differences between these two siibjects.
One, Roddy, though reporting more irrelevant attributes than anybody
else, failed to report more than half of the relevant critical
attributes. By contrast Lee reported them all. This suggests a
basic difference in their strategies - one directed, one rather aim¬
less. In support of this Lee consistently gave critical attributes
first in her justifications.
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the majority of the children ignored the irrelevant features. Whether
or not these scores are an index of cognitive style is a matter for
conjecture. It is possible, however, that they may influence communi¬
cation behaviour as mentioned above.
On the basis of the findings onsidered so far, including those
from the training sessions, the children may be divided into four
groups.
1. Those who judge all or nearly all pairs SAME (3).
2. Those who judge pairs with the gross colour difference
(coat) MOT SAKE, and the rest of the pairs SAME (8).
3. Those who operate close to adult criteria but sometimes
miss the finer critical differences (stick and hat) and
judge such pairs SAME (7).
4. Those who judge all pairs in the standard adult fashion (3).
(Figures in brackets refer to number of subjects involved).
A discussion of individual performances.
A close analysis of the videotapes and verbal transcripts
suggested a somewhat richer set of categories than those based on
the group data and given at the end of the previous section. They are
presented below in the form of a developmental progression.
1. Those who have a global undifferentiated understanding of
same/not same, by which SAME judgements always result.
2. Those who weigh up the evidence, but for whom the attributes
are differentially weighted. The strong attribute (i.e. coat
colour) always gets the verdict whether SAME or NOT SAME.
3. 'Those who attempt to come down on the side of one or other
set of attributes but remain undecided. Simultaneous
judgments of same and not same often result.
4. Attributes begin to lose their differential force resulting
in a shift in the meaning of 'same*. Judgments approximate
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to adult criteria but subtle differences tire still liable to be
missed.
5. The adult criterion is reached by which any difference in
corresponding attributes leads to the judgement not same.
All attributes have equal weight for this purpose.
Some examples of the stages - mainly the first three to which the
majority of the children belong - will be provided below together with
a general discussion of strategies used as well as other issues raised
by the performances.
GROUP 1 - no 11ifi'erentiation of same and not same.
The first group seems to correspond to the youngest children in
Vurpillot's study who seemed to be searching for similarities in a
paired comparison such that any two corresponding identical features
led to the judgement SAME. It is perhaps an over-strong claim to say
that the children of this group interpret 'not-same* as meaning 'same'
but much of their behaviour implies that this is the case, '.lien asked,
following a judgement of NOT SAME, if anything else was not the same,
some children would start reporting '3ame' features. Their behaviour
can perhaps be understood if the relationship between the utterance to
be comprehended and the concrete situation to which it refers is seen
as a loose one. The child is aware when the experimenter says 'Anything
else not the same?' that the question refers to features about the
teddy bears since he has had. his attention directed to them. The
distinction between 'same' and 'not same' is probably a vague one for the
younger and less able children. The fact that the term 'same' is subject
to considerable ambiguity anyway, does not assist the comprehension. The
children accordingly respond by naming those features which captured their
attention while still conforming to the rather blurred category of 3ame/
not same. One might conclude that it is sim ly a case of missing the
force of the negative, but the training sessions showed that if the
I I
difference is gross enough, e.g. duck and matchbox, a not-same
judgement is made. It is when same and not-same features are present
concurrently that the difficulty occurs. This difficulty# in fact,
seems to be present for the raore advanced children and will he
considered shortly.
GROUP 2 - differential weithting to attributes.
On occasions a subject will clearly state the premise for a
particular conclusion hut fail to draw it, for example Nicholas:
(AB) Nicholas: They have red coats, One has not a stick and one has
a stick, so I think they're the sine (Presses ding-dong).
E: Are they the same all over?
Nj Yes,
Nicholas's behaviour is almost perverse. He implies one thing, difference,
hut concludes another, sameness, Gregor chows the siae behaviour on a
number of occasions; for instance:
(DP) Gregor: They're not the same (presses beep),
E: 1hy?
G: The hats (pointing at one).
E: Are the hats the same?
G: Yes.
E: Is this hat just like thi3 hat?
G: Yes. They've got the same jacket, same trousers, same
shoes. One's got a stick and one hasn't got a stick.
E: Are they some or not same then?
G: Them are the same (presses ding-dong).
For the pair AC, the conflicting 'evidence' is even stronger.
Gregor: Them are the same (presses ding-dong).
E: Why?
G: I don't know. Got the same trousers, same jackets.
E: Are the hats the same?
I IJ
Gt Mima ... Yes.
Ej And the sticks?
G; One's got a big hat on and one hasn't. One's got a
stick and one hasn't.
E: Are they same or not same?
G: Are the same.
The justification given by a child may be regarded as the
evidence on -which he bases his decision. When this evidence is
contradictory, as it i3 in the examples given above, the child is in a
dilemma. Presumably he makes his choice, as would any judge, on the
basis of the evidence that carries most weight. We have seen that it
is usually the colour of coat that carries more weight than the other
•items' of evidence. The striking thing about many of the children is
the fact that they often have the necessary facts to hand, but do not
choose to use theia. It may not be going too far to say that at a
certain stage there is a weighing-up operation going on, possibly
unconsciously, whereby 'same* and 'not-same' attributes are assigned
relative values. The decision, of course, is based on what these
attributes mean to the child, not on any objective criteria or adult
meaning. Although in any pair of pictures there are more 'sane' than
'not same' attributes, for ao3t children the weight of an attribute like
coat colour can outweigh any combination of other attributes. Thus, if
coat colour i3 dissimilar the pictures are seen as different.
GROUP 3 - recognition of the same/not same paradox.
The difficulties of terras like * same' and 'different* have not gone
unnoticed in research into cognitive development (Donaldson and Wales, 1970 ).
To yield to the temptation of non-verbal methods would seem to be begging
the question,since young children do use these terms in their spontaneous
speech (Donaldson and /ales, 1970). It i3 not clear how consistently
the terms are used, and their use in this experiment suggests that some
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of the ambiguities which adults know to belong to the words are
beginning to be reflected in child speech. They reveal themselves
as conflicts sometimes explicit, more often unconscious, but never¬
theless linguistically represented. An illustration is provided
below.
(Pair DE)
Lee; (Presses ding-dong) Cos that's got the same coat as
that and that's got a walking stick, that one hasn't.
E; Oh, are they the some then or not the same?
Ls They are the same, cos they've got the same coats.
E: Yes, but is this one the same all over, as that?
L; dell, that's got a hat the same as that. Got white
there, and that one's white there.
E; But are they the same all over?
L: Except there and there (pointing to stick).
E: So which one do you press?
L: (Presses ding-dong).
And another example from the same subject.
(BC) Lee; (Presses ding-dong). That one's got a pink coat and
that one's got a pink coat.
E; Is everything the same?
L; Except the hats.
Si Oh. So which one do you press?
L: (presses ding-dong). That one's the sane as that one.
Lee seems fully aware that there art not-same attributes present in
both these pairs of pictures, but refuses to be put off her original
judgement. The perception of conflicting information is even more
apparent in this example from Linda.
(DP) Linda; That's the same blue (coats), that's not the same that hat.
E; They're not the same all over, so what do you do?
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L: They are the same, that (pointing at coats), hut that's
not the same (hats), (presses beep).
In some instances the report of same and not-same features in
one pair of pictures seems to follow directly from the experimental
procedure. This -would sometimes happen if, after being asked if there
was 'anything else not the same', the child gave a verbal commentary
while making the search for non-matching features. In 3ueh a commentary
irrelevant (in this case SAME) as well as relevant (HOT SAME) attributes
might be mentioned. This explanation does not apply to the examples
quoted however.
Same a^d not-same - the paradox made explicit.
On occasions the conflict between the competing attributes seems
to be made even more explicit when the child presses both buttons or
says that the pictures Eire same arid not same. For example, David:
(BC) David: These are the same. That one has a great big one
(pointing to hat) isn't it ,.. hasn't it ... That
one hasn't.
Es Are they just the same?
D: Yes. They've both got red jackets (presses ding-dong
and beep).
In another example, Christine is presented with DE.
C: They are and they're not.
Es Oh, why?
Cs That one*3 not got a stick and that one has got a stick.
Christine seems to be saying that the pictures are alike and yet
at the same time they are different (they are and they're not ). She
provides the reason for them being not same - only one has a stick, it
is not surprising that she doc3 not delineate the 'suae' attributes.
This extract comes from the end of the second session by which time 3he
has pointed out 'same' features many times.
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Two other children (Karen :nd Paul) press both buttons in
making single judgements. It may be that the method used in this
experiment was important because it allowed the children to express their
level of understanding in a manner not usually possible. The
contradiction which they seem to half recognise about the concept
'same' is too sophisticated to be expressed verbally, though an
advanced child like Christine even manages to do this, for the others,
the conflict can be expressed more naturally in a non-verbal fashion
vising the apparatus available. How do those children relate to those
who seem to recognise a conflict but nevertheless make a decision one
way or another? It may be that the paradoxical decisions - aexie and
not-same represent a situation where a definitive decision cannot be
reached. The force of both sets of attributes is equally strong and so
a compromise results.
The relation between language, thought and the real world for the
young child.
/□.though it has been Known for a long time that the concrete
situation has quite direct effects on the way the child thinks (Piaget 1950),
it has only recently been realised hoi/ powerful is the effect of context
on language (0l3on, 1970; Macnamara, 1972; Clark, 1975; Donaldson and Lloyd,
1974). Sometimes the effect is very direct in that change in the concrete
situation actually affects the ebb and flow, as well as the content, of
language. Consider this example.
Margarets My Uncle Ian he's got a record.
Experimenter: (Getting out and laying down next pair of pictures)
What did you say?
M: My Uncle ... (speech dries up as she sees new pair of
teddy pictures) Hot same (presses buzzer).
Es Why are they not the same?
Ms (Looking over to corner of room). You've got cars.
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Margaret is talking about something at home hut comes to a halt
when something concrete is put into her visual field. She makes a
judgement, whereupon the experimenter introduces some further linguistic,
and therefore abstract, input. 'This is attenuated by the force of
concrete reality once more and she talks about the cars in the corner
of the room.
A slightly different example of the same general phenomenon is
provided by Elizabeth, At the beginning of the session, the experimenter
says *I*m going to show you two pictures of teddy bears. Tell me why
they're not the same'. Before the experimenter has time to get out the
pictures Elizabeth says 'Because they're yellow'. The meaning
contained in the instructions is too subtle for the child, referring as
it does to a future event. As far as the child is concerned, when she
is asked why something is not the case, she is required to give an
answer now. The thing that springs to mind to connect 'teddy bears' and
•(not) same' is their colour, yellow. She probably has an image of her
ovm teddy hears at home. The force of the somewhat abstract 'I'm going
to show you ...' referring to the future does not seem to register.
David gives an instance of the same kind of behaviour, providing for the
first pair of pictures a justification of a judgement he has not even
made, before the pictures are presentedl
These examples are provided from the records of younger children.
Bearing in mind other findings, it seeras reasonable to assume that for
children at a certain stage of development, the real world has more force
thai the abstract information represented in language. As Kacnamara (1972)
points out this is why young children generally cope well with
1.
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understanding language. Adult speech to small children usually refers
to events in the here and now, and the child uses the concrete
information in the here and now to give meaning to the world, /hen
language departs from the concrete and uses slightly more abstract terms,
like 'all' and 'none', the interpretation is likely to break down.. It
is then that the child continues to use the cues available in the
perceptual situation to interpret the sentence, cues vdiich may or may
not he appropriate (See Donaldson and Lloyd, 1974; Donaldson and
McOarrigle, in press),
G-BQUPS 4 and 5 - towards an adult criterion,
The more advanced child becomes skilled in selecting those
features of a situation which carry most meaning, Olson (1970) has
shown that the communication situation is particularly useful for studying
the development of this behaviour. It would seem that it can also be
observed in a task like the present one which involves selecting
critical features over a series of picture presentations. The more able
child will restrict himself to those which carry most information, and
this is exactly what happens, A particularly able child like Brian,
carries the process a stage further. Instead of always elaborating
features in both pictures, he would sometimes say, for example 'That one's
got a blue coat' - leaving unsaid that the other teddy has a red coat.
One senses that he begins to realise that the situation is artificial,
that the experimenter can see the difference as well as he can. For
another pair judged not same (Ch) he says, 'Cos one's got a red coat and
one's just got a bowler hat'. This i3 not a clear statement, but
enough for someone who only has those two pictures in front of him.
Other evidence of more advanced levels of operation includes
linguistic form. For example, instead of saying 'because that one's got
a little hat and that one's got a little hat', Christine used the 'superior'
shortened form 'because they've both got small hats', /mother
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indication provided by Lee is being able to comment on many things
which attract her attention without impairing her performance. It is
precisely this competition for their attention set up by extraneous
objects and events which seems to impose limitations on the less
advanced child.
Two unusual strategies: - absence of a common feature as a criterion
for 'same' and ignoring the paired comparison procedure.
An unexpected criterion for sameness, introduced by some children,
was the common absence of a feature. For example, Alison after judging
t
CC SAME gives as one of the reasons 'Its not got any sticks'. Also
Nicholas, BE, 'They have flat hats on and they don't have sticks', and
Karen, BB, 'They both haven't got sticks*. The common lack of an
attribute or feature is not always a good criterion for similarity. For
example, neither a bar of soap nor an oak tree wear spectacles, but this
is not normally considered good grounds for putting them in the same
category. In certain contexts however, especially where two objects are
the same by virtue of not possessing a feature common to the rest of the
group, such a missing attribute can be critical.
There is a strategy which ha3 not as yet been discussed and it is
not clear where it fits in to the scheme as outlined. It involves
pictures being judged independently so that the intended paired comparison
is ignored. Typically, one picture is judged 3ame and the other picture
not same, not on the basis of any relationship they have with each other,
but seemingly against some standard of comparison known only to the
child. Some examples will elucidate the behaviour. It was at first
thought that this 'strategy' wa3 followed by only one subject, Scott,
and that it was an example of a totally idiosyncratic behaviour pattern,
possibly brought about by a basic misconception of the task. A careful
search through the performance records, however, revealed that at least
two other children were adopting the same tactic on occasions.
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Nevertheless this account will draw mainly from Scott's performance.
A lengthy extract from the beginning of the session indicates the
origins of the behaviour,
(AC) Scott: They're the sane. One's got a big hat, one's got a wee
hat. One's got a stick and the other one hasn't (Presses
ding-dong).
Ej Are they the same all over? Is this just the same as
this?
S: Yes,
Es But you said this one has a big hat and this one has a
woe hat. And this one hasn't got a stick and this one
does,
3« But the same size,
Es Yes, but you only press the ding-dong if they're the
same all over ..,
Ss (Uncertainly) They're the same
Es If they're not the same you press the beep,
8s One is (presses ding-dong), and the other one isn't
(presses beep).
Es iShich one is the same?
8: That one (points at picture C)
Es And which one isn't?
3s That one (points at picture A)
In ids initial judgement Scott seems to be approaching the task
in the manner of children described as belonging to group 3 (page 114),
that is pointing out the different attributes yet judging After
the experimenter points out that he has mentioned two differing features,
Scott says, 'But the same size'. The significance of this remark is not
clear. He does not refer to size -gain in the experiment and it may be
that he is searching for any justification (albeit a reasonable one) for
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his SAME judgement. .Then he is reminded of the ingwlong/beep
distinction he then says that 'one is (the same) and one is not (same)'.
She critical difference between this pair of pictures is the stick
feature, and over the whole session this factor plays a central role
in his strategy, The rule, quite simply, is that the presence of a
3tick means that picture is not the same; the absence of a stick means
that picture is the same. So the judgement is not a comparison of the
pair of pictures but a comparison of each individual picture against a
standard of his own based on the presence or absence of sticks. In
practice the rule operated as follows:
1. .hen neither picture had a stick, e.g. CF, one button
pressed (SAME),
2. Vhen one picture had a 3tick, and one did not have a stick,
e.g. CD, then both buttons pressed -- one SAME, one NOT SAME,
3. hen both pictures had sticks, e.g. AA, the NOT SAME button
pressed.
The stick is not the only criterion for sameness but it is always
the critical one, the final arbiter when a decision has to bo made. For
instance he says the pair CF 'are both the same because those two haven't
got the sticks', 'Are they the same all over?' asks the experimenter.
'That coat's not the same as that coat. They're not the same all over,
but they haven't got any sticks' he replies. He reaffirms his judgement
of SAME.
Paul is another child who shows this behaviour, only in his case
'hat* is the critical feature. It is not clear whether it is colour of
hat or merely possession of hat. It does not appear to be size of hat,
however, which is the intended critical feature. This points up a
difference in the strategies of these children. Scott is systematic
and consistent using a clearly discriminated changing feature as his
standard of comparison. There is reason to think that Paul ■oes not
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recognise any comparative meaning in the term 'same', and his
judgements, 'That's the same ;md that's the same' or 'that's the saaie
and that isn't tho same', are stereotyped responses made in relation
to ati arbitrary criterion involving the hats.
The behaviour that is common to these children, and on occasions
to Sally, is that of not basing their judgements on a comparison of
the pictures with each other. In the case of bcott, a capable child,
it is surprising how persistent this behaviour is in the faco of
repeated instructions to compare the pictures, i.e. 'Is this one the
same as this one'.
lo
11. Conservation of identity .:au e.priv lence over time
A piece of conceptual behaviour involved in the efficient
performance of the communication tasks is the recognition that equivalent
arrays remain equivalent, despite operations upon them, as long as what
is done to one set is also done to the other set. For example, if
A1 13 ^2 ^ian jii ~ ^ ~ ^2 " ^wor^il simple observation
in the communication task is that at any moment in time both members of
the communicating dyad are aware that their partner has the same sot of
objects or pictures as they have. This means that a speaker can describe
a member of a set sufficiently to discriminate it from the other members,
in the certain knowledge that this description will also discriminate the
chosen item from the listener's set of objects, faking the simplest
example, when the speaker has only one object loft, he knows that the
listener has only one object left and therefore no description is required
since no discrimination is involved. The relevance of context for
communication has already been discussed in a previous section, ./hat is
being suggested here is that, in order to make effective use of context
constraints, it is first of all necessary to know that the contexts are
equivalent.
Do young children retain the notion of equivalence and identity
over time in spite of change and manipulation? The general area involved
is conservation of number, but the type of concept in question is not
the same as that traditionally tapped in number conservation experiments.
It is therefore necessary to analyse the communication tusk in these
terms to see if the precise components can be specified. 'The steps or
processes required seem to be as followsj-
1. Match two sets (A. and &n) of objects to determine equivalence. (The
I U
data obtained from the previous study would indicate that matching
identical pictures is well within the capabilities of these subjects).
2. Realise that the sets- remain equivalent when one set is covered by
a screen. Since object permanence is fully established at the latest
by two years, this should present no problem.
3. Recognise that if an action done to Cet A, is at the same time done
to Set then the 3ets remain equivalent, '.Phis action might take
two forms:
(a) An item is removed from each set; the two items are seen to
match (see Step 1); the remaining members of the two sets are
equivalent in number and identity, i.e. - 1 = 1.
(b) Ail item is removed from each set; the items do not match.
The items are returned to the sets which fire again equivalent
in number and identity,
A complication is involved in step 3b since during the time the
withdrawn items are being matched, the remaining sets are equivalent
in number but not in identity, i.e. - 1 » A1, but A^ - x ^ - y.
Once x and y are returned to their sets, complete equivalence is
re-established,
4. Recognise that over time the successive removal of items that match
will not affect the equivalence of the two sets, that is the two sots
compared to each other. It is true, of course, that compared to their
1
original state the sets are no longer equivalent. They have been
steadily reducing in size.
5. Recognise that, however often items which do not match are withdrawn
from the sets, the sets remain equivalent as long as those items are
returned to the sets. (Step 3b repeated).
1. Elkind (1967) makes a distinction between conservation of identity and
equivalence. Conservation of identity involves comparison of a
quantity (ball of clay) with itself after transformation (panealee of clay).
Conservation of equivalence involves comparing two initially equal
amounts with each other after one has been transformed. In the situation
under consideration both sets are being transformed, in an identical
fashion. This does not seem to fit comfortably into either of
Elkind' s categories, and the tortus- .all not be used in his sense.
125
A search of the literature revealed no studies directly relating
to the number or conservation skills involved in this type of task.
Apostel, Hays, Morf and Plaget (1957) looked at the effect of screening
one of two sets of objects to be compared. The children established
that two rows of buttons were equal. The experimenter then covered one
row with a screen find distorted that row in a typical manner (putting the
buttons into clusters). The experimenter fully explained what he was
doing and could be seen carrying out the operation. Because they could
not actually count the buttons, however, it was found that the younger
children were not prepared to accept the equality of the sets. They
required that the screen be removed, so that they could count the buttons.
A study by Ihhelder and Piaget (196J) required children to add beads
one by one simultaneously to glasses, one wide mid one narrow. This
action was performed repeatedly and from time to time the conservation
question was asked, concerning the equality of the number of beads in
each glass. At some periods during the task both glasses were covered
by a cardboard box and beads continued to be added through holes in the
top. This task gave rise to unexpected conserving responses from young
children, but the interesting finding for this study was that the presence
of the cardboard box gave rise to uncertainty and hesitation. It could
not have been that it prevented counting behaviour, since this was
impossible anyway. (An alternative possibility is that it prevented the
observation of one-to-one correspondence in action - P.L.) This seems to
be an example of the removal of conflicting visual cues having an adverse
1
effect.
1, This is in contrast to the screening studies reported by Bruner (1966).
These, however, were concerned with continuous quantities where one-
to-one correspondence does not apply. Pufall, Shaw and Syrdal-Lusky
(1973) found that screening did not give rise to number conserving
responses in a sample of children under five.
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These two pieces of Genevan research suggest that in the present
experiment the presence of a screen, would prevent the counting behaviour
and manifest one-to-one correspondence which are necessary for judgements
of equality.
Research which most closely relates to the present study has been
carried out by Gmedslund (1966). He asked the question 'what determines
the difficulty of an intellectual task?' To investigate this problem
he needed a task which allowed precise prediction of level of difficulty.
He used one which involved the addition and substraction of single units
to and from numerically equivalent collections. There are a number of
obvious differences between Smedslund's task and that used in these
studies. Whereas the objects used in this task varied within arrays,
those used by Smedslund were identical both within and between collections,
that is only one type of object was used, a yellow square of uniform size.
The size of the collections was larger, sixteen against six, and the
subjects were somewhat older, 5*4 - 6.7 against 3«3 -4.11.
There are also a number of less obvious differences. Since Smedsluntl
was investigating estimation of equality, subjects were asked to make
judgements following every manipulation or series of manipulations. The
*
demonstration of equivalence was only made explicit at the start of the
communication task and during the matching of single items that were
withdrawn. In Smedslund's experiment, there were never more than three
consecutive addition/subtraction manipulations in any one trial, and
judgements concerning equivalence were required after each manipulation.
In contrast the arrays in the communication task underwent many changes
in the course of each trial, a minimum of five, and attention was
directed to the comparison of selected items rather than the remaining
arrays. Because Smedslund's task was concerned with the effect of
addition and subtraction on estimates of numerical equivalence, the
experiment was designed accordingly. Communication behaviour was the
IZt
prime area of concern in the tasks used in this study which meant that
the demands of the task were very much greater, especially in terms
of information load.
Having outlined these differences, those findings that appear
relevant from Smedslund will he briefly mentioned. Smedslund used
additions (+) and subtractions (-) in exhaustive combinations, but the
one which most nearly approximates to the current studies is what he
called minus (-) symmetry. This involved taking items from both
arrays (Left and Sight). Judgements were noted after two operations,-
Left and - Rightf when the collections remained 'same', and after three
operations,- L - S - L or - J, - R ~ R,when an imbalance had been
created. Unfortunately, Smedalund did not provide an age breakdown in
his data since he was more concerned with comparing combinations.
The - symmetry items, involving two operations only, e.g. - L - R,
yielded 72, - passes (N = 86, median age 5.11). The number judging both
the second and third operations correctly, that is, judging 'same'
after two operations and knowing which collection had more counters after
three operations, was 65';-, though the total percentage actually choosing
the correct collections after three operations was 92,'., Since this
figure may include what are in fact errors of perseveration, trie
response pattern which chooses correctly for both operations is probably
a better guide.
The evidence regarding the children's appreciation of the
equivalence concept in the communication tasks is circumstantial rather
than direct. We know that descriptions tend not to decrease in length
in conjunction with the size of array. Earlier this was described as
a failure to take account of context, and number of alternatives is a
critical factor in context. It is particularly striking that descriptions
do not reduce even for the last picture. On the face of it this
frtrnnf 'l \r Fmmmntn +.Vitit rvn"h ifin+.P! fln nnt. a.rmr'fic.l at.fi the ftniVrI enoe of
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their arrays. (Those children who havo no appreciation of the nature
of the communication procedure., who see the task as one of describing
pictures, and nothing more, will not, of course, "be concerned with
the equivalence of arrays).
The two meanings of equivalence have already "been pointed out,
number and identity. In typical conservation tasks this amounts to the
same thing, since only irrelevant perceptual attributes differ. But
in this task it is necessary that both players have not only the same
number but the same series of items, since without this the game would
become very much more difficult. This is not to say that it is necessary
to know that a state of complete equivalence exists. We can be almost
certain that some children are in a state of ignorance but this does not
prevent them playing the game, it only affects the way they play it.
The following studies are designed to obtain a clearer picture of
the young child's notion of equivalence as it appears to affect the
type of communication behaviour under investigation. In line with the
general methodological tenor of this research, the essential elements of
the task were first given in a simplified form, followed by a second
experiment in which conditions more nearly represented the standard
communication task.
Experiment 1.
haterials; Two identical sets of four objects - two white toy ducks,
and two green wooden beads.
Subjects; 23 children, 12 of whom were male, with ages ranging from
3 years 3 months to 4 years 11 months, mean 4.0 years.
Instruction and procedure
The experimenter and child faced, each other across a low table. Tho
experimenter put four ducks and four heads on the table mixed together.
'Do you know what these are? Yes, they are ducks and beads (balls).
Good, how nut together those which are the same. (Some children needed
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help, in which case a duck and a bead were placed away from the pile
and apart from each other - 'Now put together all the toys which are
the same as this one and put together all the toys which are the 3aae
a3 this one. See I've started it'.) Now I'm going to take two ducks,
and you take two ducks. I'll take two beads and you take two beads'.
The two arrays were lined up in one-to-one correspondence. 'Now, are
my toys and your toys the same? Are these toys and these toys just the
same?' $hen the child was satisfied that the arrays were identical,
two 6 inch high wooden screens were produced. 'I'm going to put my
toys behind here so that you can't see them. You put your toys
behind your bit of wood so that I can't see than.' When this had been
done the first of a series of 'test* questions was asked.
Question 1. Can you see my toys?
Question 2. Do you think that I can see your toys?
Question 3. 'Now tell me what toys you've got'.
Question 4, 'Can you tell me what toys I've got, here?'
Good. How choose a toy and put it down here in the middle (pointing to
centre of table). Now, I've got to choose one just like yours so that
we have two the same'. The experimenter matched the subject's choice,
'Is this one the same as this one?' Agreed matched selections were put
into a discard box which remained on view.
'Now it's my turn to choose one'. The experimenter put a toy in
the middle. 'Can you pick one you've got which is the same as this one?
Have you got one like this?' If the child's toy failed to match the
1. Although twelve test questions may appear to be an excessive number,
it will be seen that they fitted in naturally to the sort of dialogue
an adult and child might have in a game of this sort. The possible
encouragement of stereotyped answers was reduced by only asking for
judgements of equivalence and identity at the beginning and end of
the task. This also discouraged the cliild from thinking that memory
was involved - i.e. that he was required to remember what the
experimenter had discarded and what, accordingly, remained. It could
be argued that the procedure adopted by Smedslund of asking a series
of questions after every manipulation alerted the child to think that
changes must be taking place. At the same time the desire to follow
the reasoning process very closely is recognised.
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experimenter's selection:- 'Is your toy the same as ay toy? /ore this
one and this one the same? Can you pick one that's the same as this
one?' The game did not continue until the a .ild had chosen a
matching toy*
The game proceeded in this way until each player had one toy left.
The toys were, of course, identical,
C,nest ion 5» How many toys have you got left?
Question 6* Can you tell me how many I've got left? (alternative form:
ho you know how many I've got left?)
(jnestion 7. What toys have you got left? (What's yours).
(Question 8. What toys do you think I've got left? (Can you tell me
what mine is?)
Question 9. Could it he a duck/head* do you think? (Experimenter
provided alternative to subject's answer in question 6). If the subject
yielded to suggestion he was asked,'Is it a duck or a bead?'
The remaining toys were matched and discarded.
Question 10. How many toys have you got left?
Question 11. How many have I got left?
Question 12. How do you know I've got none/one? (depending on answer
to question 9), (alternative form: Why do you think I've got none?)
The experiment was videotaped and lasted about 15 minute3.
Results and Discussion.
The answers of subjects to the test questions are summarised in
Table 5-6. Discussion of this table will take a question by question
approach so that it can be supplemented by extracts ;jid observations
from performance records where these are helpful.
Q.1 and 2. Can you see my toys?/Can I see your3?
These questions relate to one aspect of what Piaget calls cognitive
egocentrism. The child's thinking (and perception) is said to be
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This has usually been tested in a literal way (Piaget and Inhelder,
1956). The child is first of all given the opportunity to walk round
an object or display which appears different according to the position
of regard. He is then asked to pick out from a set of pictures the one
that corresponds to his own view of the object and one that represents
the view that the person looking frora a different position will get.
Typically the egocentric child selects in both cases a picture that
represents his view of the displayt indicating, says Piaget, that he is
unable to get outside himself and look at the world through someone
alse's eyes. There are a number of criticisms one can make of Piaget's
position, in particular that he uses a highly complex display to
investigate the procedure. Does the behaviour hold for simple objects,
varying on only one or two dimensions, for example, colour? Nor does
Piaget appear to control for the roles of memory and language comprehension.
The start of this experiment could be said to represent a
simplified investigation of egocentric behaviour. The children were
first asked for their view of the situation » could they see the
experimenters toys? A couple of children were uncertain about this, at
first nodding, but the ultimate reaction of all children was that they
could not see the experimenter's toys. The second question asked them to
put themselves in the other person's position: could he see their toy3?
The result here was that several of the children answered in the
affirmative. Then the question was repeated or rephrased three changed
their response leaving four #10 might be said to be behaving egocentrically.
At first sight it might be concluded that strong evidence had been
provided to counter the notion that pre—school children are egocentric.
But it would be as unwise to conclude this as it would be to assume that
they were egocentric if the results had been in precisely the other
direction. A more revealing approach is to consider the possible ways
young children might interpret particular questions in relation to the
IJJ
prevailing context. In the utterance 'Do you think I can sgg your
toys?' the critics,! word is *1', but there is no reason why the child
should perceive it as the critical word. The context includes toys,
screens, a table and two people. It night also be said to 'involve'
the previously posed and answered question about the situation - 'Can
you see my toys?' There are at least two possibilities.
1. The words 'see* and 'toys' are perceived as critical. The child can
see toys and he therefore responds positively to both questions. The
reason why 'see' and 'toys' influence the perception of the sentence is
that the toys are the most pertinent part of his environment at that
moment. He is actively spending his time looking at them and probably
playing with them. For this child the pronoxms 'you', 'I', 'my' carry
little or no information*
2. The child may make sense of and react appropriately to question 1
and say that he cannot see the experimenter's toys. But the second
question may be interpreted as 'Can you see your toys'. This question
has not been asked before and is a logical follow-up to question one -
'Can you see my toys'. It was observed that those children viae answered
•j
•yes' to question 2 looked down at their array-' before they responded.
Those children who initially answered 'yes' changed their
response when the question was rephrased, e.g. 'Can I 3ee your ones behind
1. It might also be argued that 'Can I see your toys?' is rather an odd
question to ask. It might even be considered an absurd question end
accordingly reinterpreted - 'he must have meant can I_ see ray toys*.
This involves what Hayes (1972) calls the child's model of the
experimenter, though he believes that questioning of the experimenter's
intentions only occurs at a later age and that some of the results
from younger children may be accounted for by a sort of blind faith
in the rationality of the adults words and actions.
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there?' (pointing to their arrays). 'This again suggests that the question
as originally given was possibly seen as ambiguous but interpreted
according to the demands of the context.
To sun up, the responses to questions 1 and 2 provide evidence
against the egocentricity of young children, but it is suggested that
this is because the notion of cognitive egocentrisxa is misconceived. It
is more useful to consider the cognitive, perceptual and linguistic
constraints operating in any given situation.
Q. 3 sad 4. l-hat toys have .you got?/what toys have I got?
These questions required first of all a simple description of
the toys on the table in front of the child followed by a description
of the experimenter's toys. The answer to the second question was in
effect a repeat of the first and assumed understanding that the sets
were identical and that covering them with a screen did not affect
that identity. It is no surprise that the subjects who could not accurately
describe their own toys were also unable to 3a.y what toys V7ere in the
experimenter's possession. Apart from these four subjects the
remainder conserved identity and equivalence when the objects were
obscured from view. It cannot be ruled out that some of these subjects
were only perseverating on the original response without recognising the
necessity that the arrays were equivalent* It is also possible that
the difference between utterance Q5 and Q4 was not discriminated.
The behaviour of the four unsuccessful subjects indicates the
difficulties under which some children are under, even in very basic
situations. The fad lure was either an inability to count up to two or
not understanding the question asked, which in itself might be due to a
number of factors.
Q. 5 unci 6. Hoy/ many have you got left/How many have I got loft?
Ml the children were able to 3ay, correctly, that they had
only one toy left, but the.v were not all able to infer that the
135
experimenter also had one loft. The subjects making this error were
those vjho also had difficulty with other questions (see Table $~6)
apart from one child, Nicholas. He reacts to question 6 with an
enquiring 'Two?* He does not appear to know that his partner in the
game must have the same number of toys as himself, yet he handles all
the other questions in the task very competently. Possibly he treats
the question, initially, as part of a guessing game. The erroneous
replies to this question all gave a figure in excess of one - either
•two* or 'three*. Assuming, for the moment that the answer 'one'
indicates a correct inference, 17 out of 23 subjects (74$) recognised
the numerical equality of the two sets of toys following three
subtractions.
Q. 7 and 8. .hat have .you got left?/Vihat have I got left?
Every child was able to say, accurately, what toy ho had loft
in front of him. They were not all able to say what the experimenter
had hidden behind his screen. There is, of course, a 0.5 probability
of getting the answer' right by chance, though the actual proportion of
correct replies was 0.7Q. Those in error did not completely match the
error group in question 6. Two subjects (Margaret and Nicholas) who
failed to conserve for number, did achieve this for identity. It may¬
be that this is a case of perseveration, but if this i3 30, why did they
not perseverate oil question 5 iuid 6. It is possible that the concrete
object duck or bead has more force than the more abstract number term
'one'. Of those subjects, (there were five of them) who did not give
the correct answer, three were at least consistent. Their answers
matched numerically those in question 6, in that they said the experimenter
had a duck and a bead left, or two beads etc.
Question 9» Do you think it could be a duck/bead?
This is the only question that provides a direct challenge to
the subject's response, though question 12 also represents a challenge
I
of sorts. Up until this point the child could answer all the questions
correctly "by simply describing the array in front of him either in
numerical or lexical terms. There was no need to he aware of the
necessary equivalence of the two arrays. It could he argued that if
the answer to question 8 is simply a result of repeating the answer to
question ^ (perseveration) or of guessing, then a challenge to that
answer would cause the child to change his answer to that of the
alternative toy.
Three basic response patterns emerged.
(i) Those who stood firm, and denied the possibility that the
experimenter could have anything other than the toy they
said he had (represented by a tick in Table 5-6)•
(ii) Those who yielded to the suggestion that the experimenter
night have the other toy, but when given a chance to confirm
their original choice, i.e. 'duck or betid', did so, (A
zero in Table 5-6).
(iii) Those who yielded to the experimenter's suggestion and then
adhered to thi3 alternative choice. (Cross in Table 5-6).
The respective numbers of ticks, zeros and crosses were 8:10;2,
three subjects making no meaningful response. The majority of subjects
did therefore waver in the face of uncertainty, indicating that their
earlier responses had not been entirely confident. Their replies varied
from 'Maybe' to 'yes' and head nodding. In contrast those in the first
category above answered 'IIo* confidently, often accompanied by a smile.
Of those who wore tempted to consider another possibility, only two
finally accepted the alternative. bother this means that on reflection they
realised the logical necessity of their original choice or that they
simply favoured their original guess, it is not possible to say.
Q. 10 and 11. How many have you got left?/How many have I got left?
The response patterns for these questions mirrored those for
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questions 5 end 6. Apart from Nicholas and Karen (who said she had two
left) it was the same subjects providing irregular responses. As before
they were correctly able to assess their own situation (apart from the
exception quoted), but believed that it was not equivalent to that of
the experiraenter. He was thought to have ducks and/or bead3 remaining
behind Ms screen. They maintained this despite all discards being in
full view in a box on the table. "JQp gave a conserving response.
Question 12. How do you know I've got none/one etc?
Eight subjects declined to soy anything when asked for a
justification of their answer to question 11. These are omitted from
Table 5-7 which gives the answer of the remaining subjects to this question.
TABLE 5-7
Individual answers to test question 12
SUBJECT JUSTIFICATION
Roddy 'Cos I haven't
Alasdair 'Cos you have ... 'cos I know you haven't (lifting up his screen)
How do you ImoxfjJ 'Cos I know - I just know
Brian 'Cos they're all in the box
Angela 'Cos all the ducks and balls are in the box
John 'Cos they are (four)
Alan 'Cos you haven't
Lee 'Cos you had two and I had two. So ?/hy do you think
I've got none?/ (lifting up her screen) 'Cos see, I've got none
Linda Because you've put them away (looking at discard box) you've
put all away
Scott 'C03 we've all finished thera
Sylvia Because I do
Gregor Don't know
Nicholas Well, you don't have any (question repeated) Because you sold
them all
Christine Because you haven't ... Because you have, that's why ... Because
there's none on the board
Anna (After throe repeats of question) Can't remember
Sally (After series of repeats and no responses) I've not got any ...
It is seldom easy to interpret the justifications of pre-schoolers
138
engaged in tasks involving a logical concept, un the face of it Lee's
response *Go3 see, I've got none' and those of Roddy and. Sally (sec
Table 5-7) indicate that they tire making an inference, They are comparing
their situation with the experimenter's and. drawing the appropriate
conclusion. Since, however, that inference is not explicit it is not
possible to rule out a misinterpretation of the question. They raay
have token it to be 'now do you know you've got none loft?' This
criticism is unlikely to apply to Lee, who first of all pointed out the
initial equality of the two situations, usually regarded as one ingredient
of a conservation response.
Another group of subjects made sone reference to a change in the
perceptual situation, i.e. Brian, Angela, Linda, Scott and Nicholas,
The answers were not equally sophisticated - compare Brian's 'Cos they're
all in the box' with Nicholas's 'Because you sold them all' - but they
all seen to show that there lias been a transfer of toys from one place
to another. It is also significant that most of those answers use the
word 'all',
Another category of answer can bo distinguished - the 'Because
category. This was very often tautological! 'You have none left because
you haven't got any* - (Alan, Christine). It was represented in its
simplest form by Sylvia: 'Because I do*. Such answers would not normally
be regarded as evidence of the concept of equivalence and identity. The
answer given by JLaodair probably would: 'Cos I know you haven't, I just
know*. The answer does not look very different from that of Sylvia. It
is the committed nature of the response that distinguishoe it - 'I just
know*. .."hen the experiment was over he walked roun. the table and looked
behind the experimenter's screen md said, 'I thought you had nothing ... *
Piaget regards the use of the word 'must' us indicating awareness of
logical necessity, .ilasdsir seems to bo near to this, but it must be
admitted that there arc no solid grounds for believing that dylvia
is not equally aware of this necessity.
The conclusion seems to be that none of the justifications
unequivocally indicates that the child recognises the logical necessity
of the equivalence of the sets, though a number give empirical evidence
to support their answers. The difficulty with logical necessity is that
when it is self-evident there 3eems to be no need to say so. On being
asked for a justification, the most natural reaction i3 to provide
empirical support for an answer.
This question proved the most demanding and only two of the subjects
below the age of 3.9 showed any indication of being able to cope with it.
Summary of findings.
1. A majority of the three and four year old subjects, more than 7Oh -
well above chance level - dealt with test questions in a manner
which suggested an tinderstanding of equivalence and identity.
2. An equally consistent minority, about 25h» failed to show any
appreciation of the problem.
3. The study did not support the notion of egocentrism* but it was
pointed out that this was partly due to the use of unsatisfactory
blanket terminology in the past.
4. The design of the preliminary study did not rule out the possibility
that subjects were 'reading-off1 from their own arrays, instead of
inferring on the basis of logical equivalence, when pronouncing on
an unseen situation.
5. Two questions attempted to control for this, and, though some
children reversed their decision, an overall majority of subjects
maintained their position when challenged or when asked to justify it.
6. A consideration of these findings in relation to those of others,




An errorless performance in Experiment 1 cannot "be taken as
conclusive evidence of identity and equivalence conservation. The
same result would be achieved if the subject merely described what was
in front of him in answer to questions. He could even have seen the
game as one of echoic repetition. Notwithstanding the effect of a
challenging statement by the experimenter ( ,.9» Exp. 1) a more
rigorous test was considered necessary. This would be provided if the
experimenter made a deliberate error towards the end of the session*
If the experimenter's choice did not match that of the subject's, it
would leave the two participants with remaining arrays that were also
different. If the child was able to say what shape or shapes his
partner had left, the *reading-off* strategy could be eliminated.
However, an error in this situation would not necessarily mean that success
in Experiment 1 was based on simple repetition of ovm array, since the
inference involved in Experiment 2 may be more complex than that in the
first experiment. The basic probftem is represented in symbolic form below.
Experiment 1 x^ + y^ = Xg + y2
(x<, * y1) *■ y1 » <Xg + y2) - y2
therefore ■=> xg
Experiment 2 + y1 m xg + y2
(x1 + ) - y1 4 (x2 + yg) - xg
therefore x^ 4 y2
The second experiment sought to 31muUxtft. the standard communication
task and to this end a larger array of items was used varying on three
dimensions.
Method
Subjects; 15 of those who took part in experiment 1. (Five were
eliminated from the original pool on the basis of their performance -
those who failed to show «»vy op^reciot.ion of the pwhtsiw — and three wtfe
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absent due to illness.) The age range was 3»5 to 4.11.
Materials Two sets of hard plastic geometric 3hapes varying on three
dimensions - form, sizo and colour -as follows: Big red square, little
red square, big white square, little white square, big red circle,
little red circle.
Procedure: The instructions and general procedure followed those of
Experiment 1. Test questions were only introduced at the point where
each participant had two shapes left. At this point it was the child's
turn to select and place a shape in the centre of the table, first.
The experimenter deliberately created a mis-match by choosing the non-
identical shape. The experimenter asked if the shapes were the 3arae,
though in practice most subjects spontaneously remarked on the difference.
Test questions then followed.
Question 1: How many have you got left?
Question 2: How many have I got left?
■Question 5x What have you got left?
Question 4: .ihat have I got left?
Question 5 s How do you know?
The experimenter then changed his shape to create a match. He
then asked:
■Question 6: What have you got left?
Question 7• What have I got left?
After all the shapes had been discarded the experimenter asked:
Question 8: How many shapes have you got left?
Question 9: Do you know how many shapes I have got left?
Question 10: How do you know I've got none/one etc?
The sessions were videotaped and lasted about 15 minutes.
Results and Discussion.

















































O 2 o 0 >
o5

























































y y y y





H S o y y y y
y y y y y








Q. 1 and 2. How many have you got left?/IIow many have I got left?
These questions wore generally handled well, though the subjects
who made errors had previously indicated no difficulty in Experiment 1.
To be specific, all subjects answered question 1 competently, but the
five children at the bottom end of the age range were incorrect in
saying how many shapes the experimenter hud. (Q.2). Four of these five
said that the experimenter had none left, and this was also the answer
given by Brian, an older and more advanced child, when this part of
the experiment was repeated. The cause of the problem would seem to be
that the mismatch has taken place. It may be, for instance, that they
assume that their partner has none left since he has failed to match
their shape. He has always done this in the past and they infer that
his failure to do so must be because he does not have that shape left.
This is a fairly sophisticated (if fallacious) inference however, and
a simpler explanation may he nearer the truth, that is that they are
confused and absorbed by the mismatch and do not give the question their
full attention. The answer •none', therefore, if not entirely arbitrary,
is nevertheless unconsidered. It may be that both ex lanations help to
account for this behaviour, in that the children are partly led into
thinking the experimenter has used all his counters because their
attention is captured by the mismatch situation. These speculations are
given some support by the reactions of those children to question 4. If
they were being consistent they should also reply 'Nothing' or 'None' to
the question, 'What have I got left?' This was in fact what happened
suggesting that the'failure to match-tneans-not able to match-because-no
other shapes' inference does play some part in the explanation.
Q.3 and 4. What have you got?/ <liat have I got?
Only one child (Elisabeth) was unable to describe her remaining
shape accurately} otherwise question 3 presented no problems. Question 4
was a critical test of the 'reading-off' hypothesis and showed whether
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or not children could make the appropriate deductions and continue to
conserve identity after a deliberate mismatch had been introduced.
Table 5-8 shows that most of the children fail to transcend the conflict
which has been set up. A breakdown of the type of responses emanating
is given in Table 5-9«
TABLE 5-9. Response categories for question 4 - What shape do subjects








I E has 3ame behind screen as
they have in middle of




II E has something other than
they have left (e.g. Q : ^)
Alison
Brian (1)
III E has same behind screen as
they have behind screen





IV E has nothing left
( - : £)
Brian (2) Sally i
Gregor Christine .
V Don't know Linda
Illustration of the type of
situation prevailing when
question 4 is asked.
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,!e have alre^ dealt with the children v/ho respond with *Nothing*,
category IV,
The response pattern labelled III is one that was successful in
Experiment 1 when behind-screen shapes always did match, oeven children
react in this way which throws into doubt the idea that earlier responses
were due to the logical recognition that they must be the suae. The
*reading-off * hypothesis or one of its variants assumes greater relevance
as an explanation for the behaviour of these children.
The appropriate response pattern, I, seems to include three
children, though the degree of confidence with ,/hich recognition of
identity conservation can be assumed, varies, Angela appears to provide
good grounds. In the following extract, after mismatch, Angela has a
white square left, and E a red circle.
Es ,,'hat have you got left?
A: A square
Es iiihat have I got left?
A: Sound
Es ,'ihat colour is yours?
As Vfliite
Es What colour is mine?
As Red
Es I've got a red round one have I?
As (Nods)
Et And you've got a white Square?
As (Hods)
Es IIow do you know I have?
As (Appears to reflect. No response)
Bs vihy do you think mine is red and round and yours is white and
square?
As 'Cos you've used all the others
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She clearly identifies the experimenter's remaining item* The
justification, though adequate as far as it goes, seems to imply that
a calculation involving the elimination of items used will provide the
answer as to which one remains. If this is a correct assumption it
further implies the existence of a reasonably efficient memory 3tore.
It is not evident that she appreciates the necessary implications
of the situation in the diagram accompanying Table 5"»9* In symbolic
terms s
Her E




Alasdair is given two attempts at the problem. On the first
occasion he responds after pattern III, Jhen the problem is represented,
i.e. the experimenter again fails to match his choice, the verbal
exchange is as followss
E: What have you got there?
Ai I've got a square (showing it)
Et Do you know what I've got here?
As Square
Es What sort of ...
As A round one
Es A round square?
As No
Es ./hat have I got?




.'/hen asked for a justification after the firsi/, he said 'Cos I
Imnw' . (In-priV+.iivm+.ol ir a inci+.i -Pi nn+.i nn w:>S3 nn+. vcnnrvipd ;if+.or +.Vm
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second, trial. It does seen that Alasdair has profited by his earlier
experience and he may now realise that if y^ ^ x^, then ^ y2 and he
may further conclude that if y^ implies xg then x^ implies y^, On the
basis of the evidence it is not possible to say that Alasdair appreciates
the logical relationship involved.
Lee is the other child who gives an indication of recognising the
problem.
Es What's yours? ,'Jhich one have you got left?
L: I've got a big white one
Ej 'What have I got left, here?
L: Mm, (looks down at her array, then across at discard box).
That one (points to her shape in the aiddle of the table *
i.e, the correct shape).
This seems to be a clear-cut example of a subject recognising find
making allowances for the mismatch and deducing that her shape in the
middle must match the experimenter's remaining hidden shape. Unfortunately,
the dialogue continued as follows:
Et Is that the one I've got here, is it?
L: (Nods)
Es How do you know that?
Ls Cos ... you've got the same as me left
Es What have you got there?
Ls (Holds up big white square)
Es Have I got that left, here?
Ls (Nods)
This behaviour seeias to weaken the case made out earlier as she
appears to return to the familiar position of assuming that the
experimenter has left what she has left. It could be, however, that her
justification 'You've got the same as me left' refers to the total
situation and not just the area behind the screens. If this is correct,
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then it must be assumed that the experimenter's later question, 'Have
I got that left, here?', meaning the child's behind-screen shape
behind his screen, is token to raean something else by the child, that
is 'here' is taken to refer to the middle of the table. The exchange
continues with the experimenter repeating the question.
Eg i/hat have I got left here? (indicating behind screen)
L: (Ignores question). /ell, take that away (removes her red
circle) and that will be the same (replacing it with her big
white square)
(The matching shapes in the centre are put in the discard box).
Eg that have I got left here?
L: I've got left this? (shewing her red circle)
Eg Tell me what I*ve got left here?
Lg A wee round
Eg (E removes Ms screen)
L: See, I told you
Lee does not answer the critical question when it is posed again,
so the above explanation must once again be somevdxat speculative. It is
at lea3t clear that she sees that a different situation has been created
and that tMs might have relevance to other pieces in the ' jigsaw'. The
need to remedy a mismatch situation, demonstrated vjhen Lee exchanged her
shapes, is one shown by a number of other subjects, who do not otherwise
make the appropriate deduction.
Those children in Category II who do not equate the experimenter's
hidden shape with their selected shape, find yet do not conform to
pattern III, may represent a transitional point. They know that the
experimenter has not the same as they have concealed, because his shape
that corresponds to their 'behind-screen' shape is in the middle of the
table (it cannot be in two places at once - which is in fact the
iimplication that follows from category III responses). At the same
I4y
time these subjects fail to complete the other half of the solution,
namely that what they have in the middle of the table is the same as
the shape behind the experimenter's screen. Because of this they offer
other possibilities, shapes which have already been discarded or, in
Linda's case, the response is 'Don't know'. The following example is
taken from Alison's record:
E: "hat have you got left?
A: A square
Ei Shat have I got left?
As A round (correct)
Es Is it a big one or a wee one?
A: A big one (wrong)
E: what colour is it?
A: Maybe it's a wee one (correct)
E: il/hat colour is it?
A: Maybe white (wrong)
E: What have I got left here do you think?
As I don't know
E: (Exchanges his shapes to give match in the centre)
A: Yes, you did have a round,
Alison has definitely gone beyond the st:ige of simply equating
her remaining shapes with the experimenter's, regardless of what
selections are made. She is in fact quite near a correct response, but
it can be seen that the strategy she employs is not based on logical
deduction, biit a more or less random procedure, and she is eventually
obliged to admit that she does not know. /hen Brian, who also falls
into this category, is asked what shape the experimenter has left, he
furrows his brow and puts his head down almost like Rodin's Thinker as
if searching hi3 memory. His eventual response refers to a shape
already discarded.
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In summary it is possible to define a number of response patterns
which might be said to represent three level3 of behaviour.
1. Those who recognise the implications of the mismatch, that it must
of necessity mean that the two collections have an inverse rather
than a simple one-to-one correspondence. Three subjects seem to
be at least candidates for this level.
2. Those who appear to have some understanding of the situation in that
they do not regard the concealed shapes as identical. They are not able
however, to carry through the implications of their inference.
Three subjects belong in this category,
3. Those who believe the residual shapes are the same although there is
evidence before their eyes which denies this. They fail to recognise
the conceptual problem involved. Six subjects are clearly at this
level.
3jl
The remaining test questions will be dealt with briefly since they
were only included for completeness, and a number of the children were
disinclined to answer then. This seemed to be partly due to the
energies expended during the mismatch situation - some children were
questioned quite intensively - and partly due to a failure to maintain
attention generally.
Almost without exception, those subjects who did respond coped
competently with the questions concerning identity after the mismatch
was eliminated (questions6 and 7)» and with those concerning number
when all shapes had been used (questions 8 and 9). Of those subjects
who were prepared to give justifications (question 10), sorno appealed
to their o® situation, e.g. Alisons 'Because I've got none left', others
to the general situation, e.g. Brian: 'Because they're all in that box',
Scott: 'Cos I do. We've finished them', and others to a personal
intuition, o.g. Christine: 'Because you have'. These responses were
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very similar to those made in Experiment 1 and the remarks made then
apply here.
General Discussion and Conclusion
The realisation that equivalent collections remain the same
compared to each other, as long as anything done to one collection is
done to the other, was thought to he a considerable aid to efficient
cormaunication in the present programme of studies. The investigation
carried out has shown that the appreciation of equivalence over time
and through withdravrals is present as long as the things done to each
collection are seen to he equivalent, i.e. that withdrawn items match.
It has also been shown that even when they are not seen to be
equivalent (i.e. - x, A,, -> y) conservation of number appears to be
maintained. A simple strategy of repeating or reading-off a description
of the subject's own array could have accounted for these results,
vlhen a deliberate mismatch was perpetrated and arrays were no longer
equivalent in terms of identity, only a small minority of subjects were
able to make an accurate deduction.
It will be noted that in the latter case the original premise has
not been fulfilled - fas long as anything done to one collection is done
to another'. In order to determine the validity of the reading-off
hypothesis it became necessary to alter the rules of the game. The
notion of logical identity was still the key factor but on additional
element was involved.
Ghat do these findings contribute to our Icnowledge of conservation
behaviour and what is their relevance for the coimaunication studies? As
regards conservation, it is difficult to relate the current findings to
previous work since other studies have dealt exclusively with number
by ensuring that identity within sets was uniform, for example the
studies hy Smedslund (1966). Smedslund's youngest subjects were older
than the oldest subjects in the present task, nevertheless those
\0c
achieving number equivalence in Experiment 2, after five subtractions
and a mismatch, were 73/ of the total 3ample. It should be
emphasised that true number conservation was not being measured here
since the standard conservation question was not asked. Only in the
case of identity, for instance, was the subject's answer challenged.
Thus 'reading-off' might still be the explanation for conserving
number.
The adverse effect of screening items to be conserved, reported
by Apostel et al (1957) said Inhelder and Piaget (1963) was not observed
in this study as far as number equivalence was concerned. It may be
assumed, however, that the removal of screens would have facilitated
identity recognition which was upset by the mismatch situation.
Evidently subjects do not need to see and be able to count the
other collection to know that the number in each set is the same. When
the questions are asked the size of the arrays are, of course, minimal -
one in each - but this has reduced from six without the subject actually
observing the effect on the size of the other collection. If this
ability to conserve number over time, which also survives challenge and
mismatch, is net simply a reading-off process then it is an impressive
accomplishment for children of three and four years of age.
Since this work was carried out a series of studies by Schaeffer,
Eggleston and Scott (in press) have been reported tracing the
development of number in young children. An impressive body of ?/ork is
presented but little seems to have direct relevance for the concepts
under investigation.
It is reported, however, that the cardinality rule is not
acquired until what they call stage 5, average age 4.2 years. This was
measured by a procedure which first required the children to count aloud
a collection of poker ehip3, then say how many were present ana then
say again how many wore present after the chips were covered up.
153
Possession of the cardinality rule does not imply conservation however,
Greeo and Morf (19&2) showed that number name or 'quotite', the
cardinality rule, is correctly applied before conservation of amount,
or 'quantite*. The child may say that two sets both contain 6 items
even though they differ in visual extent, yet deny that they contain
the same number of items. It would appear that one-to-one correspondence
is still required, an opportunity denied to subjects in the present
experiments. In another recent study Gelman (1972) has shown that
when number estimation difficulties are eliminated, by using arrays of
two and three objects, children as young as three see number as
invariant under irrelevant transformations. Since one of these
transformations involved addition and subtraction the finding is of
some interest. At the same time Gelman's young subjects failed the
traditional Piagetian conservation task even using small arrays. Gainan
use3 these two pieces of evidence to support the argument that the
traditional Piagetian conservation task measures more than logical
capacity. It is 'at a minimum, a test for logical capacity, the control
of attention, correct semantics and estimation skills' (Gelman 1972).
In the current studies it was concluded that recognition of
number equivalence rather than true conservation was present, since
adequate conservation measures had not been taken. As in Gelman's
experiments small numbers were involved and it seems that this study
supports Gelman's claims that an understanding of number ifW*r\ar\ct, is
present among very young children. An extra dimension has been added
in this study in that the recognition survives the further transformation
of a hidden comparison array.
Given that the evidence regarding- recognition of number
equivalence is not conclusive, there is little doubt that the notion of
identity is not well established and may give way in the face of
challenge or a mismatch situation. This would be in line with
1p4
communication findings that length of description does not decrease
along' with the size of the array. It could be argued that the demands
of the communication task are so great that a description of a rather
complex picture (e.g. the houses) was sufficient information load
for the subject. Given a less complex stimulus, length of message
might have decreased. Unfortunately it is difficult to measure a
significant decrease in length of message unless the items to be
described are sufficiently complex, There must be enough critical
attributes for some to decline in importance along with group size.
An attempt is made to come to terms with thi3 problem in the next
study. The set of geometric shapes, used in Experiment 2, may he
regarded as a compromise between very simple objects requiring one word
descriptions for discrimination (duck/bead) and the more complex houses
pictures. As well as possessing three varying attributes, the houses
had a number of redundant features which, it was seen, were often more
powerful captors of attention. Accordingly, an additional interest in
the nexb study to be reported was to see if length of descriptions
would decrease when material such as the geometric shapes was used,
which still varied on three dimensions but was otherwise devoid of
redundant information.
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III - The effect of an 'ideal* listener on the performance of tlie child
as speaker.
In their studies of c01 iraunicat ion Glucksberg and Krauss (1967)
suggest that it is because they encode messages in a non-social fashion
that pre-school children are unresponsive to feedback from the listener
concerning message adequ; cy. An equally plausible reason is that the
feedback itself is inadequate. The evidence from the present studies is
that the children have not functioned well as listeners.
Glucksberg and Krauss (19^7) studied the effect of feedback on a
speaker's subsequent message, the adult experimenter supplying the
feedback. This was in the form: *1 don't understand which one you mean;
tell me more about it? They found that their youngest subjects, of
kindergarten age, were unable to provide a new description, but 60> of
them were able to modify their previous description on at least one
r
occasion (my underlining). As the authors do not provide any other
relevant information in their results it is difficult to know precisely
what this figure means. It has been mentioned before that the type of
stimulus material used by Glucksberg and Krauss, ambiguous drawings
sometimes called *squiggles', is unsuitable for investigating communication
skills in pre-school children. The theoretical position of theso workers
suggests that they consider feedback to be ineffectual for children of
nursery age, but since they did not include three and four year olds in
their sample, the hypothesis needs to be tested.
There are other factors which require that the performance of the
children as speakers with an adult listener be investigated. A concern
for instructions has already been expressed. In the coramunication tasks
which have been considered thus far, with one exception the experimenter
has been giving instructions to two children. It is a distinct possibility
that some confusion is possible, however carefully planned, when
sfmftrifkfl r»r>1 an nr>o lieiw mrhlinerl fnr di •Pfereirfc Children who are both
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present, s'/ith the adult experimenter as the ideal listener this
difficulty is eliminated.
The sain weakness of speakers in the past has been a failure to
include critical attributes in their descriptions. It is argued that
an ideal listener might be able to direct the speaker's attention to
critical attributes by simply indicating when a message is insufficient.
Up to now the listening children have not told their partners when they
have been unable to make a certain choice, which necessarily leaves open
the question of whether the speakers could have reacted to feedback if
they had received it. The ideal listener, who is ideal only in the
sense that he will always provide feedback when it is useful, will have
a measure of control over his part in the task. He can influence the
extent of the inference demanded of the speaker, by varying the amount
of information in his own message. For instance, if the speaker's
message was 'It's a car' and the listener had two cars in his array, a
big one and a small one, his alternative retorts might be:
(1) I've got two cars
(2) ihich one do you mean, the big or the little one?
The first feedback may alert the speaker to the fact that the
listener is in a dilemma. He has two cars and he doesn't know which one
to choose. The speaker may go on to infer that determination of 3ize
would resolve this dilemma. In the other alternative, the problem is
made quite explicit and no inference is required of the speaker. He
3imply has to say which size of car he intended. Some illustrations of
procedures to be followed by the ideal speaker are given in the liethod
section which follows.
A minor adjustment to the task situation was the introduction of
small 'trays' divided into six compartments to take each of the six
items "in the array to he described. It was thought that this would help
direct the child's attention during the initial instructions when he
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was asked to pick out one object and tell his partner which one it was.
Method.
Subjects
14 children, with equal sex distribution and ages ranging from
3 years 4 months to 4 years 8 months, mean age 4 years.
Material. As for Study II
Two equivalent sets of six plastic geometric shapes: Large red
square, small red square, large white square, small white s uare, large
red circle, small red circle. Two 6" high boards to screen arrays.
Two 20" x 4" trays divided into six compartments to accommodate the
shapes.
Procedure
The subject was first of all asked to name one set of shapes and,
with the experimenter sitting beside him, was told to put his shapes
into the tray provided. He -was asked to pick a shape from the tray and
put it out in front on its own and tell the experimenter about it. This
was dono twice, with the experimenter making no comments about the
child's descriptions, to make 3ure that the child was clear about the
basic nature of the task.
The experimenter then sat opposite the child and ;mother set of
shapes was produced. The child was invited to match them. When he was
satisfied that the two arrays were identical, they were placed in the
respective trays and concealed by screens. Instructions were then as
follows:
'Wow I can't see .your shapes. Choose one of your shapes but don't
show me. Just put ypur finger on it and tell me which one you have
chosen so that I can choose the same one from iny shapes'. If the child's
description was adequate, the experimenter selected the corresponding
shape and held out his clenched fist so that the child did not see and
was not influenced by the experimenter'3 choice. "This is the one I
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think you told me about. Now, show me the one you picked. Put it on
the table'. The two were placed side by side on the table. 'Are they
the same? Is this one the same as this one?' If they matched they
were placed in a discard box which remained in full view throughout
the tusk. If they did not match, the child was asked, 'why are they
not the same?' If he did not know or his answer was unsatisfactory,
the differences were pointed out and the shapes returned to respective
arrays. The child was a3ked to choose again.
.illon the child's first message was inadequate, the experimenter
replied according to a format which successively supplied the speaker
with more information, until finally he was required simply to 'choose'
between two alternatives. If the feedback at any one stage failed to
produce an appropriate reaction, the listener proceeded to the next
stage. The format was as follows:
1. Repeat message to see if hearing it again causes the child to notice
its inadequacy and modify it accordingly.
2. Expand the message to indicate the listener's dilemma, implying that
he has more than one item that fits the description.
3. List the shapes which fit the description.
4. Ask for a direct description.
The two examples given below indicate responses that might be
given under procedures 2, 5 and 4.
Child upeaker's Message ideal Listener's Response
A square 2, I have four squares.
3. I have a wee red square, a wee
white square, a big red square and
a big white square.
4. /hich one do you mean? Is it red or
white? Is it big or wee?
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A big one 2. I have three big ones,
5, I have a big red square* a big
white square and a big circle.
4. Which one do you mean. Is it a
square or a circle? Is it red or
white?
Jhen the child had modified his description sufficiently for the
experimenter to make a choice the procedure continued as already
described with the shapes being matched. If the child failed to
provide an adequate description even after stage 4 of the feedback
format, the experimenter chose a different shape from the speaker's,
and the procedure already described when items did not match, ensued.
The experiment involved two blocks of trials in which all the
shapes were worked through on each occasion. The session was videotaped
and lasted twenty minutes at the most.
Results and Discussion.
One subject declined to take part in the second block of trials and
therefore her scores are not included in the group data presented, though
her performance record can be found in the appendices (A & B).
There are three measures ofi successful communication on the part of
the speaker.
1) The ability to select and report the critical attributes which enable
successful discrimination by the listener.
2) The ability to ignore the irrelevant or redundant information.
3) The ability to modify the message, as a function of the listener's
feedback, if it has been inadequate,
1. Selection of critical attributes
Success in this sense means that the speaker includes the critical
attributes in his first mess.age, that is, it must he independent of any
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aid from the listener. The comprehensive subject by subject data vail
be found in Appendix A, while Table 5-10 summarises performances in
terms of number of descriptions* The 15 subjects provided a total of
152 trials.'" Table 5-10 shows that 61 of those trials were completed
with one description, that is, the information contained in them enabled
the listener to choose the correct shape without needing to ask for
further information. Since the Table also shows that there were 274
descriptions in all, this means that the remaining 71 trials required a
total of 213 messages before successful discrimination was achieved.
Figure 5-1 gives a breakdown in histogram form of the relationship
between trials and number of descriptions. The 61 trials (46, ) that
were completed after only one description appear as the first block.
Another 27, were discriminated after two messages and the remainder were
distributed more or less evenly between 3» 4 and 5- plus descriptions.
Since the listener was providing additional feedback on each occasion
the type of assistance provided after two, three or four inadequate
messages from the speaker did not seem to be significantly different in
effectiveness. This distribution suggests that mere intimation of the
1, Strictly speaking it is impossible to rule out aid from the listener,
except perhaps for the first message of the first choice shape.
Subsequent to this the listener has an opportunity to play a part.
Although on any one selection the speaker's first message is
independent of listener participation, help derived from earlier
feedback, concerning other shapes, may assist the speaker's performance.
2. A trial represents the speakers attempt to describe one shape
selected from the array of six. Five of the trials were meaningful
in the sense that when one shape remains no description is
necessary. The subjects performed the task twice, giving a total of
13 x 10 = 130 trials. The extra 2 trials are due to 2 subjects
giving descriptions which led to a wrong choice by the listener,
30 necessitating two extra trials.
1 b'l
TABLE 5-10
Performance of children us speakers showing total number







No, OP SINGLE DESCRIPTION









1 2 1 2
Alan 56 10 6 16 2 4 6
Lee 55 6 6 12 4 4 8
Scott 52 16 9 25 1 2 3
Jamie 49 17 14 51 1 3 4
Gregor 50 12 19 30 2 2 4
Elisabeth 47 9 8 17 2 4 6
Nicholas 46 12 8 20 0 2 2
Karen 44 7 11 18 5 3 6
David 44 15 15 26 0 1 1
Sally 42 6 8 14 4 2 6
Clare 42 11 6 17 2 4 6
Paul 41 16 12 28 1 3 4
Christine 40 9 11 20 3 2 5
144 130 274 25 36 61
listener's inability to make a selection was enough to alert half of
those subjects who did not achieve first time adequacy. But those who
did not 'catch-on' then, seemed to need fairly explicit feedback from
their partner, A fuller discussion of success rate as a function of
feedback type is given below (see Table 5-12)
Looking at the subject by Subject results, (see Table 5-10) if it is
accepted that three or more single-description trials out of five
Represents a fair degree of competence, the data show that eight
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subjects fall into this category (Alan, Lee, Elizabeth, Karen, Aally,
Glare, Paul, Christine), Two of them (Lee, Karen) achieve this in
both task performances. Lee comes closest to producing a 'perfect'
performance with 0/10 trials being adequate aftor 1 description, and
the other two requiring only 2 descriptions. Table 5-11 shows that
number of descriptions reduces as a function of the number of
alternatives..
Pig, 5-1 Lumber of Descriptions per trial - absolute



















1 2 5 4 5+
Mo. of descriptions per trial
TABLE 5-11 Number of descriptions given as a function of number of
alternatives.(shapes) available.
Number of shapes in pool (Trial shown in brackets)
6(1) 5(2) 4(3) 3(4) 2(5)
BLOCK
I 45 53 26 22 18 144
BLOCK
II 54 26 50 18 22 130
79 59 56 40 40 274
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Such a decrease would be predicted as the number of items became
smaller since the discrimination task should become easier. It was not
clear, however, if young- children would show such an effect. A trend
test for related groups, Page's L Test, was carried out and it was found
that the reduction of descriptions was significant. (L = 653» P< .01).
2. Rejection of redundant information
For any message there is an ideal minimum which includes only the
features essential for discriminating the object being described. This
minimum adequate message requires the speaker to reject those features
which carry no useful information or rather, redundant information, for
the listener. Inspection of the data (Appendix A) shows that the
children were not so good at rejecting redundant attributes. In the 138
trials, only 26 contain no irrelevant information. Of these 26, 14 are
given in the first message, represented by the letter 'A' in Appendix A.
The remainder require a combination of two or more messages to provide
the attributes which constitute an adequate description. These are
represented by *C in the Appendix.
The significance of thi3 result is that the children were not
following an 'ideal* strategy whereby they carefully searched the array
in order to select the unique feature or features belonging to the
selected item. This is scarcely surprising, since everyday communication,
i.e. conversation, contains much redundant information. Indeed, research
suggests we have a need for it. Although speaking in a slightly
different context, G-oodnow states the case regarding redundancy: "Under
what circumstances does redundancy help, hinder, or make no difference":
Even this question may involve a misleading singleness of mind. 1 am not
completely sure, for instance, that redundant choices are always
intended, by the subject, to gather information. They seem sometimes
to serve as ways of marking time, ways of underlining a phenomenon, or
even ways of warding off distraction. If these purposes are involved
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then "redundant" choices may be extremely useful." (Goodnow,Ap. 100).
It would be of interest to see the proportion of non-redundant messages
1
adults would attain in tasks like these.
If communication efficiency is measured by speed and accuracy then
a full description of the object may be the best strategy in this
■particular task. After all it is almost as quick to say 'big red square'
as 'big square' and as the former does not require a search through the
array to determine the minimum attributes, it may well be arrived at
more quickly. Thus it might be argued that those children who include
the three dimensions of form, sise and colour in every de cription are
the best communicators. They provide the necessary information but more
than the sufficient information. The dispute is whether the extra details
act as additional cues to reinforce the message or as noise in the channel
which might lead to confusion. This could be tested. In the present
task only 26 first messages included all three attributes, and only two
subjects (Lee, Sally) were in any way consistent in this behaviour.
One further point 3hould be made. Inclusion of sufficient
information to enable a correct choice to be made, might not be enough in
itself to lead, to a correct choice. A certain degree of clarity is also
desirable. Young children are prone to repitition and ambiguity. In
even a relatively simple task such as this, behaviour of this kind was
observed including a certain amount of contradiction, e.g. Sally
describing a big red square 'The big round one, the big square one, and
its red and its wound*. The fact that the big red circle had already been
1. Since these notes were written the author has conducted some informal
communication sessions with university students using the same or
similar material to that used in these studies. The predominant
finding was that they, too, did not reduce the length of their
descriptions as the number of alternatives decreased, meaning that
redundant features were constantly included. They reported only
changing attributes, however.
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discarded, made the listener's task easier, which would often happen in
practice. But it is not difficult to imagine the problems which a
child of like age might have with the above message and, for instance,
Christine's 'hound square, big square round, round one, a big round Qne'.
The amount of verbal Information that 5-4 year olds can successfully
process may be crucial in such cases. It should again be stressed that
such messages are an exception in that they contained sufficient
information in a single utterance. The dialogue was generally much more
disjointed.
5. The speaker's performance as a partner in a dyad - the ability to
modify the response.
The main hypothesis under test in this sub-task was that an ideal
listener would improve the performance of the speaker. More precisely,
if the listener were to provide informative feedback following an
inadequate description would the speaker be able to profit from this and
so modify his response? It was important that the feedback did not
simply put words into the speaker's mouth. The information should be
such as to require an inference on the part of the speaker. If the
child did not profit from this, further help was provided as described
in the Method,
A striking measure of the success of the speakers in this
situation was that the experimenter failed to select the correct shape on
only three occasions. This compares with the 3*1 incorrect choices made by
the children in the etirlier (houses) experiment (Chapter 4) when half
1
the number of dyads (7) were operating. This strongly suggests that the
1. Hot too much should be made of this comparison, since apart from his
greater efficiency as a provider of feedback, an adult has a number
of other advantages as a listener, not least of which is a clear idea
of the nature of the task.
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'ideal' listener is having an effect. The degree to which the speakers
modified their responses, however, is the important result, since it
was this failure which marked poor performance in the earlier experiment
(houses) and in work by Krauss and Glucksberg (196*?).
Since 61 trials required only one description, 73 trials remain to
be assessed. The detailed trial by trial performances of each subject
following listener feedback are given in Appendix B, From this a summary
of the main types of reaction are provided in Table 5-12.
TABLE 5-12 Types of modifications given by speakers as a
function of listener's feedback (Based on Appendix B),
RESPONSE
TYPE
FEEDBACK TYPE TO MICH
IT APPROXIMATES











R = Repeat of original description ME = Modified response as f of
Q = Response to direct question E's feedback
e.g. 'Big or Wee?*
M e Modified response (unsolicited)
* Inspection of Appendix B shows that the speaker's behaviour doos
not always put him clearly into one or another group. In such cases the
exemplar is placed into the group most nearly representing the behaviour
but being more, rather than less rigorous, e.g. M. ME. R. Q = Rfi
Modified responses were rare in the house experiment. The present
findings would suggest that this was a function of the almost total lack
of feedback from the listener. In the current task -where the speakers
had a sympathetic and helpful listener, reactions involving a modified
response (. ) accounted for approximately 70, of those trials
requiring feedback. Perhaps even more notable was that half of the
trials did not contain any repetition (ME and H «= 50/') • It is also clear,
however, that even with an ideal partner, some 50, of the trials were
not concluded without much repetition aid eventual reduction to a question
and answer technique (RQ and QQ ® 30/ ). Also note that the number of
trials that fire modified spontaneously accounts for only 7 of the 72
trials. Distribution is shorn as a histogram in Figure 5-2.
let, finally, the impressive thing about the children's
performances as speaker was that half the trials did not require any
response from the listener save that of choosing the described shape.
This means that the figures on modification ignore the trials vihere all
the decisions about what should be included were made as the children
gave their first descriptions. For the most part these decisions ave
made (presumably) covertly, but there are examples of this process being
•j
apparently manifested in the child's language.
An attempt has been made to characterise the performance of individual
subjects according to a description which most typified their behaviour.
(Table 5-13)* This is largely based on the manner of their descriptions
as shown in Appendix,B.
1. One instance is provided from David'3 record: 'A little red. I've
got two red ones. This is a square one and what colour is it? Red'.
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TABLE 8-15
PERFORMANCE CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTS
Symbol* Subjects Total No, of
Messtiges
Description







Roughly half first messages
adequate, the rest require
feedback from E to become
adequate
»/RME Elizabeth (17) Some adequate first messages.
Tendency to repetition before






More than half trials adequate
on first mes3age, but prone to
repetition in others and






Largely dependent on communication






Roughly equal proportion of
straight question - answering
and genuine modification of
responses
R Gregor (30) Much repetition but has ability
to modify responses
RQ Paul (28) Much repetition. Success
depends on question answering
Q Anna (19)** Distracted performance. Simple
question and answer technique
necessary
* See Table 5-12.
** Took part in only one block of trials.
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Pig. 5-2. Categorisation of trials requiring 2 or more descriptions
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Factors contributing to task failure.
by
We will conclude this section Considering the main factors in this
experiment which have led to task failure. Some of these factors have
been reported in earlier studies but it is necessary to indicate instances
which may be peculiar to this particular task situation if the eventual
aim of building up a comprehensive picture of communication behaviour is
to be achieved.
This special situation with the ideal listener means that the
emphasis has been on the speaker's reaction to feedback, but before
discussing that issue there are two other factors which should be
mentioned. One concerns the sort of apparent form confusions which
existed for a number of children, such as calling a square, a round. This
was mostly a case of applying the wrong label to a referent and though
bound to hinder successful communication, it is something which minimal
•j
training can put right. It should be pointed out, however, that although
1. Vygotsky long ago pointed out the influence of what he called the
associative complex; *... one word may in different situations have
different or even orraosite meanings as long, as there is some „ , ,,
associative lint botv,pon them., «» "* SSSS8 ff b°th
before and after, or xoaorrow for both tomorrow ;md yesterday,'
(Vygotsky, 1962, p. 70-71).
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this is a relatively minor problem in a simple task like the present one,
it does represent one of the pervasive difficulties in communication in
general. The lack of a common definition gives rise to much of the
misunderstanding between people. Difficulties in basic situations like
this experiment, where three dimensions vary in a binary fashion, are a
warning of what might happen where the possibilities for dissimilar
definitions are many times greater.
The other general area of difficulty might be covered by the term
egoeentrism, according to 3ome theoretical viewpoints. It has been
argued elsewhere (page 732) that this term is unsatisfactory because of
its unclear meaning and, accordingly, the behaviour concerned will be
illustrated by examples from the text records. Two main types of
behaviour can be distinguished.
1. Picking up and showing the selected item to the listener. This often
happened early in the experiment and although the instructions
emphasised the verbal nature of the task such behaviour suggested this
aspect had not been appreciated. The response very often followed a
question by the experimenter at the end of feedback:* ... Which one do
you mean?* This muy often have been habitual rather than a function of
not understanding the instructions. Showing something is more natural
and efficient than a verbal description, particularly for a young child
who is not yet a sophisticated verbal animal. It has not been sufficiently
stressed, perhaps, that the artificial aspect of talking about something
which could just as easily be displayed might well be playing a part in
the children's responses to these tasks. When the children did seen to
have grasped the verbal nature of the task, it was still noticeable that
on occasions when a lengthy dialogue proved unsuccessful, some children
would fall back on the sho.ving response.
2. Using object to assist verbal description. The purpose of this
behaviour seemed to be to facilitate message construction, in that the
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child would point to the object as ho described it. Usually it
remained hidden while he did this, bat one child held up the shape in
full view of the listener as he described it, apparently unaware that
such a procedure made verbal description superfluous. Behaviour which
could be said to be close to 3ome of Piaget's descriptions of egocentrism,
occurred when some subjects* realisation of the speaker's role was to
point bo the hidden object and say simply, 'This one'.
Egocentric behaviour is sometimes defined as the child failing to
put himself in the position of another person. In this sense
egocentrism could be said to underlie much of the performance in this
task. Having said this we know little more about the cause of failure,
/hat we really need to know is what components underlie or contribute
tooinadequate performances. One due is the way in which the child
indicates his misunderstanding of the problem and some of these are
reviewed below.
1. Describing more than one object at a time. This was an obvious
indication that the child was not carrying out the task as intended. It
was an infrequent occurrence and it was not apparent whether it was a
misconstruing of instructions or an Atetentional failure, that is, being
unable to narrow the focus of attention on to one item.
2. Echoing the listener's feedback. A common event was for the listener's
feedback to be repeated back to him by the subject. For example, if the
experimenter said 'I have two red ones', the child would say 'I have two
red ones (too)'. This echoic response revealed an inability to make
the necessary inference that the experimenter was having difficulty in
choosing a shape because the message was ambiguous. It appears that some
the
children regard feedback not as indication of/listener's dilemma but as
him telling them about his shapes. (Because he feels like itt)
An example from the record of one subject, bally, illustrates the
point that the straightforward statement of fact - listener's response
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type 2 - often results in an inappropriate understanding of the listener's
feedback.
Sally: This is square and red.
E: I've got two that tire square and red.
S: I've got a big one and a little square one.
E: Which one do you mean this time?
S: The little one.
The child seems to recognise that the 3ize dimension has been
omitted from her description, but does not appreciate the significance
of this fact. It requires the question before the critical information
is forthcoiaing. It is tempting to speculate what the notion of the task
is in the mind of the young child #10 performs poorly. To him it
perhaps represents a game where he chooses a shape and talks about it
for a while. The man opposite also chooses a shape and sometimes he
may say something about his shapes. Then both he and the man hold up
their shapes. If they are identical they go in a box. If they are not,
then they put them back and he chooses another shape. (This pre-supposes
he has an adequate concept of *identical' in the present context). What
the poor communicator seems to be critically unaware of is that the
experimenter's choice is dependent on his description. It is not clear
whether an appreciation of this causal connection cm be given in
instructions. It may be more fundamentally dependent on the stage which
the child's thinking has reached.
3, Repeating the original message. As has been repeatedly stressed,
good communication is marked by flexibility in behaviour. When the
resjjonse becomes stereotyped, it loses any informative property to the
listener. Persistent repetition of the original message in response to
feedback again suggests that the child fails to realise that the
listener must have more details if he is to be able to make a correct
choice. In this situation one again asks what does the child think?
1(5
Dogo he think that the experimenter guesses? iVhen the objects match,
does that represent good fortune?
4. Analytical descriptions. A further example of non-adaptive behaviour
is what might be called an analytical description. Here the child gets
bogged down trying to give a detailed account of the chosen object.
E.g. Gregor, •Same as ... two sharp points and more and two sharp points
at the top and a thing down there and a thing down there, etc..' (repeated
five times). This child would appear to be highly field-dependent, so
much so that he is unable to 'detach' himself sufficiently from the object
to recognise and name the outline.
5. Premisses but no deduction. There are cases where the child seems
to have all the necessary information to hand for providing an adequate
description, but he nevertheless ftxils to make use of his own observations.
In behaviour which is reminiscent of some shown in the experiment
investigating judgements of same and not-same, Scott 3ays:
•How I've only got a wee round and a big round. It's red and
it's round*.
In the first part of this message, he clearly Indicates that he has two
shapes left, that they are both round and that one is little and one is
big. The critical difference is therefore siae but when he actually
delivers the message he leaves out this feature. Neither shape nor colour
are helpful since they are the same for both objects. This suggests that
the concept of critical or changing attributes is not one that penetrates
the awareness of this child, nor, probably, any other in the sample.
Although this section has stressed weaknesses in performance it
would not be appropriate to end on this note given the generally high
standard of performance. It has already been reported that nearly half
the objects axe adequately described in the first message. Furthermore,
the records show that the subjects can produce self-initiated modifications
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of the descriptions, that is they can re .ogniae the shortcomings and
inadequacies of their messages and compensate for them. Some examples
are given below.
EXAMPLE 1 > Christine
In Trial 2 a Big Red Square was chosen and adequately described. In
Trial J the dialogue went as follows:
C: A little squarangle
E: A little square
C: Like the big one
E: Like the big one
C: But not a big one, A little one
The phrase 'like the big one' referred to the previous Big Rod Square.
This is an unconscious technique frequently followed in adult comirronication
when we know that the pronoun feferred to the thing just described. The
experimenter a3 an adult would handle such a message easily, but a
listener of the same age as the speaker would almost certainly be confused
and tend to think a big one was being described. Note that the
experimenter in this and the other examples is doing nothing other than
repeating the speaker's message. But this may be enough to draw the
attention of the child to what he said and cause him to recognise end
correct inadequacies when necessary. In this case Christine makes it
explicit that she has in fact chosen a little square, but the colour of
the square remains uncertain. One would assume, however, that if it is
like the (previous) big one, it is red.
EXAMPLE 2 * Gregor
Three shapes are left, all red.
G: A little white one
E: A little white one
G: A red onei Sorry (smiles)
TO
EXAMPLE 5 - Lee
L; A wee round square one
E: Wee round .. A wee round square one.
L: No (smiles us sees contradiction) A wee round red one
EXAMPLE 4 - Nicholas
N: A white square
E: A white square
Ns Just a wee one
These few examples show that young children can "be aware of the dual
nature of a communication tusk and they can adapt their behaviour in a
way very similar to the adult in such situations.
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IV - The effect of an 'ideal* speaker on the performance of the child
as listener.
These investigations of the component parts of the communication
task behaviour have arisen out of the findings from the earlier studies.
As pointed out in reviewing the results from the communication condition
of the 'Houses* study, (Chapter 4), adequate descriptions did not
necessarily yield correct choices on the part of the listener (Table 4-9
and p. 92 and 91 ) . Even when they were given all the information to
identify it, the item in question was still not chosen. This happened in
one-third of the cases and seemed a logical area in which to extend the
investigation. If it were generally true that the young children were
unable to operate in this situation on the basis of adequate messages
then the exercise would be futile as a method of cognitive enquiry. It
was necessary to establish if this was in fact the case.
For this purpose the experimenter acted as an 'ideal' speaker. He
was ideal in the sense that he provided sufficient information for the
child listener to choose the item described. He was also ideal in that
he provided no more than the necessary message, omitting redundant
information. A feature of many of the children as speakers was that,
even when adequate, the performance was inefficient. Messages tended to
be repetitive or rambling and included a number of irrelevant attributes.
To avoid the signal being obscured by noise, the ideal speaker'3 messages
were based on a rule designed to give the most parsimonious yet sufficiently
complete description to enable discrimination. This was as follows;
1. Look for and transmit the unique attribute if there is one.
2. If no unique attribute, look for the attribute which is
possessed by the selected item and the least number of other
items - the minimum attribute.
3. Transmit the minimum attribute plus ;ny other attributes needed
to differentiate the selection from its sub-set of items, i.e.
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those others which possess the minimum attribute.
An additional outcome of this design was to involve the child in
the task more fully. Earlier studies had shown that the listener's role
was a particularly passive one. This was partly because the
stimulation provided by the speakers vvas uninspired and partly because
of a failure to realise the function of the listener. The adult speaker
was designed to eliminate the first problem and the more familiar
setting of the child responding to an instruction by the experimenter
was expected to alleviate the other weakness. With his peer the child
may or may not know what is happening. Doing tilings in response to
messages from another child is an atypical situation. Even if the
experimenter's initial instructions are understood, the child speaker has
only to fail to produce an appropriate signal once for the listener's
expectation to be disappointed. The probability of unproductive
communication is reinforced with each additional failure and the likelihood
of complete breakdown is high since the threshold of focal attention for
young children is lo?f.
Thus in the experiment to be described the usual mental set of
young children in the testing situation was to be utilised, that is one
of broadly doing what they were asked to do. Different material was
used from that in the previous ideal listener condition, but, as in that
experiment, the items were familiar to the children; the set of teddy
bear pictures used in Study I of this series.
Method
Subjects 17 children, 8 male, with ages ranging from 3 years 4 months
to 4 years 8 months, mean age 4 years.
Materials Two sets of six pictures of teddy beers, as used in Study 1,
varying on three attributes; colour of coat, sikg of hat, presence of
stick. Two 6" hi$i boards to screen arrays. Two 20" by 4" trays divided
into six compartments to hold the picture cords.
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Ideal speaker's strategy The experimenter as speaker operated according
to the strategy set out in the introduction. Translating this in terras
of the coraisunicah1e material used, suppose that the speaker first
selected picture C from the set below.
A Red coat, small hat, stick
B Red coat, small hat, no stick
C Red coat, big hat, no stick
D Blue coat, small hat, stick
E Blue coat, small hat, no stick
P Blue coat, big hat, no stick
By the rule he would first look for the unique attribute. Picture C
does not have a feature not possessed by the other pictures. The second
stage is to look for the minimum attribute. Picture C has a big hat and
only one other picture (P) has a big hat. Thus the first part of bhe
message is 'Big hat*. The remaining task of the speaker is to distinguish
picture C from its subset C and P. Picture C has no stick but neither
has picture P. Picture C has a red coat while picture F has a blue coat.
So coat colour is the attribute which differentiates C from P. The
a-equate description or message is therefore: 'Big hat, red coat'.
The ideal speaker operated according to this rule throughout the
task, in terms of the size and composition of the picture set at the time
he delivers his massage. He did not, for instance, compile a description
as if he were differentiating from the whole set, when there were only
three pictures remaining.
Instructions and procedure. The experimenter faced the child across a
low table and addressed him as follows: 'You've seen these pictures before
haven't you? (laying out sets) There's some for you and some for me. My
pictures are the same as your pictures. Can you put together the pictures
which are the same? (If the child was unsure, the experimenter helped by
taking one picture from his set and asking the child to find the one in
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his set which was the sane - the matching sots ware built up in this
way). Now you take those pictures and. put them in there (pointing to
tray) and then put them behind your screen so that I can't see them.
We both have the same lot of teddies, don't we? Now, I'm going to choose
one of the teddies. I'll tell you which one I've chosen and you pick
the one I tell you about from your pictures. Listen carefully. (The
experimenter gives a description e.g. "It's a teddy with a big hat and
a red coat"). Show me the one you think it is. (The experimenter laid
the subjects choice in the middle of the table and put his own selection
beside it). Are they the some? (If 'Yes' - correct, they were placed
face upwards in a discard box to one side in view of the subject and the
experimenter gave the next description. If 'No* or 'Yes* - incorrect)}
Look carefully. Are this picture and this picture the same? (If the
child failed to report the differences, the experimenter pointed them
out and the pictures were returned to their respective arrays). Now I'll
choose another teddy and tell you about it. Listen carefully.'
The complete set of pictures was worked through twice, called
hereafter blocks one and two. The task was completed in one test session
lasting about twenty minutes end was videotaped,
hesults and Discussion
Group data
Table 5-14 .shows the number of errors made by each subject in the
two blocks of trials. The total number of wrong choices was small, 29,
out of the 170 descriptions given. The overall error rate was thus 17/-.
Less errors were made on Block 2 suggesting a practice effect, but this
difference was not significant. The error distribution is given in
detail in Appendix C and illustrated graphically in Figure 5-2. Inspection
of this shows that most errors occurred when the number of alternatives
available was greatest. 21 out of 29 mistaken choices were made in the
first two trials of each block, when the size of the array was five or
180
TABLE 5-14
Number of Errors by listener (child)
Subject Block 1 Block 2 Total
Alan 1 0 1
Lee 0 0 0
Dale 0 3 3
Linda 1 0 1
Scott 2 1 3
Jamie 1 3 4
Gregor 1 0 1
Margaret 0 1 1
Elizabeth 5 2 5
Nicholas 1 0 1
Karen 0 0 0
David 1 0 1
Sally 0 0 0
Clare 1 0 1
Paul 1 1 2
Anna 4 0 4





Incidence of mistaken oairs
picture described Picture selected ri\i.'
B A 5)
B E 5) 13
B G 3)
E B 2)
E D 1) 4
E F 1)
F C 1)
F D 1) 3
F E 1)
A D 1)
A F 1) 2
D E
23*
* The difference between this figure and that of 29t (Table 4-1), is
explained by the exclusion of perseverative errors by individual
subjects in the data on type of picture giving rise to mistakes. Then




Figure 5-5 Listener's errors
as a function of number jl£
alternatives (pictures) available
5 4 3 2
Number of alternatives available
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six. The number of errors was too small to allow a test of significance
to he made.
There is also a pattern evident as regards the type of item that
gives rise to difficulty. Table 5-15 shows the incidence of mistaken
pairs. Pictures B and E accounted for 17/23 or 74/ of the mistaken
selections. They are the pictures with the least distinctive features -
they do not have big hats and they do not carry sticks. This •silent*
minority among the bears has been mentioned before, since the same
error pattern was found with this material in Study I (see page104). It
appears, therefore, that even when adequate descriptions are provided the
perceptual problems presented by these pictures, as revealed in Experiment I,
are not overcome. The order of items selected was based on random
number tables, but it is possibly significant that in eight out of
thirteen B/E errors, those pictures occurred first or early in the block.
As something of a counter to this, however, the adequate description in
each case was also a full description, that is, all three critical
attributes were included in the speaker's message.
Individual performances
Table 5-14 shows that five children achieved faultless performances
in Block 1 and eleven had complete success in the second block of trials.
Three subjects (Lee, Karen and Sally ) correctly interpreted all
the messages in both sessions, and eleven children - two-thirds of the
sample - had one or less errors in the task as a whole.
Hie main finding, therefore, is that given the minimum but adequate
amount of information to make a choice, most of these three end four year
olds are able to determine which of a number of similar pictures is
being described. The videotape records showed the confident way in which
the children as listeners performed. They 'would appear to check off the
features transmitted by the speaker against their arrays and selection
was often accompanied by such phrases as 'It must be this one' or
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'I know which one it is'.
Although errors were relatively few in number, the videotaped
record is a useful aid in trying to account for mistaken selections. It
revealed that a major cause of errors was a tendency to make choices
based on only part of the information provided. Sometimes the visual
record showed that the child actually selected a picture before the
speaker had finished hi3 message. At other times selection awaited
completion of the message, but it was evident that not all the information
had been processed. It is likely that lack of attention and predispositions
set up by the prevailing situation contribute jointly to many wrong
choices. One or two examples illustrate the problem.
Elizabeth (3 years 11 months)
Experimenter: (Picture B) It's got a wee hat, a red coat and no
stick.
Elizabeth: (Hesitates, appears to deliberate - selects picture A)
Es (Pictures placed side by side) Are they the same?
SI: (Shakes her head)
E: You're not listening to what I say are you? You've
got to try and get the same one.
El: I've got two red coats, I've got lots of red coats.
It looks as if Elizabeth 'switched-off' after the second component of the
speaker's message. Her selection, 'A', matches that of the speaker as
far as size of hat and colour of coat arc concerned. If she had also
taken into account that the described picture did not have a stick she
would have chosen accurately. Her last remark suggests, but no more,
that she inay have based her choice solely on colour of coat. This is
supported by the results of Study I which showed that coat colour was the
dominant feature.
Another child seemed so anxious to be actively involved in the
game that he selected a picture before the experimenter was even able to
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start his first message* Kagan's measure of cognitive style would
undoubtedly categorise this child as 'impulsive' (Kagan, 1966), A
look at part of his performance record shows how this impulsiveness
(if that is what it is) affects his behaviour,
David (3 years 8 months)
Experimenter: (picture B) It's got a red coat and it's got ...
David: (Breaking in) A stick!
E: ..a wee hat, a red coat and no stick, ,'hich one
do you think it is?
D: (smiling) A red. (selects picture A and hands it
across)
E: Are they the same?
D: Yes
Ej Look carefully, are they the same?
D: Yes, because that one's got a stick
David does not appear to understand that he must base his choice
on the speaker's message. Right through the first block of trials he
was liable to select a card before the speaker had started his message.
Although the camera was not able to pick it up, it is probable that he
had made his choice before the speaker had delivered his message and it
was fortuitous that the two pictures matched on two features. His smile
and mention of 'red' possibly indicates that he has recognised common
ground between his .and the speaker's selection. . Later, when he had
settled down, he performed well.
Here is another example.
Scott (4 years 4 months)
E: (Picture B) It's got a red coat and a school cap.
Scott: A red coat ... Must be this one (selects picture C)
E: Are they the same?
S: (Hods) Yes
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E: ,:hat about the hats?
3: One's got a top hat.
It is likely that Seott repeats the art of the message that determines
his choice - 'red coat' - hut does not mention the additional feature
which would enable him to make a correct choice. He seems as certain
as those who choose correctly, i.e. 'Must be this one'. It is perhaps
this degree of certainty which causes him to maintain that the two
selections are the same.
Jirrors in this task were distinguished by being perseverative.
Fifteen of the wrong choices (see Appendix C) might be said to fall
into this category, This perseveration was partly accounted for by the
fact,already mentioned, that certain items in the arrays habitually gave
rise to confusion. It was surprising, however, that as many as six
subjects should fail,two or three times,to match picture with description.
A possible explanation is that, having shown the experimenter his choice
which results in a mismatch, the child reasons that the speaker will
choose the right one next time, the right one being the child's selection.
This betrays a fundamental misconception of the task and might well be
explained by Piaget as egocentrism. Only one subject, Anna, provides any
support for this possibility. On a number of occasions she says,when
comparing selections,that they are not the same 'because you choosed that
one', and in one instance rather exasperatedly, 'You choosed that one again!'
But when she realised that her choice was determined by the speaker's
message .rather than his or her choice .she handled the task well find made no
errors in the second session. In fact, in one instance she was able to
Chang's her choice of picture in mid-decision, as it were, when she realised
that she had not taken account of hat size.
One or two of the younger and slower subjects required that the task
be explained in simpler more concrete terms. The instructions were
prepared with this in mind, but it transpired that for some children the
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instractions were still too verbal or abstract. With Paul the
experimenter found it helped if he showed the subject the picture he had
selected - the blank side facing the child - and then described it. The
message was then followed with * See if you can find this one among yours'.
These subjects also indicated quite clearly that they could only search
for one dimension at a time. This was very often an unhelpful strategy.
Prom a message like 'Blue coat and stick', blue coat would be'picked up'
and the child would find a teddy with a blue coat. If the speaker then
repeated the message the child might be able to check to see if it alao
had a stick. In most cases the subjects in error did not reach this
second stage, but where they did and still chose incorrectly it could be
because the first criterion gets forgotten and the search becomes solely
one of looking for a picture having a stick. In such a situation stick
and red coat might be selected. Although there are some errors like this
and the above explanation seems the most plausible to account for it, it
nevertheless remains a hypothesis.
Summary
1. 'When presented with messages that were only minimally sufficient to
enable discrimination of one picture from an array of similar
pictures, young children performed significantly above chance level.
2. Though the messages were constructed according to a rule of parsimonjf,
it appeared that the absence of additional information did not affect
performance adversely.
3. It may have been that the complete absence of 'noise' - repetition,
irrelevant details etc, - compensated for the minimal nature of the
descriptions.
4. Whether what has been called the minimum adequate description is more
or less effective than a full description of critical attributes each
time, remains a matter for verification,
5. The relatively few errors seemed to be due to incomplete processing
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of the verbal message and some perceptual confusion between
the stimulus material itself. In line with this, mistakes tended
to involve pictures which gave rise to most judgement difficulty
in the earlier experiment with this material (Perception of
Differences).
For some subjects tusk instructions were not sufficiently explicit.
Breaking- down and making the procedure more concrete removed the
misconceptions.
188
(Chapter 6 A talkin,; doll as a yivctnpr in a communication situation
Introduction
dome studies have been described of children in cosamunicaiion
situations with one another and together with an adult in the role of
* ideal* partner. The latter condition led to an improvement in
performance which was largely a result of the adult being able to
compensate for weaknesses in the child*s performance. It was now of
interest to know whether there was a situation where the child could
adapt to the need3 of others. It was already established that when
working in pairs the amount of consideration given to the needs of the
partner, although not negligible, was of a limited nature. Previous
research (Olucksberg et al,, 19&>| Flavell et al», 1968) and Piagetiaa
theory 3u, ge3t that cliildren are too 3elf centred to be able to modify
their behaviour to the requirements of a purposive communication task.
It could be argued, however, that unless a situation i3 dovised whore
the needs of the other are apparent and built in to the task, a true
the
test of/egocentric hypothesis has not been carried out.
•/hat is being suggested is that the child may have it in his power
to play the role of speaker or listener in the communication task,
adequately, as long as he recognises the particular demands that are
being made of him, A mature person accepts these demands naturally since
it is understood, even if only implicitly, that communication could not
work without certain *rules* of behaviour. If the situation in itself
does not induce competent communication behaviour on the part of the
young child, are there any conditions that might? In his analysis of
the problem Flavell proposed that the speaker's 'model' of the listener
crucially affected his communication efficiency. By *model* he seems
to mean the perceived needs of the listener in that particular situation.
The listener also has a model of the speaker, loss critical to the
success of the task, but also important.
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Both Plavell and Clucksberg argue that because these models of the
other are insufficiently developed, the pro-school child is a poor
communicator. It is presumably the case that with little else to go
on, the perceived model of the ether is the same as the preceived model
of the self. In outward appearance and behaviour the other child is
broadly the same, so the assumption is that his needs are the same. The
role playing studies of Flavell et al. (1968) indicate, for example, that
in choosing presents for mother and father the child selects items v.hich
appeal to him, e.g. toy train, rather than gifts that one would consider
appropriate for adults. A projection of the solf image on to others
neons to be in operation.
This account seems to bo somewhat at variance with recent findings
by Donaldson and Lloyd (1974). In their work with a talking doll they
found that young children were willing and able to provide assistance of
a cognitive nature for an organism which 13 presented as Inferior to
themselves. Notably they have judged statements by the doll about the
visual world indicating when he was wrong or right. A deliberate
emphasis on the backwardness of the doll and on his need for help from
the children seemed to be highly motivating for the young subjects.
Perhaps the critical difference between this and previous studies in this
general area is that the child was provided with the impetus to nuke a
deliberate or intentional allowance for his partner. It may be objected
that this is an artificial piece of behaviour brought about by intensive
training. In fact Donaldson and Lloyd found that the children needed
little encouragement to assist the doll, but oven if they had, the finding
still demonstrates that the view which sees the young child in a rigidly
egocentric framework may be misleading. Further, if the behaviour
generalises to a quite different situation, the position will have to be
x*e-assessed.
It was proposed that the talking doll should be used in a suitably
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prepared coawunieation experiment to test the effect that this known.
poor performer had on the children's behaviour, dince they know that
the doll was liable to mcke errors, would they, as listeners, notice
and correct any such errors, and perhaps more interestingly, as speakers,
would they adapt their performance to suit the doll?
A clear hypothesis is not easily presented. There are two
conflicting trends: the well-known findings in egoccntrism highlighting
the young child's inability to take account of others, and the results
achieved -with the talking doll, v&ere the laboured efforts of another
have boon Instrumental in gaining co-operation and assistance of a
sophisticated order from young children. Nevertheless it could be
argued that previous work with the teliding doll has not been a true test
of communication behaviour. The aim of this study was to provide such
a tost to discover whether the limitations imposed by Piaget's 'cognitive
egocentrlsa' would show themselves. It also provided the opportunity to
extend a technique which had already proved useful in the study of
cognitive development,
--xpc.rii.icnt I
She standard experimental set-up using the talking doll has
already been described (See Chapter 2). Some special problems ;rose
in the present experiment, however. One was to present the talking doll's
role so that it was plausibly en inferior performance without detracting
from the Edms of the task. Ideally the doll should make the sort of
errors produced by young children in such a ta.sk, since it was important
to know if the children recognised in others what they failed to eliminate
in their own performance.
Basically the doll provided inadequate messages of the type the
children produced in the earlier experiments conducted. Inadequate
messages were largely those Where one or two critical attributes were
missing from the description. To give a simplified example, in the
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objects possessing attributes *AXY* and 'BXY', 'A* and ' B' are the
critical attributes, Any message not including 'A* or (i.e. 'X',
'Y', 'XY') is an inadequate message since it does not allow the listener
to discriminate the chosen object. To lessen difficulty the doll
avoided the excessive repetition, rambling or contradiction which
characterised many of the children's descriptions. If repetition did
occur it was a straight repeat of the original description when the
listener did not ask for further information.
The precise nature of errors or omissions made by the doll was
dictated by the material used as well as by the feedback from the
listener. To ensure a sufficient degree of ambiguity without having
an overlarge pool of objects, it was decided to use relatively abstract
items. Having in mind the limitations on the types of attributes which
can confidently be used with young children, blocks varying on three
dimensions - siae, with/without cross, with/without hole - were used.
The adv;mtage of this material was that it did not encourage overmuch
irrelevant comment which everyday objects like animals or cars might have
done. To this extent the subjects were helped in that their attention
was directed towards the critical features, but at the seme time the
opportunity for introducing irrelevant detail was not wholly excluded.
Colour, (when used as well as 'cross') shape and type of material
(i.e. wood) were superfluous attributes which could be mentioned.
The essential guideline for the doll's performance as listener
was that it would not select the correct item unless given an adequate
description. If a child was unable to give an adequate description, the
doll deliberately made an incorrect choice. During the task, the doll
as listener encouraged the child to give him more information when
necessary but in no way attempted to lead the subject. The doll's remarks
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were confined to statements like 'I'm not very good at this game. I
still don't know which one you've chosen. Can you tell me more about
the brick?'
As speaker the doll's role was more complicated. To be adequate,
a description typically required information about three attributes. One
of these was given in the first message, but the remainder had to be
•derived' from the doll by means of suitable feedback from the listener.
The child had to satisfactorily indicate to the speaker that he was in a
quandary because the doll's message wa3 in some way insufficient,
ambiguous, or obscure. If the child confidently assorted he had made a
choice, despite the message being inadequate, the doll allowed the child
to take that decision. /hen uncertainty prevailed, however, the doll
would seek to extend the communication procedure by following a prepared
routine. This is set out in detail in the Method section under
'Instructions'. The critical factor, always, was to ensure that, the build
received no additional information unless he had 'earned' it.
The experimenter's role in this tank had necessarily to be a
reduced one. Apart from giving the initial instructions, the experimenter
confined himself to manipulating the material on the doll's behalf, which
included putting the selected blocks in the box provided.
One further problem concerned the order of presentation. In a
traditional design, half the sample would have the condition as speaker
first, half the condition as listener first and reverse their roles in
the second part of the experiment. Those subjects, however, who took the
role of listener first would inevitably receive the benefit of the doll
as a model for the speaker role. This would seriously affect the value
of the findings for their subsequent performance as speakers,
bince the main purpose of the experiment was to see how young children
would adapt their performance as speakers for something like the
talking doll which had a proven record of incompetence, it was thought
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undesirable to prejudice this aim especially with the relatively small
sample involved. This meant that the extant of the influence of the
doll's role as listener on the child's performance as listener could
not be assessed. But, since the doll's contribution in this context
was largely a passive one, restricted to remarks like 'I'm not very good
at this game. Can you help me some more?' it was thought the influence
would be minimal. Nevertheless such a factor needs to be borne in mind
when interpreting the results. There was also the possibility of a
practice effect, caused by the child's own experience as speaker, on his
performance as listener. This possibility was not controllable find is
anyway a function of the child's own behaviour, and not a model from
someone else.
Finally, it was thought that the data already available on the
influence of a model listener on subsequent performance as listener
(Chapter 5, Study IV) were sufficient to allow concentration on the
present task, namely that of testing the motivating effect of the younger,
more helpless 'organism' as seen in other experiments with the talking
doll.
The blocks chosen and the order in which they were selected was
constant across subjects. If a very much larger sample had been
available a random order could have been adopted, but if it had been used
with this sample a variation of difficulty would have resulted which
would have been distorting. It was desirable, for instance, to insure
that each block chosen required the maximum number of features so as to
encourage a high level of communication and a constant level of difficulty.
This in itself imposed restrictions on the order. In the 'Child as
Speaker' condition subjects were at liberty to select blocks in any order





Sixteen children, 8 male, 8 female , ages ranging from 3 years
9 months to 5 years 1 month.. Mean age for the group was 4 years 4 months.
Materials
Two sets of identical wooden blocks for speaker and listener
varying on three dimensions; size, possession of cross, possession of
hole. Each set was made up of eight blocks. These were as follows;
big block with cross and hole (BXH); big, no cross, hole (BXH); big, no
cross, no hole (BXH); little block with cross and hole (LXH); little, cross,
no hole (LXH); little, no cross, no hole (LXH).
|VU
BXH BXH &XH BXH
Pig. 6-1 Stimulus material used in Talking Doll Experiment (1)
The big blocks were 6,J x 6.J x 3 on and the little blocks 3x3xJ cm.
The holes were bored centrally, 1.3 cm diameter for the large blocks,
0.7 cm for the small ones. The crosses were drawn diagonally in broad
stripes with a red marker pen on the horizontal surfaces. They are
illustrated in Figure 6-1.
Two cardboard boxes 14.5 x 11 cm, one red, one white. Two wooden
screens 60 cm wide and 17 cm high.
Procedure
The standard experimental situation with the talking doll has already-
been described. The subject was told that the doll, Chu-Chu, wanted to
play a game with some bricks he had. Before the bricks were produced, the
experimenter told both parties (doll and child) that this Was a game where
they must help each other. The child must listen carefully to Chu-Chu
and do what he asked and help him when he needed help, and the uoll must
listen carefully to the child and do what he was told.
'The bricks were then laid out to show that the child's set of bricks
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matched the doll's set of bricks. The experimenter took care to use no
labels referring to attributes of the bricks when setting them out. When
the child was satisfied that he find the doll had identical sets of bricks ,
low screens were produced which obscured the materia-ls but otherwise
left the participants in full view of one another.
As explained in the introduction, the children always played the
part of speaker first, followed by a session as listener. As speaker
the child had to choose bricks one at a time and communicate his choice
to the doll so that he could select the same brick from his set. lien a
set of descriptions for one brick (called a trial) was complete, the
child and the doll (i.e. experimenter on its behalf) put their chosen
bricks into boxes provided. The session consisted of four such trials.
At the completion of the trials, the screens were removed and the
selections compared. The choices were placed side by side by the
experimenter who asked, one by one, if the pairs of blocks were the same.
If the child said 'No* he was asked for a justification for his response.
It was then the turn of the doll to act as speaker and instructions
were given accordingly(see below). At the end of the session of four
trials the selected bricks were again compared and the child asked to




Experimenter. Your turn to go first, ...... Listen carefully,
(child's name)
Chu-Chu, because .... is going to tell you about a brick
he has chosen to go into the box. See if you can choose
the same one. You choose a brick, .... , and tell Chu—Chu
about it so that he can choose the same one. Do you
understand what you have to do, Chu-Chu?
Doll Yes. I have to listen to .... and then choose the brick
which he tells me about, the same one, and put it in my box.
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E That's right, Chu-Chu. Do you understand what you have to do ....?
(If the child is uncertain, the experimenter repeats the instructions)
Right you choose a brick and tell Chu-Chu about it,
(Jhen the child's description is inadequate):
D Can you tell me sorae more about the brick, I don't know
which one you mean,
(If still inadequate, doll repeats description given by the child)
I'm not very good at this game, ,,,, . Will you help me as much
as you can so I can ehoose the right brick? Can you tell me any
more about the brick?
(If still no addition to message):
/ell, I'll have to guess - perhaps it is this one, (Chooses wrong
one).
Doll as Speaker
(It may be useful at this point to re-read the paragraph in the
Introduction about the doll as speaker (p. 190-1) ).
D Can I have a turn now, ? And I'll tell you about my bricks.
But if I'm not very good at telling you, you must help me, so that
you can choose the same brick as me,
E Yes, .... , you must try to choose the brick that Chu-Ghu tells you
about. But Chu-Chu won't be as good as you, so you might have to
help him. If you don't know which brick Chu-Chu has chosen, see if
you can find out by asking Chu-Chu.
The detailed procedure followed is given in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. This does
not claim to cover every eventuality and this format might not always be
followed rigidly. The guiding condition wa3 that after the first message,
the child must earn the additional attributes that would determine the
correct block. If a child persisted in no response or indicated that he
wanted to make a choice, he was allowed to do so.
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TABLE b-1
Betails of procedure followed when child's response to doll
speaker'3 messa,we justifies the supply of further information





— I've got four big blocks, which one
do you mean4?
— You need to say more than that
—Has it got a cross/hole?
etc.
SECOND MESSAGE: It's got a cross on it
(IF RESPONSE ADEQUATE)
THIRD MESSAGE:
It's got a hole in it.
TABLE 6-2
Details of procedure followed when child's response does not
justify the supply of additional information
DOLL'S FIRST MESSAGE: The first one I've chosen is a big block
CHILD'S REPLY: No res|jonse Child announces verbally a
choice based on inadequate
information e.g. 'I know
which one it is, it's got a
hole and cross'.
I,






I didn't say that -































Order of gtving attributes
1. Boll: The first one I've chosen is a big brick
(2nd attribute) It's got a cross on it
(3rd attribute) It's got a hole in it
2. The second one ISve chosen ha3 got a red cross on it
(2nd attribute) It's a wee one
(3rd attribute) There's no hole in it
3. The third one I've chosen is a big one
(2nd attribute) There's no cross on it
(3rd attribute) There's no hole in it
4. The last one I've chosen has got a hole in it
(2nd attribute) It's a big one
(N.B. Although the 2nd. and 3rd. attributes are specified in the above
protocol, if the listener enquired about a specific attribute (e.g. 'Is
there a cross?*) rather than generally indicating he needed more information,
then that attribute was provided.)
Results
Child as Speaker
In assessing the performances of the children as speakers, among
the aspects considered were:
(i) The communicative adequacy of the descriptions
(ii) The effect of the material on selection and description
(iii) The significance of different types of communication
(iv) The degree of adaptation to the needs of the listener.
(i.e. the doll)
Coiiu.amicative adequacy of messages
Table 6-3 is a summary of the detailed record to be found in
Appendix 3). The Table shows that the first item chosen needed, on average,
approximately four messages before the listener (the doll) made his
choice, whereas the fourth block chosen needed, on average. one or two
199
messages. 'To see if this reduction was significantly related to the
number of alternatives available for each trial, Page's Trend Test was
administered. The number of messages reduced significantly in the
expected order (L = 379.5, P< .01). The data on attributes, however,
also in Table 6-3, shows that the number of attributes reported remained
constant over trials. This was consistent with earlier findings (sea p. 61 ).
In assessing the speaker's performance a measure is needed that
indicates whether or not the description of selected blocks enables the
listener to pick out the self-same items. This index has been referred
to in previous studies - message adequacy - find the relevant data are
presented in Table 6-3. It shows that 21 out of 56 messages (37.5/ ) were
adequate. Of the remaining 35 messages, 30 omitted detail about one
attribute but only five messages ignored two attributes. The table also
shows that 36 out of 56 messages (64/-) included some irrelevant
information, either non—critical sain factors or features totally irrelevant
to the discrimination problem. More data and a discussion of message
types will be found below when individual differences are presented.
Effect of material on selection and description
It is of interest to know if the properties of the material used had
any specific effeevs on the communication performance of the children.
There was a consistent tendency for subjects to choose blocks path 'positive*
attributes, that is 'with cross' rather than 'without cross', 'with hole*
rather than 'without hole', 'big' rather than 'wee'. This is summarised
in Table 6-4.
Each subject was given a score based on the number of ' ositive'
attributes and 'negative' attributes included in blocks chosen. A
Wilcoxen Test showed the difference in type of attribute preferred was
significant (T - 12.5, p <•65)• When the scores were weighted to take account
of order of selection, (see Table 6-5) the significance strengthened
(T - 6, p .01).
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TABLE 6-5
Distribution of no::sage categories for children acting as
speakers in a communication situation with a talking doll
(3urmaed data, n - 14)
-
MESSAGES ATTRIBUTES CATEGORY OF COMPLETED MESSAGE
TRIAI TOTAL MEAN TOTAL 1.1BEN A AI C ox BA m NI1 NI2 EN
1 54 3.9 29 2.1 0 0 2 1 3 6 3 2 11
2 44 3.1 31 2,:2 1 0 3 3 7 3 3 1 7
3 38 2.7 33 2.4 0 2 1 3 6 1 6 1 8
4 23 346 31 2.2 0 3 1 1 5 2 6 1 9
TOTAL 1 5 7 8 21 12 18 5 35
A = Adequate (no redundancy)
C = Combined descriptions adequate
I - Descriptions including irrelevant attributes
N = Inadequate
Ni(2) = Inadequate, one (two) attribute short
TABLE 6-4







Block preference a3 a function of order of select-ion
BLOCK ORDER OP SELECTION TOTAL WEIGHTED TOTAL*
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
BXH 4 3 1 1 9 28
BXK 1 oC. 3 2 8 18
BXH 3 1 3 2 9 23
Bio! 0 2 2 1 5 11
LXH 4 2 2 1 9 27
LXH 1 2 2 2 7 16
LXH 1 1 1 2 5 11
LM 0 1 0
—
5 4 6
* Taking into account order of selection, i.e. a score of 4 for
1st choice down to 1 for each 4th choice.
A breakdown of block choices, given in Table 6-5, chows up the
difference more sharply. The contrast is most marked when the number of
choices including cross end hole (BXH end LXH) are compared with those
including neither cross nor hole (BXH) end. (LXH), that is 18 against 9»
The block with all the *negative' features (i.e. the little block with
no cross and no hole) was the least popular with only 4 selections, /hen
order of choice is also considered the trends noted are given fufcther
support. Thus the two blocks with cross and hole were picked out first
or second 13 times, including 8 first choices. Putting it another way,
25$ of the blocks accounted for 57$ of first preferences. In contrast
the blocks with neither hole nor cross had no first choices but four 4th
choices in their total of 9. Another feature of block preference is that
the four blocks with a cross accounted for 12 out of the 14 first
choices.
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Inadequate messages - pattern in attributes omitted
The pattern that has been evident in the choices and preference order
of subjects is also present in the omission errors made when describing
blocks. It was 'negative' attributes which were most often omitted and
which lead to descriptions being inai equate. The findings are
summarised in Table 6-6. Although 'negative' exclusions outnumber
•positive', 25 - 19, in the largest single category, 3ize, it was the
positive pole (big) which was most commonly ignored. It is clear, however,
that the absence of an attribute (X and H) was much more likely to be
missed (i.e. 18 against 5).
The probabilities given beside omission scores refer to the
probability of suoh attributes occurring bearing in mind the earlier data
on preferences. They show that the presence of two attributes, cross and
hole gave rise to few omissions despite there being a considerably greater
opportunity for them to occur. Although the probability of leaving out
information about size was greater when the block was big, the difference
is not sufficient to account for double the number of 'big' as compared to
'wee' omissions
TABLE 6-6






SIZE 14 .55 7 ,44 21
CROSS 0 .59 7 .41 7
HOLE 5 .57 11 .44 16
19 25 44
* Probability of the attribute being available for description or
omission, based on the number of attributes present in the selected blocks
(see text and Table 6-4)
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Discussion of grouped (.ata
It is clear that the properties of the stimulus material have had
an effect on the items selected and the attributes reported. The
advisability of referring to features as positive and negative is open
to debate. Positive is used partly in the sense of being there, that is
having a cross and/or a hole, as opposed to negative, not possessing
these attributes. Yet it is also a moot point whether a block with a
hole in it is more or less negative than one without a hole. Presence
or Absence may have been better terms but they do not take account of
the siae dimension where it radices sense to talk of the positive and
negative poles. Mother possibility would have been to adopt the
linguistic terminology marked and unmarked, as used by Wales and Campbell
(19^0) for example, However it is by no means clear whether a block with
a cross on it represents the marked or unmarked attribute (except in the
obvious sensel) For the purposes of the present discussion, therefore,
the terras Positive and Negative as used above, have been preferred.
What explanation can be offered for the differential effect of
stimulus attributes on performance? Some features evidently have a
greater capacity for capturing attention than others. Apart from those
defined, an additional element - colour of cross - may have contributed
to the salience of blocks with a cross. It did not seem possible to
eliminate colour, except by having the cross embossed or engraved and
then an extra tactile as well as visual cue would have intruded. It may
be that the colour used, red, particularly attracted attention and some
children used the word red in their descriptions, but it is doubtful if
there is such a thing as a neutral colour in this context. The common
factor belonging to 'hole', 'cross' and 'big' is that blocks with these
attributes are perceptually dominant. From the subject's point of view
it certainly appears that these attributes generally have more salience,
if block preference can be considered tin accurate measure of this.
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Of more direct interest for communication behaviour is the
influence of the attributes on descriptions. It is not surprising
that attributes that are not present, no hole and no cross, tend to get
left out. It is arguable that Mien a speaker fails to mention a feature
he intends the listener to understand that that feature is not pi*e3ent
on the selected item. This i3 perfectly legitimate, even obvious,
convention, but it does need to be spelled out to the listener if
confusions are not to result. What is perhaps surprising is that
size, which is always present, was omitted more than any other
attribute, and that the favoured pole, big, was ignored twice as much
as the negative pole.
(The first thing to say is that although in one sense size is
alp/ays there it is more accurately described as a relative property.
It is not intrinsic to the block like the cross or the hole. It is only
worth mentioning at all because some blocks are smaller than others and
this can only be seen by comparing one with the other. To indicate the
presence of a cross or hole the speaker has only to describe accurately
Miat he sees on the block, but reporting the size of the block demands
that the block is seen against the background of the other items. So
Miile it has been consistently argued that a comparison process is
always necessary for efficient communication, some attributes can be
reported regardless of comparison while others only have meaning in a
relative sense. It remains true that a communicator not talking regard of
context will tend to be highly inefficient and probably ineffective. He
may include a lot of detail that is irrelevant or redundant amid by failing
to take regard of the available alternatives he will tend to miss
critical features.
As to Miy the attribute 'big* was omitted more often than 'wee',
this may be explained, at least in part, by small blocks generally
being selected after the large ones. This would tend to make the speaker
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notice the contrast in size; before then, the relative properties of
the blocks may not have been considered. The suggestion is that when
describing the early selections, the big blocks, the subject follows
the standard strategy describing only what he sees on the block itself.
But when there is a switch from a big to a small block the size difference
is brought to the speaker's attention sufficiently for it to be
reported.
Individual performances
We will deal first with a number of children who had difficulty
understanding the basic requirements or nature of the task. This was
sufficient to load to the withdrawal of two children from an original
pool of eighteen. In two other cases no data resulted in Child aa
Speaker condition. Of the withdrawn children, one was the youngest in
the sample and appeared to have no understanding of the task - his
inexperience in a formal task situation undoubtedly contributed to this.
The other subject eliminated made no response, which was probably due to
emotional problems connected with her home situation rather than the
demands of the experimental task.
It was not clear mf the subjects who did not provide data when
acting as speakers were unable or unwilling. Despite much exhortation
from the doll Dale was completely 3ilent until the experimenter asked
him if he had chosen an elephant, hoping that an absurd suggestion might
produce a response. Far from rejecting the description,however, Dale
latched on to it end the only subsequent descriptive terms to be elicited
from him were 'elephant', 'butterfly', 'duck' and 'number'. These may
have represented the sort of idiosyncratic descriptions made by the
young children in Krauss and Gluckberg's (19^9) task -when nonsense
squiggles were used as material. The other child, Karen, would select
blocks but was completely unwilling to say anything about them, again
despite pleas from the doll. Her standard reply was '(I) don't know
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what one (it is)'.
Some other subjects were equally, or perhaps raore, confused about
their role in the task but were less resistant to the demands of the
doll. As an illustration of this, take the opening choice of Jamie,
which is preceded by the experimenter's final instructions:
E: Choose a brick frora these and put it in front of you. (Jamie
selects brick). How tell Chu-Chu all about it so that he
can choose the same one,
Jamie: (4 y. 6m.) (Looking somewhat bewildered) It one on the
front.
Chu-Chu: what Jamie? ./hat did you say?
J: One brick,
She admittedly speculative inference drawn from the videotape
record i3 that the child had not understood what he had to do, but was
sufficiently alert to pick up something from the experimenter's verbal
instructions, Thus he takes 'front' from 'put it in front of you*, and
'one' from 'same one'. This suggests that he recognises the experimenters
statement as a command to do something, but precisely what he is uncertain.
In the absence of an alternative he tells the enquiring doll what he can
remember of the Experimenter's 'message* to himself, but his version of
that is garbled anu very abbreviated. Further requests for information
by the doll lead to Jamie giving relevant, if not always adequate, messages.
Paul provides a particularly fascinating example of the way the
communication situation can probe children's thought and understanding.
The experimenter has repeated the instructions a number of times in an
effort to make clear to Paul what is required.
Chu-Chu: Can you tell me about it, Paul?
Paul: (3 y« 10 m.): (sighs deeply)
C: That does it look like?
207
P; (To E) ./ill I show liim?
E: No, you tell him. He can't see it, he just wants you to tell
him about it.
Pj (stares upwards, as if in thought, but a;Ices no response)
C: Can you tell me something about the brick, Paul?
P: /henI choose a wee brick or a big brick put it in the box.
Here Paul seems to indicate quite explicitly his understanding
of the task, namely to choose a brick and put it in the box. The doll
is to do this as well,but he does not connect the doll's fiction with his
own,or appreciate that it is dependent on a description of his (Paul's)
choice of brick. In terms of Piaget's theory Paul's thought is rooted
in action; he does not seem to consider the idea that he might reflect
on his actions and communicate them to mother. The obvious and perhaps
only way of indicating choice, for him,is to show the other person. .Then
eventually Paxil does realise that he must talk about the blocks, that is
exactly what he doesI His descriptions are long, rambling, repetitive,
idiosyncratic, and with many irrelevancies. The requirements of the
communication task do not constrain him, because he has not really
appreciated what they are.
The effect of the doll on performance.
That grounds are there to support the idea that the talking doll
might encourage effective communication behaviour? The overall impression
gained was that the children were concerned to see that the doll had
sufficient knowledge to enable him to play the game. Apart from the
exceptions already mentioned (and one other, Elizabeth), the children
readily took on the role of task supervisors. This role was familiar to
them and just as they had been willing in the past to point out semantic
errors on the part of the doll, so on this occasion were they willing to
act as instructors. As a motivational force the doll was undoubtedly
successful, exemplified by the children who although having an unclear
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idea of the ta3k persisted vdth remarkable dedication until
finally achieving a tolerable degree of sucoess (e.g. Jamie, Paul).
In others,communication resembling the genuine two-way interaction
of mature subjects was -present. This was indicated, in some case3, by
the way information was given. Glare, for example, said to the doll in
her second trial, 'Have you got a big brick vdth just a redbbit and a
hole?' It is not so much that this message is adequate in one description,
and without irrelevancies, as the form the message takess it is an
enquiry «• 'Have you got ....?' • signifying that she has fully appreciated
that the doll must look for the one that resembles her choice. The
question form seems to be a recognition on the part of the speaker that
the listener is an integral part of the communication network. This
important realisation was much less noticeable in the earlier studies.
A different type of example is provided by Linda. She has failed
to say anything about the presence or otherwise of a hole in the selected
block, though the doll has tried to obtain further information.
Eventually the doll is obliged to 'guess' and says:
Cs fell maybe it's that one
Linda (4 y. 11 m.): Yes it is that one (putting hers in box). Ho hole.
(pointing to centre of block and then looking across at doll).
C: Oh. (the doll is Able to change his selection vdth this additional
information and make the correct choice)
L: (To E who puts the doll's choice in the box) Has it got two crosses
on it?
It is argued that this type of exchange indicates a deeper understanding
of what the communication task is about than this subject had displayed
hitherto. Linda appears to be aware that achievement of the goal - to
have the listener select the same block as the speaker - is dependent on
the information she supplies. She only notices at the last moment that
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the absence of a certain attribute, 'hole', could have a bearing; on the
doll's selection. She says this without having seen the doll's block
and it could be that in taking the block from the array and placing it
in the box, her attention is directed for a moment to the other blocks,
some of which have holes, and this causes her to provide the critical
extra detail. Asking the listener about his selection after he has made
it is the sort of behaviour that may often occur in mature coraiminicat ion.
/mother feature of the relationship between the child and the
talking doll was the way in which the child used the experimenter to
support his or her position on occasions. Many children seemed to view
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the relationship as one/ which they and the experimenter were in some sort
of benevolent conspiracy to help the talking panda with its problems.
Very often the child would talk about the panda as if it was not in the
room or as if it would not understand the level of the dialogue between
'big' people. Some examples of the child engaging the experimenter as
an ally are given; firstly two from Anna. In th® first extract she has
selected a small brick (LXH) and has given information about the size and
cross.
Anna (3y. 10m.): (sighs) Put it in the box.
C: I don't know which one it is yet.
As A stripey one.
C: Yes. It's a small one.
As Yes.
Cs Can you tell me any more about it?
A: (sighs - hand to mouth, looks at E,) v/hat is there
about it again?
In the second selection (BXH) she again provides prompt information about
the size and cross. Chu-Chu then asks:
C: Anything more?
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A: Mm ... (hand to mouth) I'm just gonna think (Hot
looking at brick).
C: Yes.
As I've .. (picking up brick and 3hov/ing it to E.) Peter,
is there anything more about this brick?
The third example comes from Lee. She selects LXH.
Lee 5y. 0m.); The wee one with the hole.
Cs The wee one with a hole. Yes. Can. you tell me some more
about it?
L: (Looks at E, somewhat surprised)
Cs I'm not very good at this game. It's a wee one ...
L: That's all it's got - a hole.
C: That's all it's got?
Ls (turning to E). Eh, Peter?
E: Yes that's all it's got.
In the first two examples the child believes she has exhausted
the features of the blocks and turns to the experimenter for assistance
when the doll persists in asking for more information. It seems to he
a ploy for terminating the exchanges between herself and the doll. She
seems to be indicating that she has done all she can and unless the
experimenter can offer anything else, the doll must make a decision on
the basis of the information provided. Her concept of 'thinking' is
rather comical, hut revealing. She either puts her head in her hand or
else stares up at the ceiling. ?ihat she does not do is take the logical
course of action of re-examining the blocks to see if anything has been
omitted. She is possibly going through a ritual she has seen others
engage in, what Piaget would call a case of simple imitation, where
accomodation occurs but little or no assimilation.
The older child, Lee, has not reported one of the attributes in
her description, a negative feature - the absence of a cross. She is
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surprised when the doll wants more information,indicating that she has
not appreciated that her message has not discriminated her choice from
the small block with a hole and a cross. The second part of the message:
•That's all it's got - a hole.', although not mentioning the absence of
a cross does by implication signify there are no further distinguishing
features, //hen the doll appears to question this, Lee turns to the
experimenter for corroboration, *Eh, Peter?' being translated as 'Isn't
that right, Peter?'
Reporting the message - variations in technique
In describing these series of studies some attention has been paid
to the mariner and content of the speaker's messages: Such things as the
order of report, the adequacy of the message, the number of redundant
features, the number of irrelevant properties mentioned, the repetitiveness
of the message and the general clarity of the description including semantic
anomalies or confusions. It has been pointed out more than once that the
communicative effectiveness of children of this age suffers because of
excessive 'noise' accompanying the signal. It was of interest to know
if the talking doll had affected the behaviour, since the hypothesis under
test was that the experimental condition would lead to some adaptation on
the part of the children,
message adequacy is the ultimate test of good communication, and
the general results have been given earlier. Examination of the individual
records shows that some subjects consistently omit one attribute. Thus,
Scott, Christine and Clare usually omit the size attribute, while
Elizabeth always leaves out details about the hole attribute. Other
subjects, notably Alan and Jamie, show omissions on all three attributes.
The reasons for omissions vary, ./hen one attribute is consistently
left out it may be because that attribute is not perceptually salient to
the subject, but this is little more than another way of saying it does
not get reported. In the case of the size attribute it has already been
argued that this is a relative rather than inherent property of the
material, and this can he said of all the so-called negative features.
It is only reasonable to talk about an object not having a property
in relation to those objects which do have that property. It would, for
example, he considered bizarre to say of any of this set, 'She block
without a picture of the ueen on it'.
Mother possible reason for failing to report some attributes is
that the child docs not describe the block in a systematic way. Here
are some examples of speaker's messages,
1. Hichoias (4.Y, 5ra,) I've picked a wee one with no holes except two
crosses,
2. Lee (5.Y» Om,) It's a wee one with a crosses on it and a hole.
3. Hicholas I'm gonna choose the ... big one,
Chu-Chui The hig one. Can you tell me some more about it?
Hi Yes. The one with the red crosses.
Ci The big one with the red crosses?
Hi Yes, not with a hole.
4. Linda (4,y. 11a.) There's one cross there and one cross there, and
one cross there,
Ci It's got crosses on it, jes.
Li Md the block has a hole.
C: It's got a hole in it, yes.
L: And loads o* wood (?),
Ci Md wood, yes.
L: Md it *3 a wee small brick.
5. David (4y. 1m.) This one. I'll tell you all about it. It's made
with a *X' and it's got a hole in the middle.
Cs It's got an *X* and it's got a hole - yes.
D: Why has it got a hole?
C: Can you tell me some more about it?
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I): I'll tell you more about it. It's a round hole and you
stick a finger it sticks on, doesn't it?
C: It's got an 'X' and it's got a hole.
Bs Yes, and if you stick a finger in, see ...
C: You can get a finger in it. Oh well, it must be that one.
6. Alan (5.V. 1m.) It's just square (tracing finger round edge)
C: Yes
As And square here and there (indicating top and bottom of
brick.)
Cs Can you tell me some more about it?
As Just square - squares.
Cs It's just square. I'm still not sure which one it is
Alan. Can you help me some more?
As Uh Huh. It's all white.
Cs It's all white, oh, and ib's square. Can you tell me any
more about it?
As Yes no.
7. Gregor (r.y» 7m.) Mine (?) got a cross on the other cross.
Cs Tell me about it Gregor.
I
Gs Mine got a cross and (on?) a other cross.
Cs A cross on the top. Can you tell me some more about it?
Gs Thellow (yellow?) er, em ... there was one going down and
there's one going up, again.
Cs There's one going down and one going up a bit.
Gs Yes and there's one going up and down and one going down.
That was Two?
C: Can you tell me svae more about it Gregor, I'm not very-
good at this game.
Gs (humbles something) I don't know.
The first two examples tire illustrations of efficient communication
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whore the critical features are reported clearly in one fairly brief
message. In Example J the information is again to-the-point and is
given this time in three messages with a degree of interaction between
speaker and listener. The same broadly goes for Example 4, though here
there is some redundancy (crosses) and irrelevancy (wood). By repeating
the information after each message the listener helps to direct the
speaker to the task at hand. In Example 5 David includes two critical
attributes in Ms opening message, but then seems to get centred on the
properties of the hole. Although requests from the listener do not
cause David to notice the tMrd critical feature, he does provide a clue
about size, presumably inadvertantly, by saying he can get his finger in
the hole.
All of the examples, 1 to 5» represent messages which provide
sufficient information for the listener to make a correct selection,
though the effectiveness varies, An example not quoted since it takes
up more than a page of transcript, comes from the record of Anna. For
her second block fifteen discrete utterances are required before the doll
is able to make a choice. Many of these utterances are irrelevant to the
task and others are repetitious, though finally enough information is
available to allow a correct selection.
This does highlight a very important difference between the talking
doll as a listening partner and another child of pre-school age. Although
the doll is presented as an ignoramus who needs patient assistance from
the child, the role wMch the doll does in fact play is much more positive
than might be assumed. A four year old child, for instance, would not
normally be able to maintain the support and attention which the doll
shows,sometimes in the face of excessive repetition, silent withdrawal
or obscurity. The argument that the child might provide raore help for
the talking doll because it represents a known poor perform#* may now
seem dubious. But the weight of the evidence in this and earlier
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experiment8, continues to support the idea that the doll is seen as
someone in need of help - a slightly pathetic figure even to a few -
and that it is this which is having a decisive impact on performances.
Example 6 depicts a generally unhelpful message. The word 1 square*
is applied to all the blocks, and the subject seems dominated by shape.
Later he says 'it's all white' which suggests the absence of a cross,
but the listener is unable to derive further useful information despite
the subject's willingness to try and be of help. Centration on one
element is a strong feature of Example 7 also. Here the attribute is
the cross and Gregor engages in the type of analytic description seen
before. Even with the probing of the doll Gregor does not seem to be
able to go beyond the feature which is paramount for him. This,
accordingly, limits his effectiveness as a communicator in this task.
Child as Listener.
The detailed subject by subject results can be found in Appendix E.
Table 6-7 shows the degree to which listeners were successful in
identifying the speaker's choice of block. The 16 subjects each made
four selections giving 64 trials in all, but since data for two trials
are missing, the effective total, shown in Table 6-7* is 62. The top
line in the table gives the number of blocks for each trial chosen by
listeners - the children - which matched the selection of the doll speaker.
It can be seen that 22 of the 62 trials, 35-rresult in correct solutions.
Translating thi3 into communication terms it implies that on 22 trials
the listeners were able to obtain sufficient information from the speaker
to enable a correct choice to be made. The justification, or otherwise,
for this conclusion will be discussed below.
The success rate of 35a seems low in comparison to the Q%- of the
child as listener to the 'Ideal' speaker (Chapter 5$ Study IV), but it is
difficult to relate the two studies. In the ideal speaker condition
listeners were always given adequate, though not necessarily complete,
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descriptions and so wore not required to derive further details* as in
this study.. Two other differences, the sise of array and the number of
choices to be made, were also such as to favour the earlier task.
The figures show that most successes occur in the middle trials, 2
and 3. It is understandable that the first trial should account for more
errors, but it is surprising that fewest successes are recorded on
trial 4 when the pool was at its smallest and the subjects had the benefit
of most experience. The group data does not allow of any explanation but
it will be argued below, following examination of individual performances,
that overconfidence was a factor in Trial 4 errors.
The aim of the oxercise in this task was for the children to obtain
enough information to make the correct block choice. A measure of this
ability is the number of attributes about which the children enquired.
It was so arranged that in every trial the listeners needed knowledge
about all three critical attributes to determine the chosen block. Since
they were always given one attribute in the doll's opening message, this
left them two features to derive in each trial, giving a total of 124
(64 by 2) attributes in all. The extent to which they achieved this
c;ai be assessed from Table 6-8.
The figures refer to the number of times a particular attribute was
sought - information requested about it - or not sought by the listener.
Although 54 of the 124 attributes, 432, are derived, this does not match
the actual success rate of 35c because identification demands two
obtaining attributes per trial. In fact the picture is rather less bright
than this. Inspection of Appendix E shows that in all there were 18
trials in which two attributes wore sought, that is 18 out of 62
containing the type of behaviour required to achieve a correct solution.
The difference between this figure and the 22 successful matches in Table 6-7,
was due to three instances of the doll providing 'unearned' information
which amounted to additional given attributes. There was also one trial
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TABLE 6-7
Total numbers of correct match) and, incorrect -hoice














5 6 7 4 22
MIS¬
MATCH 10
10 9 11 40
TOTAL 15 16 16 15 62
TABLE 6-8
Fr'a.juenc, distribution of attributes sou/jit mid, not sought
by listener's determining speaker's selected block.
ATTRIBUTES OP BLOCKS
TRIAL
INFORMATION SOUGHT INFORMATION NOT SOUGHT
SIZE CROSS HOLE TOTAL SIZE CROSS HOLE TOTAL
1(n»15) G* 7 5 12 G 8(10) 10 18
2(n=l6) 6 G 7 13 1Q(2G)*~* G 9(1G) 19
3(n=16) G 7 7 14 G 9(1G) 9 18
5(n=15) - 5 10 G 15 10 5 G 15
TOTAL 11 24 19 54 20 22 28 70
MEAN 5.5 8 6.3 13.5 10 7.3 9.3 17.5
*G = Given
**Pigures in brackets means that total contains instunce(s) where
additional attribute(s) given erroneously.
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■where, fortuitously, the listener had sufficient information to make a
choice after obtaining a description of one attribute in addition to
the given feature, "his was because the listener's previous choices
meant that the message 'Big, without hole' was adequate for the block
selected on trial 5«
Looking at particular attributes, it again transpired that 'size'
was the feature most often neglected. It is open to question whether
the attention drawn to 'size' by the doll, who as speaker twice provides
this feature, is offset by the reduced opportunity for 'practice' in
asking for this feature.
The group data about attributes sought, or even selections which
match, provide little insist into the approach used by children as
listeners to the doll as speaker. Since our concern i3 with the way in
which the child went about securing information from a poor speaker,
proper discussion must await consideration of the individual performance
records.
Individual performances
Although this condition might be compared with the study where the
child was paired with an ideal speaker,there were some important differences
which fundamentally affected the nature of the task. In the earlier study
the adult speaker provided adequate descriptions for each item selected,
which meant that the listener always had sufficient information to
determine the chosen object. In this study the speaker provided adequate
information as long as the listener asked for it, that is if he
recognised that he needed to know about more than one attribute.
The task of the listener in the ideal speaker situation remained a
relatively passive one in which he related the incoming information to
one of the items in front of him. The results showed (only 29 errors out
of 170 selections) that such behaviour was well within the capacity of
the young child. In the current task the demands were considerably
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greater* None of the doll speaker's initial messages were sufficient
to en- lble correct selection; the listener had to obtain data about two
other attributes to be sure of knowing which block had been chosen,
i'hio required a more sophisticated conception of the communication task
as a whole and particularly of the listener's role in the face of an
inadequate speaker. An appreciation of the relationship between the
speaker's and listener's parts in the task was necessary. Such an
appreciation had not been investigated in such a demanding way in
previous studies. Instead of just checking off descriptions about
features against the features themselves, the listener had (i) to be
able to see why a message was inadequate, and (ii) to decide how to go
about obtaining a message that did allow a choice to be made. An
indication of t he capacities involved is provided below in the hypothesised
strategy to be followed by an able listener in such a task.
Conception of a competent listener*3 strategy
(This account will be easier to follow if the set of blocks used in
the task and shorn on page 194-in the Method section, is available for
reference.)
1. Before the speaker says anything the listener should know that ail
the blocks are potential candidates for selection. In the perceptual
and conceptual sense they should be equally, and not in any way
differentially, regarded. Bvery block, which means every attribute,
should have an equi-probable chance of being attended to.
2. When the first message is received this has the effect of immediately
narrowing the listener's focus of attention. He is able to reject all
blocks not having the attribute in question, but include all those
possessing the relevant attribute. To take a3 an example the block 'Big,
with Hole and Cross* (BXH) a3 the speakers first choice. As a result of
the first message the listener knows that the wanted block is one of a
sub-set of four big blocks. But he does not know any more then this.
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He cannot determine the right block without more data and if the speaker
does not provide this unsolicited, then he must ask for it. There are
two further attributes involved, information about which will enable
the chosen block to be isolated. Depending on which attribute he chooses
to ask about, he can mentally partition the blocks into two sets. If he
decides to ask if the selected item has a cross, for instance, it is
helpful to think of the remaining blocks as a set of two 'with cross' and
a set of two 'without cross'. The answer to the question, i.e, the
speaker's next message, enables elimination of one set of the blocks still
under consideration.
5. The listener should now be in a position to choose between two
blocks and realise that ono further piece of informatioai is required to
resolve the problem. In terms of the example we have been using he sees
that the difference between the remaining blocks is that one has a hole
and one has not. He therefore enquires about this attribute.
4. Depending on the content of the speaker's third message the listener
is able to reject one of the blocks leaving the sole surviving block as
that which must match the speaker's selection. As a final check he
describes the block he believes the speaker to have chosen end, assuming
agreement, places the block in the box provided.
The above model will serve as a standard of comparison in assessing
the approaches of the children. We already know from their performances
as speakers in this study that the first requirement, investing each
block with an equi-probable chance of attention, is unlikely to be met.
The children showed significant biases in their choice of blocks, and in
the attributes omitted from descriptions.
The subjects fall into four categories of performance or listener
types. These are summarised in Table 6-9. These groupings are by no
means clear cut or mutually exclusive. Subjects who at the beginning
of the task showed no understanding, might by the end have been mtiking
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TABLE 6-9
Classification of listener's perform nee in tor as of strategies
used phen talking doll is speaker (Blocks Task)
TYPE DESCRIPTION MEMBERS
I Do not understand task or their role
in it. Content to select Block on
Basis of 'given' attribute. No




II Recognise they have insufficient
information to determine selected
block, but no strategy for obtaining






III Transitional group. Some awareness
of demands of task in seeking further
information, but limited by inability
to deconter. Strategy is to get






IV Evidence of systematic str; tegy, though
some way removed from hypothesised
competent listener's strategy. Errors







Done effort to obtain further information, Mle subjects who usually
adopted a systematic strategy sometimes made a selection «iftor the first
message. The categorisation is based, therefore, on a considered
assessment of each subject's performance, so that the final assignment
is thought to be the most representative of his behaviour,
ViV... 1 - ho recognition of message inadequacy
Type 1 subjects were content to select a block after the doll's
first message. Indeed they seemed confident that they knew which one
the doll had chosen* although in fact the description given applied, to
four blocks. Jamie's standard, response was to say 'that one* and put
his hand on a llock which possessed the attribute in question. He did
not attempt to ask for further details. In the penultimate trial Jauie
indicated that he needed to go to the lavatory and when he returned the
doll gave him the initial message again. The resulting dialogue was as
follow.
Jnsiie (4y. 6a)
Chu-Chut Well, the one I've chosen is a big one.
Jt (Ho response — head in hand)
G: Do you know which one I've chosen?
Js (Puts his hand on BXH)
Ej Tell Ohu-Chu if you Itaow.
Js Er - and its got holes in It - I think so (?)
Ci Ho. I didn't say it had holes.
J5 That one with a cross on it (points to BXH).
Cs I didn't say it had a cross on it.
Js That one, that one - the wee ones (going through those left).





J; Cos I'm been too burstin'*
Cs Oh, because you've been too bursting,
Es Do you want to ask Chu-Chu? If you don't know which
brick Chu-Chu' s chosen you can find out by asking kirn.
J: (N. R.)
Et V/ell which one do you think it is Jamie?
J: That one (BXH). That one (KXH)
Jamie seems happy to adopt his usual course of selecting on the basis of
one attribute, but the Experimenter intervenes and suggests that he tells
Chu-Chu if he knows .Thick one it is. There then follows a series of
denials by the doll of the attributes mentioned by the child. In effect
the child describes the block he has selected rather than the one he
believes the doll has selected, which is probably not a meaningful question
to him anyway, When the doll says, 'I didn't say it had holes (crosses)'
Jamie picks out different blocks in an effort to achieve some agreement,
Eventually he ignores the original given attribute, big, when he points
to the small blocks.
To some extent the child and doll are talking at cross purposes.
The doll is not denying that the selected block has a cross or a hole,
he is only saying that he has not said whether it lias or not. The
subtlety of this was lost on Jamie, It could be argued that the format
in which the exchanges between speaker and listener wee carried out do
not allow the child an opportunity to capitalise on a possible new insight.
If, for instance, when Jamie says 'and it's got holes in it' he is
really asking for information and not describing the block he believes
it to be, then it is the restricted nature of the experimental procedure
which denies him the feedback requested. There is however no reason to
think that tliis is what Jamie did intend, and the experimental procedure
could not be flexible to that degree, if it had been, the aim of having
children earn additional attributes would have been lost.
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This issue and others relating to the competent listener's strategy
will "be taken up later. By the end of the trial Jamie seems somewhat
confused and is undecided between at least two blocks. He finally
settles for one that has neither cross nor hole, which may be said in
his terms to comply with the doll's description, but is in direct
defiance of the known attribute, big. In the final trial Jamie returned
(with some relief) to his normal response of selecting solely on the
basis of the initial message,
TYPE II - No strategy for obtaining additional information
The subjects making up Type II seem to realise that they have
insufficient information to pick out the correct block but make no
attempt to procure further details. This might have been because they
did not know how to, or possibly because they considered the doll was
incapable of providing further assistance. This latter proposal is
speculative, but because the doll has always been cast in the role of
someone with limited ability, it is plausible. This suggestion is
particularly attractive to explain why two usually very able children,
Lee and Sally , performed in this unproductive fashion.
The evidence, however, is somewhat thin. When Sally was asked
by the doll why she didn't know which one he had chosen, she replied;
'Because I don't Know vhatch (sic) one it is'. 'When pressed by the doll
to give a reason she turned to the experimenter and smiled. It raay be
that she was waiting for some sort of lead from the experimenter, for in
the final trial when he eventually said, 'Tell Chu-Chu thy you can't choose',
she said 'Because I don't know whether it's got stripes or not*. Having
obtained this information, however, she still selected on the basis of
an inadequate description. Lee also repeatedly said that 3he didn't
know which one the doll had chosen after the first message, but neverthe¬
less selected blocks on the basis of limited descriptions,
Alan's general performance was one of uncertainty. He seeried to
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be aware that the doll was not providing enough data but at the same
time he appeared to think that he must try to select a block on the
basis of that data* Although the experimenter suggested he asked the
doll if be didn't know, it may be that the doll's question - 'Do you
intimidating
know which one I've chosen?' - was slightly/for an uncertain child. He
possibly took it to imply 'Why don't you know « you should do'. The
extract below illustrates Alan's dilemma.
Alan (5,y. 1m)
C: This one is a big one.
A: (Uncertain, N. R.).
C: Do you know which one I've chosen?
As Uh huh. (puts hand on BXH) The one with the hole in, and it's big.
Ci I didn't say that. I just said it's a big one.
A: Oh. Must be ....• that one (switches to BXH).
Os Do you know which one I've chosen?
As Br ... think .. (looking through the array) Yes (not confidently)
0: Do you know Alan?
As Yes ..I think so (hand on BXH)
Cs You think so, but do you know?
At Yes.
C: Well put it in the box if you know which one it is Alan.
The point at which Alan switches hi3 choice without having received any
fresh information suggests that he has not understood the necessary
relationship between the speaker's message and the listener's choice.
Karen was more straightforward. She repeatedly said she didn't know
which block the doll had chosen, and thai she didn't know why she didn't
know. She never requested more information or made suggestions but made
choices, possibly at random. It is impossible to seiy whether recognition
of her own ignorance is seen to be due to the doll not telling her more
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or the doll not showing her which one he had selected.
TYPE III - Transitional group
There is no clear defining characteristic to attach to the members
of the third group. Two of its members may be said to represent a
special sub-grouping. This is because they do not appreciate, at least
initially, that the task is essentially a verbal one; that successful
selection is not dependent on concrete visual matching hut on a process
1
of relating a verbal description to one of a series of similar objects.
Gregor, for example, repeatedly said that he did not know which one the
doll had chosen 'Cos you've got the screen over your bricks'. Paul
persisted in a similar response - 'Cos I can't see it'* despite being
directed to use an alternative method of securing information, namely
speech. These subjects also had attentions! problems which gave rise to
additional handicaps, but towards the end of the task they gave some
indication of having realised the inadequate nature of the original
message and of knowing how to obtain more details. Here is an example
from Paul's record.
Paul (3y. 10m.)
Cj A big one. ho you know which one it is?
Pi No.
0: Why not?
Pt Because I told you ... cos I can't see It.
C: Yes but I'«*» telling you about it, it's a big one.
Pi I know (smiles at E)
Cs It's a big one Paul. Do you know ehich one I've chosen?
P: Has it got no lines (cross) - or lines?
Oi It's got no lines.
Pi No lines .. has it (?) no hole?
Cj There's no hole.
Pi This is it.
1. If comprehension of this fact is an initial requirement, the skills
to carry out this operation are, of course, a necessary pro-reyoisite
for actual achievement.
227
0: Oh, put it in the box if you've got it. (BX3/BXH)
Paul'a use of the negative question form - 'IIa3 it got no lines
or linos?' «• represents an accomplished inference on the part of a child
under four. He is clearly able to express the fact that there are two
possibilities involved in the situation. It also shows that the use of
the negative need not exclude the positive from consideration at this
developmental level. The child realises that the negative also implies
the positive - if it is not a block with no cross then it must be a block
with cross. In a discussion of this issue, Donaldson (197^) gives
examples of questions that entertain two possible outcomes and Paul's
question seems to fit into this category. In Donaldson's words Paul has
an "awareness of being in a state of ignorance". Perhaps the most
distinctive feature of this group,as a whole, is that they appear to
select a block fallowing receipt of the first message and then attempt
to 'get' the doll's block to match theirs, This is clearly a different
strategy to that outlined in step 2 of the competent listener's strategy,
where the effect of the first message is to focus attention on a restricted
but multiple number of the blocks in the array, these being the four
specified by the attribute given.
Some extracts exemplify Type III behaviour.
Linda (4y. 11m)
C: This next one has got a hole in it.
Ls (picks up BXH, the only large block she has left) I've got the
right one. A big one?
Cs Ho. It's a wee one.
Ls A wee one (puts down BXLI and picks up LXH) I've got the right one.
After getting the first attribute, Linda makes two unwarranted assumptions,
i.e. big and no cross. It does however lead her to go on to enquire
about size. Having obtained further data she fail3 to exhaust the




C: This one has got a red cross on it.
N: Is it a wee one or a big one?
C: It's a wee one.
N: It must be this one then (selects LXH)
C: ho you know which one I've chosen?
M: Yes.
C: Do you know which one I've chosen?
Ns Yes. I bet it's got a hole (changes selection to LXH)
C: Do you know which one it is?
N: Yes, it's the hole one, I know.
This task leaves the onus of communication on the listener. Although it
is emphasised that the child must choose the same brick as the doll, the
children in this category establish the criteria themselves having been
given an initial indication by the doll, Nicholas's emphatic use of the
modal, 'it must be this one*, is typical of this approach - the one I've
chosen must be the one that Chu-Chu means. His change from LXH to LXH
may not be entirely a matter of personal whim however. It may be the
result of the doll's persistent questioning — 'Do you know which one I've
chosen? - which causes Nicholas to think he has the wrong one and therefore
to change it. David shows similar behaviour.
David (4y. 1m.)
Cs This next one ha3 got a hole in it,
I>: (Pulling large brick towards him) Well is it a big one?
C: No it's a wee one.
D: Well it must be this one (selecting a small brick and putting it in
the box before exhausting attributes).
In contrast to Paul's demonstration of possibility, mentioned just
previously, the behaviour of Nicholas and David seems to be a complete
229
denial of any possibility of doubt. In a task that asked children to
say what colour a hidden object was, Le Bonniec (1970» reported in
Donaldson 1971) found that some of the subjects, aged from five to eight
years, stated quite flatly what colour the object is. Like David and
Nicholas they gave no sign of uncertainty, no indication that there might
be a different answer to the one that they provided. It seems difficult
to reconcile this finding with the earlier demonstration of a recognition
of being in a state of uncertainty
Donaldson (1971) has suggested that there is a natural sense of the
possible amounting to a cognitive intuition, while the complete disregard
for possibility, called arbitrary errors by Donaldson, may be failures
due to a particular characteristic of the task situation, fits fact that,
in this instance,both types of behaviour have appeared in the same task
situation may mean that task situations affect children differently.
These performances raise a number of questions. To what extent
is a knowledge of class relations required in such a task? An understanding,
for instance, that a block can be a member of the class of big blocks,
the class of blocks having a cross and the class of blocks having a hole
at the same time. The realisation that classes can overlap to form a
logical multiplication is said by Piaget to be acquired in the concrete
operational period and is therefore unlikely to be present in the majority
of children in this sample.
Another related problem concerns the difficulty for the listener
of asking about a single item while focussing on a set of items. The
listener must simultaneously have in mind that he is looking for one
block - and must ask questions about one block - while utilising any
information received to make decisions about a group of blocks. This,
at least, is the hypothesised strategy for the competent listener but
the child seems to adopt a different approach. Certainly Type III
children selected a single item much earlier than would a competent
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listener - in many eases after the first message. For some children
tiiis migilt have 'been due to a basic misconception of the task. But
since the majority go on to ask further questions, indicating they are
aware of the need for more detail, another explanation is needed. It
is possibly an adaptive procedure used by younger subjects to limit
the information flow to manageable proportions. Once they have
isolated a particular item it becomes possible to ask for further
relevant information ana process the incoming data efficiently. Our
limited knowledge of the information processing abilities of the
immature system (Belmont and Butterfield, 1969; Clifton and Bogartz,
1968; Khandhawn, in press) suggests that there is a lower tolerance of
ambiguity and a narrower information channel capacity.
Although the approach outlined above may be useful in dealing' with
information input generally, and mag indeed be instrumental to success
as a Speaker, in this type of task, there are possible maladaptive
consequences for the listener, 7ith his attention confined to one block,
he vdll check off attributes against the chosen item but not for the
rest of the pool. Suppose the sequence was as follows.
Speakers It is a big block.
Listener: (Selects BXH) Has it got a crocs?
S: No.
Ls (Discards BXEI and selects BXH) Has it got a hole?
S: No,
Ls It's tiiis one — (BXH)
What will seem particularly bizarre is for the listener to discard BXH,
after being told the chosen block has no cross, and then to pick up
another block (BXH) with a cross. This may happen, however, if the
listener is confining messages received to his own selected block and
not extending the property 'no cross' across the set. It is being
nnfirhlll flffcftd +7Hr+. «n m+iPWinl ammnyii ssnme+lriYtcr Hire +.Vie fnl 1 r»wirxtr is
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going ons 'It isn't this block because this block has a cross, so I
must choose another block'. The immediate goal then becomes that of
choosing another block. The fact that the next block chosen has a
cross (BXH)is, it is argued, a matter of chance, but this is not true
of the attribute 'big' since this was the original premise on which he
based his initial selection, and so it carries over to his second
selection. The listener continues to base his questions find assessment
on the chosen block and so comes, erroneously, to settle for BXH instead
of BXH.
There are no examples among the children in the third group
corresponding to the behaviour postulated above, but the extracts given
earlier indicate that the general thesis holds, Another excerpt from
Nicholas's record provides a particularly fascinating example of a child
trying to 'escape* from the handicaps which his own limitations
(i.e. unwarranted assumptions) are in danger of placing him.
Nicholas 4.V. 3m)
Chu-Chu: This one is a big one Nicholas.
Ni Right (puts BXH and BXH together).
Cs Do you know which one it is?
N: I bet it's not got any red crosses or holes.
C: Do you know which one I have chosen?
N» It must be this one (picks BXH)
1. Such behaviour is reminiscent of that described by Vygotsky (1962)
in his analysis of concept formation using a classification task
with blocks varying on a number of dimensions. In particular the
subject at the stage of what he calls the pseudo-concept, although
appearing at first to classify objects in a systematic way, is not
likely to draw the appropriate conclusion when it is pointed out
that a particular selection is unjustified. Instead, he will
discard that particular choice but continue to include other
exemplars with the same 'incorrect* attribute. (See Vygotsky,
op. cit. p. 67 and also examples in Chapter 5» Study IV of this
work).
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C: Do you know which one it is?
Ns Yes.
E: Why? Tell Chu-Chu why you know.
C: I said it's a tig one.
N: I've got ... I've got one big one, two big ones, three big ones,
I've got.
C; Oh .. this is a big one with no cross.
N: It must be this one (looks at E) I've chosen the one you said
Chu-Chu.
Cj Oh, put it in the box then. (BXH/BXH)
Nicholas's first reaction is close to that proposed as the optimum
procedure. He picks out the blocks which answer to the description so
far given - 'big*. But he only picks out two, instead of three, big
blocks. But his next response implies that he has settled on one of
these blocks as the selected item - BXII, He follows this up when asked
again by indeed picking out BXH and saying 'It must be this one.* It
is difficult to know the significance of the modal form - 'it must be*.
If it indicated that the subject was sure of his choice because
consideration of the data led to such a conclusion then one must say
simply that the deduction and resulting conviction was spurious. But
it may have been a way of bolstering what was in fact uncertainty on
the part of the listener, giving him confidence in his problem-solving
1
ability. But then an interesting change takes place, .ihen the
experimenter asks the child to tell the doll why he knows -which one it is.
1. It may even amount to what 3ome personality theorists wall an
affirmation of the self, an idea with which Piaget is in some
agreement.
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Nicholas is unsure <md hesitates. The doll then repeats the original
message and Nicholas responds with the 'classical' ideal listener
retort: 'I've got three hig ones.' He gains more information by
this ploy but acts on it immediately, failing to notice this time
what he had succeedea in doing earlier, that the description still
applies to more than one block.
The advance mode by Nicholas in realising that the doll's first
message is inadequate because it specifies more than one block is carried
over into the final trial.
C: I said it's a wee one.
N: I've got three wee ones. Maybe you've made a mistake this time
Chu-Chu.
C: This one hasn't got a hole in it.
Ns It must be this one (LXH)
C: Do you know which one I've chosen?
Ns (To E) It must be this one. (No response from E or 0) Which one
is it, then? (looking hard at doll).
C: It hasn't got a hole in it and it's a wee one.
Ni I bet you...
E: Do you want him to tell you any more, Nicholas?
Ni Yes, If he can anyway.
C: And it hasn't got a cross on it.
N: It must be this one! (LXH/LXH)
Nicholas impressively indicates that the description is insufficient
because he has 'got three wee ones.' But he once again seizes on a
selection as soon as he obtains a second piece of information. When
his choice is implicitly challenged by the doll he is far from egocentric
in asking, ' Which one is it then?* How significant is the ronuirk,
'Yes. If he can anyway.'? It seoms to lend some support to the
earlier suggestion that some children's oerformancos may be affected
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through seeing the doll as a speaker incapable of providing satisfactory
descriptions. A similar tone is present in an earlier piece of dialogue
between Nicholas imd Chu-Chu.
Cs Which one is it?
Ns It's with a big cross.
C: Yes. .And it's a big one.
Nj Yes, I know that. I've got it in my mind, (points to head and
closes eyes).
E: You think you know which one it is, do you Nicholas?
Ns It must be this one.
Cs If you wont to know just ask me, Nicholas, because I'm not very
good at this game.
Ns But I am (chuckles)
Again the evidence is slight, but there is a certain patronising tone
about Nicholas's remarks which might cause him to rely more on his own
intuition than on help from his partner.
TYPE IV - Towards a systematic strategy
The most accomplished perforaaers are marked by the efficiency,
consistency and directness with which they go about determining the
object to which the speaker is referring. This is not to say they are
invariably consistent or even that they always discover the correct
block; it is the fact that a recognisable plan seems to guide their
behaviour and that failure is a function of lapses of attention or
executive errors* On some occasions lack of success can be seen to be
due to the subject 'slipping-back' into an earlier, and generally less
effective,type of approach such as those discussed above. Some examples
will illustrate Type IV performances.
Scott (4y. 9a»)
Gs It's got a red cross on it.
S: Has it got a hole?
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C: There's no hole in it.
Ss Then I know what it is. Er ... there's a cross (to himself).
1s. there two crosses?
C: Yes.
S: Wall I've got one, is it a wee one?
Cs Yg3 it's a wee one.
Note that he appears to be on the point of selecting a block after
receiving the second message, but realises that more information is
required. Note also the redundant question, 'Are there two crosses?'
All blocks with cross have two crosses - top and bottom. Glare is
another subject who enquires systeiaatically first about the cross, then
the hole, then the size, depending which attribute is given by the doll
in his initial message.
Clare (3.Y. 11m.)
C: This is a big one.
Clares Has it got a red cross on it?
Cs No, it hasn't got a cross on it,
Clares Has it got a hole.
C: No, it hasn't got a hole.
Clares (BXH/BXH)
The child rejects the blocks ruled out by the information as it comes
in. She eventually selects the brick that survives by a process of
elimination as outlined in the competent listener strategy. What is
particularly interesting, however, is that Clare did not have this
strategy ready-made at the start of the task. Her reaction to the first
message in Trial 1 was as followsj
C: The first one I've chosen, Clare, is a big brick.
CI: (Looks at array, hand to mouth. No response).




Cls I just don't know.
C; Shy do you not know which brick I've chosen?
Cls I just don't.
She is quite emphatic that she doesn't know which brick it is, markedly
different from Type I and II subjects, but she does not know at this
point how to go about discovering the identity of the block. Then the
experimenter repeats the relevant instruction.
E: Do you think Chu-Ohu can help you any more?
Cls (Ilods).
Es Would you like to a3k him anything?
Cls Has it got anything else on it?
C: It's got a red cross on it .... and it's a big one.
Cls Has it got a hole in it?
She realises that the solution to the problem is in her ovm hands, i.e. by
asking the right questions. It is significant that she believes that
Chu-Chu is able to help her further. She thus gives evidence of an
ability to put herself in the position of the speaker with all the
information at his disposal. If egocentrism of the kind described by
Piaget is a limiting factor in this task,it does not seem to be present
in tliis subject. Having discovered the way to obtain further information,
Clare confidently uses this procedure in the later trials as illustrated
earlier.
It is a truism that the more two-way interaction there is between
speaker and listener, the more successful is understanding likely to be.
When messages are ambiguous or incomprehensible there will be no progress
towards meaningful communication without further dialogue. One of the
main reasons behind the success of one subject in Group IV, Anna, was
that she had always had a close relationship with the doll. She did not
talk at him but to him, which meant that when she wanted to know something
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she needed little encouragement to a3k. After the experimenter had
explained the task the record went as follows:
Anna (3.V. 10m,): Well, which one is, I .. er em .. is Chu-Chu gonna choose?
C: The first one I've chosen is a "big "brick.
A: (No response. Looks at doll).
G: Do you know which one I've chosen?
A: (Nods) What one?
C: It's a big brick.
Aj And ... has (?) it got stripes on?
C: Yes, it's got stripes on it.
A: Not a hole?
C: It's got a hole in it. Have you got it?
Ai Yes (BXH/BXEI)
Anna continues to use a systematic strategy and even asks for information
about two attributes in one enquiry on Trial 3.
C: This is a big one.
A: Has it got no hole and no stripes?
C; It's got no hole and no stripes.
A: (Makes choice)
C: Have you got it?
A: Yes (bIS/BXH)
Anna's performance represents genuine cooperative communication, carefully
attending to the doll's statements, asking questions and checking off
the information against her array as she receives it.
Despite their obvious proficiency three of the Type IY subjects,
Clare, Anna and Scott, made errors on the final trial. This was
surprising for two reasons. Firstly, they had had practice at achieving
an effective strategy and success at using it, and secondly the pool of
blocks is reduced by three for the final task and therefore selection
should have been corres ondingly easier. The cause of their errors
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appears to have been overconfidence or over-enthusiasm. Where they were
prepared to be steady and methodical earlier, they are later betrayed
into mistakes by choosing before they have all the necessary information.
As often happens when a task becomes well practiced and apparently
easier, executive errors or slip-ups can creep in. The only subject who
totally avoided errors was Christine. Her strategy, however, was not as
clearly advanced as that used by the other children of Type IV. To
indicate the approach used by Christine a lengthy extract is required.
Christine(3y. 9a.)
Chu-Chu (C-C): The first one I've chosen is a big brick.
Christine (C)s (Looks along array' apparently examining the big bricks
and selects BXH find shews it to E).
C-Cj Do you know which one I've chosen?
Cj I've chosen ... I think the one it is.
C-Cj Do you know which one I've chosen?
C: Mm I don't know.
C-C j Why not?
C: Cos I think it's right .. that .. the one I've chosen.
C-C: Why do you not know?
C: Cos ... I can't see your bricks, and I can't see vdiich
you choo3ed.
C-C: Yes but I told you about it; I told you it's a big brick.
C: What kind did you say?
C-C: I just said it's a big brick.
C: You've got to say more than that (conspiratorial smile at E).
C-C: You need more than that?
C: Yeah, you got to say more.
C-C: Well, it's got red stripes on it.
C: So has mine. And mine's got a hole in the middle.
C-C: I didn't say that, I said it's a big brick with
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red strides.
C: You've got to say more than that.
C-Ci Well, it has got a hole in it. Do you know which one
I've chosen?
C: No.
C-Cs Well, it's a big brick with red stripes and a hole in it.
C: And grey bits on the side?
C~C: Yes.
C: I've got the same as that.
C—Ci Well put it in the box.
Christine was using a Type III strategy when she selected a block on the
basis of the first message. She adopted this procedure in each trial
and there are grounds for including her under Type III, The reason for
not doing so is that she consistently indicated that she had not enough
information until descriptions of all three attributes were provided.
Furthermore 3he was always prepared to change her selection on the
basis of new information. Her tactic for gaining more detail was the
unorthodox one of saving 'You've got to say more than that'. This meant
that the strict requirement of asking about specific attributes was not
met. The tendency to try to get the doll's block to match hers, shown
clearly in the excerpt above, indicated a basic misconception of the task.
Christine demonstrates another aspect of the task, shown also by Clare,
When they had all the information necessary to make a. choice, the
children still said they could not choose. This might have been due to
a storage problem when details had to be retained over a fairly lengthy
time span, interspersed with other, sometimes irrelevant, input. When




Communication tasks between young children showed that an adequate
appreciation of the speaker and listener roles was not present. /hen
paired with an adult providing an lideal* speaking or listening partner,
performance improved significantly indicating that, given discriminating
messages and appropriate feedback,successful communication behaviour was
possible on the part of pre-school children. The current study sought
to increase knowledge about the ycung child's communicating abilities
by using a method #11011 allowed scope for the child's own individual
approach without sacrificing the control exercised when one half of
the input was determined. The talking doll was thought to represent
thi3 compromise position between the unfettered situation of two small
children discoursing - often to little purpose - and the somewhat hide¬
bound arrangement where the adult guided the course of the interaction.
The task was so arranged that considerably greater demands were
made on the children concerning their comprehension of the coramunication
procedure. It was also hoped that the use of a partner whose verbal
and general intellectual abilities were known, by the children, to be
limited would throw some light from a different angle on the so-called
egocentric nature of children's language.
The main findings were as follows s
1. The doll was a powerful motivating force. Even children with
limited anderstanding 3tuck to the task well.
2. As far as it was possible to judge, the doll wa3 a positive factor
in inducing effective communication. Unadaptive (egocentric)
speech was minimal and signs of genuine communication were question
forms, prolonged two-way discourse, and use of the experimenter in
support of arguments.
3. Messages became shorter - i.e. fewer utterances per description -
as number of alternatives decreased, when children were acting as
speakers.
4. Number of critical attributes reported remained constant across trials.
5. The material seemed to affect both choice of blocks and attributes
omitted in descriptions. The most •interesting* blocks visually -
large, with cross and hole - were selected and absent properties
tended not to get reported.
6. Size was the dimension most often left out of speakers' messages.
It was thought that this was because it was an attribute depending
on a comparison process for perception.
7. Examination of individual performances revealed a wide variation
in efficiency of message transmission. Apart from the already
known interference of repetition and irrelevance there were found
to be individual differences in attributes omitted.
8. Some subjects suffered from a marked inability to decenter, with
one attribute being reported at length to the detriment of others.
9. A strategy was proposed for a competent listener. This suggested
that the children would be handicapped by (i) attentional bias
towards certain attributes, (ii) difficulties in making a selection
of one block while necessarily making decisions about a set of
blocks, (iii) limited knowledge of class relations.
10. The findings suggested that (i) and (ii) above, were significant
factors. The data did not allow any conclusions to be drawn about
(iii).
11. Listener^' strategies were classified according to four types,
(I to IV), I had no real understanding of the task and were happy
to select on the basis of one attribute. II were not happy to
select on the basis of one attribute but did so, apparently for
lack ofarule for obtaining more information. A disbelief in the
doll's ability to provide the wanted information was a possible
explanation for some subjects behaviour.
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III usually sought more details but often failed through ranking
premature selections find attempting to get the doll's block to
match theirs. Their remarks indicated that they did not appreciate
the causal relationship involved.
IV could be described as using a systematic -procedure in which
executive errors sometimes intruded.
243
Communicating with a talking doll - 2. Spatial relations as a critical
attribute.
It has been seen that the four year old child con readily discern
and communicate differences in shape., size and colour. He can also tell
when something is there or not there. It was of interest to know how
these children might handle a more abstract dimension where the critical
attributes were not intrinsic to the features themselves hut depended on
the relationship of the features. As has been discussed size requires
a comparison process for its perception, and size was a dimension included
in the current ta3k. The other variable dimension to be used was the
spatial relationship of the constituents, in this case coloured squares
on a white card.








Figure 6-2 Figure 6-3
Since both items have two squares which are of the same size and colour,
it follows that shape, number, 3ize and colour are not differentiating
features. In the communication situation it would he necessary to say
something about the spatial alignment of the squares if the listener
was to know which one was being named. If 'A* was the target item a
message including a term like 'next to' or 'boside' would be sufficient,
and for 'B' reference would need to be made to the fact that one was
'above' or 'below' the other. In Figure 6—3 it would not be helpful
to establish the plane in which the squares were set since this is common
to both. Here the exact relationship between the big and small squares
needs to be described. We need to know which one is at the top or the
bottom, (but not necessarily both). Mother way to describe this
adequately would be to tlk about the big square being above the little
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square.(in the case of 'x').
Visual spatial discrimination in young children is an established
research field, much of the impetus being given by its assumed importance
in learning to read. The field has been well reviewed by Gibson (1969)*
This tradition ha3 not been concerned to examine the relationship
between the discrimination of spatial relations and verbal terms used
to describe them.
Piaget and Inhelder (1948) have made a detailed study of the
development of children's ideas about space; they describe the emergence
first of a topological stage whore categories tend to operate according
to the Gestalt laws such as proximity, continuity and closure. This
gives way to the second stage in which ideas of projective space and
Euclidean geometry appear and the relations between component parts of
the spatial field are perceived. It is only then that the child is
able to comprehend adequately such concepts as above and below, left and
right, before and behind.
Asso and Wyke (1970) have looked at the comparison between visual
discrimination of spatial relations in line drawings and verbal
instructions about those relations. They found that visual discrimination
was significantly superior to verbal comprehension in the three age
groups tested, (5, 6 and 7 years) and that significant improvements
in both occurred over this period. Their findings supported Piaget's
position that an understanding of the spatial relations between objects
does not appear until about the age of 7* It follows that consistent
verbal comprehension vail not be present until after this since Piaget's
view, broadly speaking, is that language reflects conceptual development.
The opposing Russian view is that language has a predominant role
in structuring the perception of 3patial relations. Sinchenko and
Kontseva (reported in Zaporozhets and Elkonin, 1971) conclude from
their investigations "that children three - four years of age understand
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quite well .. the relation 'over' and 'under'". 'Over' was a word used
specifically by Asso and dyke ana they found that the success rate of
a group with mean age 5 years was only 15 per cent, and had barely
reached 70/ at 7 years. In their discussion they remark on the lack
of support in their findings for Soviet theory.
A major difference between the studies of Asso and iyke and
Kontseva concerns the experimental approach. The British workers used
relatively abstract material and asked the children to pick out one item
from a series according to the instruction, e.g. 'Show me the card in
which the ball is over the line.* The Russians have used more
naturalistic situations, e.g. 'Put the checker-piece under the table',
but no details of their procedure seem to be available in translation.
The study to be reported here makes no claims to be a follo?^ up
to the work mentioned but some discussion of the effect of different
methodologies on the acquisition of spatial terms will follow the account
of the main experiment. Relatively abstract material was preferred far
the comraunication task for the following reasons:
1. It was thought that this would demonstrate the spatial relationships
in the least ambiguous fashion.
2. Its convenience for the task as devised, where identical sets of easily
handled items were required.
3. The need to avoid material with many superfluous or distracting
features - i.e., an attempt to control the signal-noise ratio.
The pool of cards used demanded that the subjects reported the size
of squares used, the orientation they were in (horizontal or vertical)
and in the case of some items, the precise spatial location, i.e. which,
was at the top, viiich was at the bottom.
As in the first experiment with the doll, all the subjects took
the part of speakers first, A difference was that the experiment was
split into two sessions, the second being where the doll acted as sneaker.
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The conventions used by the doll in the roles of speaker and listener
which were successfully employed in the first experiment were used again.
The basic aim was to see how children who had shown they could
cope with quite sophisticated objects containing up to three critical
features would handle stimuli which required the use of more abstract
terras, again using the doll as a sympathetic and motivating partner to
whom they should direct their efforts
Method
Subjects
Thirteen children, six of them male, with ages ranging from 5 years
1 month to 3 years 10 months, took part. Mean age for the group was
4 years 4 months.
Materials
Two identical sets of seven cards (9 cm square) with squares of
blue paper of two sizes, BIG (3 cm), LITTLE (1,5) mounted on the cards
B
in a central position as followsj BIG above LITTLE (T), LITTLE above
BIG (J), BIG beside LITTLE (B L), BIG beside BIG (B B), LITTLE beside
LITTLE (L L), BIG above BIG (B), LITTLE above LITTLE (£). They are
illustrated below, Figure 6-4,
\ □ L_l 1| ,y□□on*
B L BL BB LL B L
L B
Figure 6-4 B L
Procedure
The standard procedure described in the blocks experiment was
used. The subject was shown his set of cards and then shown that the
doll's cards matched his own, Garccns were then pwt so that, the
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participants were only able to see their own cards, The experiment was
run in two parts. In part one the child acted as speaker and described
chosen cards, one at a time,so that the doll could choose the same card.
In part two the child was the listener while the doll described the
cards. In each session four out of the seven cards were described.
The instructions for the respective parts were as follows.
Part one - Child as Speaker. After child had been shown that the two
sets of cards vera identical, by matching them: 'Now let's see how
clever you are,,,,,, at telling Chu-Chu about your cards. Listen
carefully Chu-Chu because .,,. is going to tell you about a card he has
chosen to go into the box. See if you can choose the same one,'
Doll: Yes, I'll listen to what «... tells me and see if I can choose the
same card.
E: Mow, choose a card. Put your finger on it, but don't move
it yet. Tell Chu-Chu about it so that he can choose the same one
as you,'
If the child's initial description was inadequate the doll would
say 'Can you tell me some more about the card, .,,? I don't know which
one you mean,*
If the description was still inadequate, the doll repeated the
description by the child and said: 'I'm not very good at this game, ...,
I still don't know which one to choose. Can you tell me some more about
it?' If still no help from the child: '(Veil, I'll have to gue3S, perhaps
it is this one'.
.'/hen the child's description was inadequate, care was taken that
the doll's choice did not match the child's.
Part two - Child as Listener
E: We're going to get the little cards out again, and this time
Chu-Chu's going to have a turn. ..'ill you help him? How ... you
listen carefully to Chu-Chu because he's going to choose a card
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and tell you all about it. See if you can choose the same one.
If you don't know which one Chu-Chu's chosen, see if you can find
out by asking him.
The doll's initial messages which were always inadequate, were as
follows:
Trial 1. Big square and wee square.
Trial 2. Two wee squares.
Trial 3» Two big squares.
Trial 4. A big square and a little square.
The doll provided the additional information about spatial
distribution as long as the child made it clear that he needed such
information. The type of feedback which qualified for more detail is




The data will be treated anddiscussed under three headings:
a) Message adequacy and omission of attributes.
b) The effect of material on selection and description.
c) An analysis of words used to describe spatial relations.
Message adequacy and omission of attributes. 13 children participated in
the experiment but one showed no interest in the task and declined to
describe any cards, bach of the remaining 12 children chose and
described four card3 except one subject (Anna) who wished to terminate
the session after three selections. (I'm tired of playing the game now).
For some children, at least, it was clear that this material held little
interest for them. Anna made this very obvious when she said, 'Well I
think the next day we'll have different ones with animals.' In the majority
of cases the presence of the talking doll compensated for the dullness of
the material.
249
Table 6-10 shows that of the 47 trials only 12 contained adequate
descriptions. An adequate description in this task usually required
that the speaker provided information about the size of the squares,
the orientation or plane in which they were set, and, in the case of
different-size squares, the position of one in relation to the other
(e.g. big above little). The data on attributes omitted shows why so
few adequate descriptions resulted. The first critical feature, size,
was only missed out twice, but the plane in which the squares are set
was omitted in 31 of the 47 trials (68/). The reason why the 16 references
to plane did not all lead to adequate descriptions,is that position, or
very occasionally size, was left out. Position was a critical factor
in 15 of the trials and so its level of omission (73/) was even higher
thorn that for plane.
The explanation for the almost invariable reporting of size in
contrast to its frequent omission in the blocks study would seem to be
due to two factors. In the first place the necessary contrast (Big/little)
was provided within three of the cards. In the previous task it was
necessary to compare the selected block with other blocks to perceive
the size difference. The second factor was that,although four of the
itees contained squares of the same size and therefore no contrast was
present, because size was the only obvious and easily described varying
feature it was always reported. In the blocks task there were other
more dominant variations.
To sum up then, the speakers messages were generally unhelpful
because they failed to include information about the orientation,
horizontal or vertical, in which the squares -were lying and., when relevant,
the position of large relative to small squares.
Effects of material on choice and description. Table 6-11 shows that
choice of card was not uniformly distributed across the seven items. The
vertical same-size squares, E and fc, were the most popular selections
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TABLE 6-10
Number of adequate descriptions and. attributes for each child when
speaker
ADEQUATE DESCRIPTIONS ATTRIBUTES OMITTED
SUBJECT
(Maximum =4) Size Plane Position
Alan 0 2 0 2
Lee 4 0 0 0
Linda 3 0 2 0
Scott 1 0 3 1
Gregor 0 0 2 1
Elizabeth 0 0 4 1
Paul 2 0 3
Anna (n <= 5) 0 0 3 1
Sally 0 0 4 1
Nicholas 2 0 2 1
Christine 0 0 4 1
Clare 0 0 4 t
12 2 31 11
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TABLn 6—11
Distribution and order of individual card choice and, preference for













1 0 2 1 3 2 2 2 12
2 2 2 0 1 4 2. 1 12
3 1 2 3 0 2 2
■
2 12
4 2 0 0 3 2 2 2 11**
TOTAL 5 6 4 7 10 8 7 47
WEIGHTED* 10 18 10 18 26 20 17 MEAN
VERTICAL
PLANE 10 18 18 26 18
CAEI
HORIZONTAL
PLANE 10 20 17 15.7
TYPE
SAME
SIZE 18 26 20 17 20.25
DIFFERENT
SIZE 10 18 10 12.7
♦Weighted totals giving 4,first choice., (Trial 1) down to 1 for fourth choice
** Total is one short as one subject completed only three trials
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and this difference is highlighted v/hen totals are weighted to take
account of order of choice. The lower half of table 6-11 gives number
of selections (weighted) as a function of the two major variables, plane
and sine. It can be seen that a majority of children preferred cards
that had same size squares in a vertical orientation. To see if the most
marked difference, size of s.uare, was significant, subjects were scored
according to the number of same-size and different-size squares they had
selected. The scores took account of order of selection end were equated
for the number of choices available, i.e., there were more same-size
squares in the set. A Wilcoxen matched-pairs signed ranks test indicated
that although 9 of the 11 subjects showed a preference for same-size
squares, the difference shown in Table 6-11, 20.25 against 12.67, was not
significant (T - 14, p. > .05). The number of adequate descriptions was
too small to see whether some card tjpes were more likely to yield
errors than others. It did transpire however, that different-size
squares had considerably less successes (15/ ) than same-size squares (51/ ).
It has already been mentioned that this was due to position being
required on different-size items. There were slightly more successes in
the horizontal than vertical plane.
lords used to describe spatial, relations. It has become evident that the
key to success in this task was to be able to describe the topographical
relationship of the coloured squares on the white cards. It is therefore
of interest to know the types of words used by the subjects to express
this relationship, and to what extent they were used appropriately. Table
6-12 3hows the terms used by the sample to describe the two basic spatial
relationships, vertical and horizontal. The total number of subjects








Up 5 (3) Along 1 (1)
Down 3 (2) Going- that way (+ point) 3
Not down 1 (1) Beside 1 (1)
Top 5 (4) 5
Bottom 5 (4)
Not beside 1 (1)
20
Private Language
Hair Spray j Rocket 6 (1)
(Figures in brackets refer to number of subjects involved)
A disproportionately higher number of instances relating to the
vertical plane was reported, even allowing for the fact that more
vertically orientated squares were chosen in the ratio 6j4. One reason
for this, apparent from the table, is that there are more terms available
to young children, and indeed in the English language, for describing
objects having a perpendicular relationship. Asso and Jyke (1973) found
that when describing spatial relations 5 year mids used 7 'vertical* terras
and only 3 'horizontal* terms. Two of the latter were 'left' and 'right'
which were not used in this study. The other term was 'beside' which is
the only word, as opposed to a combination of words and gestures, used in
this experiment to refer to the horizontal plane. The words relating to
objects in the vertical plane, 'up*, 'down', 'top', 'bottom* were well
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represented in Asso and fyke's experiment and they also found 'under*t
'beneath* and 'underneath'. 'Over' was used by 6 year olds but not by
tho five year olds. Among appropriate words not recorded at all in
either study were 'above', 'below', and 'next (to)', dome discussion
of the way the children employed these words and other strategies used
will bo given in the section on individual performances which follows.
It is not sufficient to use prepositions which define spatial
relationsliips, they mu3t be used accurately. There was only one
instance of a child using such terns inappropriately. This was when the
words 'top* and 'bottom' were used to refer to the squares in the card LI.
There were two occurrences of negative fox-ms, e.g. 'not down', a finding
not reported by Asso and fyke. Neither of these instances were due to
denials of a suggestion by the listener. Some children described their
cards according to the distribution of colour as a whole and so would
refer to white at the sides, in the middle etc. In such cases the
spatial terms were not incorrect but they v/ere unhelpful. Both this and
the negation phenomenon will be discussed below.
Individual Strategies.
Requirements of a competent speaker. The general requirements of a
speaker in this type of task have been described on a number of
occasions previously and the purpose here is only to delineate the specific
demands of this task. Three critical dimensions are involved:
(i) Size of squares, (ii) orientation of squares, (iii) location of
the big in relation to the little square.
Describing the size of the square 3hould be relatively straight
forward when they are different since the contrast, which it was argued
earlier was necessary to determine size, is present on the cards. In such
cases an appreciation of size does not require the speaker to compare the
chosen card with the rest of the set. But suae size squares do not have
e
a 'built-in' contrast and this might present probleras. Hovfyer, the
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fact that some cards do have the contrast may be sufficient to alert the
speaker to the size dimension, for all the cards. There is an important
difference in this respect in comparison with the blocks material since
here size is not a property of the whole object - the card - but of part3
of the object - the squares. This again might serve to focus attention
on size.
After size the most important feature is orientation. The speaker
should provide a message that will tell the listener whether the squares
lie in the horizontal or vertical plane. In the horizontal plane
expressions like 'side by Side', ♦beside' or 'next to' adequately convey
the orientation of the squares, although it does not seem possible to
say categorically that these terms exclude a vertical relationship. In
the vertical plane the situation is more clear-cut and words like 'above',
•below*, 'under', 'beneath* and expressions like 'up and down* and 'on
top of* seem to be satisfactory.
When it comes to location, specifying the precise position of one
square in relation to another, the choice of word to describe orientation
may clearly be relevant. The word * above' for instance can serve to
indicate orientation and location as in *the big square is above the little
square'. The terms 'below', 'beneath', 'under', and 'on top of also
fulfil both functions adequately but 'up end down' is not precise enough.
In such a case, an additional message would be required if location was
important. The language does not have the same richness for specifying
relative position in the horizontal or lateral plane. '/hen referring to
wheels on vehicles we talk about near side and off side, and in cricket,
on side and off sine. The most precise terms are 'left* and 'right* but
this requires that we know the perspective of the observer. There is no
1
one term like 'above* which defines plane and position. This was one
1. Note that in the third dimension, depth, there are satisfactory dual
function terms: 'behind' and 'in front of* for example.
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reason why the task did not ask the children to determine precise
location in the horizontal plane.
The key then, to satisfactory performance, ha.ing provided details
about size, is having suitable labels to describe the orientation and
sometimes the actual position of the squares on the card. There may be
occasions when the child perceives the differences between cards but is
unable to report them because he is unable to describe what he sees
accurately in verbal terms. The other possibility is that he may have
the labels but apply them inappropriately.
Subjects who report size exclusively. Consideration of the individual
performances shows that the sample broadly divides into two, those who
use terras to describe the spatial distribution of squares and those #10
do not. Five of the younger children fall into this latter category.
Having described the size of the squares on their chosen card, which they
always do, they appear unable to provide any further assistance when the
doll asks for it. When pressed, a common response was 'white* referring
to the colour of the card. There was no reason to believe these children
did not possess the pertinent words in their vocabularies. Anna, for
instance, makes it quite plain that she does. When the two sets of cards
are laid out at the start of the experiment for the subject to see that
they are identical, Anna's subsequent conversation i3 as follows:
A: Now vjhose ... which is which (pointing at the row of cards). Is
mine at the bottom?
E: That's right, Anna.
A: And Chu-Chu*s at the top.
It is also evident that she employs the terms correctly. Why she fails
to do so in the task itself is due, presumably, to her not noticing that
the critical differences were ones of orientation. Once again this
demands a comparison of the chosen card with the rest of the set. If
the description ia confined to what is seen on the chosen card, then
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mention of the number of Squares, their siae and possibly their colour
would appear to be all that is necessary. Some of the children showed
mild irritation at being pressed to provide more information when they
believed that they had given all they could. For example Clare.
Clare: It's got two squares ... wee squares.
Chu-Chu: Two wee squares, yes?
CI: And that's all.
C: Ohi Two wee squares. Can you tell me some more about it, Clare?
CI: No, because there's no more. Just white.
C: Well, I'm still not sure which card it is.
CI: Well, that's just all that is on it.
Note that when mentioning colour - 'just white' - she seems to he aware
that such information is neither necessary nor helpful.
Paul does his utmost to provide the additional information that
the doll 3eems to want and sometimes describes the hack of the card, even
though it i3 blank. In a patient and extended exchange during the second
selection Paxil eventually hits on something which interests the listener.
Paul: At the top, there's another square at the top, at the bottom there's
a square at the bottom, at the top there's a square at the top.
C: Oh, there's a square at the top.
P: At the bottom there's a square at the bottom.
Since siae had already been mentioned this description is adequate. But
Paul doe3 not refer to the spatial distribution in his next selection,
possibly because the squares tire in a lateral relationship and, in all,
he includes spatial terras in only one trial.
A feature of some subjects oho were restricted to the size
dimension was that when pressed they began to describe the cards in a
detailed hut largely unproductive manner. Below are examples from Scott
and Sally.
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Scott: ... it's one big one, one snail one. And white in the middle.
Cs Yes.
S: And white at the side and white at the top and white at the other
side, and at the bottom.
Sally; 'ihis one has got a big square and a little square and its ... one
has got big sides and the other has got little sides, and the big
one has little corners - big corners - and the little one has got
tiny corners.
They seem to set out to give the doll a verbal picture of the card mainly
in terms of the distribution of colour on the card, that is .There the
largest patches of blue and especially white are to be found. They are
possibly driven to this end by the doll's persistent questioning and
it is a tribute to their patience and willingness to help the doll. It
can be seen that spatial terms are used, like 'sides', 'middle', 'corner*
and also 'top' and 'bottom', but they are not U3ed in a way that is
helpful in determining the selected card. These examples do show that
children of this age possess spatial terms and that they are able to use
them appropriately e.g. when referring to the sides and corners of the
card. One can only assume, therefore, either that they miss the
critical differences between thuds or see them but do not appreciate
their significance.
This difficulty is highlighted in Gregor's performance,who seems
at times to have understood what is required but is never quite able to
put together an adequate description. In hi3 first selection he is
unable to go beyond the size attribute. When pressed he gives the sort
of detailed analytic description he has shown in the past which is quite
unhelpful to the listener, e.g. 'it's got points to it on each side and
then it's got poixits*. For the second choice his message is as follows;
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Gregor: It's the same one except then are little end *ee urn, and they've
only got .«. one's at the top and one's at the bottom.
He has provided an adequate description for the card fc; unfortunately
the card, he is describing is LL. At face value he seems to be using
'top' and 'bottom' inappropriately, but it is possible that he is not
referring to the coloured squares at all or to only parts of the squares.
The use of the phrase 'it's the same one' is only helpful if it refers
to the type of previously selected card and if the listener understands
this convention.
The following extract from the start of trial 5 gives an idea of
the decoding problems of the listener.
G: There was little one and a big one and they've all got ... and
them are the same. Then (?) the little one's got that (?) on ...
one's there sticking out and one at the top and the other one
sticking out at the bottom and sticking up a bit and the other ...
and it's a big one,
Cs There's a big one and a little one.
G: Yes.
C: And one*3 at the top?
G: Yes ... em.
C: Can you tell me some more about it Gregor?
G: 13m ... all right. Well it's little ... And is a big one.
Again he has most of the relevant information but it is not difficult
to imagine the problems a child listener would have deciphering the
message. He does not appear to have provided the necessary additional
detail about the relative positions of the big anfi little squares.
Gome confusion is also evident in his final description.
G: Now, them are both little and them both got sharp points and them
are oa (?), them are on, but just except (?), except one's bigger
and one's stabler (sic).
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Why, having said they are "both little, does he say one is bigger? The
card in question is £» Perhaps he is trying to communicate the
orientation of the squares. In this context the word •stallor* may
mean taller, though it may easily mean smaller in contrast to bigger
used earlier. In any event it again presents a formidable problem for
the decoder.
Idiosyncratic strategies. When speakers are aware of the importance
of orientation and position,and make an attempt to signify this
information,their performance may be marked by idiosyncratic terminology
which varies in its communicative effectiveness. Table 6-10shows that
Alan is one of only two children who always reports the plane in which
the squares are lying. Unfortunately his first two selections are
^ and p. For his first two messages axe as follows:
(1) It's got a big square and a wee square.
(2) And the wee, and the big one is pointing up.
The listener has understood from this that a big and little square are
involved and that they are in a vertical orientation. The remainder of
a lengthy exchange on this first trial is devoted to trying to obtain
the additional information about position, Alan seems to think that the
doll has not understood what pointing up means and accompanies statements
like they're all pointing ... two of them are pointing up* vjith an
index finger raised in a vertical position. Showing remarkable patience
in the face of continual questioning from the doll he later says, 'They're
not pointing down but they're pointing up'.
It is not surprising that Alan is dismayed at the doll apparently
not understanding 'pointing up'. It is evident from the first two
trials that the semantics of the situation for Alan is as shown in





'Pointing up' 'Pointing down' 'Pointing along'
Figure 6-5
1
have been adequate. But for him those words satisfactorily describe
the situation as he sees it, that is 'pointing up' means the little
square above the big one. As he himself says, this is 'not (the same
an) pointing down'. The way in which he uses these descriptions
suggests he sees the pattern which the squares make as a gesta.lt and
it is this which he describes rather than the relationship of the
squares to each other. If anything he is describing the squares as a
unit in relation to the card. Yet his perception is not entirely
holistic since he does report size for two of the cards.
The particular strategy adopted by Alan poses the interesting
question of how he would, have reacted to material such as that shown
in Figure 6-6. Here, although identical objects are used in each, picture
A a
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Figure 6-6
their particular alignment means that 'pointing up' could apply to 1
and 2, 'pointing along* to 3 and 4, and 'pointing down' to 5 and 6.
An extract from his final selection reveals another feature of
his performance.
Alan: It's only got two now, and it's pointing up.
1. This is not to say that Alan*s descriptions are unreasonable since in
practice they may well be adequate, nevertheless they are not a
clearly unambiguous specification of the relationship involved.
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C; Pointing up, yes.
A: It's not very near ... seems (?)/s£une (?)
C: Yes, can yon tell me some more about it?
A: It's pointing up arnd it ... it's not beside the other one,
it's a little bit.
C: It's not beside it?
A: Ho, but a little bit.
This is the second occasion on which he has used the negative form, in
this case 'not beside*, and at face value it represents a sophisticated
understfinding of spatial terms. He knows for instance that 'not down'
implies the inverse 'up' find 'not beside' implies the vertical plane
up/down. It may be said that tho particular abstract material used,
prevented him from fully demonstrating his appreciation of spatial
relationships. It would certainly he worth replicating the experiment
with readily codable objects such &3 animals or household objects. Lee
uses a ploy that Man showed, that of pointing her finger to indicate
the plane of the squares. She doc3 this consistently in company with
the phrase 'Going that way'. By this strategy she achieves an adequate
descxrLption on every trial - the only child to do so. She was assisted
by not selecting the cards B and ^ which would have required information
about precise position. '.Then she does choose a card with different 3ize
squares, BL, although position is not critical she might be said to
transmit it.
Lee: They're going that way (pointing along in the direction of
the door).
C: Which way?
L: That ?/ay (indicates with hand towards door.)
Ct Oh, they're going that way,
L: The wee one's going that way (pointing: with arm outstretched
towards door).
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This could he taken to imply that in the chosen card the little square
was next to the big square in the horizontal plane with the little
square nearest the door, a hi^h level of communicative ability.
./hen we look at the genesis of Lee's strategy we see a fani.liar
pattern. The child operates at a. particular level which to her is
entirely appropriate,'which inevitably means that she is unlikely to
understand that a different approach is required. (hen a switch does
ocourr it happens quite suddenly when apparently an extra dimension is
perceived and reported. In common with the rest of the sample Lee
reports the size of the squares avid,when asked for more detail,follows
up with colour and shape, both redundant features. Then the doll says
that he is still unable to choose she is puzzled and for a visile no
progress is made. Then,while looking at her array, it appears that she
notices an additional feature - the orientation of the squares * and
reports this by saying 'they're going that way* and pointing in a
sideways direction. The'break-through' would seem to be due to the
speaker comparing the chosen card with the rest of the set and
perceiving an attribute which only assumes force because of this
comparison procedure. This is not to say, as has been argued earlier
for other attributes, that comparison is necessary to recognise the
spatial relationship, but without it such information is unlikely to
register.
In the last trial the listener attempts to get Lee to verbalise
the orientation which she has been content to describe with a gesture.
The dialogue is as follows:
Lee: There's two big oneft, square and blue, and going that way (moves
finger along horizontal plane in direction of door).
C: Can you tell me about them? Two big ones.
L: (Slightly puzzled) Square and blue.
C; ?®s.
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L: Going that way (points towards door)
C: Can you toll me about them? Two big ones.
L: (Slightly puaalod) Square and blue.
C: Yes
L: Going that: way (points toirards door)
C: Can you tell me which way they're going.?
L: That way (points towards door).
C: Yes * but can you tell me?
L; I told yerj
Cs Which way is it?
L: That way (moves finger in direction of door).
C: Which way is that, though?
Ls There (points in direction of door),
C: Can you say it?
L: (looking down) Eh?
Cj Well - I think I know which one it is BB/BB
This speaker has provided all the necessary information in the opening
message. If there had been a large screen between speaker and listener
cutting off any possibility of non-verbal communication, that message
would not have been adequate. Since the task was designed to investigate
verbal communication ability the doll persists in asking Lee if she can
tell him which way the squares are going. Somewhat exasperated at
being a3ked to provide information already supplied =■* 'I told yer' -
she is unable to appreciate the subtle difference between verbal and
non-verbal communication.
Egocentric speech? Table 6-12 reported the incidence of some imaginative
terns to describe the cards, such as 'hair-spray' and 'rocket*. These
are used by one subject, Nicholas, and fire virtually the only instance
of a child projecting private speech onto relatively absti'act items.
This is in marked contrast to the findings of Krauss and GluckBberg (1969)
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7iho claim that egocentric descriptions fire standard for pre-school
children. It has already been pointed out that Krauss and Glucksberg's
highly abstract nonsense figures are almost bound to encourage the use
of non-social language.
Nicholas's use of such terms represented his attempt to communicate
the 3patial relationship of the squares. Like Alan, he treats the card
as a gestalt while recognising there are differences in the gestalts.
As long as the listener also perceives an association between the card
g and the description 'hair-spray', then such a description id.11 be
adequate. These descriptions (Figure 6-7) represent Nicholas's best
endeavours to corainunicate the differences as he sees then. He is not
LJ □ ■—1 >—1
♦Spray*, 'Hair-spray' 'Two things you 'Hair-sxjray tops*
press on a hair
spray', 'rocket*
Figure 6-7. Examples of imaginative language used by liicholas to
describe stimulus items.
blind to parts of the whole, however, and does at various times refer to
squares and size in addition to using spatial words like 'upwards', 'top*
and 'middle*.
Nicholas's terminology would, following Piaget (1926), usually
be regarded as egocentric speech and this aspect of child language has
too often received uncritical acceptance. The widely accepted view that
with egocentric speech "there is no attempt on the part of the child to
adapt his speech to the needs of the listener or even to make sure he is
listening" (Novell 1969, p. 75) would seem to be challenged by many of
the performances in these studies. Hie question of whether or not ego¬
centric speech, characterises the verbal communication of young children
has already received some attention, but the particular case of Nicholas
is worth examining. His descriptions would certainly qualify as
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egocentric speech as the tern is applied by Krauss and Glucksberg, but
consider the dialogue in the opening trial:
N: It's the one with the topj it's like a spray and it has like a
cup down at the bottom and like a spraying thing up at the top.
C; It's like a spade at the top?
N: Not a spear, a spraying thing like hair spray.
C: Spray?
Nj Yes.
Cj Oh yes, Can you tell me some more about it, Nicholas?
N: Yes. Well it's ... er ... it's got round ... a big thing and
it's like a cup (making gestures with hands, probably
unintentional) and er ... the top one is like a hair spray,
down like you press (making pressing down motions with fingers)
and the ... it's ... it's like sort of a rocket, but not quite
(smiles at E).
C: Oh, it's like a rocket. I 3till don't know which one to choose,
Nicholas.
E: I don't think Chu-Chu has seen a hair spray, you see.
Nj It's from two, two, three ... from one, two, three ... um three
... (indicating the number of cards along from end is selected
card) One , three.
E: 3ce if you can tell him about it again, Nicholas,
C: Yes, can you help me Nicholas?
Nj Well, it's like a spray, a cup - like a cup - (stretching out
hands) and it has a round thing and it's like a rocket pointing
upwards (points upwards with finger)
Come of Nicholas's terminology is certainly idiosyncratic but there
is no evidence here of a speaker making no attempt to adapt his speech to
the needs of the listener. Indeed every effort is being made to make the
listener understand v/hich card has been selected. Because a word like
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' hair-s-pray' generally has a narrow, well-defined reference its usefulness
In this context is limited. But the speaker doe3 not confine himself
only to that term for he trie3 to provide an analytic description of
the card, and later introduces a new term, 'rocket'. It seems that the
degree of modification and even new descriptions given by very young
speakers was underestimated by Krauss and Glucksberg. It may also be
true that their task was such that it did not allow any such behaviour.
The danger of a term like egocentric speech, which is usually
defined as above by Lovell, is that it oversimplifies and falsely categorises
the young child'3 communicative behaviour. Certain speech, certain
behaviour, may look on the surface to be egocentric and therefore by
definition can have no communicative function. Closer examination may
show that the speech does have a communicative function and that the
degree to which it is successful will depend on several factors such as
perception of critical differences and possession of an adequate vocabulary.
Factors will very often be situation specific and the more general
variables involved have been discussed at length in reporting these
studies.
It is argued therefore that investigation of the specific cognitive
and situational variables involved will tell us more about the development
of communication ability than a rather broad classification like
egocentric speech. Egocentrism, as discussed by Piaget (1962) for instance,
can be seen to be having an influence on performance and the finding
that the child as listener tends to impose his choice on the situation,
was discussed in the last section. Yet, though it is possible to see
traces of egocentrism influencing communication behaviour, it remains
questionable whether the molar level at which Piaget explains such
functioning provides a sufficient account.
A quite different feature of Nicholas's approach, also illustrated
in the above extract, is to report the position of the selected card in
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the array, This piece of behaviour may indicate a recognition of the
exact one to one correspondence that there is between the cards>since
they remain in the positions that they occupied when the initial
matching procedure was carried out. If it does,it represents a particularly
shrewd strategy. It is not taken up by the doll since such a ploy had
been excluded as an illegitimate method of communication in this task.
Scott was another subject to adopt this procedure.
Using spatial terms appropriately. The results of the group's performance
as a whole have already shown that success is restricted in this task.
V7e know that success can be effectively measured by the extent to which
children are able to use words describing spatial relationships. On an
individual level, Linda is the most effective at this. She uses words
like 'beside', 'top* and 'bottom' to achieve adequate descriptions in
three out of four selections. A peculiar- feature of her performance is
to compare explicitly the chosen card with another similar card. In trial
1, having established that her choice has two little squares, she goes on
to say 'It's like another wee one on a big one*. The listener take3 that
to mean that the card is b inve3ting the word 'on' ^th the connotation
• above'. In fact her choice is LL and it is not clear why she describes
the horizontal plane in this way.
In the second trial she uses a similar strategy more successfully.
Linda: There's two big ones with no wee ones on it. It's white, and
nothing on the back,
Cj Can you tell me some more about it,Linda? I'm still not sure
which one it is.
L: There's two big ones ... and it's the same as a wee .. as a wee
one beside a big one.
Since she clearly knows when to use the word 'beside', why does she not
use it directly to describe her own card? The reason may have something
to do with the contrast between different size squares. It may}in this
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case,"be a matter of relationships being* more difficult to express
(and perceive) for sane-size as opposed to different-size squares. It
may even be that different words for the constituents - big and wee -
highlight the contrast and also provide 'pegs' 011 which to hang the
comparison. In other words the suggestion is that it may be in some
sense easier to say 'big beside little' than 'big beside big*. Such a
hypothesis could of course be tested.
For her next selection Linda chooses a card with different-size
squares and accordingly, by the above hypothesis, should make the
description easier for herself.
L: There's a wee one a big one. And it's got white and blue.
Cs Yes. I'm still not sure which one it is. It's a wee one
and a big one. Can you tell me some more about it?
Li Yes. It's got a wee one down on the bottom and a big one at
the top.
This represents one of the few examples of a perfectly adequate description
in this task. In view of this,the difficulty in trial 1 may be the result
of an executive error, that is, a slip in the choice of word, her last
selection is such that an adequate description needs only to report size,
and so no further data is forthcoming about the description of
orientation and loc,- tion.
Child a3 Listener
Th e results and discussion for this condition will include a b±ief
presentation of group data, the ways in which subjects signal recognition
of inadequate messages, a break-down and discussion of successful strategies
employed and the use and understanding of spatial terms. But first some
efficient strategies for listeners are suggested.
In the restricted form in which the experiment was given, the listener
always began the task with one piece of information supplied, namely the
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1
size of the squares. The difficulty of the task was automatically
determined according to whether the squares were the scone 3ize (big
ones or wee ones) or a different size (big one and a wee one). Two
efficient strategies which might be followed for these respective
starting points are set out below.
Situation one.
Initial message:
First question (re plane):





Big one and little one
Up and down?
/ \
If YES If NO
















The exact form of the questions i3 largely a matter of individual
taste, it only being necessary that they are comprehensible to the partner
in the communication task. The important thing is to ask the question
1. The reason for doing this was that size was almost always reported
when the subjects were speakers, and so to give them another feature,
like orientation, would virtually be giving the whole description
to the listener. Furthermore the main purpose of this particular
task was to see to what extent the children could utilise spatial
terms. Nevertheless, if the sample had been larger, it would have
been interesting as well as a useful control, to see if size was
sought as the second feature by most children, having been given
plane.
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about plane first since this may then allow a correct choice straight
away (always in Situation Two, and if the horizontal plane is established
in Situation One),
It should be noted that there might arise situations where the
initial message itself was adequate. In Situation Two, for example, if
there was only one card remaining with two big squares. In the present
experiment this possibility was deliberately avoided, but strictly
speaking the first action of the listener should be to scan the array
to see how many cards applied to the description given. On this basis
the listener could then begin to seek further information from the speaker.
Group Data. 16 of the 44 trials resulted in speakers and listener's
cards matching; -sdiich necessarily followed a successful operation by
the listener in securing the information needed to determine the speaker's
choice. Table 6-15 shows that these successes are not evenly distributed
since four subjects accounted for 14 of the matches. Five subjects
achieved no correct selections.
As in the earlier blocks study, failure in this ta3k was primarily
a function of selecting on the basis of the first message. Performances
tended to follow a standard pattern. The doll would say what size the
squares were on the chosen card and the listener would pick out a card
from the set saying either *1 know which one' (Linda) or 'I think it's
that one' (Alan) or even 'hasy-peasy, I know which one it is - that one'
(Nicholas). Sometimes a selection was made without any verbal response.
In every casejhowever, the doll would ask 'I)o you iaanw which one it is?'
and this group of subjects would affirm their choice.
In an attempt to gauge the strength of their conviction, the doll
introduced an additional dimension (plane) after they had made their
selection on the third trial. The general reaction was to comply with
the fresh information and t o change their card if it did not correspond
with the new input. (Such correct matches have not been included in the
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above totals). It did not lead to any change in approach however, nor
occasion any real surprise, and these subjects continued their usual
strategy in the final trial. It would seem therefore that these children
are able to make good use of critical information when it is provided
but are unable to secure it for themselves. What is more they do not
seem to regard such information as necessary - they are content to select
1
on the basis of the first message. This seems to suggest a fundamental
misunderstanding of the purpose of the task. A little light is thrown
on this question when the data on the children's judgments of completed
selections is discussed below.
Recognising an inadequate message. The key to an adequate performance
lay in asking for information about the orientation and possibly exact
location of squares. A pre-requiaite for the information-seeking role, of
the .listener was the recognition that the initial message was ambiguous.
A first sign of this recognition might be uncertainty and tux answer of
♦Wo' to the question 'Do you know which one it is?'. Such a reaction is
shorn by Clare. She recognises a dilemma but is unsure how to resolve
it.
Chu-Chus The first one I've chosen has got a big one and a wee one on it.
Clares (looks at her array - N R).
C: Do you know vshich one I've chosen?
Cls No.
1. Donaldson's description of 'arbitrary errors' seems to fit this
behaviour: " ... (the subjects) appeared to make decisions that
were unjustified both in the sense that there seemed to be no
rational basis for deciding, and that the subject offered no
supoort for his conclusion, simply making up his minds 'It is so3.:l
(Donaldson, 1971, p. 87).
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C: .Thy not?
Cls Cos I just don't know,
C: It's got a big one and a wee one on it,
CI: And some white?
C: Yes, there's white on it,
E: If you're not sure Clare, see if you can find out by asking
Chu-Chu.
C: There's a big one mid a woe one on it - and its white.
CI: Has it got blue squares?
C; Yes.
CI: Now I know which one it is.
C: Well, put it in the box then.
There is a suspicion that asking about an irrelevant feature like colour
is something of a compensatory action to offset her present inability
to discover the appropriate strategy. Having found a way to 'justify'
her choice, she uses the same tactic in the follovring trial. But being
an intelligent child the uncertainty remains with her and in the final
trial there is an indication that she has begun to recognise the nature
of the problem,
C: This one has got a big one and a wee one on it.
CI: I know which one it is.
C: Well, put it in the box then.
CI: I've got two of them (having put one in box).
C: Well, this one, the big one's below the wee one.
CI; Well, I've got it (removing original choice froia box).
Well, it'3 another -it's the other one (picking up p)
C: The big one's below the wee one.
CI: Is the big one at the bottom?
C: Yes.
CI: Well, I've got that one. t>/ ts
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She is almost on the point of completing the task when she notices there
are two cards which fit the doll's description. Verbalising this
perception is enough to earn her more feedback and 3he goe3 on to select
the correct card.
Successful strategies. The elements of a successful strategy have "been
outlined already. The key to an adequate performance lay in asking for
details about the orientation and possibly specific location of squares.
Table 6-13 provides a breakdown of how this was achieved by the capable
subjects.
The general question, which seeks information in a broad, unspecific
way, is the most economic strategy and as such may be considered the
best. It may however be so general as to be of little help to a poor
speaker. Those children who did not really grasp the role of the
listener would say something like>'Vihich one?' when told to ask the doll
if they did not know which one he meant. This would not be a helpful
rejo&mder to a peer in a communication situation like this.
We have already seen that Clare used a response of this general
form when she said)'I've got two of them'. This makes the ambiguity of
the original message quite clear and it was a standard feedback in an
earlier study when an adult acted as an ideal listener. It was found,
however, that most subjects failed to realise the implicit request behind
this statement, A more specific demand was usually required. Thus there
is reason to doubt the effectiveness of Clare's strategy in a peer group
situation.
Lee was quick to see that correct card choice was contingent on
information concerning direction. She accordingly confined her response
to 'Which way?' This approach was satisfactory for same size squares,
but was not strictly adequate where position as well as orientation was
required. In practice the doll's planned feedback was not able to take
account of this method of requesting information and Lee's
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TABLE 6-15
Strategics used by children as Listener to gain more information from
Speaker
TYPE FORM EXAMPLES SUBJECTS











A little one at the
top and a big one
at the bottom?
Next to each other?
Is the big one on
the top and the
wee one on the
bottom?
Is the wee one
at the top and on
down the bottom?
At the sides?
Is it up or down?
Point down?












(ii) DOUBLE A big one at the
top and a little
one at the bottom
or a little one at






(in) awnus-nvfc Beside one another
or one above the
other?
Beside each other





response was sufficient therefore, to secure all noCGSGary information.
What has been called the Specific question appeared in three forms
which varied in their efficiency. The Unitary Specific occurs tnrougii
the child having made a selection on the basis of the inadequate initial
message. Grogor for eaample, having been told that the card had two wee
ones, selected the card with small squares in the vertical plane tind
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said 'Point down?' In this instance his selection was confirmed and
he retained it. In the following trial his enquiry 'Up or down?' was
met by the response 'beside each other', and he had to discard his
vertical selection in favour of a horizontal cue. The limitation of
the Unitary Specific question is that because it arises out of focussing
attention on one type of card, feedback which does not confirm the
original selection may nevertheless see that selection retained. In
practice there was only one instance of this happening, but bearing in
mind previous results, this is probably not a true reflection of this
eventuality. (Cf. p.227)
Table 6-13 shows that the Unitary Specific is the most popular
method of obtaining more detail and this is in accord with earlier
findings. Typically the subject selects a card on the basis of the first
message and his question is by way of confirming his choice. As long as
he acts on the reply should it prove negative, such a procedure vd.ll be
efficient in this task where the amount of additional information
required is minimal.
A more efficient procedure i3 described as the Double Specific
question. In this the subject again makes an unwarranted assumption
about plane but realises that the squares can be in one of two orders.
Thus we get the approach shown by Scott.
C: This one Scott ...
S: Uh huh.
Cs ... has got a big one and a wee one on it.
S: Is the big one at the top and the wee one at the bottom, or is
the wee one at the top and the big one at the bottom.
C: No. The wee one and the big one are beside each other.
S: The wee one and the big one ...(looking at array) This is it
(selecting card).
C: Have you got it?
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S: iainhm.
Cs O.K* Put it in the "box. BL/B&
His long question is a considerable feat in memory and semantic
organisation, but he does not consider the other possibility that
the squares may not be in the vertical plane at all* In reality
B Ii
only two cards ^ and BL fitted the initial description since B had
been selected on an earlier trial. His question as phrased was there¬
fore redundant* His reason for posing it probably stems from the first
trial -.Then he asked a specific question - 'Is the big one on the top and
the wee one at the bottom?* The doll's reply was 'No, the wee one's at
the top and the big one's on the bottom.* When the occasion next
presents itself he is able to include these alternatives in one question.
He is demonstrating a technique acquired but he is not directly relating
it to the context at hand. The important tiling is that when the feedback
requires him to turn Ms attention to another card, BL, he is able to do 30.
The most efficient strategy used is one that exhausts all the
possibilities in an explicit way, referred to as the Specific Exhaustive.
Christine wa3 the only child to adopt it.
Chu-Chu: Two wee ones on it*
Christine: Beside each other or on top of each other?
C-C: Beside each other.
C: (Puts her choice in box),
C-C: Have you got it?
C: Mm hmm.
It was noticeable that her approach was based on a consideration of the
set as a whole and that she did not make a selection until she had
received an adequate message.
How do these observed strategies relate to those hypothesised
earlier? (p.270). Subjects generally tend to enquire about the plane of
the sauares. This varied from Lee's 'What wav?' to Christine's hiahlv
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competetent exhaustive question. Between these the other questions
correspond to those given in the hypothesised examples, e.g. 'up and
down', and called Unitary Specific in the analysis presented. Other
subjects (Scott, Clare and Paul) ask about position initially. When
position is not relevantjas it is not for five of the cards, Situation Two
is in force and a question about position serves the same purpose as a
question about plane, for example Scott's 'Is one wee one at the top
and one down the bottom?' following the initial message: 'Two woe ones',
When Situation One obtains, the initial message is 'a big one and a wee
one', A question about position can serve to short-cut the procedure,
but the example of Scott above shows that such a strategy makes an
unwarranted assumption that plane is known. Such a course does not
adversely affect performance in this task, but might well do so if the
set of alternatives were greater.
Comprehension and use of spatial terms. Table 6—14 gives the words used
to seek information about the spatial relationship of the squares. Words
relating to the vertical plane are again in a majority. It is significant
that positional terms like 'top* and 'bottom' are most in evidence when
cards with different size squares are selected. There was no appearance
of idiosyncratic terms like 'hair-spray' in this condition.
The doll confined its spatial vocabulary to words used by the
children when they acted as speakers. There was nevertheless one
notable lack of comprehension by Lee.
C; This one's got two big ones on it.
L: .'/hat way?
C: The two big ones are beside each other.
L: But what way are they going?
C: They're going across the way.
L: (Selects card and puts it in the box).
The Scottish manner of describing the lateral plane •* across the
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TABLE 6-14
Spatial terras ixsed by children as Listeners.
INITIAL MESSAGE TOTAL
Two Big Two Wee A Big &
Ones Ones Wee One
On top of 1 1 0 2
Up/Down 1 1 1 5
Top/Bottom 0 1 4 5
Beside 1 1 1 3
Sides 2 0 0 2
TABLE 6-15
Comparison of performances of children as Speakers and Listeners in
Cards Task
















* These subjects obtained one additional adequate description each, but
since these were achieved by reporting only one attribute they are not
included in this comparison data. One subject, Anna, took part in
only one condition and is therefore excluded.
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waly - was more meaningful to Lee than 'beside'. This is not to 3ay she
does not understand the word 'beside', but rather that she had what
amounted to a set or predisposition for interpreting orientation
using the word'way'.
Comparison of Performances as speaker and .Listener
Table 6-15 sho.73 that the children perform better as listeners (16)
than speakers (9)• As a percentage of the total this is a 20/. success
rate for speakers, as compared with J6/ for listeners. Thus in both
situations the level of success is small, but considerably better in the
listening condition where more than one-third of the trials are concluded
successfully.
Table 6-15 also shows that only one subject (Lee) is consistently
good at both roles, otherwise there appears to be no correlation except
possibly an inverse one. Three children who show no ability as speakers
perform very creditably as listeners, (Scott, G-ragor, Christine), One
good speaker (Linda) has no success as a listener. This suggests that
the greater success in the listener condition is not a simple practice
effect, A more plausible reason is that soxae reference to spatial
relations is sufficient to obtain an adequate description from the doll
whereas speakers, when children, had often to give plane and location
as well a3 size if the message was to be adequate. It is not easy to
explain the comparative failure of a subject who was successful in the
speaker condition, like Linda, The answer may lie in the fact that the
speaker role requires the child to be active, to talk about the chosen
card, Linda achieves success by talking about her pictures. In the
listener condition the role is perhaps seen as one of choosing pictures
and not talking about them. The passive nature of the listener's role
has been emphasised in the pent as a limiting factor in young children* 3
communication. It was hoped that the doll would compensate for this by
encouraging children to talk through helping the doll, and in terms of
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degree of interaction "between listener and doll, this aim could be said
to have succeeded. Despite this a number of the children still seemed
to have difficulty in appreciating that there was an active role to
play as listener.
Comparison of Selections
How far is inefficient performance due to a failure to perceive
the differences between cards? To throw some light upon this question
subjects were given an opportunity to judge the choices at the end of
the session. The experimenter would always ask, 'Is this one the some
as this one?', and point at the relevant cards. The results of these
comparisons, for both conditions, are summarised in Table 6-16
TAKLE 6-16
Children's ability to identify differences in chosen cards jhich do
not match: (summed data)
CARDS 3 as SPEAKER S £t3 LISTENER
MATCHING SELECTIONS 14 23
MISMATCH IDENTIFIED 22 15
with correct
jxistifieation
MISMATCH NOT 8 6
IDENTIFIED
The important figures above are those concerning mismatch situations,
since the match figures, apart from not being strictly relevant to the
question of perception of difference, are not always a function of
adequate descriptions, i.e. they may occur fortuitously following a
partially adequate description.
It can be seen that the majority of mismatches are perceived by
the children and correct justifications offered for them. The 'misses'
are confined to a few subjects (notably Clare, Nicholas and Paul) who.
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rather than failing to see the differences, fire probably operating
'I B L
on a different criterion of sane. Thus - and are the same because
Jj Ji
they both have a big and a little square.
Apart from the success rate already discussed, there are minimal
differences between the two conditions - speaker and listener - as far as
proportion of mismatches identified is concerned.
Note on research into the development of spatial terms.
Asso and dyke (1970, 1973) used a formal task situation to
investigate young children's comprehension of spatial terras. The material
consisted of line drawings such as those shown in Figure 6-8. The
standard instruction was in the form: 'Show me the card in which the







The other spatial words used were under, beside, between, loft, right,
and centre. These were chosen on the basi3 of their frequency in the
Thorndike - Lorge word count. The results of Asso and Wyke's 1973 study,
when the children were asked to descrihe the spatial relationship
portrayed in the drawings, revealed that over and under were used very
little by five year olds - in the case of over, not at all. Ton and
bottom are much more popular ways of describing the vertical orientation.
It is likely therefore that the figure of le3s than 40, correct
responses for five year olds in the comprehension task is misleading.
1. Despite the earlier research into this topic (Chapter 5? Study I)
it appears there may still he a failure to communicate a request to
compare identities. If not, then it indicates that perception of
differences is a problem for some subjects in this task.
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Misleading in the sense that it may not he an accurate reflection of
the number of children who understand in verbal terms the relationship
between the components in the line drawings illustrated. If the question
had been ' dhow me the card -where the ball is at the top and the line at
the bottom' the number of correct responses would undoubtedly have
been higher, What Asso and /yke have shown is that some spatial -words
are less well understood,by children,than others.
Another issue is the choice of material, and the particular way
in which it is described. The fact that the word 'ball' is used,
introduces a realism to the pictures which they might not otherwise have,
since they are essentially abstract pictures. The observer may, for
instance, see the line as a wall, a stick (or even stick figure), or a
line as represented in a ball game such as football. In such situations
it would not be implausible to U3e the word beside to describe the
position of the ball. If the child pointed to pictures 1 or 2 in
response to 'Show me the card in which the ball is beside the line', his
response would be judged wrong by Asso and Tyke. Part of the problem is
that the picture is treated as having two dimensions, but very often we
see a third dimension when we are looking at pictorial representations.
A diagram of a tennis court may require the illustration of a serve being
out of court. In such an instance picture 2 would be described as the
ball over the line, but in the more conventional sense we would say-
that this represented a circle under a line. Conventional, however, only
in the pictorial 3ense, since in real life these iaay not be the appropriate
spatial terms.
With children these problems are multiplied because it is not easy
to explain the assumptions being useu. Besides this,children often take
meaning from situations which an adult may not do. 'The impression
gained from Asso and Wyke's work is that they have imposed certain
categories of meaning for spatial words on their chosen situations and
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only later sought to discover the way in .vhieh the children themselves
might describe these relationships. It is of interest to know that a
child does not understand the adult meaning of a word in a particular
context, but it is fallacious to assume subsequently that this area of
linguistic expression is therefore a blank for the child. The
advantage of the coimaunication situation is that the child is free to
describe a situation in terms which are meaningful for him. In their
1973 paper, Asso and Wyke says
"... The younger children used words which were more closely
associated in meaning with the concept of direction (e.g.
straight on, at the end) position (e.g. in, out, outside) or else
described more appropriately a three dimensional spatial relation
(e.g. U£, underneath). On no occasion could any verbalisation
be categorized as being totally unrelated to the concept of space'.'
Asso and Wyke fail to bring out strongly enough that young children do
not describe spatial relationships in the same way as adults largely
because they do not interpret the contexts in the same way. Issues like
two-dimensionality, direction and so on do not concern them. What we
need to know, however, is whether the children do have verbal terms which
do make such contexts meaningful. As argued above, Asso and Wyke talk
of correct responses only in relation to their own standards of correctness.
Since we need information about as many different contexts as
possible, the Russian approach to this area is of interest. As reported
in the introduction, Zinchonko and Kontseva used naturalistic situations
in giving the children commands containing spatial words, such as 'Put
the checker-piece under the table'. Though no figures were reported, they
claimed that children of three-four years of age understood the relation
over and under, "quite well". The author has carried out a small study
looking at the effect of context on the interpretation of commands. Three
of these commands included spatial terms. They required the child to put
one object on, underneath and by_ another object, respectively. Fourteen
subjects aged between 38 and 38 months took part and only one child had
285
any difficulty with the word on. Only four subjects interpreted
underneath in a literal fashion - the instruction being to put the
box underneath the mirror. These subjects picked up the box and placed
it under the mirror; another four eliildren put the box on top of the
mirror so achieving the same end-point. The most popular response (6)
was to put the mirror on top of the box. The word by was contained in
a total instruction: 'Close the box and put it by the mirror'. The
box was an open matchbox. Leaving aside the first half of the
instruction which most of the children handled capably, five children
subsequently put the box by, that is adjacent to, the mirror. Six
children put the box on the sairror, and one put the mirror on the box.
Two subjects did not respond to the second half of the instruction.
It is not?of course,possible to make very much of this restricted
set of data,but it does not support the reported Russian finding's on
'under'. The context may be crucial, however. Putting something under
the table is a more familiar and possibly more natural action than
placing one small object beneath another. There is also the issue of
reversible sentences (Turner and Rommetveit 1967). Either rairror or box
may be the subject of the action, but it i3 hardly feasible to put a
table under a checker-piece. The significant thing that appeared to come
from these findings was that objects have certain properties which will
affect not only a child's perception but also the way ho acts towards
them. Putting a matchbox on a small hand mirror is all right, but
putting a mirror underneath the box seems to create problems. There may
be many reasons for this and Clark (1969) and Huttenlocher (1968) have
debated some aspects of the issue at length. The important point to
make is that because a child can put a matchbox on a mirror but not by
a mirror is not grounds for saying simply that he comprehends on but not
by. If, in a different context, he had been asked to put a chair on a
table and a chair by a table, the response pattern may well have been
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reversed. Some things 3eom to 'demand' that other things are placed on
them, other objects may have a beside relationship with each other.
A recent study germane to this discussion is one by E. Clark (1973).
Working with children between 18 months end five years, she has found
that what she calls non-linguistic strategies affect their understanding
of language, speciiically the locatives in, on and under. The non-
linguistic strategies amount to a sort of response bias, a preference
for behaving towards certain objects in a certain way. It may be that
putting a box on, rather than by, a mirror is an example of such a
strategy, but it is better to confine remarks to the ones that Clark
has demonstrated. Iler youngest subjects, average age 21 months, appeared
to use two non-1i^juistic rules when processing sentences like 'Put x
in/on/under • These were:
Rule 1: If x is a container, then x always goes in it.
Rule 21 If has a supporting surface, then x always goes on it.
Thus, when presented with £ a that were containers, in was handled
apparently competently, but on and under were treated as though they
meant the same as in. With ^'a that had supporting surfaces, but were
not containers, on was handled in the usual adult sense, hut under was
treated as on. Particularly fascinating wa3 the finding that in a
copying task, using no verbal instructions, where the same subjects
were required simply to do the same as the experimenter, they behaved
according to the above rules. For example when the experimenter put
a toy animal beside a glass container, the child would put it inside
the glass.
At a later stage, between two and three years, Clark found the
children in a transitional period when they would operate according to
a combination of competent linguistic knowledge and non-liguistic
strategies of the type discussed. Full semantic knowledge appeared to
be attained during the third year, at least for these task situations.
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Since a significant amount of research is starting to show that
situations can have quite specific effects on language comprehension
(e.g. Donaldson and various collaborators, 1968, 1974) a brief word
might be said in conclusion about methodology. There is undoubtedly an
advantage in a technique which seeks to gain an understanding of children's
language in natural contexts. But, since there is probably no such
thing as a 'representative' context, they should be varied as much as
possible. It is also important that opportunities are available to
study production as well as comprehension. In order to understand how rrvu.c.!<\
children know about a particular concept it is more valuable to find out
how children talk about that conceptual area, if language is of interest,
than rely on such data as word counts or even oorrect responses to
instructions interpreted only in terms of adult semantics. In this
context Clark's study is an admirable example of how to derive child-
centred strategies.
The study reported by Asso and ,/yke contained a description or
Speaker stage and a Comprehension or Listener aspect, but was limited
by these roles being very much more artificially imposed and confined
than need be the case.
The particular advantage of the communication task with the talking-
doll is that one can observe production and communication talcing place in
a controlled but relatively natural situation.
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Chapter 7. Use of the con:iunication procedure in an ordering task
(seriation).
An original aim of this series of studies was to use the communcation
situation to investigate more traditional aspects of cognitive development.
A task which seemed to lend itself to this approach was seriation -
constructing a series of objects in ascending or descending order of size,
weight, brightness or some such dimension.
Most of the -work in this field has been done, or been inspired, by
Piaget. He has been interested in seriation not only for what it reveals
about the child's understanding of number but also, and primarily, for
what it tells him about operational thinking. Seriation in its mature
form has strong affinities with logico-matheinatical structures and such
structures play a central role in Piaget's theory of intellectual
development. The seriation under investigation in these studies is a
long way removed from the ultimate operational concept, but since it is
regarded by Piaget along with classification and conservation as one of
the elementary operational groupings, it would seem to represent a good
choice for study.
The Genevan school has always taken care to observe the growth of
such behaviour from its earliest appearance and it is appropriate to
outline, very briefly, the ordering capacities of children in the
pre-operational stage. Piaget ana Inhelder (19&4) remark on the early
appearance of seriation type behaviours
"Seriation exists at the sensorimotor level even if the
relevant behaviour is unsystematic. A necessary condition appears
to be that the difference between the elements of the series must
be fairly sizeable so that the child can pick them out just by
looking at the material."
An example of this would be building up a tower of blocksfor,
nesting boxes. On the basis of evidence we need not go into here, Piaget
has determined that the perceptual configuration which aids seriation
is itself a function of the subjects previous actions. He has also
2B 9
satisfied himself that such perceptual information can give rise to
what he calls semi-anticipation of seriation around 5-6 years, "but
this must not be confused with operational seriation. The former is
usually achieved on a trial and error basis and can be upset when
the series does not make a recognised 'good* form.
Gxilia and Schircks (reported in Piaget and Inhelder, 1964)
found that in a sample of four year olds 53/» made no attempt at seriation
while the remaining 47% achieved small unco-ordinated series. This
usually involves putting 2, 3 or 4 elements into sub-series but without
being able to assemble a co-ordinated seriation. Of the five year olds
12% were successful using a trial and error method, while 9% seriated
with an operational method. In brief we can say that the child of pre¬
school age being used in this sample would not be expected to have
reached an operational level of seriation.
Apart from the main aim of observing communication behaviour in
an established firea of cognitive developmental research, the importance
of the study was seen to be methodological. An approach which requires
children to describe behaviour which is assumed to reflect underlying
cognitive processes could presumably be of value. Sinclair (see below)
has used a procedure which asked children to say what they were doing
in an ordering task, but no study appears to have employed the
communication situation as investigated in these studies, which is
essentially a verbal interaction between two people engaged on the same
enterprise.
In terms of the details of the task, it seemed sensible to have
the children work first with material which by its perceptual form
would encourage seriation behaviour, such as a tower of bricks. If
this proved successful then the more traditional items used by Piaget
and Szeminska (1952), sticks increasing uniformly in height, should be
tried.
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It was thought that a major difficulty in this task would he
that of giving names to the objects to be seriated. Obviously
without names for the various elements there could be no communication
at all. A study by Sinclair, reported in Inhelder (19^0), had asked
children to describe a seriation problem; she found that they used
words like long and short and at a later stage qualified them in the
form: tiny, very short, a bit short, middling long, long etc. It
seemed unreasonable to expect pre-school children to be able to handle
such comparative terms with any degree of competence. Accordingly in
the current experiment, pictures of well-known objects were painted on
the items to be ordered, thus giving them clear labels. The children
would then be able to describe their behaviour in terms like 'Put the
(stick which has the) cat next to the house, and the flower next to the
cat* and so on, where cat, house and flower might be sticks of varying
heights. While this would greatly reduce the difficulties of
encoding and decoding, it would not lessen the demands of the seriation
task itself.
To insure that communication to some purpose took place, one
member of each pair had a preliminary session with the materials during
which the seriation task was presented. It was intended that each child
should show a certain competence in the task before being asked to instruct
a peer. Once in the communication situation they would tell a naive
subject how to order the elements and, in turn, the naive subject would
take the role of the speaker to see how efficiently he could instruct
the experienced subject.
Communicating Seriation - Experiment One.
Method
Subjects
Ten children, 4 boys,6 girls with an age range 5 years 2 months
to 3 years 11 months. Mean age 4 years 6 months. The sample were split
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into five groups of two to provide the communication pairs.
Materials
Two identical sets of six square blocks, with a uniform thickness
of 1.8cm but increasing in length and breadth by equivalent amounts of
2cm from the smallest, 3.4cm, up to 13.4cm. Each block had a centrally
drilled hole of 1,2cm for stacking* on a peg set vertically in a wooden
base. Each block had a familiar object painted on it, each picture
taking up an equivalent proportion (about 10/j) of the block. In order
of ascendance the pictures were: ball, flower, car, telephone, key, dog.
Two small screens, 16cm high, 60cm wide.
Procedure
Before the experiment all the subjects were individually shown
the pictures to be U3ed on the blocks to ensure they could identify them.
Preliminary 3es3ion; In a preliminary session one member of each of the
five pairs was presented with the material to be used to familiarise
them with the seriation task. The blocks were presented stacked on
the stick in descending order of size with the biggest at the bottom
and the smallest at the top. The instructions were as follows:
1. 'Look what I have here, .... There are some blocks on a stick. A
big one at the bottom and a wee one on the top, and these other ones
going up (pointing finger), do you see? It makes a sort of castle,
doesn't it? Wow let's take them all off the stick. Bo you see that
they have pictures on them? Vh&t's that one? (E scrambles blocks on
table and asks child to identify the pictures on each one.) Now see if
you can make a castle just like the one I showed you, putting the
blocks on the stick*
The order of seriation was noteci. If incorrect the experimenter continued:
2. 'Is that just like the one I did? Does it start with the big
one at the bottom and go right up to the wee one? Which one
should we have at the bottom? Which i3 the bi gest one? ..hat picture
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has it got on it? Now see if you can make a castle like I did.'
If the child is still unsuccessful, E continues:
3. 'Let's start again shall we? Which block goes on first? It's the
biggest one, isn't it? And which goes on at the end? On the very
top? Yes, the wee-est one. So the rest must go in the middle, mustn't
they? Now put on the block that goes at the bottom. Now, which is the
next biggest one? Right, put that on. Now see if you can make a castle
like the one you saw.•
4. If the child is still unable to reproduce the seriated set of blocks,
an identical model is introduced.
'Look, here's the castle I made. Can you make one like that? (The
model is left until the child has achieved seriation)
The preliminary session was concluded when one errorless seriation,
large to small, had been achieved.
Communication Task: In the communication session, the member of the pair
who had already had some experience of seriation with the materials (the
experienced subject - ES) was taken into the experimental room first and
told that they were going to play the same game as before but this time
he must tell a friend of his how to do it. As a reminder the blocks
in the finished position were briefly shown to the child, and then taken
off and scrambled on the table. The naive subject (MS) was then fetched
and the following instructions were giver..
'We are going to play with these blocks and this stick today. (The
blocks are lying in random order on the table). ES has seen them before.
We had a game with them before, and ES mil tell you what to do. Can
you see the pictures on than? Tell me what they are (the experimenter
ascertains that HS knows the names. As MS identifies the blocks, E
points out the same blocks in the other child's array). Small screens
were then put in front of each child's materials so that they were not
visible to the other subject.
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(To NS) Now you've both got the same blocks, haven't you? Now
will you listen carefully to ES because he is going to tell you how to
put your blocks on the stick.
(To ES) Now will you tell NS what to do. Make the same thing
you made before for me, so that you both have the same blocks on the
stick.
At the completion of a trial, usually when all blocks were on the
peg but also if subjects indicated they had finished, the screens were
removed so that a comparison of seriations could be made. The experimenter
asked if the series were just the same and, if they were not, for the
subjects to indicate the differences. The experienced subject invariably
supplied this information.
When the experienced child had successfully transmitted instructions
about seriating in the order learned, the new subject took a turn as
speaker and instructed the experienced subject. After this the experienced
subject again assumed the role of speaker and was this time asked to
build up the blocks in the reverse order, from little to big. If this
was achieved successfully the naive subject attempted the same task. A
summary of the experimental design is given in Table 7-1 • All sessions
were videotaped.
TABLE 7-1 Experimental design of -Experiment One in Scriation.
PART ONE PART TWO
ORDER LEARNED REVERSE ORDER
(BIG - LITTLE) (LITTLE - BIG)
TRIAL 1 TRIAL 2 TRIAL 3 TRIAL 4
Speaker Listener Speaker Listener Speaker Listener Speaker Listener
ES ES NS NS ES ES NS NS ES
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Results and Discussion
The communication experiments involving seriation are preliminary
investigations with two main purposess-
1. How does the communication situation operate when a
comparatively sophisticated intellectual concept is required?
2. what does the communication procedure reveal about the nature
of this concept?
The results are affected because each condition in Table 7-1 was not
completed by all subjects. This was due to limitations of time or
subject ability. Since the sample was in any case small this necessarily
means the findings can only he presented in the form of fairly broad
inferences. These are based on an analysis of the complete behavioural
record from videotape.
The first point to note is the general competence of the subjects.
This was first apparent in the preliminary session when one member of
each pair was given the opportunity to 'practice' the seriation task.
Three out of the five carried out the operation successfully first time,
end another subject achieved this on her second trial. Only one subject
had serious difficulty, but she worked her way through by trial and
error to a correct solution on her fourth attempt.
Table 7-2 summarises performances in the communication session.
The most noticeable statistic is that 15 seriations are completed in
a total of 21 trials, that is 6 of the trials contain error. But, since
some of these mistakes tire corrected spontaneously by the speaker, a
more realistic figure is 4 incorrect trials, a failure rate of only 19h»
These figures are based only on the speakers' performances, in other
words the verbal report. But beoause both subjects play both roles,
the experienced arid naive subjects are represented. It is only
experienced subjects, in fact, who make errors, but this is partly due
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to their playing a bigger part in the process.
TABLE 7-2 Number of successful mid, unsuccessful seriationsM






Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect TOTAL
Experienced
subject
5 4 4 2 15
Naive
subject
4 0 2 0 6
TOTAL 9 4 6 2 21
So, it can be said that when they act as speakers, naive subjects
perform creditably. Their rate of success is remarkable considering it
is based on one exposure to the correct solution by way of verbal
instx*uctions from a peer. They have first created the correct assembly
in response to their partner's description, and are subsequently able to
reproduce this seriation accurately when asked to begin again with the
blocks scrambled. It seems unlikely that this is a feat of memory. Some
sort of cognitive rule must be hypothesised, though whether based on
imagery, language, or some other symbolic form is not clear.
In order to assess the strength of the ordering concept, subjects
were asked to seriate in the reverse order, that is construct the series
from little to big. This was a task for which none of the subjects had
any direct experience to call upon (at least in this experimental
situation). Therefore a correct performance could not be the result of
simple transfer or generalisation of earlier learning. It would rather
suggest a real understanding of the principle of serial order if only
in thi3 limited context.
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In the event, subjects again performed very capably, there being
no significant difference in terms of error rate. An examination of
the performances showed that there was initially some hesitation
but that once the seriation was underway it proceeded without difficulty.
The Speaker-Listener relationship in this task.
It has been pointed out that the speakers perform much better
than might be predicted from previous knowledge of seriation in four-year
olds. But do the listeners do what the speakers tell than? From the
evidence of this study it appears they do. Certainly the naive listener
usually follows the experienced speaker faithfully. There are fewer
trials of naive subject as speaker and, with very few errors being
made, the experienced listener's faith in his less experienced partner
is not put to the test. In those instances, however, where the naive
speaker is incorrect or uncertain, the experienced listener provides the
correct response.
At this point it is worth taking a closer look at the communication
set up both in terms of speaker/listener and naive/experienced subject.
Do these dichotomies conform to a leader - follower relationship? It
is obvious that in the first trial the naive subject is completely
dependent on his partner with prior knowledge. However, observers of
small children know that the four year old is no respecter of
reputations, especially if that reputation belongs to another four-year-
*
old. So it is perhaps worth noting that all the naive subjects were
content to follow the example set by their experienced partner. The
presence of the adult experimenter may have contributed to this.
Conflict may be expected to occur when the naive/experienced and
speaker/listener dimensions work against each other. The experienced
subject assumes the role of nominal leader by virtue of his superior
knowledge. This is enhanced by his position as the first speaker, since
in the communication set-up, the speaker inevitably leads the dialogue.
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When the experienced child takes the secondary role of listener there
i3 a potential conflict "between his conception of himself as the
knowledgeable subject (and therefore leader) arid that of the rather
passive listening role. This conflict does emerge quite strongly in
two of the pairs, but in different ways.
then acting as listener in a male-male group, the experienced
subject had difficulty in restraining himself and vocalises far more
than the naive subject as listener. At first he aids the speaker when
he is uncertain, but eventually assumes the role of speaker himself and
by the end of the trial the naive subject is once more an acquiescent
follower. When the same pair are seriating in the reverse order, little
to big, and the experienced subject is again listener, he is asked for
help by the naive speaker. The incident goes as followss
OBJECTS s Big < > Little
dog - key - telephone - car - flower - ball
Naive Speaker (NS): The ball first (puts it on stick)
Experienced Listener (EL): Ball first (puts it on stick)
NS: (looking round his array): Then flower I think, (picking it up)
is itt (looks across at EL).
EL: Er .... no .... er ..... you can do it the wrong way round.
The experienced subject's tone of voice and hesitation suggest that,
having beon asked for his opinion, as the 'understood' leader of the
operation he should at this point take over. His 'no' to the naive
subject is almost a reflex action. He is then thrown into 3ome difficulty
because he realises the naive subject is correct after all. He stalls
for a moment and then says, in an important-sounding voice - "you can do
it the wrong way round'. The experimenter reaffirms that they are going
from small to large and then the experienced child announces, as though
his partner has not mentioned it - "I think the flower". The way now
became open for the experienced subject to assume the speaker role again.
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and tlais he does for the remainder of the trial.
Undoubtedly personality characteristics also contribute to this
interaction process and certainly played their part in this instance.
The experienced subject in the example above was generally seen to be
a more dominating figure in the nursery than his naive colleague.
(Manning, person*.I c-orMAUAicfctio*),
In the other pair where dominance relationships emerged, the
conflict appeared as fairly marked competitive behaviour. The dyad was
made up of two girls of above average intelligence. They performed the
*
task very competently, and completed the seriation in the 'learned* order
in a matter of seconds. For the reverse order, the experimenter did not
explicitly determine the roles of speaker and listener aid it was the
naive subject who looked to the experienced player for a load. But once
the seriation was under way they both vyed with one another to be first
to announce the correct block. The trial contained some active exchange
and co-operation in a competitive way. This somewhat paradoxical
statement is explained by the fact that they both wanted to contribute
to the task, and in this way it was a co-operative venture. But the
co-operation was achieved because one wanted to have as much (if not more)
to say as the other. There was a slightly challenging note in their
messages.
This co-operation brought about by competition suggests that}in
this context, co-operation is more apparent than real. It appears to be
present because a statement from one child brings about a change in the
behaviour of the other. The competition represents a challenge for the
leadership of the dyad and, as such, control of the group. .hen two
subjects are equally proficient at the task, then the urge to outshine
one another may be strong. It could be that achievement motivation was
already present in these children owing to their circumstances and
background.
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The dynamics of the communication sittxation
The experiment provided some information about the young child's
speech and thought processes during cognitive activity. It was
noticeable that children did not usually communicate information until
they wore satisfied as to its correctness. In this task when the
speaker was uncertain about the block he had selected, he would first
assess the choice, check it against what had gone and what remained in
the pool, and if he decided to discard it, there would be no mention of
it. Only the blocks that actually went on the 3tick were spoken about.
This demonstrates a high degree of speech inhibition and, of course,
greatly increases the communication effectiveness. It may be that a
task such as this, which is stretching four-year-olds mentally, would as
a consequence tend to eliminate unecessary speech, because the 'channel'
is already fully occupied.
This speech inhibition was also seen in error correcting situations
with rather less beneficial results. \!hm a subject put a block (or
blocks) in the wrong order,end subsequent1f noticed it,he would either
decide to remedy the fault immediately, or remark on it but nevertheless
continue to the end giving an incorrect solution. It is the error
correcting behaviour which is relevant at this point. What happens is
that the speaker communicates what is a wrong block choice as it is put
on the stick, then notices the error. At this point he rill remedy the
situation, often saying 'Oh* or 'No' and effect a change - frequently a
transposition - hut will not inform the listener of the change. It is
as if the extra concentration demanded to correct a fault precludes the
ability to comment on the behaviour. Such behaviour is, of course,
detrimental to the success of the communication operation. An example
will illustrate the point.
The following extract gives the verbal record only, which largely






When this is amplified "bp the rest of the behavioural record, the
nature of the confusion becomes apparent.
Speaker Telephone (puts it on the 3tiek)
Listener Telephone (puts it on the stick)
Speaker (Picks up flower, put3 it on top of
the stick briefly, but quickly sees
it is the wrong choice) No. (Picks
up the car and puts it on) Car.
Listener Car? (Takes off telephone and picks
up car).
Here we have examples of the two type3 of speech inhibition, one
adaptive, the other mal-a&aptive. The listener not surprisingly connects
the speaker's 'No' vdth the previous instruction, 'telephone', and
accordingly makes an adjustment on his stick. Confusion would also have
arisen if the speaker had said 'flower' when he handled that block, and
the supression of verbal comment about this is a positive aid to
communication efficiency.
The picture is not quite as simple as this, however. Cutting across
this analysis are the influences of other variables particularly the
experienced/naive dichotomy and the part played by non-verbal factors.
Although it was stated that the verbal record is the main source of
information to the participants, there are important additional aids. The
speaker, for example, comes to expect the small cues which tell him that
the listener has responded to his message. This is often a repetition
of the message - a sort of acknowledgement - or merely the sound of the
block going on the stick which many speakers wait for. Although they
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cannot seo the block being put on the stick, they can tell by the
listener's actions whether or not he is putting a block on the stick,
and this is another cue they quickly come to use.
Then, also, the material itself provides clues. The experienced
participant, particularly, can utilise these to good effect on occasions,
as the following example illustrates. The speaker is the naive subject
and makes an error on the third block putting car before telephone,, The
listener does not remark on this, and puts them in the same order. Sven
while he is carrying out this action, however, the speaker seems to realise
the order is wrong. The verbal record for these fow minutes is as
follows j
Speaker: ibid or ..... the car. And er the telephone. No.
That amounts to the sum total of verbal communication between the
two, but it does not indicate the considerable amount of non-verbal
activity, which itself is reasonably effective as coramunication.
After saying 'Ho', the speaker removes the telephone and the car
frora his stick and puts them back in reverse order, thus seriating
correctly. The listener cannot see what is happening, of course, but she
hears the word 'Ho' end then perceives sounds and actions suggesting
blocks are being removed from the stick. She has the evidence of her
own materials that something might be -wrong, and being the experienced
subject might very well conclude that to be the case. In any event, she
also removes the offending blocks and correctly reverses the order.
Hence these young children are performing considerably in excess of the
level that might be predicted from the verbal behaviour record.
Listeners are not always experienced, however, and the general
pattern is that they take a passive role. This conforms to the findings
of earlier experiments with an 'ideal' speaker and with the talking doll.
The listener tends to act on the data given by the speaker as though it
were sufficient to allow him to make a decision. In the present study
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a one-word message is sufficient to allow a choice to he made. Its
efficiency is dependent on the speaker's understanding of ordering
blocks according to size.
Evidence against the egocentric hypothesis
Shis study does suggest that speakers, especially experienced ones,
do have some consideration for the listener. In this sense, awareness of
the two-way interaction of the communication situation is present.
Consider the follo'wing example
Speaker: I think the flower next (puts it on stick). This is
another castle (grins at E).
Listener: (Picks up flower but has trouble putting it on the stick).
S: The motor car.
E: Wait a minute, Alan (L) is getting behind a bit,
S: (Picks up telephone).
E: Wait a minute Scott (3), 'til Man's ready.
S: Have you got the motor car, Man?
This awareness of the other's requirements runs counter to the
notion of egocentrisa. It is true that the experimenter's assistance
as a guiding force is influencing the situation, hut this is largely
because the young listener is almost entirely passive. When the
listener's difficulties are brought to the speaker's notice he shows that
he is able to take the other's viewpoint. He knows that the car must
come before the telephone for both of them, if a correct solution is to
be obtained. For the remainder of the trial he ensures that his message
is acknowledged before proceeding to the next block*
And another example with a different group.
Speaker: And this time its with (picks up key) the key (putting
it on stick).
Listener:(No response - looks at E).
S: (realising L has made no choice). It's the key.
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L: (giggles - puts on key).
If the speaker had 'been behaving in an egocentric fashion he would not
be concerned as to whether the listener had heard and carried out his
instruction. Even less would he give an unsolicited repetition of the
message. This lack of egocentrism may have something to do with the
prior exposure to the materials for some subjects, giving them knowledge
to which their partners did not have access. This may have motivated
them in some sense to transmit this knowledge to their partner. It
will be remembered that this was partly the purpose, or a hypothesis,
behind the doll studies. Only there the superior laxowledge was an
inferred one and possibly not a real one. That is the children were
encouraged to feel superior, but in fact the circumstances in which they
were placed did not always lead to this feeling. In the present study
the experienced subjects have two concrete reasons for feeling in an
advantageous position a propos the naive children. They have played the
game before and they know how to play it. They are not only familiar
with the materials but they are aware that they have properly constructed
the 'castle'.
This real degree of confidence may be an important factor in good
communication. Equally so might be the tusk itself. There may be some¬
thing inherent in these materials which facilitated seriation and this is
what Piaget has argued. A further study with different materials would
be required to ascertain this information.
As well as the materials themselves, the act of describing the
behaviour necessary to carry out the tusk may also facilitate the process.
Certainly the speech needs to be describing an active process if it is
to be successful. This i3 demonstrated in an incident occurring in the
first trial of a female-male pair (Elisabeth/Gregor ). The speaker
not
(Elisabeth) begins to seriate but doe;/make use of the attached labels
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to transmit messages, Her first message is 'the big block* and she
adds two further blocks without communication. The listener is not
clear about his role and the experimenter suggests to the speaker that
3he tells C-regor what she has done. She finds this very difficult. The
accurate reporting of an event that has happened, even when the results
are clearly available, doos present problems for young children. Part
of the difficulty may be the need to use temporal phrases such as 'first',
'next' and 'then*. But it 3eems that the speaker needs to be describing
the action as she is carrying it out to be effective. Incidentally,
this is also an example of the problems this task presents when easily
recognised labels for the items are not present (or not U3ed).
Individual characteristics
Some subjects are particularly capable and demonstrate a level of
ability that would not have been predicted from previous studies of
seriation. I.ee, for instance, is a naive subject, hut in her first
performance as speaker achieves a rapid correct seriation. She does this
without getting all the benefits of the perceptual properties of the
assembly. That is to say, the usual method of construction is to stack




subject sees a pyramid shape being built up which gives some aid in the
selection of blocks. The best way to illustrate the difficulties that
Lee made for herself is to look at her construction in plan (Pig 7-3)
and compare it with the usual finished display in plan (Fig. 7-2)
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each block appeared to be in a slightly different orientation. This
was evidently a deliberate ploy, apparently to make things more
f
interesting for herself. Later in the session, Mien she is listener,
she seriates directly on to the table keeping the blocks flush with
each other on one side (Pig. 7-4) and says 'I've got iay thing like
stairs'.
Pig. 7-4
It seems that the stacking peg may assist the seriation task but it is
not necessary.
It was stated earlier that subjects need to describe an on-going
activity to communicate successfully, ,/hile this might be said to be
the norm, with exceptional four-year-oldB this condition need not hold.
In an till female group, the speaker, Clare, starts to tell the listener
what she 3hould do without carrying out the actions herself. Since she
has been exposed to the task and materials only once before,and then for
a very brief period, it seems that knowledge of how to perform the task
is present as a plan or scheme. Having carried out the task once
previously in a aensori-wotor fashion the. qecessery information hps
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been assimilated ;md a strategy formed. Presumably it is this on uhieh
the child draws to predict the operation verbally. She is helped by the
materials before her, but these only represent the building blocks of
the finished structure in a random order and do not, in themselves,
indicate how this structure should be created, -then it was explained
that she may carry out the task manually, her very competent performance
(including the reverse order) suggests that the cognitive operation
enabling seriation, at this level at least, is present.
CoiXaunicating ■ .-cudation - ,,.x,orinent Two.
fh© considorsiblo success that was achieved in the first seriation
experiment encouraged a further study with materials used in the
standard Fiagetian task (Piaget, 1952), i.e. graded sticks. It ,/ould
then bo possible to see whether the results obtained in the first study
were a function of the material. If it proved to be the caao that
material hiieh could be said to achieve a 'good' form led to very much
greater success in ordering objects, then it would suggest that material
properties and perceptual factors in general have an even stronger
influence at this stage of development than perhaps Piaget has
emphasised. fhe configurati .lis made by the completed series are shown
in Figure 7-5* I'he outline made by (1) seems, intuitively, to bo more
(1) (2)
Figure 7"P
*powerful*, but why this should be is open to debate. Whether it is a
matter of Gestalt laws of perception or simply a question of greater
familiarity with one form rather than another, or again a question of
experience in actively constructing such shapes will to some extent
depend on one's theoretical preferences. Further discussion of this
507
issue should perhaps await the outcome of the second experiment.
Before describing the Method, a number of differences between
this study and those reportod by Piaget should be made clear. The
intervals between sticks are the same as thoso used by Elkind (1964),
which was slightly greater than that used by Piaget and Szeminska (1952).
•j
The number of sticks is less, six as opposed to ten. The procedure of
having subjects interpolate intermediate sized stick3 in an already
constricted array was not administered. The ability to carry out this
operation is said by Piaget to be a necessary component of seriation.
A further consideration was the influence of Experiment One on
the second study. Piaget's many writings indicate that the processes
involved are nothing like as simple as to allow one fairly brief
exposure to influence a fundamental cognitive operation. In these
particular circumstances such a view may be unjustified and the effects
of practice must be watched for in the subjects* performances.
Method
Subjects. Ten children, 4 hoys, 6 girls, seven of whom had. taken part
in Experiment One (see comment below). The age range was from 5 years
10 months to 5 years 2 months, giving a mean of 4 years 5 months. The
sample was divided into five pairs for the communication sessions.
Materials. Two identical sets of six sticks, 2.4ca. square and varying
in height by equivalent amounts of 1.5cm from the smallest, 7.5cm, up to
the largest, 15cm. Each stick had a familiar object painted on it for
identification purposes. These were, in order of ascendence: chair,
cup, fish, house, train, cat. Small screens for shielding the materials
from the view of the fellow communicator.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that followed in the first
1, It was thought unwise to make two changes from Experiment One, that
is type of material end number of elements.
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seriatioa experiment with a preliminary session for half the subjects
followed by communication sessions in which both experienced and naive
subjects took the roles of speaker and listener. Oeriations were
carried out in the order learned and afterwards in the reverse order.
Instructions for preliminary session. After getting the child to
identify the pictures on the 3ticks, the experimenter said; *How watch
what I do. See, we can make these sticks into steps starting with the
big one and going down to the wee one (sticks placed upright, one by one).
Do you see what I've made?* The sticks were then mixed up and the
experimenter said. 'How see if you can make the steps just like I
showed you.* If the child was unsuccessful on this first occasion, the
procedure continued in an identical fashion to that of Experiment One
with the subject being given successively more help. For full details
see Experiment One, page 2*) I , which also gives the procedure followed
for the communication session and the overall experimental design. All
sessions were videotaped.
Results and Discussion
Before describing and discussing the performances in detail one
or two general observations will be made about the findings. Subjects
did not handle this task as capably as they had dealt with the blocks
in Experiment One. The difficulty was not solely one of communication,
The preliminary session, where one member of each pair learned the task,
presented more difficulty than it had done in the first experiment, though
only one subject failed to achieve the correct order with his first trial.
But, although in terms of trials to criterion the performances were
identical, it could be seen that the present task was more demanding.
Careful measuring behaviour v/as needed if mistakes were not to bo made.
In contrast, in the earlier study the differences were such that a
reliable estimate of the correct stick was often made without physically
putting together the relevant bricks to make the comparison beforehand.
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Yet, the dominant impression from the performances in the preliminary
session was again one of competence, borne mistakes were made in the
course of seriation, but they were noticed and rectified by the
subjects themselves.
In the communication session none of the pairs worked together
with any degree of certainty. This seemed to be due to two main factors,
the constitution of the pairs and the type of material used. Originally
it had been intended to use the same pairs of subjects as in the first
study, but owing to the absence of some children, new subjects were
introduced and some new pairs constituted. There remained seven of the
foraer subjects, including one of the original pairs, so the introduction
of new subjects was unlikely to be the whole answer.
The nature of the material has already been referred to in the
introduction, and it was suggested that the task might prove harder. An
important contributory factor was that the materials in the first study
actually appeared to lend themselves to the task in hand. They seemed
to possess intrinsic properties which gave the child a good idea of
what was wanted, communication or not. To put it another way, if a child
was left with these objects anu given the opportunity of free play, it is
very likely that he would stack the bricks one on top of the other, and
almost equally likely that he would 3tack them on the peg provided. It
is less certain, but still quite possible, that the blocks would be
stacked in ascending order.
This 'suggestive' property is not apparent in the sticks and clear
evidence of this was given in one pair when the naive listener started to
place the sticks on top of each other in response to the speaker's
instructions. The reason for this was that the speaker omitted the small
but crucial words 'next to*, and although the omission of these terms did
not seem to affect the issue in the earlier study, they were influential
on this occasion.
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Also tied in with the influence of the materials i3 the other
major fault of the listeners ~ the order of stick placing. Order has
two facets in this context, temporal and 3patial. The temporal aspect
depends on listening to the speaker and, assuming correct understanding,
complying with his request by selecting each item as it is named. As
long as the speaker's order is correct, then so should be the listeners.
But although each item night be selected in the correct temporal order
as instructed, errors could still arise owing to an incorrect placing of
the sticks - the spatial aspect. It was this aspect rather than the
temporal one which gave rise to most difficulty. Some naive subjects
never seemed to appreciate that the sticks should be placed consecutively
along the table in one direction and so subjects were often to be seen
building up in two directions at once, and sometimes from a third when
they inserted sticks within an original line. Although explicit
instructions from the speakers could have prevented such errors, equally
true is the fact that material such as that used in the first study, would
also have prevented it.
Patterns of Performance
Preliminary bossion
There was a vjider range of performance in this task than in that
with the stacking blocks. No subject required the presence of a model
to achieve seriation, thou^ii one child was taken up to step 3 in the
familarisation session (see Procedure). In marked contrast another child
correctly seriated without even needing to manipulate the material. This
somewhat striking performance was achieved as follows. The sticks were
first briefly presented in the correct order and their ascending and
orderly nature was pointed out. The material was then laid flat on the
table and mixed up. At this point the experimenter asked the child (Lee)
to identify the pictures on the sticks. Her reply was 'It's the cat,
a train, a house, a fish mid a cup and a chair.' This represented a
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verbal description of the sticks in descending order of size - a
correct serfation. It could have been that she was merely naming
the pictures and the seriation was arrived at by chance, This possibility
must be rejected however, for at least two reasonss- 1) If she had been
going through a simple naming procedure, she would have almost certainly
labelled the objects by some rule of proximity as did every other subject.
That is, she would have followed the order 'on-the-table' instead of
dodging about among the sticks, apparently at random. 2) The way in
which the description was given followed a special notation frequently
seen in the earlier seriation study. Speakers communicating the order
in which material should be assembled, often began with the phrase 'It's
the where 'it' seems to refer to the ordered complex rather than
1
the individual item. Some children were more consistent in this respect
than others, and Lee was ono of those children. Further support for the
idea that this was a genuine phenomenon was provided by her immediate
J;.
rendition of a correct seriation with the erected sticks at the
experimenter's request.
If the behaviour is accepted for what it appears to be, then it is
worth analysing for a moment the nature of this piece of cognition. It
seems to be behaviour of a fairly high order. The child has successfully
1. hat i3 being suggested here is that the children had a prior concept
of the finished array, whether this was understood as a seriated
set of blocks or sticks, or something like a castle is not known. The
latter is more likely. But that they had in their mind some formulation
of the completed task, represented linguistically by 'it' is strongly
suggested. For the purpose of the argument above,however, it is
sufficient to say that the speech form used by Lee in the preliminary
s€S$ion mirrors that used in her communicated messages about seriation.
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ordered the materials without manipulating then - an entirely mental
operation. There can thus he no doubt she has an internal
representation of the strategy required. This strategy or plan is
unfolded, independent of motor interaction with the materials, to
produce the desired result. But this strategy, assuming it is not
simply a feat of memory, involves a great deal of mental manipulation
and sorting behaviour. The evidence of other subjects has shown that
the sticks need to be measured against one another for correct seriation
to follow. It can only be inferred that Lee is carrying out this
activity as a correct cognitive operation, IIow does she know when the
task is complete? Does she mentally tick off each item as it takes
its place in the order? Or as suggested earlier in a footnote does she
visualise the completed display and 'slot* each stick into its place
until the spaces are filled? This appears to resemble what Piaget and
Inhelder (1964) call anticipation.
The possibility that the impressive ordering behaviour was dependent
on memory was mentioned in passing. In view of the claims by Soviet
psychologists (e.g. Yendovitskaya, Istomina, and Zinchenko, reported in
Zaporozhets and Elkonin, 1970) this criticism must be taken seriously.
Yendovitskaya says 'A four-five year old child is able to accept a
mnemonic goal set by an adult and is also capable of constructing such
a goal for himself, especially when conditions of activity favour it'.
The Soviet research has concentrated on memory for momentarily
presented objects and also the effects of factors favouring hierarchical
organisation of material to be recalled. Hone of it relates very closely
to the present experiment. The arguments for rejecting a simple memory
Explanation are:
(1) The limited opportunity available for scrutinizing the
individual items and committing them to memory. (The
competed seriation was presented briefly to show that sticks
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descended from large to small in fan orderly fashion).
(2) Six items is well beyond the memory span of a pre-school
child.
(3) The task required recall not only of an array of pictures,
but of an array in a particular order,
As far as the latter point goes, it is true of course, that the
task is made simpler by the objects being present, albeit in a randcan
order. To this extent is the memory involved one of recognition or
recall? In fact, a memory explanation demands that the order be
recalled, but since the objects themselves are present, one assumes
recall is facilitated.
Since the original enquiry never set out to investigate such a
question (tmd the behaviour concerned arose quite incidentally out of
a familiarising session) nothing can be said with confidence on this
matter. It is evident, however, that the hypothesis is open to test.
While the other subjects do not exhibit the startling ability of
Lee, their performances are highly competent with the one exception
noted earlier. Christine,for example,shows she has a plan in mind
when,after erecting the largest stick followed by another large one, she
picks up the smallest stick and places it at some distance from the other
as if marking the end point of the array she has in mind. The line i3
constructed by comparing sticks from the pool with those already
assembled. The subject's eye movements can be seen scanning the pool
for the item which she believes should go next in line. She is able to
carry out this operation mentally. That is she doesn't pick out a stick
at random, put it next to the last stick in the line and observe if it
is the correct mount smaller. This is the procedure adopted by a less
able child. When Christine makes a choice she already has a good idea
of the worth of her choice. When she stands the selected stick in line
it is confirmation she is seeking rather than a decision.
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In contrast to this pattern is the strategy employed, by Sally.
Her choice seems to be based on proximity rather than on any inherent
attributes possessed by the sticks. That is the sticks are put up as
they come to hand. Even when the experimenter aids her by directing
her attention to the largest and smallest sticks, and suggests she uses
these as the two pole positions, little improvement results. Success is
finally accomplished when the idea of 'next biggest* is given to her,
but there remains a strong suggestion of a trial and error solution.
The implication of this performance is that the subject will prove an
inadequate speaker in the communication situation.
CoiUiunicat ion Session
The main findings from this second study of soriation were the
adverse effects of the task on communication efficiency and the narked
independence or self-reliance of some listeners in the face of information
challenging their own viewpoint. The factors affecting and signalling
breakdown in communication efficiency will be examined in relation to
the present findings and with respect to Piaget's concept of cognitive
egocentrisra.
Two other issues arise out of the 3tudy: the extent to which a
successful child in this task can instruct and influence a peer end the
nature of seriation as revealed by this approach.
The opening dialogue of one of the communication sessions highlights
a major problem for subjects in this second study.
Alan (speaker)'. "Put them ... stand them up like ... the big one ...
then a we ... little bit right up to the big one'3 shoulder ... and I
think ... next one is it? Yes. Now measure that ... then that one, the
fish."
Faced with a number of sticks and a verbal message like that above,
anyone would be hard pressed to produce something constructive. Because
Alan's non-verbal behaviour is omitted, the record is almost bare of
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information content - and yet that is the record on which the listener
must rely, since she cannot observe the manipulation of the material.
The excerpt above takes place over a period of 30 seconds, and in that
time Alan erects four sticks. Only when he comes to the fourth, however,
does he give a meaningful message - fish - and this is said largely to
himself.
A description of Alan's motor behaviour would put 3ome flesh on
the bones of the verbal record. It would then reveal his words for
v/hat they were - an aid to himself. For Alan was just talking to
himself as he engaged in a problem which demanded a large degree of
concentration. His words are not instructions directed to an attentive
listener. This seems to be a key concept in understanding the
performances in this experiment. Although Alan was sufficiently familiar
with the communication situation to know what Ms role -was in it, it
appeared that the task was such as to cause him to forget or ignore the
duties of that role. Seriation in this form, apparently, is not the
simple exercise it was in the earlier experiment. The preview session
showed that the majority of the subjects handled the task competently.
But they needed to bring to it a measure of attention unnecessary in the
blocks on rod tank. Because of this, the additional burden of communicating
the actions to a dependent listener becomes a problem. It overtaxes
the system, and as a result is either left out or its effectiveness
seriously weakened.
It is self-evident that if a speaker does not provide the necessary
information then a naive listener is not going to be able to achieve the
desired goal. But even if the speaker does carry out his part of the
contract efficiently, success is not guar-intend. It has been pointed out
more than once in discussions of the coimaunication process that the
operation frequently breaks down because of some inadequacy on the part
of the listener. Although his role is passive - he has simply to do
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what he is told - it has "been suggested that it is this very passivity
that is his undoing. A child is most successful in a cognitive tack
•when he is actively involved. When the task appears to offer no scope
for action, the child may very well initiate some himself. For example
in a dyad where Lee is the speaker (her remarkable competence has
already been mentioned) and Paul the listener,a successful outcome would
result if Paul simply complied with the speakers instructions. But he
seems to feel a need to make a contribution. In the first trial he
says "I haven't got my fish up" just before Lee instructs him to place
the fi3h in line. Preoccupation with his own concerns causes him to
miss this message and tin incorrect solution results (see Appendix GO.
In trial two he tries to go his own way when in response to the message
"train", he says "Well I'm going to put the cup up". Both Alan, as
speaker, and Paul, as listener, illustrate how the communication set-up
can break down if the subject fails to take account of his partner.
Factors giving rise to communication failure in this task
At this point a brief diagnosis of communication breakdown can
be provided. Sufficient records are available to allow some conclusions
to be drawn as to the factors which signal breakdown (see Table 7-3)•
Causes of communication breakdown and their frequency in unsuccessful








Not attending, distrac£- 1 3
Selection errors 2 4 Inappropriate verbal 1 1
comment
1 0 Independent functioning 0 3Inadequate comm.
Total 3 6 2 7
In quaarcitive terms, of the 18 trials which fail to lead to
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soriation by loth subjects, in only five could the experienced speaker be
said to be a major cause of failure, and three of these five occasions
are perpetrated by one subjoct (Sally) oho indicated she had not
grasped the soriation conceit.
She picture euergeo that, given an accomplished listener, four of
the experienced subjects would always communicate successfully - i.e.
communication failure is seldom due to shortcomings on the part of the
experienced speaker. As a listener the experienced subject can be
helpful, but there are instances shore his superior knowledge adversely
affects the naive speaker, /'or example under the heading 'inappropriate
verbal canmt' in Sable 7-3 it is remarks by the experienced listener
such as "I've done it already", "I'm doing it right" and laughter at
the naive speaker*s errors which largely contribute to cooaunicativ©
breakdown.
But it is a fair summary to say that the naive subject is tho
prise cause of communication breakdown in whatever role he happens to
be. from this one would expect the chances of dual success when tho
naive subject is speaker to be much loss than when h© is listener. In
th© latter case tho experienced subject lias a groator measure of control
of the situation which is more likhly to lead to a favourable outcome.
fit-dig 7—4
umber of trials ending in correct solutions for both subjects (all
figures refer to subjects aa sneakers)
order learned hovers© order











It can be soon fro® fable 7-4 that the naive subject has no success
at all in the role of sr>enker. The success achieved. ..hen the naive
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subject is in the role of listener does not rise above the 50. level.
We need to examine what limiting factors subjects, especially the
inexperienced ones, imposed on the situation such that the success
rate is relatively poor.
The factors can be briefly stated and then enlarged upon.
Abstracting from Table 7-3 they fall into four main categories:
1. Task errors - i.e. mistakes in seriating.
2. Attentional factors.
3. Independent functioning, including passivity,
4. Inadequate messages (excluding Type 1.)
Task errors are those determined by the child's incapacity in the
cognitive area under investigation. In Piagetian terms the child tackles
ordering problems in a pre-operationa! manner whether at the stage 1
rv
level of global indifferentiation or the intuitive representation level
of stage 2 characterised by a trial and error approach. It is easy to
see that the naive subjects who fail to realise what is required when
operating in the role of listeners, will make task errors when taking the
speaker role, hen task errors are made by experienced subjects it is
an indication that those subjects have not attained the operational
level of seriation. Absence of errors doe3 not in itself imply that the
operation of seriation is present, of course.
The category labelled attentional factors covers a rag-bag of
behaviour which seems to have attention as the common feature. It may
represent the subject's way of compensating for the passive role he seems
to have been offered as listener, though this behaviour is not confined
to listeners. Some examples will indicate the type of behaviour under
discussion. There is the task irrelevant utterance e.g. "I can build a
castle", "You can't see where you're going with your peak (cap) down there",
"Smell my perfume", "I can do it louder than her" and task irrelevant
activity, of which knocking over the sticks was a much favoured instance.
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Such a subject showed himself to "be easily distracted and seemed to "be
constantly looking for an excuse to impose his presence on the
situation in a manner usually unproductive.
Other causes of breakdown falling within this area were what
might be called unhelpful utterances. These were not irrelevant, in
that they did concern the task, but they concerned the listener's own
idea of the task. There seemed to be a quite strong desire on the part
1
of some children to function independently of their partner. So, for
example, the verbal record would appear as follows:-
(Lee) Speaker "You put the cat up"
(Paul) Listener (Stands cat up)
Speaker "And then the train"
Listener "Well, I want to put that" (standing cat up).
"Well I'm goin' ... put the cup up".
This example was mentioned earlier * the child appears to want to
bring something of his own to the task. Whether it is helpful to
regard this as egocentric behaviour must be considered. But first another
example. At the start of this discussion, an excerpt from a verbal record
was given which contained very little positive information for the
listener (p.3H). But the listener, though making no attempt to seek
further information, nevertheless attempted to carry out the task as she
saw it. She in fact started piling sticks 011 top of one another and
1. On some occasions this independent functioning was adaptive, for
instance Mien an experienced listener refused to follow the
unreliable advice of the naive speaker, but insofar as we are at
present interested in communication breakdown,the positive side of
independent functioning will be discussed later.
320
constructed two towers. This strongly suggests that she was making
some transfer from the previous blocks-on-peg task in which she had
taken part. Prom this point of view, lacking pertinent information,
building the sticks upwards represented reasonable behaviour. To be
sure it did not indicate knowledge of ordering behaviour, but nor did
it deny this possibility.
Egocentrisin as a cause of communication failure.
The Piagetian explanation for communication failure in the
areas that have been mentioned would be egocentrism. That is a "lack
of differentiation between ego's and altar's points of view, between
subjective and objective" (Inhelder and Piaget 1958 p. 543). The fact
that the naive listener prefers to do one thing while the speaker is
trying to get him to do something else may be described as egocentric
behaviour. But having said that,what has been explained? The trouble
with a term like egocentrism is that it is used in situations where
there seems to be a lack of co-operation between two persons or where
someone's view of a situation appears idiosyncratic.
There would seem to be two points to consider. First, is
egocentrism a useful term to use? Should we not try to be more exact
in explaining behaviour that is said to fall into this category?
Secondly, however defined, is egocentrism always the explanation for
such behaviour? In the area of behaviour under consideration, is a
'failure to consider the other's point of view' a satisfactory
explanation for breakdown in communication in yo ng children? There are,
for instance, sound reasons for thinkiiig that in some cases breakdowns
are due to a lack of comprehension on the part of the participants. In
other cases, a failure to involve the hiId seems to be a contributory
factor. Both of these arguments are supported by the results in the
ideal speaker/listener experiments, where an effort was made to overcome
these limitations and subsequent improvement in performance resulted.
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The Piagetian notion of centration certainly plays a part in this
process but it is perhaps better regarded as one aspect of attention
and one of a number of attentions! factors that ought to be defined
as precisely as possible.
We need to know if the cues in a particular situation are
perceived as identical by speaker and listener, experienced and naive
subject. This is highly unlikely. To give one example, even when
speaker and listener are equally familiar with the material, the speaker
is put in a special position by being instructed to choose an object and
communicate his choice to the listener. As soon as he has selected an
item, the speaker* 3 task is facilitated by having the number of
competing cues diminished. He can then describe that object without
relating it to any other members of the array. If the description is
full enough it will be adequate. The listener, however, is subject to
all the cues, and Ms choice, though supposed to be a function of the
message he receives from the speaker, may equally be dependent 011 the
salience which the objects have for him. Even if he doe3 systematically
narrow down Ms focus using the verbal messages sent to him, Ms
interpretation of the message is liable to distortion cither because of
linguistic incompetence, that is being unable to relate word to referent,
or through the compelling influence of perceptual cue#, outweighing the
power of the speaker's communication (see Donaldson and Lloyd 1974).
'That this amounts to is that he is told to select one item but chooses
smother because Its size, colour, texture or whatever, captures his
attention.
It would seem,therefore, that the relative fMlure of the naive
subject and the subject as listener might be explained by attentional
factors, comprehension difficulties and lack of active involvement.
According to Piaget, egoceutrism is a pwevasive feature of the
behaviour of pre-operational children. "It is only when the cMld
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reaches the stage of concrete operations (7-8 years) ... he acquires
skill in inter-individual relations in a co-operative framework.
Further, the acquisition of social co-operation and the structuring of
cognitive operations can be seen as two aspects of the same developmental
process." (Piaget, 1963).
ihen the performance of the children in the communication task is
examined in the light of this statement, many counter examples to
Piaget's hypothesis appear. Perhaps the most overwhelming evidence is
that four of the five experienced children in this study successfully
communicated the method of completing the seriation task such that the
outcome was a mutually correct solution. Additional evidence from the
whole series of studies makes this claim an even more substantial one.
So, it is maintained that the degree of co-operation required and
achieved for success,in ?iiat must be considered a fairly complex task,
does much to weaken the Piagetion argument concerning egocentrism.
Let us consider some more specific instances. Linda is the naive
listener, Alan the speaker familiarised with the task. They are
seriating in the reverse order (chair,cup, fish, house, train, cat).
Alan: The chair (stands it up)
Linda: The chair (bangs it down on table) The cat (looks up at Alan)
A: Ho
L: The hou3e?
A: Cup! (sttinds it in line)
Cup (puts it next to chair) The house
A: (puts house against cup and discards it - probably not
in response to L*s suggestion. Picks up fish and checks
it against cup)
L: (repeats) The house? (half question, half assertion)
A: No, the fish (putting it in line)
L: Fish (putting down house and standing fish next to cap)
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The house?
A: Yes, house (having first checked train against fish)
L; (adas house to line) Now the cut? (going to pick it up)
A: No, the train (both put it in line)
L; Cat now (picking it up)
it: Yes (both finish seriating)
Note that Linda makes a series of challenging assertions in this
trial, most of them incorrect suggestions, but Alan manages to resist
them and to communicate the correct choice. It might be argued that
this is an example of egocentric behaviour. But the record shows that
he is fully aware of his partner and considers her suggestions, so we
get an exchange like 'Hie cat' - *No * - ' Yhe house?' - * Cup I' and. again
♦The house-' - 'No, the fish' and later 'The house?' - 'Yes, house' -
'Now the cat?' -'No, the train' and so on. And just as Man is taking
account of his partner's point of view, so also is Xinda. Indeed 3he
is having to do so in a much more wholesale fashion, since she is having
to reject or inhibit her own point of view and adopt that of her colleague.
Another example is provided by a different pair, Lee and Paul. Leo
is the speaker and is describing seriation in the reverse order (chair,
cup, fish, house, train, cat) after a number of trials in the other
direction big - little. Paul is rather slow at assembling the sticks
and after announcing the third stick and observing- a fair amount of
activity on Paul's part, Lee saps "lie's getting mixed up 'cos I put the
cat first before, eh?" This seems to show not only a remarkably mature
assessment of the seriation problem, but also behaviour far from
egocentric, Lee has recognised that the change in order could lead to
difficulties for the other child and as such has demonstrated a degree of
perception much more sophisticated than the theory of egocentrism would
predict. Later in the trial the dialogue is as follows;-
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Lee: How the train (stands it in line)
Paul: (Puts the train in line)
Lee: Have you got the train up?
Paul: I've put it up.
Once again Lee i3 showing a concern for the other child, a degree
of co-operation not generally thought to he within the compass of
egocentric children. The issue of egocentrism will he taken up again
in a general discussion of the findings.
The Experienced Listener Independence Hypothesis
There is a factor which signals a breakdown in communication which
has not been discussed up to now. This is independent functioning of a
positive sort. It is positive because it is instrumental in the subject
aciiieving a correct solution in the face of unhelpful or inadequate
information. At the same time it signals breakdown by indicating that
the listener has lost faith in his partner's communications and vd.ll
continue to function independently. In practice the behaviour shows
itself by a reduction of exchanges, and by the listener continuing to
build up the correct solution without any instruction or in disregard
of any instruction. In some cases the experienced listener seeks to
change the message or selection of his partner, and in this way correct
descriptions are achieved which would otherwise have failed. In Table 7-5




Number of correct and incorrect descriptions or solutions in the
serlation tusk.
Descriptions/Solutions
Order Learned Reverse Order













* One short since N.8. not able to complete descriptions and so
E.L. does not complete trial.
'i'he table shows that although only one correct series of descriptions
is provided by a naive speaker, five correct solutions are achieved by
the experienced subjects. This behaviour might almost be expressed in
the form of a hypothesis: the experienced listener independence (KLI)
hypothesis. This states that: the listener rail always rely on his own
judgement rather than that of the speaker when he knows that the speaker
is wrong. Ironically enough, on the one occasion when a naive speaker
achieved a correct solution, the experienced listener arrives at an
incorrect solution. This seems to suggest that the hypothesis might be
more strongly worded by leaving out the rider 'when ho knows that the
speaker is wrong*, One should he cautious about this, however, since this
particular experienced listener was the least accomplished and confident
of the subjects familiarised with the material. Furthermore she did in
fact ignore the ELI hypothesis and attempt to follow the speakers
communications. However, since the naive subject was solving the task
in a trial and error fashion, and was not always roxx>rting the changes
he made ,a correct solution was never possible purely on the basis of
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his verbal messages. Strictly speaking therefore, no correct descriptions
were provided by naive speakers as pointed out earlier in the discussion
on causes of breakdown.
The table also shows how consistently correct the experienced
subjects were when carrying out seriation in the reverse order. One
further point to note from this table is the sparcity of data in the
bottom right quadrant. This is because the experiment was carried out
in one session and most of the subjects were thought to he either too
tired or too disinclined to complete a trial as naive speaker. It must
be remembered that these are the subjects who are likely to find the
task most frustrating as they are relying on their peers for
information about it. This degree of sacrifice in data was thought to
be preferable to bringing the subjects back on another occasion when
other variables might affect the issue. In any event, there is no reason
to believe that the trend would have been significantly different from
that shown under 'Order Learned'.
The Placing Problem
A feature of some performances, which was mentioned in the introduction
to the results, was the problem presented by the spatial ordering of the
sticks. It was pointed out that even if the listener correctly followed
the spoken or temporal order given to him by the speaker, he could still
fail to arrive at a correct solution by placing the sticks in the wrong
order. The experiment could have been designed to eliminate this
possibility, that is, a piece of apparatus (a holder or slot of some sort)
could have been provided, obliging the listener to place the sticks in
the serial order in which he selected them. This would have made the
task very similar to the first oeriation experiment, where spatial order
was dictated by the material used. But since the point of the second
experiment was to remove tliis constraint and make the task similar to
the standard Piagetian problem, it was thought desirable to discover
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how the children would handle this extra dimension.
An examination of this "behaviour needs to be divided into the
familiar categories of speaker and listener and experienced and naive
subject. The onus is on the speaker to rake it clear how he wants the
sticks placed, as well as the order in which they should be erected.
Hone of the speakers appears to have fulfilled thi3 function. This is
not surprising considering the kind of abstract terms that would be
required to describe verbally such a procedure. To some extent it means
putting into words the essence of the operation itself. Seriation is
more than just standing up sticks vhen told to do so, it also requires
that the sticks are assembled within a particular spatial configuration
governed by size and order such that there is a unidirectional uniform
progression. Success occurs where the listener happens to adopt the
■uniform approach shown in 'A* of Figure 7-6, since, as has been pointed
out, no cues are provided by the speaker. *B* and *C* represent
examples of the non linear approach which was produced by one subject




After the listener (Linda) had produced an incorrect order for the
second time (C), the experimenter asked the speaker (Alan) if he could
tell Linda why she was doing it wrong. Fe replied 'dell, it's supposed
to go like this', running his hand along the top of his line of sticks (A),
(This was at the comparison stage at the end of & trial, when each could
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see the other's set of sticks).
Other naive subjects also placed the sticks in on idiosyncratic
manner and some combined this with mistakes of a selection nature
e.g. selecting fish when Speaker said house. .hether this was done on
the basis of personal preference, misunderstanding of the speaker or
some other reason was not always clear. What was sometimes evident was
choice based on proximity - that is to say the child would seloct and
stand up a stick as it came to hand. This was a particularly noticeable
strategy by naive speakers who had obviously not grasped the nature of
the task.
By examining these errors in terms of selection and placing,one
begins to acquire on understanding of the various strategies adopted by
naive subjects. At one level there were those children who appeared to
have no grasp of the problem. The task as they understood it was to
stand up sticks. At a slightly higher level there was an attempt to
stand up sticks in some sort of line but the order in which the sticks
came to hand, i.e. proximity* tended to govern choice. It would be these
subjects, levels 1 and 2, who would be operating in an independent manner
as listeners and in a completely non-constructive fashion as speakers.
Level 3 is represented by an awareness of the requirements of the
task in as much as there is a serious attempt to follow the order given
by the speaker. The fact that success is still not assured may be due,
after ]>onaldson (1963)» "t° executive errors - the subject picking up the
v?rong stick 'by mistake'. Observation alone is not enough to determine
whether in fact these are executive errors. .All one can say is that some
subjects appear to be monitoring the speakers' messages and responding to
them proiuj)tly, but that they occasionally pick up the wrong stick. Such
errors are not wildly wrong, being usually removed from the correct choice
by one. If it could be established that such errors were merely slipups,
there would arise the interesting question of whether such a subject was
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operating at a higher level than the child, who erects sticks in the
/
transmitted (and correct) temporal order but places them idiosyncratically.
In this context it is necessary to distinguish between trial 1 and the
later trials, since after trial 1 the listener sees the finished product
and has the opportunity of a 'model' from which to work.
Caution should be exercised here, however. The sort of evidence
that would be needed to attempt an objective assessment of these
children's seriation ability is a post test of serration following the
instruction by the experienced subject, This would show how effective
this instruction had been, A post test has been built into the experimental
design, since the naive subjects are asked to perform as instructors after
a spell as listeners. It has already been shown that in terms of successful
seriation the results were negative. However^ performances varied and
it is of interest to know if the performances as speaker in any way
corresponded to those as listeners.
In a communication task such an assessment is complicated by the
influence of an extra variable in the situation - the other child. In
this case the other child was the experienced subject, who might be
expected to make a contribution. This, in fact, he very often did, and
mistakes or hesitations on the part of the naive speaker were frequently
rectified by the more knowledgeable child. The result was that only one
naive speaker achieved a correct soriation maided and he failed to
communicate this solution adequately. The reason for this child's success
is not hard to find. He was paired with the least able experienced
subject, and the attainment of the goal unaided was a function of the
listener's inability to aid him. It is nevertheless noticeable that none
of the experienced subjects contributed to or contradicted the naive
speaker until errors were made. It was very much a case of the experienced
listener monitoring the speakers instructions and only passing comment
when they failed to match his own conception of the task. To this
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extent the communication procedure conlcl be counted a success because
it greatly ninimised the number of errors. At the same time the
presence of the second child reduced the opportunity for the naive
subject to work out a solution by trial and error in his own time.
When such an opportunity was available, one subject was able to grasp
it as we have seen above.
The correspondence, then, between performance as listener and
speaker,by the naive subject,is difficult to assess. An ex;mination
of the records 3hows that those subjects who, as listeners, make
primarily errors of placement (Linda and Paul) continue to do so as
speakers, but as speakers they also tend to make errors in the order of
selection. This indicates that their understanding of the task was
not only being limited by a failure to appreciate the direction of
placement. The misapprehension seems to go deeper than this. Of the
other two subjects, two of them (Anna and Elizabeth) receive a degree
of assistance that prohibits a comparison. Comparison of the performances
of the child who eventually seriated correctly is also hindered. As
listener he received inadequate guidance and therefore it is difficult
to differentiate his own predispositions from those directly acquired
from the speaker. Of all the children his performance is in some ways
the most remarkable for he successfully completed the task without ever
having witnessed (verbally or visually) a correct solution. His hold
on the problem, however, is shown to be tenuous when he fails to seriate
in the reverse order.
Communication Development in . iniature - a case-study approach
.An opportunity provided by the present study is that of observing
the course of a communication pattern as it evolves in the brief duration
of an experimental situation. .That we have is a sample of behaviour
involving two children who, in theory at least, are combining to solve
a problem. The relative spheres of influence or degrees of participation
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very as a function of role (speaker or listener) rnd frailicxity
with the problem (experienced or naive), A longitudinal analysis of
the record of each pairing might provi.de an answer to a number of
questions. Does the operation of roles vary in the eovirse of the
communication session or are they constant? Does the naive subject
remain uniformly passive or does his performance fluctuate, and if so,
why? How does the actual interpersonal relationship between the children
develop? Do the constraints of the situation effect the task positively
or otherwise?
In order totry end answer these questions, the record of one pair
villi be described in some detail and then some more general conclusions
based on all the sessions will be offered. In the pair under scrutiny,
Lee is the experienced subject, female (age 5y. 1m.) and Paul the naive
subject (age 3y. 11u,) Lee demonstrates a high level of ability in the
preliminary familiarisation with the problem and therefore Paul had a
potentially good chance of acquiring the necessary information to carry
out the task,
The data required for this analysis is all taken from the videotape
of the session, This has been abstracted in various ways in written fori
and can be found in Appendices P and G,
The early exchanges are controlled by Lee as speaker and she
functions efficiently as expected, e.g. her first message is rYou put
the cat up*. *Up* is a crucial word at the start of the session viian
the naive subject is completely unaware of the nature of the task. Not
only does he need to know which stick to select but also what he should
do with it. There is a breakdown at the very beginning, however, whoa it
is clear that Paul is unsure of his role in the game. He does not remark
on his own ignorance and as a result does not act on the message given to
him. After a suggestion from the experimenter, the session gets under
way. Paul fails to seriate although all the necessary information is
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provided. His failure is of two types - firstly, attentional deficiencies
causing him to miss a message and, secondly, idiosyncratic placing of
the sticks. The attention factor is not due to distraction caused by
boredom or lack of interest - it is rather too much interest in his own
array. He has not yet fully realised the Implications of doing two
things at once - building up a line of sticks, and listening to and
acting upon a series of messages. The two activities are of course
interdependent, particularly the first (build-up) on the second (monitoring
messages). If anything Paul proceeds in the opposite order and if he
is absorbed in building, messages are liable to be missed. As a check of
trial 1 shows, fish is the critical message that fails to penetrate
Paul's 'filter', to borrow a metaphor from the information theory approach
to selective attention. The difficulty of achieving the correct spatial
order has been discussed earlier and typically the listener receives no
information from the speaker about spatial distribution. Apart from his
one lapse, however, Paul does erect the sticks in the transmitted temporal
order.
There are signs in Trial 1 that Paul is resenting his passive
role and in Trial 2 he tries to assert his inde endence by suggesting
alternatives to the orders coming from the speaker. His suggestions are
inappropriate and the trial is abandoned. The behaviour of Lee in Trial 3
is noticeable for its consideration towards the listener. In the first
two trials Lee went through the motions as speaker, always giving adequate
information, but not otherwise taking much account of the listener. The
change of approach may be due to the experimenter who suggested she went
a bit slower for Paul. This she does, making sure he has received and
acted upon the message before giving a new instruction. A correct trial
results. This is not to say Paul's lack of success in the earlier trials
was due to an insensitive speaker. The fact that he is becoming familiar
with the demands of the task, not least the sort of motor manipulation
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required, will also affect bis performance. Probably most important is
the fact that he manages to restrain his own impulses to function
independently.
The first trial (4) where Paul acts as speaker exposes his
limitations, The first point of note is that he starts communicating
adequately but makes no attempt to construct a line himself. Is this
another example of not being able to carry out two functions simultaneously?
'The demands of one excluding the other. Or, is it that Paul does not
fully appreciate the role of the speaker - that he must construct a line
and tell his partner what he does? Hince he has already taken part in
a number of trials as listener and seen the speaker* s completed array
at the end of each trial, this explanation does not seem likely. After
Paul has been reminded of his duties as speaker, he proceeds to provide
adequate information about the first four sticks he puts up. His
strategy appears to be based on proximity rather than seriation, however,
and Lee erects sticks according to her own criterion when Paul starts to
make errors. Her reaction when Paul makes his first error, on the third
stick, is of interest. She ignores the instruction *Put the chair up'
and picks up the correct stick, house. Before putting this in line she
hesitates, apparently to see if Paul changes his mind. It is only when
Paul's next message fails to amend the situation, that she decides to
continue under her own direction. To some extent this has been the case
from the beginning of the trial, since Lee had chosen the correct stick
before Paul's message was received. But she nevertheless waited for his
message before standing u the stick. It was not that she wanted
confirmation of her choice, but rather that she wanted to be able to
confirm hi® choice » to be certain that the two arrays were proceeding in
a like fashion simultaneously. In this sense the communication situation
seems to be tin endeavour involving two people in some sort of partnership,
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for some children at leo.st.
As has been said, Paul was proceeding confidently when he noticed
a discrepancy. Prom then on his behaviour is far from confident. He
is aware that mistakes have been made (the chuckles coming from the other
side of the table may have contributed to this awareness), but is not
clear how to remedy them. He attempts to put things right but in his
words is 'getting mixed up'. He removes a stick, inserts another,
switches another one and ends up looking confused with a stick in each
hand, Most noticeably, his verbal communication ceases altogether. Once
again, when things become difficult, when extra concentration is required,
the verbal flow dries up.
In the following trial (5) Paul begins as before and makes the
same error as before. Lee seems amused by his mistakes and her somewhat
derisory remarks (see Appendix 5) probably serve to confuse Paul even
further. She consideration she displayed as a speaker, earlier, is not
apparent as a listener. This is possibly due, in part, to the sense of
impotence the listener has in the face of an inadequate speaker. It is
possible to keep one's o® house in order, but it is not so obvious how
the speaker might be helped. One method is to point out mistakes as they
occur e.g. 'No, not chair, house'. We've already seen that some
listeners adopt this tactic. For some reason Lee is disinclined to play
this i'ole. Later she does so at the instigation of the experimenter.
On this occasion when Paul seeks to recover the situation, his role
as speaker does not break down to the extent it did in Trial 4. On two
occasions he tells the listener to 'wait* while he tries different
manoeuvres. Whether this is Paul indicating awareness of his responsibilities
as speaker, or a more basic desire to re-establish his authority, must
remain a matter for conjecture. Lee has by this time completed her line
and the experimenter suggests that she helps Paul 'You tell him if ho's
got them right'. With undeniable logic Lee replies. 'How can I see with
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the screen up?' as if to emphasise egocentricity on the part of the
experimenter! The trial ends with Paul in a state of perplexity and
no nearer a solution.
The following tidal (6) represents something of a compromise. The
material situation is left as it is hut Lee becomes speaker and is asked
to tell Paul how she has assembled her sticks so that he can arrange his
in the same way. ho instead of dismantling the structure altogether Paul
is asked to build on what foundations he already has. The operation is
not a success. It seems that the configuration of his partially erected
series serves to confuse rather than assist the listener. Instead of
being able to concentrate on the speaker's message and base his selection
on that message, he is distracted by the properties of the series. It
has been pointed out earlier that the various dimensions existing in any
set of material tire all potential influences on performance. Proa this
trial we can see that those influences are accentuated when a particular
sort of configuration is present. In the standard situation, the sticks
are lying in a random manner and the listener selects according to the
message received and any other factors, properties etc,, which might
affect his choice. In the situation obtaining in thi3 trial some of the
sticks are standing in a line and are thus part of the goal or solution
that the subject is seeking. Therefore it would be reasonable to assume
that these sticks carry more 'cue weight' than the sticks left in the
pool. Paul is able to follow Lee's instructions as long as she is
describing what he has in his series, but as soon as her word and his
referent no longer correspond, a conflict develops. The force of what
he is told, the word, is in dispute with the solid object he has in front
of him. So, when Lee says 'cat', then 'train'. Paul is able to point to
these in his series. But when she says 'house', he at first says 'Yeah'
and points to the cup, which is next in his line. Then he recognises
the mismatch and searches for the house in the pool. He finds this but
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doesn't know how to go about putting it in position. The cup has first
to be removed, and he hasn't received any instruction about that. In
other words Loe's description is not appropriate to his situation. In
a more profound sense we can say that this is a basic problem in so much
of the field of study in cognitive development. One person's description
(usually the adult experimenter's) is not appropriate to another person's
situation (usually that of the young child.)
Paul i3 not able to overcome this problem and he spends some time
trying to impose some order on his sticks, but only succeeds in
discarding them all, except the cat, eventually. This helps him in the
next trial (7) because he is virtually back in the conventional conmunication
situation. He achieves a correct seriation with the help of a patient
speaker. It may be that Paul's confusion and dismay in the previous
trial - 'I'm getting them wrong', he says at one point - has an effect on
Lee. Certainly for the rest of the session she is patient end solicitous
towards her partner. This and the final trial show increasing competence
on the part of Paul, As before there is a critical moment when the
message does not match his array. He has the cat standing, but when
train is transmitted he has trouble locating the relevant 3tick. It is
not standing and it is upside down (i.e. picture not showing) in the pool.
The experimenter is obliged to turn it over for him. After this he succeeds
in following Lee's instructions, but would very probably have been in
difficulty with a loss helpful speaker.
The final trial (8) has Lee instructing Paul in seriating in the
reverse order. Thoy both take it gently, with Paul having to concentrate
for this unfamiliar order. The degree of application of both children





It was never a serious aim of this 3tudy to add anything to our
knowledge of the seriation process; the sample size is too small and
the differences between this and other studies are too great. Nevertheless
the temptation to try and place these findings in the context of mainstream
theory cannot he resisted.
The most notable feature of the present findings was the success
achieved by this sample of four year olds. It certainly seems to be
greater than a direct prediction from Piagetian theory would suggest.
Accepting that the test has not been rigorous enough to satisfy an
unequivocal claim for seriation, the fact remains that these children
demonstrated accomplished ordering behaviour. Piaget would want to argue
that the 3ize of the interval between elements and the perceptual
configuration made by the finished array accounted for this result. It
must be admitted that the configuration and the intrinsic properties of
the material used in Experiment One probably affected performance. But
seriation was carried out in the reverse order just as capably and the
inverted triangle configuration would not seem to be such a compelling
form.
In Experiment Two the configuration argument does not apply. At
least it has not been used by Piaget in his interpretation of results
in what for him is a standard situation, i.e. ascending sticks. The
reduced number of elements and the slightly larger perceptual differences
may account for the success, though it is unlikely that the degree of
confidence shown by some subjects was due to this alone, A possible
influence is the picture on each stick for naming purposes. Although
these pictures are not correlated with size, it may he that they facilitate
the task in some way, perhaps by assisting a mediating process. Piaget,
however, has frequently used different coloured sticks in the seriation
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task ana has not commented on such an influence. Piuget and Inhelder (1964)
did in fact find that anticipation of serial order by drawing was achieved,
in one colour only,before the correct correspondence between colours and
size was made.
In their discussion of seriation, Piaget and Inhelder remark:
"... we might have found a marked improvement in the seriation ...
had we used fewer elements, or if there had been greater differences
between the elements. But either of these variations would mean that
we were measuring a perceptual adjustment to an intuitive whole instead
of operational reasoning." (Piaget and Inhelder, 1964 p. 251).
There is a suspicion that the notion of intuitive wholes is a somewhat
speculative inference to account for certain behaviour which cannot be
contained within the operational framework. If they are the explanation,
then they deserve further study, for on the evidence of this performance
they are powerful forces which give rise to quick, accurate, two-way
seriation.
Another factor not considered up to now is the possible role of
language. In an intriguing 'aside1 Piaget and Inhelder say:
"Seriation ... is somewhat improved by verbal training, because then
the linguistic process also relates to the act of comparison and
therefore to the concept itself." (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, P« 90)
They do not really enlarge on this statement, but there was certainly
some short but intense 1language experience', if not verbal training, in
the communication task. Again there is a suspicion that Piaget is trying
to cover all possible eventualities, in assigning an unexplained role
for language. If such conceptual understanding can be improved by talking
about it, at an age when, for Piaget, the role of language i3 inconsiderable,
this provides support for theorists such as Bruner and Vygotsky. For
them language is a prime factor in the acceleration of cognitive growth
from about four or five years.
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The significance of the present findings would seem to be the
demonstration that young children are able to use efficient strategies
to solve relatively complex cognitive problems. Having done this they
are also able to instruct other young children so that they,too, master
the task. If Piaget is right,and this behaviour is a function of
intuitive and perceptual factors, can we be sure that they are only a
primitive form of reasoning and do not continue to play a significant
role in cognitive development. Eleanor Gibson (1969) is sceptical of
the view that perception simply gives way to inference, and prefers to
say that our efficiency at extracting invariants from the stimulus flux
increases with experience. This is dependent on such things as
improved attentional strategies and perception of distinctive features*
If we also accept that different stimulus situations possess intrinsic
properties .Thich cause them to be interpreted differently, even if there
is an underlying common relationship or concept, it may help to explain
some of the performances we have seen in a number of these studies.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions.
This work had six main aims which were stated in the Introduction.
It is time to see to what extent thej have "been achieved. Before
drawing conclusions it is necessary to point out once more that, because
of the special conditions obtaining, many of the points that will be made
are in the nature of hypotheses which 3hould be tested with a larger
population.
1. Communication abilities of pre-school children in discrimination task3.
This aim refers to the quantitative findings on communication and
is dependent on the measure of communication ability used. G-lucksberg
et al. (1966) used the number of trials it took speaker und listener to
achieve a matching set of objects as their criterion of communication
ability. This seems a 3omewhat gross measure and may not represent the
real level of ability, that is it does not differentiate between speaker
and listener. The preferred measure in the present studies has been
message adequacy - the extent to which a message is able to specify the
intended referent. A listener's ability is measured by the extent to
which he is able to act on adequate messages. There are also qualitative
indices of communicative success ana these will be discussed in the next
section.
It will be remembered that the conclusion reached, based on a review
of previous research in the area, was that pre-school children possessed
little or no communication ability. The results of the present research
do not support this conclusion. It is impossible to be categorical,
however, since communication ability has been shown to be sensitive to
the situation in which it occurs. The task, including the type of
material, and the nature of the communicating partner have been shown
to be particularly influential. Equally important is the manner of
the
presentation and/instructions used.
In terms of message adequacy three experiments (Houses, Chapter 4,
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Study III, Chapter 5, Talking Doll - 1, Chapter 6) showed a success rate
between 57.5, and 46, . This compares to Glucksberg et al's figures of
of no errorless trials by pre-school children. (It is not suggested
that these results can be seriously compared to those of Glucksberg et al.
because of both task differences and types of measurement used. They are
being
included, however, as/the only communication study with a similar age
group). The level of message adequacy is remarkably consistent,
considering the differences in materials used and the type of partner
(peer, adult raid doll), and suggests that it is a fair reflection of
communication ability by speakers in this sample. The individual data
indicated a wide range of achievement with approximately equal proportions
of high, low and average ability children. In the study which investigated
more abstract verbal ability (Talking Doll - 2, Chapter 6) the level of
success dropped to 26'/ indicating that it was the most damanuing of the
tasks.
Listeners* abilities were assessed according to the extent to
which they could respond to adequate messages. Another index of listener
competence was the degree to which they could recognise, and make good,
inadequate messages. They had to he information seekers as well as
processors. hen paired with peers, children managed to identify two-thirds
of adequate messages but made little or no effort to obtain further
information on inadequate messages. When paired with an adult speaker who
provided just enough information to enable discrimination, three- uarters
of the children achieved at least one errorless series out of two, the
overall error rate being only 17f Glucksberg et al. found that two-thirds
of their sample identified blocks described by adults, and Grusbhow and
Gauthier (1971) report a similar figure, although in their case the messages
contained a considerable amount of redundancy.
The talking doll studies measured the information seeking capacities of
the children. As listeners they were required to obtain two missing
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attributes to discriminate chosen blocks. A success rate of 35- in both
studies was therefore impressive.
Mother aspect of communication is the speaker's ability to profit
from feedback, i.e. to modify Ms description when the listener indicates,
it is inadequate, This implies that the listener is able to signal the
inadequacy of a description, something the child was not able to do
in the peer situation, when partnered with an ideal listener, nearly
three-quarters of those messages which were not initially adequate were
modified by child speakers. These figures represent an improvement on
the findings of Glucksberg and Krauso (1967) as far as it is possible to
compare them. It was not possible to monitor modification of messages in
the talking doll studies, but inspection of the data indicated that only
a small proportion of the children failed to introduce any modification
of inadequate messages. The degree to which this modification was
successful corresponds to the number of descriptions Mich subsequently
became adequate. In the blocks task (Chapter 6, Experiment 1.) 90,5 of
inadequate messages were modified but of these 60k provided only One,
instead of two, additional attributes. It should be pointed out that the
number of items in the array was greater in this task, thereby increasing
difficulty, and the talking doll was a less able partner than the ideal
listener.
How then can we summarise communication ability as measured by the three
criteria of message adequacy, discrimination based on sufficient information,
and degree to which information can be sought Men messages are inadequate?
The conclusions must be that over this range of tasks:
1. Between one-third and one-half of messages sent allow a listener to
know Mich, of a number of objects, is being specified.
2. As long as messages are adequate listening cMldren perform well, but
not perfectly. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of such items are
correctly identified.
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3. Although poor at signalling the inadequacy of a message spontaneously,
listening children .all work hard at deriving more details in an
appropriate situation, i.e. with a talking doll.
4. When they are told that their messages are inadequate, nearly all
speakers provide additional helpful information.
As communicators -re-school children may he some way short of
competence, hut they are considerably more accomplished than previous
theory and findings predicted. Many children in this sample have shown
that far from being unable to converse and co-operate productively, they
can understand and talk to one another, to adults and to a talking doll.
Hot unnaturally the degree of effectiveness varies according to the topic
of conversation. The more complex the message, the larger the number of
alternatives present against which to relate the message,and the more
abstract the referent, the greater the likelihood of ineffective speech.
It is argued, however, that both Piaget and Krauss and Glucksberg seem to
have underestimated the level of communication skill in children between
three and five years. In the case of Krauss and Glucksberg it has been
suggested that this may partly be due to using a task unsuitable for the
purpose and a measure not sensitive enough to give an accurate picture of
the behaviour.
2 • 'Qualitative analysis of communication abilities » strategies of
speaker and listener.
Qualitative analysis is a sophisticated expression referring to
discovering the way someone goes about doing something, for example,
solving a problem. In this case the problem is taking the role of speaker
and listener in a communication task so as to achieve the perceived goal.
Because the behaviour in question cannot be reduced to a statistic, or
possibly because it is not considered informative to do so, it becomes
1
necessary to present the data in a different form. Perhaps the
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1. This does not, of course, mean to imply that figures are never used
m cjculitaJ'ive q.Y\w_lijS£S ■
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best examples of subjecting behaviour to qualitative analysis are certain
computer programmes. Here the idea is to specify, as precisely and
exhaustively a3 possible, the procedures followed to achieve a certain
end, as for example the analyses carried out by Klahr and Wallace (1972)
of the perforiaan.ce of children in some Piagetian tasks.
The analyses that have been presented here, in no way approached
the sophistication of Klahr and Wallace's programme, but they have been
attempts to represent the strategies followed by children as they played
or wrestled with the games they were given. They have been based on
inferences made from videotape records of the behaviour concerned. Although
every attempt has been made to remain f it'nful to the records, it scarcely
needs to be said that the opportunities for fallacious inference, or
perception even, do exist. For this reason, wherever possible, extracts
from the protocols have been providec for the reader to see on what the
inferences have been based. To repeat a point made in Chapter 2, it can
only be said that, for this author, they represent the best means available
for saying something about the way young children behave in the comsuniaation
situation, without doing a total injustice to the complexity of that
behaviour.
It would be unproductive to try to review the various strategies
which emerged for handling different tasJ^aj instead one or two theoretical
issues will be discussed.
Among the pre actions arising from Olson's (1970) model was the suggestion
that utterances do not exhaust the potential features of the perceived
referent, but specify it sufficiently to enable the listener to differentiate
the intended referent from the alternatives. The implication of this for
the tasks used is that the message should decrease as the number of
alternatives available decreases, since the number of features needed to
differentiate one block from the others will lessen. It was an analysis of
the strategies used by speakers in an early study (Pilot Study - 2)
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which first showed how in fact young children operated in these terms.
In brief, the numbex* of features reported did not decrease as a function
of pool 3ize. An 'ideal1 strategy for speakers was constructed based on
the minimum amount of information needed to differentiate target items
from the remainder as the size of the array decreased. Summarising a
number of studies, the findings were as follows:
1. Critical or changing attributes did not reduce along with number of
alternatives, i.e. children were not 'ideal' speakers.
2. Number of messages, i.e. discrete utterances about any one referent,
did reduce as the array tiadnished. This suggests that children learn to
say what they want to say in a shorter time.
3. It follows from the above that speakers '■will become more efficient from
the listeners' point of view by including the information in one or two
messages instead of three or four.
4. An exploratory study with adults, carried out by the author but not
included here, showed that critical attributes reported did not reduce
along with number of alternatives.
5. Unchanging, or totally redundant, features did not appear in adult's
messages. Those children who included such features tended to be
consistent and reported them in every descid.ption.
6. All children reported critical features first in messages (see sections
3 and 5 below).
These findings broadly support those of Ford (reported in Olson, 1972).
He too found that message length remained constant though the number of
features needed varied. Neither Ford nor Preedle (1972), working with
adults, had number of alternatives (and therefore critical features)
reducing across trials. In their studies they were either increasing or
randomised. Foard found a tendency for number of critical attributes
to increase,but not to match the ideal strategy for four year olds, as
number of critical features required increased from one to three. But
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in a presentation randomly varying the number of features needed,
message length was constant.
There is a possible danger of confusing en ideal message with an
efficient one. Since work with adults shows that a constant message
length is maintained, it suggests that it is more efficient, unless words
are at a premium (as they are in the well-known example of the telegram
•writer), to repeat all the changing features on each occasion than pick
out only the necessary ones. The difference between adults and, at least
some children is that the adults restrict themselves to changing features.
There would presumably come a point, for adults, whore the number of
critical features was such that the speaker would find it more efficient
to restrict the size of the message, Freedle*s (1972) findings suggest
that this is what happens, but Preedle was investigating written
communication, where it could be argued the coding operation and the
demands on economy were different.
So, although children are not functioning in accord with Olson's
model,they do approach it. Changing features tend to be reported first,
irrelevant information drops away for the older and more able children and
in some tasks (Talking Doll - 1) is not included at all.
Further support for the Olson model comes from the persistent strategy
to include features, but only certain features, which were not present.
In the Houses task (Chapter 4) it was noticeable that houses with no smoke
coming from them were described as having no smoke. Although a
relatively minor finding, it is of interest because it was not clear
if young children would subscribe to Olson's postulate of specifying the
intended referent in relation to the perceived alternatives. It was
unlikely thay they would have referred to no siaoke on some houses, if there
had not been smoke coming from other houses. They might, for instance,
have talked about houses with no curtains but did not, presumably because
there were no houses with curtains. This general finding held for other
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task situations where there was a feature that appeared on only none of
the items. An. assumption of information theory is that decisions
involve binary choices - a thing is either square or not 3quare, big or
not big, with a hole in it or without a hole in it. It may be that
processing information in this way is present from an early age (see
Simon,1$72).
It has been argued by Flavell et al. (1963) that pre-school children
are poor at communication because they fail to take account of the other's
role attributes. The findings reported here suggest a speaker can perform
well if it is made clear to him when a message is inadequate. It is
this at which listeners are poor. If the listener indicated \ihen he was
unable to make a choice, as did the ideal listener and the talking doll,
the speaker was able to modify his description and reasonably satisfactory
communication was possible. Vihy then does the child listener not fulfil
this function? It could be said that he fails to perceive the speaker's
role attributes, but a more helpful way of looking at it may be to Say
that he fails to see he is a causal link in the communicating chain.
Listeners are just as vital a3 speakers to communication - without both
there would not be any - but young children as listeners tend to he passive.
Ways were found to involve them more, end these are referred to in other
sections, but it is argued that because verbal communication is a more
abstract process for the listener, than the speaker, he is les3 successful.
'The speaker has the object in front of him as he describes it - reality is
assisting him as he carries out hi3 function. But the listener has to
decode abstract input and relate it to reality. There are situations, of
course, where there i3 no concrete reality at all to aid the listener, such
as the stories which Piaget asked children to recount to each other, and
not surprisingly these represent the most difficult tasks of all for
children, even as old as 7* In line with this was the common listeners'
stratesv of selecting objects, in the talking doll studies, based on the
•given* attribute,and then acting as if that message was sufficient to
enable then to select a block. It is argued that what the listener is
doing is giving himself an active role in the task. At the time it was
mentioned that the listener's strategy seemed to be to get the speaker's
block to match their own, This would be described by Piaget as egocentrism,
but that obscures what is seen as the critical factor in c:omnia>ication
breakdown, since a more specific factor than egocentrisn on the part of
p. rticipants seems to have been isolated, (See section 4 for further
discussion on this issue.)
5• A breakdown of the constituent 3kills involved in communication,
The rather ambitious aim of Chapter 5 was an investigation of some of
the skills thought to be involved in communication, following an analysis of
the previous findings. The well-known difficulty of distinguishing
competence and performance was raised by this and also the problem of using
language (in instructions) to investigate language use. It was considered
useful to carry out these investigations within the framework of the
existing research.
It is evident that perception of the features that differentiate one
object from another is a necessary ability for participants in these
communication tasks. As a test of this, subjects were asked to make paired
Comparisons of similar, but for the most part not identical, pictures. The
same material was subsequently used in a communication task where the
child was paired with on adult speaker providing minimal, but adequate,
information. This was not primarily a follow-up of the earlier task, but it
did allow one to see if the type of errors made in the first task were
those that also gave rise to failure in the communication task. In the event
there were relatively few errors in the ideal speaker task. The effect of
the communication situation seemed to be'to concentrate the mind \randerfully',
in Johnson's phrase, but in this case the cause was not the thought of
imminent death but the minimally adequate messages of the speaker. It
350
seams that differentiating descriptions assist the discrimination task
considerably. Nevertheless when errors do occur they are of the same type
that characterised the earlier study.
If we might return, to that study for a moment, the indications were
that discrimination of differences ./ould not "be a major cause of
communication difficulty but might be critical for some subjects, dialysis
of individual performances revealed some interesting strategies being
followed. A hypothesis was put forward that for many children the features
might be seen as having weightings, depending on their salience for
individual subjects. These weightings determined the strength of the
evidence that was considered in reaching a judgement. Changing features
were found to carry most weight, but some were found to be 'heavier' than
others. For some children the force of a distinctive colour change obscured
more subtle differences of size and presence or absence of a feature. It
was argued that the use of a motor device for signalling same/not-same
allowed the child to indicate explicitly when he could not make up his uind
about the evidence. Hence both buttons were pressed and same and not-same
judgements resulted. Donaldson and ./ales (1570) and Clark(1973) have
discussed such issues in the acquisition of relational terras like 'same'
and 'different' and it may be that the use of a non-verbal device might assist
research in this urea.
A variation on the above theme was the strategy adopted by at least
three subjects, namely, comparing pictures independently against a
standard of comparison set up by themselves, so that one of a pair might be
judged sane and the other not-saae. Essentially these children had
understood, in a slightly distorted fashion, the comparative meaning implicit
in the words same and different. The acquisition of these terms is
fascinating precisely because the relation between the 'word and the context,
which, it has been argued, is critical for meaning, is such a oomplex one.
A 'same' cannot be simply pointed to, and examples of situations which
351
do correspondto our undoratand ing of these terras are raany ;md varied.
A third incidental finding was the strategy of using the absence of
a critical feature as a criterion for sameness. Teddy bears were the
sane because they did not have sticks (even though they might have
different siae hats). Again the absent feature was determined by the
context as a whole. Teddies were never judged not the same because they
did not have gloves,because no teddies possessed gloves! This is further
support for contextual theories of meaning (e.g. Macnamara, 1972, Olson, 1970).
The finding from the second experiment in this series, that children
could not conserve identity, at least when withdrawn items from series
wore shown not to match, represented a possible reason for the number of
attributes, included in messages,not reducing a3 a function of the number
of available alternatives. The account already offered, concerning the
encoding effort involved in restricting messages to differentiating features,
is generally preferred. This is not to say that an appreciation of
equivalence is not involved in successful communication since such a
recognition must aid the efficiency of the process. It does not scam to
have been considered, however, as a variable by other workers in the area.
There is a study that has some relevance to this experiment and that is
the one by Plavell et al. on role-taking reported in Chapter 1. It is
not altogether clear to what extent role taking is critical in the
conservation of equivalence experiment. As reported in Chapter 5, Study II,
most of the children seemed to be able to make the sort of perceptual
inference necessary to the understanding that the view of another may not
be the sane as one's own. But the sort of manipulations which went on in
Study II were very much more complex than those involved in Flavell's
task and had more in common with a conservation of number experiment. This
•was particularly because of the mismatch procedure and the presence of
screens. lore research is needed on this topic, particularly since a
consequence of failure to recognise the constant equivalence of
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speaker and listener's arrays is that the perceived alternatives -which
are thought to affect message construction (Olson, 1970) are not perceived.
According to Piaget the egocentric pre-school child is not atle to
account of another. It follows that a listener replying to a speaker,
*1 don't know which one you mean - can you help me some more?* would not
draw a modified or changed description from the speaker. A listener who
made precisely the above request was provided to test this aspect of the
egocentric hypothesis. The findings have already been reported above and
compared with a study on speakers' modification behaviour by Krauss and
Glucksberg. It will be recalled that nearly three-quarters of the children
who gave initial inadequate descriptions were able to modify them after
feedback. The quarter who were only able to respond to direct questions
of the form 'Is it x or y?' are of interest since they throw light on the
sort of cognitive factors underlying the inability to modify. (Details can
be found in Study III, Chapter 5)• The use of the term egocentrism to
describe this syndrome is thus potentially counterproductive for it can
serve to direct attention away from the specific factors which,in fact,make
up the behaviour. Further consideration of the egocentrism issue will be
found in section 4.
The main findings from the study which paired children with an ideal
speaker (Study IV) were reviewed in the previous sections. The prevailing
impression given and reported was the competence of the children in decoding
the minimally adequate messages, checking off in a systematic manner the
transmitted attributes against the array in front of them. But possibly
more informative were the factors which appeared to give rise to errors, since
these might add more to a long berm aim of understanding communication
development. These factors included premature selection of an item before the
message was complete or had been fully processed; failure to realise the
dependent relationship between speaker's message and listener's choice
which, it was hypothesised, accounted for perseveration; difficulty in
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perceiving perceptual differences and inability to cope with the abstract
nature of the instructions. Those factors have been discussed, elsewhere,
but ma additional point of interest is attached to the last finding.
The importance of action for the listener was emphasised in a previous
section. Piaget has distinguished between the acted and verbal case and
attempts were made to act in accordance with this distinction. Examples
include the use of concrete material, encouraging finger pointing at the
selected card and use of non-verbal signalling devices. In Study IV it
was found that some children were helped when the speaker indicated
selection of a card by holding it up, blank side to the listener, end said
'I've picked this one - I'll tell you about it - see if you can find the
same one among your ictures.' The success of this procedure indicates
there is still room for a greater degree of action and concreteness in the
administration of these tasks. (Sheldon ihite, 19&9, provides a good
discussion of this issue).
4. The nature of egocentrism.
Throughout this series of studies,findings opposing the idea that the
young child is like Humpty Dumpty, taking no account of others in his
verbal behaviour, have been reported. It has been made clear that the
egocentric hypothesis must be rejected and, since the issue has been
discussed at length already (Chapters 5* 6» and 7)» some general
observations will bo offered in conclusion.
Some of the writings on egocentrism (e.g. Flavell et al., 1968) suggest
that the young child is not able to adapt to the needs of others; this is
reflected by an inability to modify behaviour when it would be appropriate
to do so. But it may be that the degree of inflexibility that this
suggests is suffered by the ypung child is exaggerated. Is there a
distinction between the child who tries to persuade hi3 mother to let him
stay up later then usual and the speaker who wants to get the listener to
select a particular object? There are of course many differences, the
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most important of which is the dominating measure of self interest in
the former behaviour. J3ut there also seems to be a substantial common
element. The child may U3e very subtle ploys to influence Ms mother,
wMeh Mil require being very alert to the smallest changes in her
behaviour, including 3uch communication factors as tone of voice, facial
expression as well as speech content.
Bell (1968) has indicated that the developmental history of this sort
of behaviour starts very early. He has looked at the use the infant
makes of his limited repertoire, crying, smiling, etc., to affect his
mother's behaviour. Those talcing an etiological approach (e.g. Richards,
in press) have shown what a complex two-way process is the
interaction between mother and child, each influencing the other. So
communication begins at an early age. Initially, 'purposive* communication
is aimed at alleviating physical needs «• hunger, warmth, elimination, etc.
Later it comes to take on more sophisticated targets such as the
preference for one food rather than another. Very often the method of
achieving these goals is to vise a stereotype - a motor routine - that has
been found to work in the past, varying from a wheedling tone, or
expression, to a temper tantrum. When such means fail some variation may be
introduced, and when language is acquired the cltild's armoury is much
strengthened. As long as the child is able to try out a variation, can it
be argued that he is limited by ogocentrism?
It may be protested that such behaviour, motivated entirely by self-
interest, is precisely what egocentrism refers to. Yet even the cMld
'trying to get Ms own way* discovers that such a goal is facilitated by
taking account of the other's attributes «• by -using one strategy rather
than another. This makes one question the crippling effect that is implied
by Piaget's use of the term (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969). In trying to
relate their experimental findings to 'real life* situations Flavell et al.
(1963) say that the young child manages because he will "set Ms enter-
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prises in rough correspondence with his capabilities, to make what he tries
to do accord reasonably well with what he can do." And "the communicative
tasks he poses for himself are typically much simpler than those which his
elders undertake." (p. 216). 'Phis is undoubtedly true, but the critical
question is, when does a child start to modify his behaviour in order to
take account of another's perspective? Once there is evidence of this sort
of response, then egocentrism is breaking down. For, it is argued,
egocentriam can probably never be viewed as an absolute restriction on human
development. Statements which suggest that egocentrism characterises humans
at a certain age are therefore misleading. Egocentrism is more likely
something we allpossess permanently, to varying degrees and. depending on
1
situations. The reason it has taken on importance in the three to six year
age range is probably that it is particularly easy to demonstrate at that
age. Ikind (1967) has indicated the influence of ogocontrisra in adolescence
and Looft (1972) has suggested that it is manifested throughout the life span
and increases in later life.
The question shieh remains is do we need the term egocentrism? The
usefulness of any hypothetical construct is not only its explanatory power
but its faculty in bringing together pieces of behaviour which at first soem
unrelated. It has already been argued that the explanatory power of the
concept is limited. It is too global and diffuse an idea to be of much
1. Observing the child, in these communication tasks it has sometimes seemed
as if the cognitive apparatus has been too fully engaged handling an
encoding problem to have any spare capacity for considering how another
may view the same situation. It is like an inability to detach oneself -
an attentional problem in other words. If our own minds are pre-occupied
with something, it becomes difficult to take account of other things,
persons, ideas etc, Piaget is probably partly right when he says that
social interaction affects^tehaviour, since one learns there are
sanctions to be suffered for not talcing account of others.
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service at our present state of knowledge. Indeed, until more research
is conducted we will not even be in a position to make use of the terra.
It is an explanatory concept with very few hard facts to explain. For
the time being at least the aims should be sore modest, namely, to reveal
the specific perceptual (which includes contextual, extra-linguistic
factors), cognitive, (which includes rule-following behaviour), and language
influences at work in the various social situations in which a young child
finds himself.
As an umbrella term bringing together pieces of previously unrelated
theory and findings, egocentrisra has servod a useful purpose. Some social
and personality psychologists have been reinterpreting conformity behaviour
in this light (e.g. Feffer, 1970, '/einheimer, 1972) and Looft (1972), as
well as seeing egocentrism as a life-span phenomenon, has also indicated
that some of the psychoanalytic concepts can be viewed within the same
framework. While applauding attempts to rationalize psychology a danger
follows from what ha3 been said previously, that is, that egocentriam has not,
as yet, the status of an explanatory concept in developmental psychology.
Nevertheless, since the study of human behaviour has always marched on many
fronts, some of which, logically, do not belong in the sane army, more might
be lost than gained by totally dispensing rath the terra at this stage.
5. The role of extra-linguistic factors.
The extra-linguistic factors which will be discussed are those which
have particularly influenced communication behaviour in the tasks used. We
will be mainly concerned,therefore, with the way properties of the material
used have affected attention and speech production and comprehension.
It is well known that) not only are there certain attentional strategies
used by children>but also that some properties of objects and situations
are more salient to children than others, and that both affect the child's
transactions with the environment. Those phenomena have been discussed
by various writers operating in slightly different theoretical frameworks.
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Piaget, for instance, refers to ccntratiou, the gostaltists to field
effects, Pitkin to field dependency, itdle /hite (1969) cad kaccoby (1%9)
have preferred an attentional approach. A number of postulates have
emerged, such as *younger children focus on whatever level of the stimulus
is most strongly organised' (paraphrasing Maccoby), and "the amount of
irrelevant information that can be tolerated without affecting the
response increases (with age)*' (lohlwill, 1$62). In discussing stimulus
selection, aocoby says that it is the effect of unwanted material on
perception of wanted material that is the heart of the problem, and, if
not the heart of the problem, this would also seem to be an important
factor in successful communication.
It was seen that certain features of material did tend to 'capture*
the attention of children — the coat3 of the teddy beard, the smoke on the
houses, the cross and the hole 011 the blocks - and in many cases tills
was productive, for such features were critical for discriminating the
items. But there were cases whore they were too powerful, so that salient
differences would he reported, like coat colour, but more subtle ones like
the presence of a stick would be missed. When it came to attributes
which could only he perceived by comparing one block with another, such as
siso, and which required the child to stand back, as it were, the likelihood
of it capturing attention and so being reported was much loss. When the
material could only be usefully discriminated by employing abstract terms
which referred to spatial relations, the difficulties were considerable.
Some children consistently used very detailed descriptions which have been
called analytic. They were quite unhelpful since they corresponded to no
level of perception that was recognisable by listeners. It is difficult to
know what level of the stimulus was most highly organised for these
children. They appeared to represent an extreme degree of field dependence.
The particular concern in this research has been where contextual
factors have specifically affected language production or comprehension.
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Clark (1973) and f'acnamara (1972) have pointed out how powerful ouch
influences are for young children and some instances emerged in these
studies, ' ost attention has keen paid to the effect material properties
have on descriptions, in these studies, that is,on the "behaviour of the
speaker. An example was the division found "between colour conscious and
component conscious children in the houses experiment. But there: are
good reasons to think that ouch effects play an even greater part for the
child interpreting the response - the listener. The young listener in these
communication tasks was often unclear about the message ho herd, .vben in
doubt the sensible course is to use the concrete situation to help in
giving meaning to the utterance. But which will be more influential, the
situation or the verbal message? There is no straightforward answer to this.
It will depend on the age of the child, the content of the message, the
clarity of the message, the 'power* of the situation for that child, end a
number of other factors. Put since the young child, as we have seen, does
not tend to seek an expansion of an utterance, except in special situations
like that with the talking doll, the relation between the utterance rod the
situation obtaining will often be crucial.
A message like 'It's one with a red cross on it', usually caused a
child to select an object answering to this description, but since such a
massage was insufficient to determine the chosen item from others like it
an error could easily result. But, leaving aside inappropriate descriptions,
there is J.so the possibility# for the young child especially, that the
attention capturing properties of the material will bo 30 great that the
listeners choice will be determined by that, rather than by the utterance.
This problem will exist for older children, as well, when the language is
more abstract. Some examples of this were given in the concluding section
to Chapter 6. What seems to happen is that when a child is uncertain about
an utterance, he reformulates the message in a way he can understand,
using the properties of the situation to aid him. This is what gJ.ves
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rise to the results of Clark (1973)» when young children wore using non-
linguistic strategies end/or partial semantic knowledge to interpret
prepositions like 'in*, 'on*, end •under'.
Although total reliance on context, to the exclusion of language, is
usually unadaptive, a consideration of context is, of course, essential
for both speaker and listener. It is because he is tied too closely to
the context that the child cannot always make use of it in the manner
specified by Olson. Nevertheless we have seen that pre-school children
frequently make use of context to assist theia in communication, A nice
example was seen in the first pilot study, when the description 'buffalo'
applied to a crocodile was perfectly adequate to discriminate it for the
listener, because among the perceived alternatives there was nothing that
resembled a buffalo more than the crocodile. The relation between the
effect of context on language in Olson* s sense, and the effect of the
saliency of features on attention and t herefore language is not clear.
Presumably the effects of saliency are more powerful for the younger child,
but Donaldson and McGarrigle (in press) have argued that context, in the
form of *local rules1 may play a part up to middle childhood. As distinct
from this effect, which causes children to structure or interpret language
in a certain way, Olson's point about the context as a whole affecting the
construction of messages is a feature which affects all comraunication,
6, A technique for investigating thinking in the young child.
Russian psychologists in particular (e.g. Vygotsky, 1962, Luria, 1959)
have argued that language increasingly plays a directive role in thinking.
As pointed out in the Introduction, it appears initially (Vygotsky, 1962) as
egocentric speech which is the overt precursor of inner speech which, it
i3 argued, becomes a powerful mediator of symbolic processes. If egocentric
speech is a feature of young children's language, it was thought it might
appear in these tasks. Instances which night qualify as egocentric speech
were relatively few, however. This may have boun because the tasks did
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not encourage auch behaviour, unci in this context it is of interest that
the occasion on which Janet voiced her 'cognitive rule' (Pilot Study II)
- 'colour first' - while describing a picture of a car, she had been
interrupted by her partner just as she had been about to begin her message.
Vygotsky has suggested that task interruption is a circumstance which
precipitates egocentric speech. On the other occasions on which egocentric
speech seemed to be present9the behaviour was a3 Vygotsky has described it
(see p. 14- of this volume). The child seemed to be using language to
organise his perception of the object in question.
Apart from the scattered references to egocentric speech to be found
in this work, a final 3tudy sought to use the communication situation to
gain some insight into conceptual thinking. The findings have been
presented in Chapter 7« In a sentence they showed that as a technique it
was useful because it showed what aspects of the problem the child
considered important, but as a method of instruction it3 success was governed
to some extent by the materials used. /hen the materials lent themselves
to the task, as in the first seriation experiment - stacking blocks on a
peg, the level of success was high. In the second experiment matex-ial
properties did not assist ordering behaviour and difficulties were presented
by speakers having to specify 3patial position,or airaction of placing,as
well as temporal order,
Olson (1970, 1972) has pointed out that in the communication sense
language is not an aid to the speaker, but to the listener. Its consequence
is to alter the way in which the listener perceives that context. In
extreme cases he might even see a crocodile as a buffalo. It is only later,
when the child is able to use sentences as propositions, that language can
be said to restructure the perceptions of the speaker himself (Olson, 1972,
p. 162).
Since it is unlikely that these children would be using language in
the proposition;),! sense, the communication situation as a method for
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instructing others is an interesting possibility. Since it can work
with children between three and five, there is no reason why it should
not be a useful educational facility at a later age. This is not to
suggest that intellectual abilities tire necessarily improved using such
a technique. Its application may be better directed tovtards personality
and social behaviour in which a child might be encouraged to become,
say, less withdrawn, less dominating, more co-operative or whatever.
The illustration given in Appendix G shows that the listener for the
moot part has difficulty in making sense of the coramuiication. This is
partly because he cannot subordinate his desires to those of his instructor,
but also because the ta3k is very demanding for someone not yet four years
old. The significant point is that a degree of success is still achieved.
Some suggestions for future studies in this area.
1. An obvious requirement is a follow-up of the basic type of communication
task (Chapter 4) with a large sample.
2. A more active procedure might be employed, particularly with a view to
engaging the active involvement of the listener. If, for instance, the
material used was blocks with pictures on, the reverse side might be in
view of the listener. This would mean that when the speaker selected a
block, by physically pulling one forward, the listener would realise that
a real event - the description of a concrete object - was taking place.
3. The verbal nature of communication might be encouraged by the use of
telephones. It would not be necessary for the children actually to
communicate by real telephones but to have toy ones in front of them
which they would use during the game. Observation of children in a
nursery play situation indicates that having pretend telephone conversations
is a popular activity.
poor
4. It was proposed that a cause of/communication was the participants'
failure to appreciate the dependent relationship involved. This scorned
+.n "ho •nflr+.ipiiioT'iv +.mio nf 14 R+.nners. In the tasks used thus far, a
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recognition of the equivalence of arrays over time seems necessary for
such a realisation of causal dependence. The proposals in (2) and (3)
above may go 3ome way to acliieve tliis recognition. But it may be that
the dependent relationship can be built into the task itself. The goal
needs to be made explicit for the participants and it must also be evident
that the goal can be achieved only if the children co-operate. The task
would be such that cliild A and Ohild B each have a piece of information which
together would represent a solution, A possible illustration would be if a
large picture depicting a sequential type of event was cut in half so that
each child had half the 'solution' - the goal could only be reached if they
communicated. A third party might be used who would provide feedback,
possibly illustrating the story as it was recounted, so that they could
at all times see the goal to which they were working. If the goal was
manifestly a rewarding one it might further encourage the children. Such
a task would not have a speaker and listener in the sense of other tasks
described here.
5. The talking doll was seen as a particularly effective partner and it may
be productive to use this situation in a more flexible manner, e.g, in telling
stories - but more simplified than the ones used by Piaget (1926). The
talking doll might also represent a valuable remedial instrument for
children vdth language difficulties. Unfortunately the technique as presently
devised is not portable and somewhat expensive.
6. The indices of communication used were considered adequate for the
tasks employed. But other approaches could be used, for example modifications
of content analyses used by Jarvis and Fry with older children (see Flavell
et al«, 1968).
7. Communication need not be restricted to two persons. It would be of
interest to compare the effectiveness of a speaker with more than one listener.
Would it lead to more feedback and therefore be more productive, or would
unadaptive chaos result? With older children communication networks on
the lines developed by Bales (1950) might be used.
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SPEAKER (LEE (IS) )
Action Running Sequence




5! C T c
T* c T T T c
H c T H h F* H T C
P c T H P H* H 0? C
CP c T H P CP CP H T C CP
CH c T H P CP CH CH H T C CP CH
- c T H P CP CH P H T C CP CH P
C c
T c T c
CP
C c
T c T t C 3?
H c T H h C T H
P c T H P •
pw F c T H P
CP c T H F CP cp c T H P CP
CH c T H P CP CII ch c i1 n P CP CH
Paul (N) Lee (E)
C*
c c
T c T t c T
CH c T CH -
P c T CJi P h c T II
JJx c T CH H * c T H
Si H C fP CH • c T H
H*
Trial Unit Action Running Sequence Action Running sequence
V 1 c
2 c* C
3 T C T t C T
4 CH C T CH h C T II
5 CP C T CH CP f c T H F
6 CP cp ch C THPCP CH
7 -
Lee Paul
VI 1 C <•»
2 C* -
3 c* c
4 T C T t C T
5 H C T H H* c T
6 F CP CH C T H F CP CH -
VII 1 C C
2 T C T T c T
3 H C T H h c T H
4 F C T H F f c T II F
5 CP C T H F CP op c THPCP
6 CH C T II F CP CH ch c T II F CP CII
Reverse Order
VIII 1 CH CH
2 CP CH CP op CH CP
3 F CH CP F f CH CP F
4 H CH CP F H h CH CP F H
5 T CH CP F H T t CH CP F II T
6 C CH CP F II T C c CH CP F H T C
KEY
Unit => piece of behaviour by either or both speakers which results mn a
transformation of array e.g. adding of stick, removal of stick,
transposing of stick, etc.
Cat (C), Train (T), iiouae (H), Fish (F), Cup (CP), Chair (CH)
sticks with abbreviations in order of descending height.
C = Subject articulates and erects stick (cat)
c = Subject erects stick, no articulation
C*= Subject .'articulates stick, not erected or already erected (repetition)
(C)=8peaker erects stick in response to listener's message
«* =No material action by subject.
1,2,3»etc. = Figures represent order in which units carried out.
APPENDIX G
Performance record of one pair in sertation task. Experiment 'Two,
transcribed from videotape.
Communieati(in/Seriation - 2(sticks) Lee (Ibcperienced) - Paul (Naive)
(27.6.72)
(Experienced subject enters first mid is reminded of material which she
has seen during a preliminary' session the previous day/)
Es Lets mix all (yours) up because I don't want him to see how its done.
(E randomly mixes her sticks).
L: Will you do it how Paul's got his? /asking if her array should correspond
to Paul
E: It doesn't matter.
L: My trouser suit's wet. Playing in the water ...
(Has a good look round the room while E is getting P. Tries to peep
through window of cubicle).
Paul enters
C J
Es You've got to stand the sticks up in the way Lee tells you.
TRIAL 1
L: You put the cat up.
Ps (sitting doing nothing, looks across at Lee) Yes.
Es You do the same tiling Paul. Do what Lee tells you.
Ls Er .. train (stands it in line)
Ps (Still getting cat up - at first on top of another stiok that is
horizontal)
Es (To Paul) Did you hear Lee?
Ps Yeah (not doing anything)
Es /hat did she say next?
Ls Train
(put3 train on left of cat)
L: Then the house (puts it in line).
Ps (picks up house and puts it beside train) I haven't got ray fish up.
Ls Then the fish (puts it in line)
P: The house (referring to that vshich he has just completed).
L: Cup (putting it in line),
P: Cup (picks it up and puts it in line having missed out fish)
L: And then the chair (finishes seriating)
Ps Chair (stands it in line. Waits for another message) Where's that, there?
Es Have you got all yours up,Paul?
P: I've not got the fish up (picks it up and puts it on end).
Ls (chuckles)
Es Can you help him, Lee?
Ls The cat, the train, then the house, then the fish, then the cup, then
the chair.
P: (hand on fish) Mine are all up.
E: (noticing Paul has iris pictures obscured from himself, tunas them round.
Paul still fingers fish and at one point seems to think about putting it
somewhere else).
P: I can "build a castle.
(E removes screens)
E: Are they just the same?
Ls They're ju3t about, but they aren't quite.
T.Rli*-L 2
Es Don't go too fast Lee, because Paul hasn't done this before.
Ls I done it yesterday.
Es Sight Paul - listen carefully to Lee.
Ls You put the cat up (stands it up and looks across to Paul, waiting).
Ps(Stands cat up)
Ls Arid then the train (puts train up).
Ps Hell, I want (?) to put that (standing cat up)1
E: Are you listening to Lee?
Ps Veil I'm goin' (don't think?) put the cup up.
E: No it wasn't the cup. Lets start again /~ J
TRIAL 3
E; You've got to listen to Lee and do just what she tells you.
Li You put the cat up (standing it up)
Pi (stands his cat up in the middle of the 3ticks)»
Es Put it over there so you've got more room.
L: Then the train (having put it up. Looks across at Paul to see if he's
readj)
Pi (puts train up)
L: Then the house (puts it in line)
Pi (puts it in line)
Li (patiently waiting for P to finish) Then the fish (pronounces it fush.
Puts it in line)
Pi What? (hasn't understood word)
L» ^sh
Pt Fish (puts it in line)
Li Then the cup (puts it in line)
Pi (puts cup in line)




P: Put the cat up (no movement himself)
Ei You can do it as well
Ps (stands cat up as does Lee) Put the train up (puts it in line)
Li (has train ready in hand. Smiles slightly when P gives instruction and
puts the train up
Pt Put the chair up (now apparent that he is erecting them in the order
they are on the table)
Lj (ignores his message and picks up house)
Pi Put the fish up (stands it in line)
Li (after hesitating, decides to put house next to train)
Ps Put the ... oh, getting mixed up (appears to notice that the order is
incorrect when he picks up the house. Removes fish and stands houso in
front of chair)
Ei fell Lee if you change it
P: (puts house right at the other end of the line next to cat)
L: (chuckles, noticing his strategy - or perhaps the look of concern on
his face)
Ps House up
Es Where are you putting the house? - tell Lee
Ls I've got my (?) I've only got three down.
Pi (looking confused - a 3tick in each hand - knocks over one of the line)
E: Do you want to start again, Paul* We'll start again Lee.
TBIAL 5
L3 (?) from the wee one to the big one?
E: No, we'll do that afterwards
Pi (puts cat up)
Es fell Lee as you do it
Ps Put the oat up —— (?)
Ls (puts cat up)
P: Put the train up (stands it next to cat)
L: (puts train in line)
Ps Put the ... (picks up choir)
Ls (already has houso in hand and st;mds it next to train)
Ps ... chair up (stands it next to train) Put the cup up (puts it next
to choir)
Lj (chuckles and looks at £ as if the two of them recognise Paul's
inadequacies) I'm putting it right (puts fish in lino and carries on
adding the remainder of the sticks and moves them all up right beside
the screen.)
P: Wait (picks up cup and hesitates with cup in hand Takes it to other end
of line, then "brings it back to stand beside chair) Wait ... wait Lee
(momentarily puts it on top of chair - trying to arrive at correct
height?)
Ls Hmm (laughs) Done it already. Hra. Done it already.
El Lets 3ee if Paul can tell you how to do it as well
Ps (still undecided what to do with cup. Eventually discards it and
picks up chair)
Ls I've done It already (picks up all blocks, i.e. moves them back from
against screen)
P: (this time Lee's words penetrate and he looks up insuurprise and
dismay??)
Es Well, you finish yours Paul, Carry on telling us
Ls See what I've done.
P: You put the chair up (some way left of train) You put the cup up
(between chair and train and then moves chair closer to the others)
Ls I got them up, though (?)
P: (talking to himself and pushing sticks together) Got the chair up
lilt the fish up (looks across at Lee. Appears slightly disconcerted,
perhaps because she doesn't appear to be doing anything except grin at
him. Puts fish next to chair, then takes it away and tries house
Instead. Doesn't like house there and puts it on top of train)
Ls You don't load them on top of each other
P: (puts house to end of line again, next to chair)
E: See if you can help Paul, Lee - you tell him if he's got them right
Ls How can I see mth the screen up? /Good question}/
Es ./oil you can ask him if he's got the same as you
P» (still struggling away • holds up house and fish) //hat about these
two? (can't fit them into the pattern)
E: (to L) Tell him how you've got yours
L: I've got the cat, the train, the house, the fish, the cup and the
chair (said quickly)
E: Hot too fast, because Paul wants to get it right
TRIAL 6
Ls The cat ...
Ps I've got these sort (passing hand over his blocks)
L: (repeating louder) The cat •••
E: You see if you can get the same as Lee, Paul,
Ls The cat, right?
Ps (puts his hand on cat)
L: Then the train
Ps (Points at his train)
Ls Then the hp-use
Ps Yeah ... (touches cup) 'The house isn't up (picks up house from table)
Es Listen to Lee, do what she says
L: fell, its the house, then the fish, then the cup, then the chair
Ps (looks puszled, plAying around vrith house and fish■ Turn3 to E) I
heard her but ...
Es Can you get them in then?
Ps (proceeds to try and fit house and fish with no great success)
Ls Do you know what the people have been uoing at our stairs?
Et No
L: They've been painting and they're tailing the toocid.es (?) away
Es Oh
L: (says something indistinct - may have been referring to P's lack of
success)
P: (still struggling) I'm getting than wrong
Es Perhaps Lee will tell you once again
C J
TRIAL 7
Ls Now its the oat
Ps (cat still standing) The cat's up
Lj And then the train
Ps (searches for train, twice picking up small and incorrect sticks. The
train picture is not facing up ;jfid E turns it over) There's the
train (puts it next to cat)
L: Then the house
Pi (puts house in line)
Ls Then the fish
Pi (correctly places fish)
L: Then the cup (Lee very patient, going slowly)
Pi (puts cup in line)
Li Then the chair
Pi (puts chair up - takes a long time to get sticks standing to his
satisfaction)
(E removes screens)
Es ilre they the same?
Li Yes
Es Yes, they are, Paul's goes round the comer a hit, doesn't it?
Ls Mine goes straight.
Es dell, we'll do it once more
Li Upside dovm (referring to wee to big, with blocks, where in a sense
they were placed upside down from the original order)
(E gives instructions for reverse order)
YhlAL 8
Ls You put the wee one up
P: The chair (Lee echoes his words. Both stand chair up)
Li And then the cup (puts it beside chair)
Ps (finds cup and stands it up where it is, a long way from chair)
E: We're going to build it out again Paul, Put the cup up properly
(P moves it next to chair)
Li Then the fish (given plenty of time to decide on next choice while
Paul is getting sorted out)
P: (picks up fish and first goes to put it beside chair, and then pushes
away the other sticks to make room "beside cup)
Li He's getting mixed up 'cos I put the cat first before, eh?
E: No, Paul's doing very well, I think
Li And then the house (both stand it in line) Now the train (stands it
in line)
Pi (puts train in line)
L: Have you got the train up?
Pi I've put it up
Lt And the cat (completes line)
Pi(Adds cat to lino)
Bath correct. Lee (right to left) Paul (left to right)
(E removes screens)
E: Yes, they're the same. That's very good, Paul.
Pi (looks at E and smiles)
Li I've done that before, yesterday
E: Yes but Paul hadn't. He did very well, didn't he
Li Aha
P: (as he's leaving) Is (Jhu-Chu there, (pointing at cubicle)
